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An Analysis of Britain’s Influence in the Deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana Bilateral Relations, 2000-2013

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Submitted to Midlands State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Master of Science in International Affairs Degree

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2015
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all material in this dissertation submitted to Midlands State University for the purposes of attaining a Master of Science in International Affairs Degree is my own work. Any material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and acknowledged as such.

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Date
APPROVAL FORM

The undersigned certify that they have read and recommended to the Midlands State University for acceptance a dissertation entitled, An Analysis of Britain’s influence in the Deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana Bilateral Relations, 2000-2013, submitted by Fungayi Promote Maraire (R11225w) in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Science in International Affairs Degree.

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Dr Sadiki Maeresera

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Prof Percyslage Chigora
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my parents for the support and encouragement they have given me to get to this stage of my academic life.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Almighty God for affording me the opportunity to further my academic career through this study. It was through His guidance and protection that I was able to make it through this difficult period.

My profound appreciation goes to my supervisor Dr Sadiki Maeresera for the advice and firm guidance provided in the completion of the study. His support proved invaluable and I salute him for his patience and dedication.

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I would like to thank the following people for their input and contributions towards the research: the Zimbabwean Minister of War Veterans Affairs and former Zimbabwean Ambassador to China Ambassador Cde Christopher Mutsvangwa, Professor Hasu Patel (University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political Science), Dr Heather Chingono (University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political Science), Mr Mediel Hove (University of Zimbabwe, History Department), Colonel Cosmore Kaondera (Zimbabwe Staff College, Academic Division) and the Staff at Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several others whom I could not mention by name.

To my wife Tariro and the kids Tawananyasha and Tadisa, thank you for enduring those long periods without my comfort. I am also hugely indebted to my parents for without their support none of this would have been possible.
ABSTRACT

The study analyses the deteriorating bilateral relations between the two Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) member states of Zimbabwe and Botswana as from the year 2000 to 2013. The research aims to establish the extent of Britain’s liability in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties. Therefore, the major objectives of the study are to analyse Britain’s influence in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations as from 2000 to 2013 as well as evaluate the political, economic, military/security and social dynamics surrounding Britain’s influence in the deterioration of these relations in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period under study. In addition, the research seeks to proffer scholarly and policy recommendations on the normalisation of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. The research study adopts a qualitative methodology in both data collection and analysis. Primary data derived mainly from interviews and questionnaires is utilised extensively throughout the study and this is used in collaboration with data derived from secondary sources such as published books and journal articles. Data collected is analysed using content analysis and discourse analysis as the main analytical tools. The theoretical framework of the study is based upon the constructivist approach to international relations as propounded by Alexander Wendt. The research study establishes that, indeed bilateral relations between the two SADC states were frosty during the period under study with land policies, governance and sovereignty being some of the contested issues. Furthermore, the study notes that, while Britain could be held as partially liable for the state of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana post year 2000, the two African states were ultimately responsible for their unsound bilateral relations. The study recommends the initiation of dialogue and the strengthening of African institutions as a means of normalising and maintaining cordial bilateral ties between the two African states. Furthermore, the study notes that the resuscitation of the Zimbabwean
economy would go a long way in thawing the frosty bilateral ties between the two states. This is due to the fact that some of the contested issues such as the influx of Zimbabwean economic refugees into Botswana have their roots in the declining Zimbabwean economy.
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIPPA</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTLRP</td>
<td>Fast Track Land Reform Programme</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai</td>
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NATO                             North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU                              Organisation of African Unity
RSF                              Rhodesian Security Forces
R2P                              Responsibility to Protect
SADC                             Southern African Development Cooperation
SADCC                            Southern African Development Coordination Conference
UDI                              Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK                               United Kingdom
UN                               United Nations
USA                              United States of America
USSR                             Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZANU (PF)                        Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZDF                              Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIDERA                           Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Despite calls for the strengthening of inter-African relations by the African Union (AU) and regional groupings such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), inter-African relations have continued to deteriorate. Zimbabwe and Botswana are two such states whose bilateral relations deteriorated as from the year 2000 up to 2013. Questions have emerged as to what influenced the deterioration of the two states’ bilateral ties? Were these states’ preferences and interests shaped more by domestic or external factors?

Different sources of information seem to suggest that the once cordial relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana became frosty during the period 2000-2013. Media reports and academic studies on Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties all point towards deteriorating ties during this period (Jonas et al, 2013). The two SADC member states had a history of deep and close ties that dated back to pre-colonial times (Oitsile, 2010). These ties were based on the fact that the two landlocked SADC states are geographically tied, sharing a 500km border that is to the east of Botswana and to the west of Zimbabwe respectively.¹

Furthermore, the two states share several cultural traditions and values with some ethnic groups such as the Kalanga present on both sides of the border. Zimbabwe and Botswana share one more characteristic that has been argued to be the root cause of their strained bilateral relations during the period under study. This is the fact that both states are former British colonies. Both states were at one point in time member states of the Commonwealth, an organisation which Botswana remains a member and from which Zimbabwe has since withdrawn its membership as of December 2003 (Mudyanadzo, 2011:121).

Despite several shared characteristics, the bilateral ties of the two neighbouring states deteriorated during the period under study. It is worth noting that, the souring of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations “coincided” with the deteriorating ties between Zimbabwe and the former colonial master Britain. Prior to the souring of relations between Harare and London, the two SADC neighbours had cordial bilateral ties. Therefore, this correlation between deteriorating Harare-London bilateral relations and deteriorating Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties begs further scrutiny to establish any causal links between the two events. The question that emerges is whether the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations could have been directly influenced by the unsound relations between Harare and London.

This correlation between the two events led to increased sentiments that there is a nexus between the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations and the British onslaught on Zimbabwe as from the year 2000. The argument is that, London directly and indirectly influenced Gaborone to break rank within SADC and publicly criticise President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) [ZANU (PF)] government as part of Britain’s regime change agenda. The fact that the British policy on Zimbabwe was to totally isolate the country from the rest of the world so as to force regime change within the country validates such a hypothesis.

The argument proffered by proponents of this school of thought is that, having succeeded in convincing the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU), Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the rest of the Western world to isolate Zimbabwe through sanctions, Britain had to convince the developing world to join in her dispute with Zimbabwe. It is important to note that despite several attempts by the West to depict Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) government as authoritarian, the developing world had resolutely stood behind Mugabe.
Therefore, without support from the developing world, the British stance on Zimbabwe would have been viewed with suspicion given Britain’s history as a former colonial power. Hence, there was need to allay these suspicions and legitimise the British policy through courting some developing states especially SADC states to the British corner. In order for the British plans to gain legitimacy, other developing states should have been seen to be criticising Mugabe just as much as Britain and the Western world were.

The need for more support from the developing world prompted Britain to court Botswana to support its regime change agenda in Zimbabwe. Mashingaidze (2006:66) noted that, “Contrary to the West’s position, most African countries, with the exception of Botswana and Senegal, much of the Third World have resolutely stood behind the country (Zimbabwe) much to the frustration of many quarters.” The fact that only Botswana and Senegal adopted the Western stance among all the Third World states on its own raises suspicion as to whether these states were not under some form of influence from Britain.

Stensland (2009:8) notes that “Botswana, despite its modest capabilities both militarily and politically, has been the most vocal critic of Mugabe’s regime in the region.” Crucially, it is worth mentioning that Botswana’s criticism of Zimbabwe appeared to be centred on Zimbabwe’s failure to uphold the same debatable and contested tenets of democracy that Britain referenced in imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe (Grebe, 2010).

Gaborone’s stance on Zimbabwe with regards to governance and human rights issues seemed to be an extension if not a reflection of the West’s position, particularly that of London. This led many observers and analysts to suspect and indeed propose a causal relationship between Botswana’s criticism of the Mugabe government and No 10 Downing Street. Moreover, any shift in London’s foreign policy stance towards Harare during this period, almost certainly induced a similar shift from Gaborone leading some scholars to suspect that London was the catalyst in the deterioration of relations between the two SADC neighbours.
The fact that Botswana adopted what could be viewed as a pro-British position on the issues that were contested by Zimbabwe and Britain namely land, governance and human rights led to perceptions within Zimbabwe that Botswana was a British ally. Phrases like “British stooge” and “imperialist agent” were commonly used in most Zimbabwean discourses to describe Botswana (Zvayi, 2008). This state of affairs naturally led to tension and consequently, unsound bilateral ties between Zimbabwe and Botswana.

While Botswana’s concerns with regards to Zimbabwe were centred on issues such as governance, land policies and human rights, Zimbabwe’s concerns with its western neighbour appeared to be centred on Botswana’s disregard for the principles of sovereignty, Pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism; norms which have consistently guided Zimbabwe’s foreign policy since independence (Badza and Rusike, 2005:65).

For Zimbabwe, by interfering into the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe, Botswana was infringing upon the norm of sovereignty as enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, in much the same way as Britain and the West. It is indisputable that divergent conceptions of the norms such as democracy, human rights, sovereignty and non-interference appeared to be at the centre of the dis-consensus between Zimbabwe and Botswana. However, what is not so clear is whether and how Britain managed to influence Botswana to adopt a pro-British position in the Zimbabwe-Britain dispute, eventually leading to unsound bilateral ties between Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000-2013.

The research study traced the sequence and structure of events as well as the actions by Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000-2013 to try and establish how British influence on Botswana could have led to the deterioration of bilateral ties between Zimbabwe and Botswana.
1.2 Research hypothesis

The hypothesis of the study is that Britain, as part of its Zimbabwean regime change agenda either overtly or covertly influenced the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana diplomatic relations as from 2000-2013.

1.3 Statement of the problem

The focal point of this study is to establish whether and how Britain influenced the deterioration of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000-2013. The questions that need to be answered are; could Britain have influenced the deterioration of Zimbabwe and Botswana’s bilateral relations during the stated period or there were other factors independent of Britain’s regime change agenda that influenced the deterioration of these bilateral ties? Could it be possible that Britain either directly or indirectly influenced the divergent conceptions that Botswana and Zimbabwe had of norms such as democracy, human rights, sovereignty and non-interference?

1.4 Literature review

International relations scholars such as Brown (2001) and Burchill (2001) concur that despite the widening of content within International Relations, “diplomatic-strategic relations of states – with a focus on war and peace, conflict and cooperation” still form the core subject matter of the discipline (Daddow, 2009:23). Bilateral relations are therefore, a key element of contemporary international affairs.

Thucydides as cited in Morgenthau (1993:10) asserts that “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals.” Lord Salisbury also concurs with Thucydides’ perspective by remarking that “the only bond of union that endures” among nations is “the absence of all clashing interests” (Morgenthau, 1993:10). Therefore, it can be argued that there is a distinct relationship between external relations, precisely bilateral state relations and national interests. Where there are common interests between two states, then the bilateral
relations are likely to be sound. Inversely, where these relations are divergent, then the bilateral ties will be unsound.

Over the past decade or so, academic interest in Zimbabwe’s external relations intensified. Most of the studies focused on Zimbabwe’s relations with the West, in particular Britain and Zimbabwe’s relations with the East particularly China. Youde (2006) concluded that the deepening of Zimbabwe-Sino relations was a direct impact of the deteriorating Zimbabwe-Britain relations. Similarly, Chigora and Goredema (2011) in their analysis of Zimbabwe-Iran bilateral relations noted that a common adversary in the form of Britain and USA had led to the strengthening of Zimbabwe-Iran relations in the 21st century when Zimbabwe has been at odds with the West.

While international relations scholars have been concentrating on analysing the effect that the deteriorating Zimbabwe-Britain ties had on Zimbabwe’s relations with the global East especially China, scant attention has been given to the effect that the British isolation has had on Zimbabwe’s relations with fellow African states. Therefore, there is need to understand whether the deteriorating Zimbabwe-Britain relations have had an effect on the national interests and indeed foreign policy of Zimbabwe towards its neighbours resulting in deeper ties as was the case with China and Iran or in strained relations as was the case with Zimbabwe and the European Union as noted by Chigora (2008). Similarly, there is need to establish whether and how the British policy towards Zimbabwe influenced the national interests and foreign policy of Zimbabwe’s neighbours with regards to Zimbabwe.

Since bilateral relations are primarily a product of national interests, there is need to review what various scholars say about bilateral relations and also about the concept of national interests in order for one to be able to apply the concept in relation to Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period under study.
1.4.1 Understanding bilateral relations

Before analysing the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations, it is essential that the concept of bilateral relations be discussed and understood that is, what the concept entails and how bilateral relations are depicted in contemporary international politics.

As highlighted earlier, all relations are a function of shared identity and interests and bilateral relations are no exception. Bilateral relations refer to political, economic, or cultural ties between two sovereign states. For Barston (2006:38), “Bilateral relations aim to develop joint ideas, often as dominant directing concepts in regional and international fora and the protection of shared interests.” Commonality of interests or lack thereof is thus one of the core determinants of sound/unsound bilateral relations. Where there are common interests between two actors, the bilateral ties of these actors are likely to be sound. In contrast, when these interests are divergent, the bilateral relations of the two actors would most certainly be strained.

The issue of bilateral relations is hinged on the norm of sovereignty. Pasic (1996: 92) postulates that, external sovereignty entails mutual recognition and legal equality of states which in turn signify a shared identity in which states accept each other as being the same type of entity. This mutual recognition that sovereignty bestows upon states is therefore central to bilateral relations. States that uphold the principle of sovereignty rarely have bilateral relations with entities that they don’t recognise as sovereign states. For this reason states such as Taiwan whose sovereignty is in doubt have struggled to have bilateral ties with any other state.

One feature of bilateral relations is the exchange of diplomatic agents between two states through the establishment of embassies or consular. The purpose of the diplomatic agents such as ambassadors is to facilitate cooperation and dialogue between the two states. All diplomatic relations are guided by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (Mudyanadzo, 2011:53). These conventions emphasize reciprocity between actors that decide to have diplomatic relations.

With reference to Zimbabwe-Iran bilateral relations, Chigora and Goredema (2011:423) note that the extent of bilateral relations is depicted by the state visits, diplomatic relations, trade agreements and support for each other at international fora. In contrast, deteriorating bilateral ties are signified by the recalling of embassy agents such as ambassadors and in the worst case, the closure of an embassy as what happened between the USA and Iran in 1979. What is worth noting is that bilateral relations or relations in general are not static, they change over time depending on circumstances.²

Barston (2006: 38) highlights the features that depict bilateral relations by explaining that:

Bilateral special relations are distinguished by high levels of military bureaucratic coordination, summits, extensive political co-operation and a network of formal treaties. Most special relations also involve special secret arrangements in such areas as intelligence, weapons supply and security guarantees. The main characteristic of most bilateral special relations is the concern of one or both of the parties to retain exclusivity and exclude or reduce the significance of access by other actors.

Bilateral economic ties are another feature of bilateral relations. These ties are usually formalised by written treaties and agreements in areas such as trade, energy, transport, civil aviation, investment protection, trade dispute settlement and arrangements for repatriation of foreign earnings (Barston, 2006:38). Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and agreements on Foreign Direct Investiments (FDIs) are some of the treaties that signify sound bilateral relations. Park (2012: 2) notes that the signing of a Strategic Cooperative Partnership Agreement between South Korea and Vietnam in 2009 intensified bilateral ties between the two countries which resulted in South Korea becoming Vietnam’s number one investor with US$23.5 billion worth of FDI in more than 300 projects.

²As highlighted by Professor Hasu Patel (University of Zimbabwe, Political Science Department) during an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015), bilateral relations are dynamic. They change over time depending on circumstances like the global political environment, the personalities of the leaders of the countries concerned etc. For example, Zimbabwe-Britain bilateral relations were excellent in the 1980s but deteriorated as from the year 2000 onwards.
History is a critical component of bilateral relations since it has the potential to make or break bilateral ties. With regards to history, Barston (2006:38) posits that, “A further distinguishing feature of some special relations is the manner in which adverse historical legacy is underplayed or managed as political theatre, in order to not to undermine overall political cooperation.” Whenever states fail to manage this adverse history the result has been unsound bilateral ties as is the case with China and Japan. Consequently, Gustafsson (2011:34) argues that, “Among all the problems clouding bilateral ties, the most problematic are the so-called ‘history issue’ - including Japan’s refusal to apologise for wartime atrocities.” The history of the 1937 Nanjing massacre remains the determining factor in contemporary Sino-Japan bilateral ties.

Bilateral relations also hinge on social aspects such as visits by private citizens of one country to another country. As Park (2012: 3) notes increases in people to people contacts also enhance bilateral ties as was the case with relations between South Korea and Vietnam which saw the number of Korean tourists to Vietnam increasing to 600 000 in the year 2011. However, in some instances increases in people to people contacts have resulted in strained bilateral ties as Marr (2012) noted in his study of Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana. In the study Marr explains how social and political relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana have been strained as a result of the alleged ill treatment of Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana over several allegations that include illegal entry into the Botswana.

One of the major issues affecting bilateral relations is that of territory. Barston (2006:38) notes that territorial boundary issues have traditionally been a feature of bilateral relations. Contested territories including islands, enclaves and border lines have been a contributory factor in determining the state of bilateral ties. Le Roux (1999) explains how relations between Botswana and Namibia became strained in the 1990s over ownership of the small islands of Kasikili-Sedudu. Similarly, Msafiri (2011) analysed the effects to regional peace
and security caused by the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania and how this has strained bilateral relations to such an extent that both sides have contemplated using force.

Barston (2006:39) postulates that bilateral ties can be improved through visits by head of states. For him, Visits are the workhorse for the strategic management of relations and policy, in particular bilateral. Barston sees the purposes of visits as falling into five broad categories namely symbolic, improving diplomatic space, addressing (or not) substantive issues, signalling and other purposes e.g. reorientation.

Mugabe accuses Britain, in particular, of internationalizing a bi-lateral disagreement over the resolution of the land question and of leading a Western-propaganda campaign aimed at destabilizing the country in retaliation for the white farm seizures that were according to Mugabe, necessary in order to correct ownership imbalances created by colonialism (Chingono, 2009).

1.4.2 National interests in the context of bilateral relations

Like most concepts in International Relations, national interests lack a universally accepted definition. Different scholars have however, weighed in with their own understanding of the concept of national interests. From a realist perspective, Morgenthau (1952) as cited in Campbell (1996:168) argued that the concept of national interests has both a residual element “which is inherent in the concept itself,” and a content beyond that residual element “which can run the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it.”

Morgenthau explained that the residual element was that any foreign policy that makes use of the concept of national interests must make reference “to the physical, political and cultural entity which we call a nation.” For Morgenthau, while the residual element was logically required, the content was variable and determined by circumstances. Morgenthau’s analysis of the concept of national interests highlights two aspects that are central to this concept, which is reference to a nation state and the dynamic nature of the content of national interests.
Classical realists define interests in terms of power (Morgenthau, 1993:5). The realists affirm that the primary concern of states is power and as such all states compete for power. Those states that have power seek to consolidate it, while those that do not have power aspire to have it. For the realists, the content and the manner that power is used is determined by the political and cultural environment. “Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man (Morgenthau, 1993:11).” Realists perceive national interests to be power centred. Power is seen as the end state of any states’ interactions with other states in the international system.

Like its predecessor classical realism, structural realism which is a branch of neo-realism is again power centric in its conceptualisation of national interests. Waltz (1986:329) maintains that states want “a small number of big things”. This small number of big things is a combination of power, security and wealth. National interests are therefore modelled around these state aspirations. However, critics of the interests defined as power approach point to several flaws that are inherent in this approach. For example, Finnemore (1996: 1) argues that while realists define interests in terms power, they fail to adequately address questions such as, “what kind of power? Power for what ends?”

Constructivists such as Wendt (1992) and Finnemore are critical of the way realism perceives national interests. Finnemore (1996:7) for example argues that by assuming that states already know their preferences, realists wrongly imply that the source of state preferences lie within the state itself. Thus Finnemore and other constructivists claim that rather than interests being believed to be a given, something that is inherent to states, states are actually socialised into wanting certain things by the international society in which they live. “Interests are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction” (Finnemore, 1996:2).
From an African perspective, Badza and Rusike defined national interests as “the basic determinants that guide government policy in relation to the external environment” (2005:54). Badza and Rusike further explain that the concept of national interests is used in two main senses. Firstly, it is used as an analytical tool identifying the goals or objectives of foreign policy. Secondly, it is used to justify particular policy preferences by the government.

There is need to understand the effect of interests on bilateral relations as well examine cases cited by different scholars where interests have either intensified or strained bilateral relations. Wendt (1999:233) propounds that, “States are actors whose behaviour is motivated by a variety of interests rooted in corporate, type, role and collective identities.” Since identities are social constructions, constructivists perceive interests to be constructions of the international system (Wendt, 1999:234). According to Wendt, “The concept of national interests refers to the reproduction requirements or security of state society complexes.”

Robinson (1980) divides interests into categories that are primary importance, specific, general, secondary or identical. For Robinson, primary interests are those that can never be traded and should be defended at all costs such as protection of a nation’s physical, political and cultural identity and survival against encroachment from outside. Secondary interests are those that do not fall under primary interests but are contributory to it such as protection of citizens abroad.

George and Keohane (1980) identify three national interests’ namely physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being which they describe informally as “life, liberty and property.” Wendt (1999: 235) adds a fourth interest which he calls “collective self-esteem.” For Waltz (1979:125) survival is the only national interest of states.

Literature on Zimbabwe and Botswana relations intimates the existence of divergent national interests between the two SADC states. However, contrary to what the realists prescribe, Zimbabwe and Botswana’s dis-consensus is not centred on divergent material interests but
rather divergent ideological interests. Sovereignty, anti-imperialism, land and pan-Africanism seem to be some of the concepts that are contested by both Zimbabwe and Botswana.\(^3\)

### 1.4.2.1 Democracy

Constructivists affirm that there is a strong link between identity and interest, which is interests are derived from identity and in turn interests shape identities. For Wendt (1999), Breuning (2011) and Katzenstein (1996), these identities and interests are socially constructed through shared ideas rather than through material desires such as military capability and the economy. The concepts of democracy and human rights provide evidence that ideas can shape interests more than material desires of states.

Like most concepts, the operational definition of democracy is not fixed. Gustafsson (20011:108) notes that different actors will try to define the term in ways that suit their interests. Sklar (1983:12) while analysing the concept and practice of democracy in Africa highlights the fact that “Democracy in Africa is as varied as the ever-changing forms of government in more than fifty sovereign states.” For Sklar, democracy in Africa is an “experimental process” (1983:12). Africa has over the years experimented with various types of democracy since independence. Sklar (1983) lists liberal democracy, guided democracy, social democracy, participatory democracy and constitutional democracy as some of the types of democracies that African states have experimented with. Sklar’s analysis that democracy is a widely approved but doubtful concept in Africa has over the years gained acceptance amongst most scholars of democracy in Africa.

Democracy is one idea that has been credited for intensifying bilateral relations and interstate relations in general. Muller (2011:70) posits that, “The more democratic dyads emerge and

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\(^3\) This view was expressed by Dr Sadiki Maeresera in an email commentary to the author (21 January 2015). While most bilateral disputes in the SADC region have been about territory for example that of Malawi and Tanzania and that of Botswana and Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana’s dispute seems to be hinged on norms and principles such as the rule of law, governance, sovereignty etc. This argument was reiterated by Dr Heather Chingono (University of Zimbabwe, Department of Politics) in her questionnaire for the study (Harare, 5 June 2015).
the progressively more intense interdemocratic institutions become, the more communicative action in interstate relations is likely.” Risse-Kappen (1996:398) citing the example NATO concurs with Muller by explaining that countries that identify themselves as democracies tend to be bound by “democratic norms” one of which is not to fight each other. Democracies also cooperate on security and economic issues resulting in the formation of institutions like NATO and EU.

While enhancing interstate relations, the same concept has also been criticised for straining bilateral relations especially amongst those states that have divergent perceptions of what the concept entails. Muller (2011:71) argues that some “younger democracies might develop militant political cultures, like some current democracies, and thus be inclined to take a confrontational attitude towards the non-democratic other, even to the point of missionary zeal to democratise others by force.” This naturally leads to tensions between states thereby negatively affecting bilateral ties.

Chigora (2009) analysed the EU’s multilateral foreign policy towards Zimbabwe as from 2000-2008 and concluded that divergent conceptions of the notions of democracy and human rights were at the centre of contention between Zimbabwe and the EU. For Chigora, it is the international system and its skewed policies that needed democratising and not Zimbabwe as the EU demanded. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2009) note that while the West was advocating for democracy and human rights, ZANU (PF) openly disparaged them as alien values.

Chimhowu et al (2010) note that the divergent conception of the idea of democracy by Zimbabwe and the USA was one of the reasons for the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the USA through an act aptly termed as the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001. Zimbabwe claimed to be committed to the democratic
principles by holding regular free and fair elections while USA accused Zimbabwe of constitutionality amongst other undemocratic practices.

Chigora and Goredema (2011) cite the Western hypocrisy and double standards in applying democratic variables. They argue that the concept has been selectively applied by the so-called liberal democracies. While USA has demonised Zimbabwe for not being “democratic” they have maintained close “friendships” with autocratic and authoritarian states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The concept of democracy and its rather vague and contested meaning has led to strained bilateral and at times multilateral ties when actors have not shared the same meaning for the concept. Closely related the concept of democracy is another equally controversial concept of international politics and that is human rights.

1.4.2.2 Human rights

Human rights are defined as universal, indivisible and inalienable rights that are inherent to humans by virtue of birth (Grech, 2006: 48). Despite the existence of a somewhat ubiquitous definition, human rights just like democracy are a normative concept that is disputed in Africa. According to Shivji (1989) the contemporary concept of human rights in Africa originated in the West. Africa was thus socialised into adopting Western norms of human rights through colonialisation and imperialism. Shivji argues that human rights have been used by the West as a political tool to justify capitalism.

Similarly, Mashingaidze (2006: 65) highlights the double standards in the international human rights regime by arguing that the land reform in Zimbabwe was framed as a human rights issue by the EU, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand because the victims were their “kith and kin”. By engaging on the FTLRP, these countries felt Zimbabwe was infringing upon the rights of the white farm owners and hence used the issue of “human
“human rights” to justify the imposition of sanctions that included travel bans and withdrawal of economic support.⁴

However, as Mashingaidze aptly notes, the West paid a blind eye to what some regard as a genuine human rights issue in the form of the state sanctioned violence in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces during the 1980s. This they did for two reasons explained by Mashingaidze. Firstly, whites were not the victims and secondly, Zimbabwe was then a geo-strategic ally of the West in its fight against socialism. As Mashingaidze puts it, Western self-interests and not hard and fast principles have shaped international politics for a long time. Dictators like Mobutu and Idi Amin have been condoned and supported all because they were Western allies. Despite preaching extensively about the benefits of these norms and principles to the rest of the world, the West has hardly ever been bound by them. What emerges is a classic case of moral self-contradiction or Western hypocrisy at its worst.

The application of international norms such as human rights on its own infringes upon one of the basic tenets of statehood, that of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the bedrock on which bilateral state relations are made and as such deserves further scrutiny.

1.4.2.3 Sovereignty

The question that constructivists seek to answer is whether interests are material or ideational. For Wendt (1999:122), “Interests are themselves cognitions or ideas.” Wendt cites D’Andrade (1992) a cognitive psychology anthropologist who argues that “motivations, desires or interests are ‘schemas’ (or ‘scripts’, ‘frames’ or ‘representations’) which are knowledge structures that make possible the identification of objects and events.” One such schema is the idea of sovereignty.

⁴These sentiments were also noted by Col Cosmore Allen Kaondera (Zimbabwe Staff College, Academic Division, PhD candidate with Midlands State University) in an interview with the author (Harare, 3 September 2015). He noted that human rights were being used by the West as a “proxy” with the major issue of contention between Zimbabwe and the West being the “land issue”.
Roberts (2015) notes that the concept of sovereignty is defined simply in most international relations texts as, “having supreme political authority.” The concept of sovereignty has both regulatory and constitutive effects on actors. As such, the concept has strengthened bilateral ties in cases where the meaning of the concept was shared by two states. In case were this meaning was divergent, bilateral ties have been strained. According to Wendt (1999:210), “States that recognise each other’s sovereignty tend not to conquer each other, not because they cannot, but recognition implies a willingness to live and let live.” This idea is supported by Buzan (1993:345) who argues that the doctrines associated with sovereignty namely ‘Mutual recognition and legal equality signify… acceptance of a shared identity in which states accept each other as being the same type of entity.” Sovereignty has also resulted in tensions and unsound relations between actors. Finnemore (1996) cites efforts to enforce international human rights norms as having been blocked by states for infringing upon the principle of sovereignty. Folz (2011:158) notes that, Norway has continually rejected EU integration efforts citing EU membership as a threat to Norwegian sovereignty. While it can enhance inter-state cooperation, sovereignty can also be a causal factor in unsound inter-state ties.

Non-interference has been the most contested doctrine of sovereignty. Like most other concept, this principle has been given several meanings that have resulted in bilateral tensions. Several studies on Zimbabwe’s bilateral relations with the Western states e.g. Britain and the USA all indicate that Zimbabwe accuses these states of failing to recognise the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state (Mudyanadzo, 2011; Chigora, 2008 and Badza and Rusike, 2005). The fact that sovereignty bestows upon an entity absolute authority over territory that it deems to its own has also been a source of bilateral tensions. Msafiri (2011) notes with regards to the Tanzania-Malawi dispute over Lake Malawi/Nyasa, an amicable settlement like sharing the lake has been considered unacceptable by both parties since it does not entail sovereign authority over territory. As
such, sovereignty has contributed to continued bilateral tension between the two states dating as far back as 1967 (Msafiri, 2011). Most territorial disputes affecting bilateral relations of some African states are more ideational than materialistic and could be easily solved if states set aside the principle of sovereignty.

The principle of statehood as espoused by The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) seems to suggest that there is correlation between sovereignty and territory intimating that for an entity to be regarded as a state it has to possess both sovereignty and territory. Therefore, it may be argued that sovereignty entails territory and vice versa. Territory, especially the land and the water including the oceans, seas lakes and dams has been the source of tension and ultimately unsound bilateral state relations. Therefore, there is need to dissect the views of several scholars over the issue of land in the context of Zimbabwe.

1.4.2.4 Land

Studies of Zimbabwe’s bilateral relations with most Western states pin point land reform as the issue of contention between Zimbabwe and Britain, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other EU states (Chigora and Dewa, 2009). Despite land being a key factor in the impasse between Zimbabwe and Britain post 2000, Western discourses have portrayed the issue negatively. Mashingaidze (2006: 65) quotes former South African President Thabo Mbeki as bemoaning the fact that Western discourse on Zimbabwe has deliberately ignored the land question and framed it as a human rights issue. Mazango (2005: 37) argues that imminent electoral defeat as a result of domestic and international pressure forced the ZANU (PF) party to adopt populist policies that appealed to the majority of voters such as the FTLRP. Land or to be specific, the FTLRP is depicted in most Western and pro-Western

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5 There are however, a few exceptions to this principle. For example the Sovereign Order of Malta issues passports but does not have any territory yet it is still recognised by other states as a state. In contrast Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) has territory but lacks sovereignty and ultimately legitimacy due to the fact that other states have not recognised it as having the same identity as them.
discourses as an issue that Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) only adopted as means to bolster support that was allegedly waning.

Contrary to the widely presented notion that land only became an issue in the year 2000, Hager (2007:237) notes that land had always been an issue for Africans, throughout their history in Rhodesia and the newly independent Zimbabwe. He argues that The Lancaster House Agreement had attempted to deal with the land disparity issue arising from colonial rule by requiring the prevailing policy over the next ten years to be that land was purchased from willing European settlers at fair market value.

1.4.3 Existing views on Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties

While historical Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations have been cited in some studies notably Oitsile (2010) and Makgala & Fisher (2009), few if any studies have analysed contemporary Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties. The few studies where contemporary Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations have been cited have been studies on Botswana’s foreign policy by Malila & Molebatsi (2014) and by Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014). One study that provided a detailed analysis of contemporary Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations was by Stensland (2009). Stensland (2009) analysed whether and how South Africa and Botswana where influenced by SADC’s peace and security norms in their foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.

Stensland (2009) noted that Botswana had not been socialised into compliance with the SADC norms of non-interference in domestic affairs. Instead, Gaborone was according to Khama (2008:28) as cited by Stensland, coming closest to complying with the norms of non-indifference towards human rights violation. As a result, Botswana had broken rank amongst the SADC states and became a vocal critic of Harare and Mugabe. However, Stensland’s research was not concerned with analyzing the role played by Britain in influencing Botswana’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe.
Stensland’s research noted that Botswana’s noted that governance and human rights were critical issues to Botswana. These two issues had been central in determining Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. For South Africa, Pan-African solidarity and a shared history had been the major determinants of South African foreign policy on Zimbabwe.

Little if any academic literature has been able to articulate Zimbabwe’s foreign policy stance with regards to Botswana. However, there are several scholars that include Chigora (2006, 2007 and 2009), who have written extensively on Zimbabwe’s foreign relations since 2000. One such article was by Chigora and Dewa (2009).

Though their article was a broad analysis of Zimbabwe foreign relations in the 21st century, Chigora and Dewa (2009) clearly articulate Zimbabwe’s foreign relations with the West, and Zimbabwe’s relations with states within SADC including Botswana. However, there appears to be reluctance in Chigora and Dewa to explore the contemporary, which are the 21st century bilateral relations of Botswana and Zimbabwe preferring to dwell more on the history of deep ties.

Similarly, Mudyanadzo (2011) also fails to acknowledge the current strained diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana. In common with Chigora and Dewa (2009), Mudyanadzo concentrates on the strong historical bilateral ties that Zimbabwe has with Botswana. Whether by choice or otherwise, the deteriorating bilateral ties have not been given enough attention by Zimbabwean academics. This is a gap in the literature that the current study fills by providing a detailed analysis of contemporary Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations.

This denial to acknowledge the presence of tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana has been noted in several Zimbabwean scholars and politicians, one example being Professor Claude Mararike a prominent sociologist and broadcaster. Mararike denied the existence of
tension between the two states at a time when the media was awash that the two states were on the verge of war. He attributed the apparent strained ties to media speculation and hype.

In contrast with Zimbabwean scholars, scholars in Botswana acknowledge the existence of frosty relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana. Jonas, Mandiyanike and Maundeni (2013) affirm the deterioration of relations between the two SADC states. By citing leaked cables between Botswana and the USA, in which Botswana was requesting for military support from the USA in the event of an attack by Zimbabwe, they show the close ties that Botswana had fostered with the West. This was at a time when Zimbabwe’s relations with the West were at their lowest.

Another study on Zimbabwe and Botswana was by Marr (2012). Marr’s research sought to establish the perceptions of Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana about their hosts the Batswana and vice versa. Marr traced the historical tensions of the Batswana and immigrant groups in Botswana and the current relations of the Batswana and Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana.

The focus on identities, that is Batswana and Zimbabweans and the fact that the research was about perceptions is evidence that the author evoked the constructivist theory to guide his research. Marr notes that identity is at the centre of the tensions between the Zimbabweans and the Batswana and that the Batswana perceive the Zimbabweans as depriving them of the opportunities that in essence should be solely reserved for the Batswana.

The study confirms that there is tension between Batswana and Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana. This tension could be traced to ethnic tensions that date back several decades. A misunderstanding and mistrust of each other’s cultures was one factor that Marr established to be the root of the tensions between the two groups. This study was quite insightful in that,

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6View expressed by Professor Claude Mararike (University of Zimbabwe lecturer in the Department of Sociology and political analyst) during a presentation on the State of the Media in Zimbabwe, paper presented to Junior Staff Course Number 53 at Zimbabwe Staff College with the author in attendance in May 2010.
even though the views sought by the researcher were those of the ordinary citizens, further inquiry could establish whether or not the perceptions of the individuals could have been influenced in one way or the other by political or media discourses.

Dillon (2003) differs from Marr in that he examines remittances by Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana that is their remitting patterns, purposes and the potential developmental impact of these remittances. The research sought to establish the challenges that Zimbabweans in Botswana face in their endeavour to remit goods and money back home. The study established that, despite facing challenges, Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana were remitting goods and money back home. These remittances were having a positive impact in the development of Zimbabwe. The study proved that while relations between the two neighbours appear strained, there is still some cooperation.

1.5 Research justification

“In the worst-case scenario, deterioration in bilateral relations may lead to war, destruction and death” (Gustaffson, 2011:15). Gustaffson’s assertion highlights the significance of understanding bilateral relations and the consequences that arise as a result of failure to understand bilateral relations. Therefore, it is extremely important that bilateral relations be studied and understood since they have consequences in the way politics is conducted. The importance of understanding the state and nature of bilateral relations of actors should therefore not be over emphasized.

Bilateral relations have been one of the most topical areas of study in Zimbabwean international affairs. To this end, a plethora of studies have been done that focused on Zimbabwe’s bilateral relations with state actors such as Britain.

Similarly, several studies have also been done that determined the influence that Britain’s isolation of Zimbabwe had on Zimbabwe’s bilateral relations with USA, Russia, Iran and China. However, few if any studies have examined Zimbabwe and Botswana’s deteriorating
bilateral relations as from 2000 to 2013. To date, no study has analysed the role that the British policy of isolating Zimbabwe could have played in negatively influencing Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period under study, a gap which this study fills.

While some studies have managed to highlight the existence of strained relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana such as Jonas et al (2013), some of the literature does not acknowledge the existence of strained bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period under study. Therefore, there is need to establish the exact state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations as from 2000-2013 as well as aptly expose the direct and indirect role of Britain in negatively influencing Zimbabwe and Botswana bilateral relations during the stated period.

This dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature regarding Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations especially the reasons for the deterioration of ties as from 2000-2013. The study will try to provide scholarly evidence to support or refute claims that foreign influence is still rampant in Africa. The study shall contribute to the literature around the issues of interests and identity in international relations. The study aims to either prove or disprove the notion that interests, especially those of the weak states could be socially influenced by external forces. In line with interests is the idea of state identities and interests could be influenced and eventually constructed through norms and principles such as governance, human rights, sovereignty and pan-Africanism. In addition, the study contributes to literature on the normalisation of the bilateral relations of small states that are heavily influenced by external factors such as foreign state and non-state actors.

1.6 Research objectives

The major objectives of this study are as follows:

a. Analyse Britain’s influence in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations, 2000-2013.
b. evaluate the political, economic, military/security and social dynamics surrounding Britain’s influence to the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties as from 2000-2013.

c. offer scholarly and policy recommendations on the normalisation of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations.

### 1.7 Research questions

The research study will endeavour to address the following research questions:

a. To what extent did Britain influence the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations, 2000-2013?

b. Is there evidence of Britain’s influence in the political, economic, military/security and social dynamics surrounding the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties as from 2000-2013?

b. What scholarly and policy recommendations could be proffered for the normalization of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations?

### 1.8 Theoretical framework

The research is guided by the constructivist theory of international relations. Constructivism in international relations deals with the “impact of perception on state behavior” (Daddow, 2009:114). Burnham et al (2008:28) further expound by explaining that this approach is based on the thinking that each person may look at a given object or situation and perceive it differently.

Constructivism as applied in international relations has its roots in sociology especially in the writings of Anthony Giddens (Burnham et al, 2008:28). Finnemore and Sikkink in Burnham et al (2008), further qualify this position by asserting that constructivism is not in itself a substantive theory of international relations but rather on approach to social inquiry.
The successful fusion of constructivism into the international relations discipline has been attributed to Alexander Wendt (1992) in an article titled “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. Wendt placed emphasis on identities and interest as central to state behaviour. For constructivists, identities and interests are socially constructed rather than naturally given. Thus for Wendt (1999:1) the two basic tenets of constructivism are:

(1) That the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces.
(2) That the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.

Roberts (2006:705) as cited in Burham et al (2008) points out that, “The main constructivist theme is the impact of ideas and discourse on social action, the end result being socially constructed realities, including those constructed internationally”.

The study fits well with the constructivist theory in that both Zimbabwe and Botswana are small and weak states whose interests can never be understood in terms of power as the realists would like to suggest. These states have over the years sought survival through invoking norms and principles such as sovereignty and equality rather than through material domination such as military and economic power (Wendt, 1999; Nkiwane, 1999). The fact that most African states are militarily weak and economically underdeveloped has seen them emphasizing the importance of norms and principles. The interests of these states and indeed their identities have tended to be shaped more by these norms and principles than power.

Wendt (1999: 231) posits that, “Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is….” While acknowledging the existence of several identities, Wendt lists personal/corporate, type, role and collective as the different kinds of identity (1999: 224). Interests of states are therefore shaped by the identity that the state
assigns itself and is assigned by other states. To this end, the interests of a state that identifies itself as a democracy cannot be the same as the interests of an autocratic state. Therefore, it is misleading to assume that all states want the same things. For example, what Zimbabwe wants in interacting with other states is different from what Botswana wants.

In common with Wendt, Finnemore (1996: 2) notes that, “States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perception of the world and their role in the world.” Finnemore stresses the fact that states do not just independently decide what their interests are. Rather they are socialised to want certain things by the international society where they live. Such an approach could perhaps, provide a logical explanation of the reasons why the “interests” of Botswana are premised on issues such as democracy, governance and human rights that appear are widely contested and appear alien to most African societies.

On the same note, Finnemore’s idea of interests being socialised rather than being naturally given also provides some theoretical justification to Zimbabwe’s interests being centred on sovereignty, pan-Africanism and resisting neo-colonialism and imperialism. These are principles that resonate with most African states that share the same collective identity as Zimbabwe. These principles whose roots can be traced back to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its founders such as Kwame Nkrumah, have now become norms shared by most AU member states.

The foreign policies of most of the Front line States (FLS) during the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa provide yet more evidence that interests can be socialised and can be determined by norms and principles rather than the material needs of a state. As Youde (2007) noted, the confrontational approach that the FLS took towards the militarily and economically superior white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa can never be explained from a realist perspective but rather from a normative perspective.
Furthermore, from a rational choice perspective, it made more sense for Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and later Zimbabwe to put their individual material needs first rather than risk military and economic sabotage from Rhodesia and South Africa. However, norms or principles such as a belief in pan-Africanism, sovereignty and non-racialism trumped material needs. It therefore follows that any study that deals with the interests of African states be best studied from a normative perspective. Constructivism becomes the theory of choice when studying the effect and the role of norms in international affairs.

The study adopts the constructivist theory as its main theoretical tool of analysis. Theories perform a number of critical functions in research, they shape and guide research efforts by pointing towards likely discoveries. The study of international relations is guided by several theories and concepts that have been developed by different scholars over the years. The most dominant of these theories are realism and idealism. However, both these theories and some other theories that are derived from them such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism were found to be inadequate for this research due to several reasons that were highlighted in the previous chapter. The one theory that was adopted to guide this study is constructivism whose major tenets shall be discussed in detail in the paragraphs below.

1.8.1 A brief overview of the constructivist approach to international relations

Constructivism is premised on the thinking that, what is seen as the natural reality of the social world is in essence a socially constructed perception based on a “complex mix of social and contextual influences and/or presuppositions” (Moses and Knutsen, 2007:10). Wendt (1996: 48) explains that, “Constructivism is a structural theory of international politics that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal actors in the system; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in large part constructed by those structures, rather than being determined exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. As Wendt rightly notes,
constructivism shares certain tenets such as state-centrism with other structural theories such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. However, the theory differs with the other structural theories on the second and third tenets.

Constructivism is a relatively new approach to the study of international affairs. It emerged as “part of a wider intellectual movement within the social sciences from the 1980s onward and was simultaneously a response to key trends within the discipline of IR” (Daddow, 2009:113). Constructivist theorists argued that the study of international relations was a far more complex field than we had been led to believe by earlier theorists such as the realists, liberalists and their neo offshoots (Onuf, 1998).

For constructivists, any theorist who claims to tell the way things are is in fact telling his/her ‘version’ of the way things are (Daddow, 2009:113). This assertion is supported by Tickner (1992) a feminist critic of realism. Tickner (1992: 30) argues that by emphasising on the power seeking interests of states as a function of human rather than male nature, classical realists “have constructed a worldview based on the experiences of certain men.” While realists claim to articulate objective and timeless laws, their portrayal of power and the need to balance it reflects a deeply gendered view of it.

Wendt (1999:1) concedes that there are many forms of constructivism. However, these different streams of constructivism share the view that “Neorealism and Neoliberalism are ‘under socialised’ in the sense that they pay insufficient attention to the ways in which the actors in world politics are socially constructed” (Wendt, 1999:4). Therefore, Constructivism can be argued to be a normative approach to international affairs that is heavily influenced by both social and political theory in its conceptualisation of international politics.

The fact that constructivism recognises the centrality of states in the study of international affairs distinguishes the theory as one of the few possible approaches that could be applied in the study of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations in the post-colonial era. Moreover, the
centrality of social norms and principles such as human rights and sovereignty as compared to material needs (military and economy) to both Zimbabwe and Botswana throughout their history provides yet more justification for the use of a more social approach in the form of constructivism.

Moreover, the fact that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy has over the years embodied norms and ideas that trumped material interests vindicates the use of a more social theory of international relations such as constructivism. Youde (2007:7) argues that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy can hardly be defined in terms of rational choice or any other theory that emphasizes material interests.

Ideas have tended to inform Zimbabwe’s foreign policy more than material needs. Therefore, it can be argued that for one to get value out of a study that analyses Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the interests that inform it, a normative approach has to be applied.

1.8.2 The constructivist approach to norms, identities and interests

Constructivists emphasize the existence of a strong nexus among norms, identities and interests. As such, from a constructivist perspective, an attempt to define or describe any one of the three concepts without including the other two would be a futile exercise. Within the constructivist paradigm, the three concepts are almost synonymous. Hence, the three concepts shall be discussed simultaneously in this section.

The concept of norms as applied to constructivism, describes “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996:5 and Jepperson et al, 1996:54). Norms can be said to be a shared code of conduct by entities that share the same identity. The definition implies that norms are a regulatory tool on the behaviour of states. Jepperson et al (1996:54) explain that in addition to prescribing (“regulating”) behaviour for already constituted identities, norms also define (“constitute”) identities of actors.
Sovereignty is one norm that has constitutive and regulatory effects in that it is sovereignty that affords an entity the right to be called a state and it is sovereignty through the doctrine of non-intervention that regulates the behaviour of actors that are constituted by it.

While theoretically valid, the notion that norms regulate state behaviour should not be taken in its abstract sense, this is because as realists argue, the mere fact that there are norms does not entail observance. As Jepperson et al (1996:56) note, the presence of norms does not dictate compliance even in so called liberal democracies. Similarly, the presence of international law which amongst other things prohibits acts of aggression by one state on another has not done much to regulate the behaviour of states such as the USA that have continued to act arbitrarily by invading other states.

There are several norms that appear to have been in existence since the beginning of time. These include domestic, international, political and religious norms that have been around for several generations. However, norms by nature are not constant. As Stensland (2009:18) aptly notes, norms are not cast in stone; “they can emerge, spread into new arenas or regions or disappear.” As new norms appear, they have to compete with existing ones for acceptance and recognition by actors (Jepperson et al, 1996). However, new norms make new types of action possible. The emergence of new norms has in the past brought about frictions and conflict between actors (Stensland, 2009:18). For example, the introduction of Western norms of democracy in the developing world has certainly triggered tensions between the West and the developing world.

Identity is a concept closely related to norms. For constructivists, identity is the flipside of norms. Jepperson et al (1999:59) affirm that identity is a concept that comes from “social psychology where it refers to the images of individuality or distinctiveness (“selfhood”) held and projected by an actor and (formed and modified over time) through relations with significant “others””. Wendt (1999:224) posits that “identity is what makes a thing what it
is.” Identity reflects mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other. The image of self that an actor holds only becomes an identity when other actors recognise that image. This means that identity has an intersubjective or systemic quality (Wendt, 1999).

Identity can be understood as a product of both internal and external forces. (Katzenstein, 1999:23) explains that, “The international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways.” Identities are therefore, socially constructed. Katzenstein cites Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983) and Haas (1993) as some of the scholars who emphasize the social construction of national identities.

According to Wendt (1999:230), “There are four types of identities namely, (1) personal or corporate (2) type, (3) role (4) and collective.” It is worth noting that these identities are activated selectively depending on situations. That is, a state can in one situation exhibit a corporate identity and may in another instance reflect a collective identity. However, Wendt is quick to highlight the fact all the identities, with the exception of the corporate identity may be simultaneously activated within the same actor.

Though the two concepts are closely related, identities are not the same as interests. For Wendt, identities are who or what actors are, whereas interests are what actors want. Constructivists posit that identities may themselves be chosen in light of interests. However, the mere fact that interests may shape identity does not negate the validity of the thinking that identity is socially constructed. This is because interests themselves presuppose a deeper identity (Wendt, 1999).

However, identities by themselves do not explain action, since being is not the same thing as wanting. Without interests, identities have no motivational force, without identities, interests have no direction (Wendt, 1999). It can be argued that the two concepts are complimentary. Katzenstein (1996:30) argues that what matters is not how identities and norms prevail over
interests or vice versa but what matters is how identities and norms influence the ways in which actors define their interests in the first place.

For Finnemore (1996: 2), states do not always know what they want. Similarly, Jepperson et al (1996:60) and Wendt (1999:231) concur with Finnemore by positing that, “Actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing – “who they are”- which in turn depends on their social relationships.” They explain that this was the dilemma that faced USA and the successor states of the USSR after the Cold War. Without the perceived threats of the other and the identity that came with it, it was difficult for both sides to clearly articulate their national interests in the post-Cold War era. This entails that identity is closely related to interests.

Wendt (1999:224) sees identity as a property of intentional actors that generates motivational or behavioural dispositions. In common with Wendt, Jepperson et al (1996:60) also affirm that identities can generate and shape interests. They argue that while some interests such as mere survival and minimal physical well-being exist outside of specific social identities; many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity as related to the conceived identity of others. What becomes apparent is the dynamic nature of both national interests and identity. As identity changes, so too do national interests and vice versa. However, as highlighted above, in this constantly changing sphere of national interests, there are certain constant features or permanent national interests inherent to every entity worth of the title ‘state’.  

Highlighting the strong nexus between identity and interests, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1999:61) postulate that change in identity can precipitate substantial change in interests that shape national security policy. Citing the USSR and Germany as examples, they

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7While national interests are dynamic and constantly change depending on the identity that a state adopts, there are certain aspects that are constant and are always present namely survival and physical well-being. These form the base upon which different interests can be defined and pursued. In the same vein as a foundation that can support different structures of buildings that may be built upon it. Views obtained courtesy of comments made to the author by Professor Hasu Patel during an interview, Harare (14 September 2015).
explain how the redefining of Soviet and US identities in the 1940s led to the Cold War and also how the reconstruction of the post-World War II German identity led to a pacified, democratic and internationalist interests for Germany.

While structure influences identity, Jepperson et al (1999:62) argue that “states also seek to enact or institutionalise their identities in particular shifting or multiple identities in interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities.” The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU expressed the common identities of liberal democracies and European identity respectively.

Nabers (2011: 82) brings in a role theory dimension to identity arguing that identities and roles are co-constitutive. Role theory posits that actors are guided by the expectations held by the self and a corresponding other. Roles are therefore characteristic behaviour patterns that are learned through experience, based on social interaction. There are distinct similarities between what Nabers terms “roles” and what constructivism refers to as norms. For Nabers, “Roles are the basis of identities, but are at the same time filled with meaning through identity” (2011:83). Role determines behaviour, which in turn constitutes the identity of an actor.

1.8.3 State-centrism as a tenet of constructivism

Constructivism, or rather Wendt’s version of constructivism is state-centric. Much in the same way as Waltz’s structural realism and Keohane and Nye’s institutional liberalism, constructivists affirm to the notion that states are central to all international relations. Finnemore (1996:71) asserts that in a states’ system such as the contemporary international system, the unit of concern is the state and individuals are recognised and categorised in relation to the state as either citizens or aliens. So entrenched is this norm that it has become a basic human right that every individual must have the right to belong to a state.
While accepting that both domestic and transnational non-state actors now have “important, even decisive effects on the frequency and / or manner in which states engage in organized violence”, constructivists argue that states are still the primary means through which these effects are channelled (Wendt, 1999:9). He further explains that,

It may be that non state actors are becoming more important as initiators of change, system change ultimately happens through states. In that sense states still are at the centre of the international system, and as such it makes no more sense to criticise a theory of international politics as ‘state-centric’ as it does to criticise a theory of forests for being ‘tree-centric.’”(Wendt, 1999:9)

According to constructivism, “Regulating violence is one of the most fundamental problems of order in social life, because the nature of violence technology, who controls it and how it is used, deeply affect all other social relations” Wendt (1999:8). Since the state is a structure of political authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, when it comes to the regulation of violence internationally it is states one ultimately has to control.

Sovereign states are therefore at the centre of any change in perception or transformation that can be done to the heavily socialised system that many actors in international politics find themselves.

1.8.4 Constructivist perspectives of sovereignty

The claim by constructivists that states remain the central actors in contemporary international politics presents the need to discuss one of the key concepts of Westphalian states, that of sovereignty and what it entails from a constructivist perspective. Sovereignty is a principle with a contested theoretical and operational definition in international politics. As such, the term has been used and abused by both scholars and practitioners of international politics.

Jepperson et al (1996:45) posit that, “Perhaps the most fundamental institution in international society is sovereignty.” Roberts (2015) defines sovereignty as a principle that establishes the nation-state as an independent actor within the international system. It is based on two international law doctrines. These doctrines are that of formal equality of states and that of non-intervention.
For Jepperson et al (1996:45), sovereignty determines the basic political unit of the state system. This is because; sovereignty affords states only and no other entity the political authority over their territories, making it crucial in the construction of the state identity. Sovereignty is therefore one of the benchmarks of statehood. Any entity that does not lay claim to the principle is not recognised as a state by other entities in the international system.

Sovereignty also regulates state behaviour through norms and practices associated with it such as mutual recognition, non-intervention and (state) self-determination - which in turn help reproduce state identities. Sovereignty norms establish a largely “juridical statehood,” something which becomes a key political resource in the interstate system for most states in Africa.

On sovereignty, Ruggie (1983) as cited in Katzenstein (1996:24) affirms that the international society also shapes varying states identities by virtue of recognising their legitimacy and admitting them to international organisations whose membership is often restricted only to states. Governments crave the diplomatic recognition by members of the international society of states because it bestows upon them the legitimacy they may need to secure their existence. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) postulate that in Africa and elsewhere, for example, sovereignty constitutes and legitimates states that are extremely weak in terms of material power (Katzenstein, 1996:24). Sovereignty is therefore a key concept that is crucial for the survival of weaker states in the international system.

Gottwald and Duggan (2011: 240) note that the Chinese position of respect of state sovereignty has found favour amongst most African states where local elites emphasize the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states by external actors. Governments that have been marginalised by Western criticism of their human rights record have found China’s position on sovereignty particularly attractive. As Sicular et al (2007)
explain, China seems to be providing an alternative source of political legitimacy for autocratic African polities.

According to Wendt (1999: 206), state structures constitute state actors with sovereignty which in turn is traditionally divided into “internal” and “external” sovereignty. According to Wendt, internal sovereignty means that the state is the supreme locus of political authority in society. After all is said and done, it is the state rather than the church, corporations and private citizens who have the right to make final binding political decisions. The fact that this is a “right” is crucial.

Lapid (1996:37) argues that early writers of international law such as Grotius and de Vattel added an external dimension to sovereignty by positing the existence of a system of independent states that were not obliged to recognise any higher authority. Wendt (1999:208) agrees with Lapid by asserting that external sovereignty is “relatively straightforward denoting merely the absence of any authority higher than the state, like other states, international law or a supranational church.” Therefore, states have constitutional independence or autonomy.

The concept of sovereignty has been undergoing some sort of transformation over the years. While remaining autonomous, increased international interdependence has meant that states are increasingly subject to powerful external constraints on their action. Therefore, a gap now exists between states right to do what they want and their ability to exercise that right. The emergence of international norms such as International Human Rights Law (IHRL) means that the principle of sovereignty has somewhat been diluted. Sovereignty is no longer valid as a defence for contravening international norms such as jus cogens. However, as Finnemore (1996: 71) observes, asserting humanitarian norms in a world dominated by states has been a major challenge. This is due to the fact that humanitarian values are premised on a world view not easily accommodated within the principles and rights associated with state
sovereignty. Moreover, as highlighted earlier in the study the mere presence of the law does not on its own guarantee compliance. Despite its pervasiveness globally, international law has been continually contravened by those that are supposed to be bound by it.

From a feminist constructivist’s perspective, Tickner’s analysis of the concept of sovereignty concludes that the development of the concept of state sovereignty in the West has been fundamentally flawed and reflected a “deeply gendered construction that has not included women on the same terms as men” (1996: 152). She argues that early versions of sovereignty were modelled around men in the form of kings and princes a situation that is still prevalent in the contemporary world where women remain marginalised when it comes to foreign policy formulation and implementation.

1.8.5 Understanding discourse in the context of constructivism

A discourse is a “specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible” (Campbell, 2007:216). Burnham et al (2008:250) define discourse as the interrelated texts, conversations and practices associated with a particular object. This object could be devolution, Obama’s health care policy or policies towards Iraq. For Schmidt (2002: 210), discourses are “whatever policy actors say to each other and the public in their efforts to generate and legitimise a policy programme.”

The discourses are according to Burnham et al (2008) revealed in texts such as Bills and Acts, debates, politicians speeches, party manifestos and other publications, articles in the press, television programmes and academic books and articles. They are identified through a careful reading of selected texts, such as official policy texts, articles by journalists, academic publications and influential travel books. The selection of key texts has to be made and justified.
Nabers (2011: 85) posits that discourse is necessarily about change and is defined through articulation. Articulation is any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of that articulatory practice. Texts connect the two speech situations of producing and receiving (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:89-90). A text is produced by certain social actors and received by others. Texts exist and need to be understood in the context in which they are created. Discourses are social practices that are dependent on the context in which they are produced.

Discourses are socially constructed by people who give meaning to objects in the material world. The discourses may often be organised in binary opposites contrasting for example the first and third worlds; good and evil; development and underdevelopment and democracy and authoritarianism (Milliken, 1999). Perceptions and understandings of those with access to the media are encouraged and reinforced. According to Burnham et al (2008: 250) discourse frame and constrain given courses of action some of which are promoted as sensible moral and legitimate thus commanding wide levels of support whilst others are discouraged as stupid, immoral and illegitimate.

Campbell (2007:216) asserts that discourses do not simply describe the world; they constitute the objects of which they speak. Daddow (2009: 161) cites his (2007) study in which he compared the British discourses about Europe, that is the one reflected in Tony Blair’s speeches and the one reflected in the British media as an example of discourse.

Post-colonial constructivist Said (2003) affirms that discourses are power. He notes that Western discourses dominate the world and as such the depiction of the rest of the world by the West actually tells us more about Western beliefs and prejudices than it reflects any realities of those other worlds.

For Said (2003: 40) language plays an important factor in discourse. Western speakers have according to Said, traditionally framed characteristics of Europe and the Orient (representing
parts of Africa and Asia). Said (2003) notes that, western discourse frames Europe as positive and criticises and/or undervalues the orient. Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (1994:7) remark that imperial oppression came in part via the control over language as the medium through which the hierarchical structure is perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of “truth”, “order” and “reality” become established. The reclaiming of the English language by indigenous populations has to the expansion of anti-imperial literature that has challenged “conventional” discourses about the rest of the world.

1.9 Research methodology and design

The study adopts a qualitative research methodology in both data collection and analysis. “Qualitative research is very attractive in that it involves collecting information in depth but from a relatively small number of cases” (Burnham et al, 2008:40). Qualitative research involves the collection and analysis of non-numerical data. Qualitative research tries to understand the meaning of social phenomena, events, institutions and activities. Meaning is therefore a key concept in qualitative research.

Burnham et al (2008:39) define the research design as the “logical structure of the research inquiry that the political scientist is engaged upon.” The authors proposed five major types of research designs namely experimental design, cross-sectional design, longitudinal design, case study design and comparative design. This study adopts the case study design.

Case studies enable researchers to focus on a single individual, group, community, event, policy area or institution, and study it in depth, perhaps over an extended period of time. A case is defined by George and Bennet (2005:17) as “an instance of a class of events.” In this context, the class of events would be the influence that exogenous, socially influenced perceptions of identities and interests have on the bilateral relations of African states. The instance therefore, becomes the deteriorating Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties as from 2000-2013.
1.9.1 Data collection

The research study utilised both secondary and primary sources in the generation of data.

1.9.1.1 Secondary sources

The research made use of secondary sources of data. These secondary sources included newspaper articles, scholarly journals, books, magazines, media clips, unpublished theses and internet sources. These sources were critical to the research study in that they assisted in shedding more light on the research topic especially the contemporary issues surrounding the topic. Moreover, the documents were essential in analysis of the language used. Language is an important element of discourse analysis, the data analysis method utilised in the research study.

Routine public statements by various government representatives and other stakeholders throughout the period of study were extracted from different newspaper articles from both the electronic and print media. These statements reflected the views of these officials on the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana relations and also the issues and principles that were shared or contested by the two states.

Published books and journal articles by various scholars were also analysed so as to establish the existence of any links between the language used by these scholars and the language portrayed in the official communications by Botswana regarding Zimbabwe. The aim was to ascertain if the scholars could have been socially influenced in one way or another by the politicians or media and vice versa.

1.9.1.2 Primary sources

Primary sources are original materials on which research is based. The primary sources used in the research were mainly written primary documents such as protocols, communiqués, treaties and other official documents and correspondences by the governments of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Britain, USA and other multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth and
the EU during the period 2000-2013. A review of these official documents was essential in establishing the extent of the relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana and also the type of influence that Britain had on both these states.

Furthermore, an analysis of the text in official British documents regarding Zimbabwe was done. The reason was to establish any similarities with the actions that these actors prescribe and encourage as the most moral, sensible and legitimate course of action to follow regarding Zimbabwe and the eventual course of action adopted by Botswana towards Zimbabwe. This would therefore prove or disprove the notion of British influence on Botswana’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe.

1.9.1.3 Questionnaires

Questionnaires were administered to 8 academics within the international affairs discipline. The 8 academics were mostly Zimbabwean scholars with the exception of one Batswana scholar/political analyst who was resident in Zimbabwe. Open ended questions were used in these questionnaires; these were then coded for easy analysis. Coding was done along thematic lines. Questionnaires were self-administered in which respondents were asked to complete a hard copy of the questionnaire themselves. Questions in the questionnaires were drawn from the three main research questions. All the 8 informants responded within a six to ten days of being issued with the questionnaire. Questionnaires proved to be a fast and cost effective method of collecting data.

1.9.1.4 Personal interviews

According to Burnham et al (2006), an interview is an important research tool that acts as a means of cross checking facts and views obtained from subjects. It can be structured or unstructured. Some of the advantages of personal interviews are that, issues that are not clear are clarified and it is possible to probe for further details from the participants to get specific and accurate information. However, there also some challenges associated personal interviews,
amongst them being the difficulty to arrange them. Furthermore, some respondents are sceptical to divulge information in the presence of the researcher.

There were measures taken to control the weaknesses of the personal interviews and these included arranging interviews at the convenience of the interviewee. The interviewees were also assured of anonymity and confidentiality through the use of a letter of informed consent as a means of ensuring that they do not withhold important information for fear of victimisation later.

Key informant interviews with academics, political analysts and government officials from Zimbabwe were conducted. These were semi structured interviews. In total, one cabinet minister, one Botswana political analyst, one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe and 4 Zimbabwean academics/political analysts were interviewed using open ended questions in what could be termed as a guided conversation. These interviews were relevant in that they provided background information and access to essential documentary sources that was then analysed later such as official government correspondences.

Due to the constraints of time, financial resources and difficulty in accessing the Botswana Embassy staff in Harare, there was no Botswana Embassy official interviewed. However, this challenge was overcome through the use of a collection of various academic publications by scholars and media reports on the speeches and statements given by these officials.

1.9.2 Data analysis

The study relied on both content analysis and discourse analysis as methods for analysing data. Holsti (1969: 85) defined content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics within a text.” Put simply, content analysis takes place whenever one summarises and interprets the contents of a body
of communication that one would have read or listened to. Qualitative content analysis relies heavily on the judgement and expertise of the researcher (Burnham et al, 2008).

Discourse analysis “focuses attention on the role that language, texts, conversations, the media and even academic research have in the process of creating institutions and shaping behaviour” (Burnham et al, 2008: 250). Philips and Hardy (2002) note that discourse refers to the practices of talking and writing and therefore, institutions are seen as being socially constructed through practices and writing.

This study fits well with discourse analysis in that it intends to examine the influence that discourse had in the deterioration of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana. Discourses encourage and reinforce the perceptions of those with access to the media such as the politicians, journalists and academics. Burnham et al (2008:250) posit that discourses are a tool for framing and constraining given courses of action, “some of which are promoted as sensible, moral and legitimate, thus commanding wide levels of support, whilst others are discouraged as stupid, immoral and illegitimate.”

Discourse analysis researches into the origins of social practices by analysing the discourses that are linked to them and continue to give them legitimacy and meaning (Howarth, 2000). Fairclough (2000) argues that language and discourse are dominated by those that are powerful in society. The powerful manipulate language and discourse by imposing meanings and explanations of social reality that protect their interests. Therefore, discourse analysis would expose whether and how these actors Botswana and Zimbabwe have been encouraged or discouraged by discourse in the foreign policies that they have pursued towards each other.

One advantage of discourse analysis is the flexibility it allows the researcher in terms of research. Burnham et al (2008:256) note that discourse analysis is not limited by the “strait jacket of the traditional scientific approach to research with its emphasis on testable
hypothesis, research design and empirical analysis leading to generalisations.” Despite this, it still permits the conduct of rigorous analysis.

1.9.3 Data presentation

Data for the research was presented in the form of a report using thematic sub-topics. Key findings were reported under different main themes or categories with appropriate verbatim quotes being used to illustrate some of the findings.

1.9.4 Validity and reliability

External validity has often been a contested issue with most case study researches. This is because it is difficult to draw generalisations from one case since this case could be a chance occurrence. Rather than make any generalisations that the findings of the research shall be applicable elsewhere, the researcher invites more research of similar cases so as to draw comparisons with this case.

The researcher intends to use process tracing and data triangulation as a means of enhancing reliability of the findings. Stensland (2009) argues that process tracing illuminates a causal relationship between the independent variable and an outcome of the dependant variable. Data triangulation on the other hand, validates the findings in that different sources of data are used. The results are then compared to ascertain and confirm their accuracy. What this entails is that results obtained using one source should match the results obtained using a different source.

1.10 Limitations

Objectively determining the extent that one variable causes an effect on the other variable has been a challenge for most research designs adopted by international relations scholars due to the limited use of experiments. As such, the extent that external forces such as Britain influenced the bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Botswana proved difficult to measure.
This was due to the presence of other intervening variables. Therefore, it was difficult to attribute the deterioration in diplomatic ties to just one factor, that of external influence.

Although all attempts were made to ensure objectivity in the research study, one limitation of the research is that it was written mainly from a Zimbabwean perspective. Due to the limited time frame and budget, travelling to Botswana proved impossible. However, this constraint was countered by the use of other sources such as official speeches, autobiographies and transcripts of press interviews to glean the views of these informants who could not be interviewed. Alternatively, where certain issues needed to be clarified, electronic means especially electronic mails were utilised.

Given the fact that publicly, both Zimbabwe and Botswana continued to deny the existence of any sort of tension between them, the researcher faced challenges in obtaining accurate and reliable information on what the exact state of the bilateral relations were. Due to the red tape associated with government institutions, accessing ‘official information’ on the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations proved to be a challenge. Classified information, that is information or material whose unauthorised disclosure can harm the interests of the state was not used for this research.

1.11 Delimitations

The research covered the bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period 2000-2013 only. Reference was made only to the pre 2000 era but no reference was made to the post 2013 period. Furthermore, bilateral relations encompass a lot of issues that is political, economic, diplomatic, military, social etc. Whilst reference is made to other aspects of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations, this study mainly focused on the political and social bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Botswana. The reason was that, there was more change than continuity in these areas of bilateral relations as compared to the other areas during the period under study.
1.12 Ethical issues

“Political research cannot be conducted in a moral vacuum. It has consequences for those who participate in the research and those who are influenced by it” (Burnham et al., 2008:282). Ethics are an important component of any research that involves humans. Siakwah (2010: 69) posits that the success of a qualitative researcher depends on whether he/she pays exquisite sensitivity to ethical issues surrounding the research. The researcher obtained informed consent of all the participants, respected privacy and confidentiality at all times, minimised risk and deception and avoided exploitation of the researcher participant relationship.

1.13 Chapter outline

Chapter One

Introduction

Chapter one is the introduction of the research study. It covers the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, literature review, methodology and ethical issues amongst other aspects.

Chapter Two

A historical overview of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations

Chapter two provides a historical overview of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. It traces the two countries’ bilateral ties from the colonial era right through to the period under study which is from 2000-2013. The objective is to determine aspects of continuity and change in the bilateral relations of the two SADC states.

Chapter Three

Evaluating British influence in the context of deteriorating Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations, 2000-2013

The chapter analyses whether there was any influence from Britain on Botswana’s national interests and foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it looks at aspects
Zimbabwe-Botswana relations that could have been manipulated by Britain to negatively influence relations between the two states.

**Chapter Four**

**Understanding Harare’s responses to Gaborone’s foreign policy actions, 2000-2013**

Chapter four discusses Zimbabwe responses to Botswana’s foreign policy actions towards Zimbabwe and the effect it had on the bilateral ties of the two states.

**Chapter Five**

**Conclusions and recommendations**

The chapter provides a consolidated summary of all conclusions. It also fulfils the third objective by providing recommendations on the normalization of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations.
CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ZIMBABWE-BOTSWANA BILATERAL RELATIONS

2.1 Introduction

Chapter two provides a historical overview of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. The chapter is divided into two sections with the first section providing a historical background of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations and the second section giving a detailed analysis of contemporary Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. A historical overview of the bilateral relations is essential since it provides a baseline for determining the extent to which bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana deteriorated during the period under study. This section also highlights the national interests that were regarded as key by both states in their interactions with each other prior to the year 2000. A historical background is crucial in determining whether there was continuity or change in the foreign policies of the two states towards each other during the period under study.

The second section then assesses the bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000-2013. The purpose is to establish whether there was continuity or change in the foreign policy thrust of both states towards each other during this period. This is done by tracing the events that had a bearing on the bilateral relations during the period of study. There appears to be two schools of thought regarding Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the 21st century. On one hand are those that argue that there was more continuity than change in the bilateral relations of the two Southern African states. On the other hand are those that subscribe to the notion that bilateral relations between the two states deteriorated during the period under study. Hence there is need to analyse the arguments proffered by both camps so as to determine the actual state of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000-2013.
2.2 A historical overview of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations (Pre Year 2000)

Zimbabwe and Botswana have a common and long history of cultural ties that dates back several centuries. Colonialism ushered in another common characteristic in that the two territories both fell under British rule in the late 19th century. Oitsile (2010:15) notes that Bechuanaland became a British Protectorate in 1885.\(^8\) Southern Rhodesia on the other hand, came under British authority as a result of the 1889 Royal Charter that authorised the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to occupy the territory of Zimbabwe and exercise governmental authority over it (Moyana, 1984:9).\(^9\) Besides the geography and the culture, British colonialism became another shared trait between Botswana and Zimbabwe. Contemporary African inter-state relations seem to suggest that states that share the same legacy of colonialism, for example having being colonised by the same colonial power tend to forge closer multilateral and bilateral ties if the case of the Francophone states is anything to go by. Despite sharing what at face value appears to be a common legacy of British colonialism, there were differences in the form and manner that colonialism manifested in Zimbabwe and Botswana.

2.2.1 The colonial era

As highlighted in previous chapters, the present day states of Zimbabwe and Botswana share a 500km border that is to the west and east of each state respectively. However, in pre-colonial times, the boundaries between the two states were not as well demarcated as they became in the post-colonial era. This came about with the advent of colonialism which both territories experienced in the late 19th century. Oitsile (2010:15) notes that Botswana was the first of the two territories to be officially colonised. Fearing further Boer encroachment into Tswana territory, Parsons (1998) as cited in Oitsile (2010) explains that the three main chiefs in the Tswana territory namely Kgosi Khama III, Kgosi Sebele and Kgosi Bathoen appealed

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\(^8\) Botswana’s colonial name was Bechuanaland.

\(^9\) Zimbabwe was known as Southern Rhodesia during the colonial era. However, after the independence of Northern Rhodesia which subsequently assumed the name Zambia, Southern Rhodesia began to be referred to as Rhodesia.
for British protection in 1884. This paved way for Botswana to become a British protectorate in 1885.

In contrast with the colonisation of Botswana, Zimbabwe’s colonisation was a violent and bloody affair. It involved the forceful seizure of land that belonged to the Africans by the BSAC which had colonised Zimbabwe on behalf of the British Crown. The BSAC led by Cecil John Rhodes had been authorised by the British government to occupy the territory that later came to be known as Southern Rhodesia. In addition, Moyana (1984) as cited in Chigora and Guzura (2008) notes that, the BSAC had been authorised through The Royal Charter of 1889 to exercise governmental control over this territory. In apparent act of constitutionality, the BSAC and their band of white mercenaries known as the Pioneer Column actually settled in Rhodesia and from 1890 onwards embarked on a systematic policy of expropriating land and cattle from the Africans in Southern Rhodesia through the enactment of racially discriminatory policies such as the directive of the Native Affairs Department of 1910, The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, The Maize Control Act of 1934, The Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and The Land Tenure Act of 1969 (Chigora and Guzura, 2008).

What was being experienced by the Africans in Southern Rhodesia was in stark contrast to what their Batswana counterparts were experiencing as a result of colonialism. According to Oitsile (2010) besides using it as gateway to the potentially mineral rich south-central African interior and preventing further German and Boer expansionism, the British had very little interest in Bechuanaland. Oitsile notes that the British Protectorate of Botswana was administered from outside of its borders in Mafikeng, South Africa. Most of the land and its administration were left to paramount chiefs. Mendelsohn and Obeid (2004) as cited in Oitsile (2010:16) note that the British interests in Botswana were summed up by the British high commissioner when he stated that:

We have no interest in the country to the north of Molopo except as a road to the interior. We might therefore confine ourselves for the present to preventing that part of
the protectorate being occupied by filibusters or foreign powers, doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as possible.

While the British were prepared to settle and build infrastructure in Southern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland was a different scenario all together. Mogalakwe (2006:75) points out that colonialism “subverted and underdeveloped” the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland. At independence from Britain in 1966 there was very little infrastructural development in Botswana. In fact, it argued that Botswana inherited less than 10km of tarred road with the rest of the road network being dusty roads. Contrastingly, at its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited what Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere called a “jewel”. Could this differential colonial history have influenced the two states’ future bilateral ties?

2.2.2 Botswana-Rhodesia relations, 1966-1979

As highlighted by Barston (2006) dependency is a common feature of bilateral relations. In dependent bilateral relations, the weaker power or the dependent power is usually vulnerable to different forms of diplomatic manipulation and often cedes part or all of her sovereignty to the independent power in exchange for political, military or economic support (Barston, 2006).

If Barston’s description of dependent bilateral relations is anything to go by then the Botswana-Rhodesia bilateral relationship was an empirical example of a dependent bilateral relationship which had Botswana as the dependent actor and Rhodesia as the independent actor. It can be argued that virtually all the actions and in actions by the newly independent state of Botswana were a reaction or were triggered by Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Botswana’s actions were constrained by its geographical position, “hemmed in between the minority-ruled territories of Rhodesia and South-West Africa and South Africa itself, with only a narrow and disputed frontier with independent Africa (Khama, 1970: 1).
Due to its dependence and reliance on Rhodesia economically and its “fear” of the Rhodesian military might, Botswana was incapable of charting an independent course domestically, regionally and internationally. The decision by Botswana not to openly support the freedom fighters was influenced by South Africa and Rhodesia. The decision not to have an army was partly due to the perceived “close ties” that Botswana had with both South Africa and Rhodesia, the only potential regional threats. The decision not to join the rest of the international community in enforcing Rhodesian sanctions was largely influenced by Rhodesia. Moreover, the decision to eventually form the Botswana Defence Forces (BDF) was also influenced by Rhodesia.

Rhodesia was therefore, a vital player in Botswana’s diplomacy in the early years. It can be argued that Botswana’s national interests were to a large extent influenced by Rhodesia. As such, the state of bilateral relations between the two was determined by Rhodesia with very little or no input from Botswana. The events in the relations between Botswana and Rhodesia reflected the dependent nature of the bilateral relations and the shifting nature of national interests and how this affected the relationship.

2.2.2.1 Evidence of dependency

By the time that Botswana gained its independence in 1966, there were already deep political, economic and social ties between the two territories (Makgala and Fisher, 2009:3). Botswana was surrounded by white ruled states in the form of South West Africa (Namibia) to the west, South Africa to the south, and Rhodesia to the east in what Dale (1978: 7) described as a “horse-shoe type configuration.” Botswana’s position as an independent landlocked state amongst white supremacist states naturally placed challenges and constraints on state behaviour (Dale, 1978:7). The new Botswana government under Seretse Khama was wary of the threat posed by both South Africa and Rhodesia to its survival and thus it sought to remain neutral to its economically and militarily superior neighbours (Oitsile, 2010: 33).
It is worth noting that Botswana became a critic of the racially segregatory policies of its neighbours to the west, south and east. However, despite the apparent differences with South Africa and Rhodesia over their racial policies, Botswana maintained close trade ties with both states (Oitsile, 2010:34). Oitsile argues that Khama acknowledged his country’s economic dependence on its two neighbours and hence declared that Botswana was open to investments from anywhere including South Africa and Botswana. Rhodesian investments in the newly independent state of Botswana spanned the whole spectrum ranging from construction to service provision. Botswana had to balance between economic survival and the security of the nation as far as its relationship with Rhodesia was concerned.\textsuperscript{10} It was due to this ability to realistically and practically appreciate the political and economic dynamics of the region that earned Seretse Khama the reputation of a pragmatic leader (Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014: 8).

Despite concerted efforts to remain neutral, Botswana’s strategic geographical position as a link between the mostly independent black Africa to the north and the white powers to the south put her in a rather precarious position with regards to her security and economic situation. For the nationalist movements fighting against white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, Botswana was the easiest link to countries in the north such as Zambia that overtly supported the nationalists. As such these nationalist movements sought support from Botswana in the form of refuge and safe passage.

However, as Oitsile (2010: 38) highlights, Botswana found herself in a dilemma of whether to support nationalist movements since doing so would have placed her at risk of military attacks and economic isolation by the white minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia on whom she was economically dependent on. Therefore, Botswana neither overtly supported the nationalist movements that were waging armed struggle in both South Africa

\textsuperscript{10} The idea came courtesy of Professor Hasu Patel in an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
and Rhodesia nor publicly rebuked the regimes in both states for fear of economic isolation by the two states on whom she was heavily dependent on (Ntibinyane, 2013). Botswana was so inextricably tied to Rhodesia economically to an extent that, both the UN and the Commonwealth consented to exempting Botswana from observing the conditions of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia for its UDI in 1965 (Oitsile, 2010).

Moreover, Botswana could not have defended herself in the event of an attack by either South Africa or Rhodesia given the fact that she did not have an army until 1977 (Makgala and Fisher, 2009:3). Instead Botswana’s foreign policy thrust towards both South Africa and Rhodesia was one of caution (Makgala and Fisher, 2009). Botswana called for a negotiated and peaceful but just settlement between the whites and the nationalists in both South Africa and Rhodesia (Oitsile, 2010). Makgala and Fisher (2009: 3) remark that while it covertly supported the liberation struggle, Botswana could only provide moral support to the liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia.

2.2.2.2 Shifting interests and their effect on Botswana-Rhodesia bilateral relations

As the armed struggle in Rhodesia intensified in the late 1970s, relations between Botswana and Rhodesia soured (Oitsile, 2010:80). Rhodesia accused Botswana of harbouring terrorists that were allegedly launching terrorist attacks in Rhodesia from bases inside Botswana. In turn, Botswana accused Rhodesian security forces of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity by illegally entering Botswana on several occasions (Oitsile, 2010: 82). The killing and harassment of Batswana citizens inside Botswana territory by the Rhodesian security forces forced the Botswana government to establish the BDF in 1977 in a bid to protect their citizens (Makgala and Fisher, 2009:8).

The previously neutral Botswana began to use what an observer in Rhodesia termed “warlike language” (Oitsile, 2010: 93). However, despite such allegations Botswana maintained that it had not deviated from its policy of neutrality with regards to Rhodesia. The influx of
Rhodesian refugees into Botswana further strained relations between the two neighbours. According to Oitsile (2010) Botswana accused Rhodesia of infiltrating spies and operatives into the refugee camps disguised as refugees. The operatives would later carry out acts of sabotage in Botswana (Makgala and Fisher, 2009:12). Rhodesia on the other hand accused Botswana of knowingly harbouring terrorists in these refugee camps (Oitsile, 2009).

The turning point in Botswana-Rhodesia relations was undoubtedly an encounter that came to be known as the Lesoma ambush of February 1978 (Oitsile, 2010 and Makgala & Fisher, 2009). On 27 February 1978, a patrol of BDF troops that was reacting to reports of the presence of Rhodesian Security Forces at Lesoma, a village to the north-east of Botswana close to the Kazungula Border Post was ambushed by Rhodesian troops (Makgala and Fisher, 2009). According to Makgala and Fisher (2009) the ambush resulted in 18 casualties, notably 15 BDF troops, one Batswana villager and one Rhodesian guerrilla.

The Lesoma attack resulted in the closure of the Kazungula border between Botswana and Rhodesia which was to remain closed until Zimbabwe’s attainment of independence in 1980. Furthermore, Makgala and Fisher (2009:18) note that the widely condemned Lesoma attack forced the Botswana government to reconsider its policies and whole approach towards Rhodesia. While in the past Botswana had avoided overtly criticising Rhodesia or openly supporting the Rhodesian freedom fighters, after Lesoma everything changed. Botswana became a vocal critic of Rhodesia and also openly pledged its support for the freedom fighters.11

The dynamics in the bilateral relations of Botswana and the white minority state of Rhodesia revealed what could be termed as the naivety and inexperience of most newly independent

11 Botswana provided support to the Zimbabwean freedom fighters during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle (1966-1980). This is a fact acknowledged by Mr Mediel Hove (University of Zimbabwe, History Department) in a discussion with the author (Harare, 5 June 2015). This was also corroborated by Professor Hasu Patel in an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015). Professor Patel pointed out that Botswana gave sanctuary and support to the Zimbabwean guerrillas during the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.
African states. Botswana under Seretse Khama was under the illusion that politics could be separated from economics and hence it felt that the closer economic ties with Rhodesia were enough to deter Rhodesia from attacking them. Furthermore, Khama and his government had the misconception that if they remained neutral on all political issues in Rhodesia and South Africa, then the two states would have no reason to attack Botswana. Having “befriended” the potential threat, Khama did not see any logic in having a defence force. This was again a miscalculation on Botswana’s part.

However, as the survival of white minority Rhodesian regime became increasingly threatened by international sanctions and guerrilla activities, the Rhodesian interests and priorities naturally shifted from economic development to political survival. The shifting Rhodesian priorities meant that the mutual respect and economic ties with Botswana were sacrificed by Rhodesia in a desperate bid for survival. As it emerged, regime survival trumped mutual economic interests. Furthermore, the shift in Botswana-Rhodesia bilateral relations highlighted the dynamic nature of national interests and state relations in general.

2.2.3 Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties, 1980-1999

The independence of Rhodesia which subsequently became Zimbabwe in April 1980 ushered a new era in terms of relations with Botswana. Prior to 1980, these relations had been “completely severed” in the aftermath of the 1978 Lesoma ambush (Oitsile, 2010:99). There was a very strong relationship between Zimbabwe’s newly elected president, Robert Mugabe and Botswana’s first president Seretse Khama a fact that Mugabe regularly alludes to in his speeches on Botswana.\footnote{In a speech at the signing ceremony of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Harare (October 2008), President Robert Mugabe recounted his close relationship with the late first president of the independent state of Botswana, Seretse Khama.} At the multilateral level, Botswana and Zimbabwe, together with Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania cooperated in the regional grouping known as the Front Line States (FLS) (Anglin, 1985:163). The FLS were a group of independent Southern African states that were determined to bring to an end all forms of colonial rule in
Southern Africa and together they supported efforts to bring independence to Namibia and end apartheid in South Africa.

Botswana and Zimbabwe together with the other FLS were also instrumental in the formation of the sub-regional grouping, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in Gaborone in April 1980 (Oitsile, 2010:99). The mandate of SADCC was to reduce its member states economic dependence on the apartheid South African government (Anglin, 1985). The regional grouping became a major tool of Botswana’s diplomacy during this period. Encyclopaedia of the Nations (2003) affirms that Botswana’s foreign policy during the Masire presidency (1980-1998) used SADC as a vehicle for diplomacy. Regionally, Zimbabwe joined Botswana as a member of the OAU, while at the international level the two states were both members of the UN and the Commonwealth.

One notable feature of both Zimbabwe and Botswana’s diplomacy during this era was a tendency to exhibit solidarity with the African consensus on most international matters. As Patel (1985) noted, African solidarity was a key tenet of Zimbabwean diplomacy during this era. As such, the two states collaborated both as individual states and within the SADCC framework to bring independence to Namibia and end apartheid in South Africa.

An analysis of both Zimbabwe and Botswana’s policy towards South Africa and Namibia in the 1980s suggests a commonality of interests between the two neighbours. Both Zimbabwe and Botswana shared several common beliefs at the time and this perhaps provides a logical explanation for the close ties and cooperation between the two states. The shared beliefs in democracy, non-racialism and development resulted in the two states cooperating in the formation of SADCC, supporting the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa. Moreover, these shared interests meant that the two neighbours would equally suffer similar consequences as a result of South Africa’s destabilisation policy. One such example is the 1986 simultaneous bombing by the South African apartheid regime in Harare and Gaborone.
It can be argued that both Zimbabwe and Botswana shared similar beliefs in ideas such as democracy, Pan-Africanism and non-racialism and hence forged closer ties.

At the bilateral level, the economic ties that had been forged in the colonial era were maintained by the independent states of Zimbabwe and Botswana. According to Zwizwai (2007:41), Botswana was one of Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partners at independence in 1980. The others were regional states such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi. The two states decided to strengthen their bilateral ties by establishing full diplomatic relations in May 1983 (Saunders, 2004: 93). However, the establishment of full diplomatic relations was to coincide with an influx of Zimbabwean refugees into Botswana. In a classic case of deja vu, Botswana found itself having to deal with Zimbabwean refugees who were fleeing the disturbances in the Midlands and Matabeleland Provinces of Zimbabwe as a result of an insurgency (Saunders, 2004:93). Saunders notes that the volatile security situation at the Zimbabwe-Botswana border and refugees caused diplomatic tensions between Zimbabwe and Botswana in the early 1980s. In much the same way as its predecessor the Smith regime, the Robert Mugabe led Zimbabwe government felt that dissidents were using the refugee camps in Botswana as bases from which they would launch terrorist attacks in Zimbabwe and retreat back to the safety of the refugee camps.

These allegations of the presence of dissidents among the Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana were instrumental in the formation of a Joint Commission for Cooperation between the two states (The Europa World Year Book, 2003: 824). The joint commission was established in 1984 and held its first meeting in October of that same year. The purpose of the joint commission was to share intelligence and other issues that had an effect on the peace and security of the two states.

The resolution of the Zimbabwean political crisis in 1987 normalised relations between the two states. The refugee status that had been afforded to Zimbabweans by the Botswana
government was revoked in 1989 and all Zimbabwean refugees were said to have returned to Zimbabwe (Saunders, 2004:93). However, by the mid-1990s, the government of Botswana was reporting huge numbers of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants crossing daily into Botswana.

The two states maintained close political, diplomatic and economic ties throughout the 1990s something that the Botswana ambassador to Zimbabwe Kenny Kapinga acknowledged in an interview in 2014. Kapinga remarked that “Botswana used to buy almost everything from Zimbabwe when the industry was productive, farming equipment, steel and a whole lot of other things.”

Having enjoyed cordial relations throughout the 1980s and 90s, there were those that affirm to the notion that Zimbabwe and Botswana’s relations soured or rather deteriorated during the post year 2000 era.

2.2.4 Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties, 2000-2013

The section traces the events in Zimbabwe and Botswana’s relations during the period, 2000-2013. By analysing the elements of continuity and change in the bilateral relations between the 2 states the section aims to determine the areas of bilateral relations that deteriorated and those that were constant. With the leadership of Zimbabwe having remained firmly in the hands of Robert Mugabe throughout the period under study, the section is therefore, divided into two sub-sections representing the two Botswana leaders that exchanged power during this period, that is Festus Mogae and Ian Khama.

2.2.4.1 The Festus Mogae era

The turn of the millennium brought with it several changes that were to alter Zimbabwe’s standing domestically and internationally. There is academic consensus that the event responsible for this upheaval was none other than the “controversial” land reform programme.

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As at 1 January 2000, some 11 million black Zimbabweans were still crowded on unproductive communal lands while 4,500 principally white commercial farmers owned 11 million hectares of prime land (The Europa World Year Book-2003, 2004:1117). The Government of Zimbabwe thus embarked on a programme that was meant to redress this disparity that was a legacy of colonial occupation and its racially discriminatory policies (Chimhowu et al, 2010: 34). The FTLRP as the programme came to be known was conducted at a pace and magnitude never before witnessed in Zimbabwe.

Under the FTLRP, the government compulsorily acquired all the land and did so without paying any compensation. The law was amended in order to legitimise the compulsory acquisition of land and render invalid issues such as the legal protection of private property rights (Chimhowu et al, 2010:40). This meant that there was little or no recourse at the courts for those whose land had been acquired. It is this controversy over payment of compensation and the neglect of private property rights that most scholars cite as the major reason behind the deterioration of relations between Zimbabwe and Britain and in deed most Western powers (Chigora and Guzura, 2008; Badza and Rusike 2005; Chimhowu et al 2010).

While the FTLRP did not sour Zimbabwe’s relations with most developing countries, several scholars point out that, Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties became strained over the issue in much the same way as the Zimbabwe-Britain bilateral ties. As Saunders (2004:93) remarks, Relations between the two countries were again strained in early 2000, as instability in Zimbabwe increased following the seizure of white-owned farms in that country. The Botswana President Festus Mogae expressed his commitment to respect for private property rights and described the developments in Zimbabwe as regrettable.

Mashingaidze (2006:66) concurs with Saunders assessment by positing that contrary to the West’s position over Zimbabwe, most African countries and much of the Third World with the exception of Botswana and Senegal have resolutely stood behind Zimbabwe when the West has sought to isolate it internationally.
Saunders (2004:93) notes that the Botswana government was one of the few states from the developing world that adopted a position similar to the West by criticising the 2002 Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe which were won by Robert Mugabe amid allegations of several irregularities in the conduct of the elections. He argues that Botswana was one of the African states within the Commonwealth that identified themselves with tougher measures against Zimbabwe.14

There are several events in the early 2000s that point to shifting bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana. Besides the political and diplomatic tension over the land reform and elections, there were contentions between Zimbabwe and Botswana over a number of other issues. One such issue is that of Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana. As the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe deepened, thousands of Zimbabweans were forced to become economic refugees in neighbouring states such as Botswana and South Africa.

The influx of Zimbabweans many of whom were illegal immigrants became a major headache for the Botswana government. Botswana feared that the large numbers of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants inside Botswana could have a negative political, economic, social and environmental impact on the country (Jonas et al, 2013). According to Mukumbira (2006), this illegal immigration of Zimbabweans was a major headache for Botswana which in 2002 repatriated 26 717 illegal Zimbabweans at a staggering cost of US$350 000 per month.

Besides the economic burden, social tensions increased amongst the Zimbabwean immigrants and their Batswana hosts. Marr (2012:85) explains that perceptions amongst the Batswana were that Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana led to increased levels of criminality and

14While most respondents did not point out the fact that the 2002 Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe were a source of some tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana, Mr Mediel Hove, highlighted this in a questionnaire he completed for this study (Harare, 5 June 2015).
immorality. These perceptions it would appear, were not only shared by the citizens but by the state of Botswana as well (Jonas et al, 2013:6).

Such perceptions of Zimbabwean immigrants naturally led to ill treatment of Zimbabwean immigrants by both ordinary Batswana and security agents (Marr, 2012). One such incident which a Botswana newspaper described as a “war” between Zimbabweans and Batswana occurred at the Gaborone Bus Station in 2006 (Mukumbira, 2006). Mukumbira (2006) explains that the Zimbabweans at this bus stop reacted to the assault of a fellow Zimbabwean by the Batswana police and members of the public resulting in a mob of about 300 Batswana shouting that they wanted to kill the Zimbabweans.

This incident caused a diplomatic row which saw the then Zimbabwean ambassador to Botswana Phelekezela Mphoko meeting officials from Botswana Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation (Mukumbira, 2006). According to Mukumbira, Mphoko was under pressure from the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure that Zimbabweans in Botswana were protected. This was after several reports of ill treatment of Zimbabweans by the Botswana immigration officials, police, army and paramount chiefs who were accused of publicly flogging Zimbabweans. Mukumbira claims that Mphoko’s predecessor Zenzo Nsimbi was recalled by Harare in October 2002 for failure to deal with the plight of Zimbabweans in Botswana.

While Gaborone was clearly dismayed by the high numbers of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants, Harare was not amused by the alleged ill treatment of its citizens at the hands Botswana authorities and citizens. The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), political upheavals in Zimbabwe and the economic meltdown resulted in the legal and illegal mass exodus of Zimbabwean professionals and non-professionals into Botswana. Competition for economic space naturally led to social tension and xenophobic tendencies by
Batswana on Zimbabweans.\textsuperscript{15} The erection of an electric fence along the Zimbabwe-Botswana border by Botswana was another source of diplomatic tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana during the Mogae era. According to Mukumbira (2006) Botswana claimed that the fence was meant to prevent the spread of Foot and Mouth Disease on to Batswana heard. However, Harare viewed the fence as an attempt by Botswana to shut its borders to Zimbabweans. Indeed, the then Zimbabwean Ambassador to Botswana expressed concern over the electric fence by voicing out that “Botswana is trying to create another Gaza strip”\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to these issues, Harare accused Botswana of hosting a Voice of America radio station called Studio 7 (Mukumbira, 2006). This radio station was allegedly being used to disseminate propaganda against President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) government.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, Zimbabwe accused its western neighbour of housing a US military airbase, allegations which Botswana fervently refused (Mukumbira, 2006).\textsuperscript{18}

While there were several changes in Zimbabwe Botswana bilateral relations during the Mogae era, there were also several elements of continuity in some areas of bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{19} Even though Botswana had initially condemned the FTLRP and the 2002 Presidential Elections, it was not overtly critical of Harare. Saunders (2004:94) notes that at

\textsuperscript{15} The majority of respondents and interviewees for this study concurred that the influx of Zimbabweans into Botswana was a major source of tension. An anonymous Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) Senior Officer (Msc International Relations) pointed this out in an interview with the author in Harare (9 September 2015). The same point was also reiterated by an anonymous Botswana Government official who was resident in Zimbabwe during the period of study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 8 September 2015).


\textsuperscript{17}This point was also highlighted by an anonymous government of Zimbabwe senior official who was once resident in Botswana during the period under study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 11 September 2015).

\textsuperscript{18}Professor Hasu Patel also highlighted the fact that Botswana denied and continues to deny the existence of any military base belonging to the US, UK or any foreign government despite the insistence by some of its neighbours led by Zimbabwe that Botswana hosts such a base. This emerged courtesy an interview with the author in Harare (14 September 2015).

\textsuperscript{19}This was reiterated by an anonymous ZDF Senior Officer in an interview with the author in Harare (9 September 2015).
one point in 2001, Botswana made representations to the US Congress against the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. This move was appreciated by Harare to an extent that the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs formally thanked Gaborone for its effort.

Moreover, Botswana together with other SADC states maintained a policy of silent diplomacy with regards to the issue of Zimbabwe. Malila and Molebatsi (2014:12) assert that, “While the Mogae administration had been openly critical of the Zimbabwean government since 2002, it was always careful not to be seen to be strident and hostile and together with other SADC states pursued what was euphemistically known as ‘quiet diplomacy’”. Similarly, Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014:11) posit that “Mogae opted for the SADC position that supported Mugabe in spite of electoral irregularities in the 2002 presidential elections.”

Despite what some scholars called frosty relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana in the early 2000s, there were certain aspects of continuity in these relations. Diplomatic relations remained and were never at any moment threatened during the Mogae era. The embassies in Harare and Gaborone were never closed, neither were there any threats of closure during the Mogae era. Despite the construction of a fence along the border by Botswana, the borders remained open on with both sides accepting visitors from the other. The cordial relations between the two neighbouring states were also depicted through the continued cooperation between the BDF and the ZDF. Military diplomacy continued as witnessed by the continued exchange of defence attaches and military students throughout the Mogae era. Another example is the Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation between the countries which continued to hold its regular meetings (Saunders, 2004:93).

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20The author is grateful to an anonymous ZDF Senior Officer (Msc International Relations) for reminding him of this important aspect of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during an interview with the author in Harare (9 September 2015).
Continuity was also depicted in trade related issues. As highlighted in earlier chapters, the strong link between the Zimbabwean and the Botswana economies continued through this turbulent phase in Zimbabwe-Botswana relations during the Mogae era. The Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreement between Zimbabwe and Botswana remained operational during this period when other areas of bilateral relations were increasingly strained (Zwizwai, 2007:44). Makova (2012:72-73) notes that in 2005, Botswana was the third highest recipient of Zimbabwean exports. While there were signs of deteriorating bilateral relations during the period 2000-2008, some areas of bilateral relations remained largely unchanged during this period. This was however, not the case during the Ian Khama presidency where the two states nearly went to war.

2.2.4.2 The Ian Khama period, 2008-2013

Gustafsson (2011:15) aptly justified the need for the constant study of the bilateral relations of states by stating that, “In the worst-case scenario, deterioration in bilateral relations may lead to war, destruction and death.” Several scholars posit that the worst-case scenario that Gustafsson described above was nearly the result in Zimbabwe Botswana bilateral relations during Ian Khama’s era as the Botswana president (Badza, 2009; Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014; Malila and Molebatsi, 2014 and Jonas et al, 2013).

While there were apparent signs of deteriorating bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana prior to 2008, the events after Ian Khama’s ascendancy to the Botswana presidency dashed the hopes of normalisation of bilateral ties between the two states. Ntibinyane (2013) notes that, “Under Seretse Khama, Sir Ketumile Masire and much later Festus Mogae, Botswana shied away from publicly condemning other heads of state or governments.” However, the relatively young Ian Khama favoured ‘megaphone diplomacy’ as opposed to
the ‘quiet diplomacy’ employed by his predecessors (Ntibinyane, 2013). Ian Khama was much more forthright in his criticism of Robert Mugabe.\textsuperscript{21}

The 2008 Harmonised Elections in Zimbabwe proved to be the major turning point in Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations (Stensland, 2009:65). After the much publicised election irregularities of the Presidential run-off elections which opposition Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) leader boycotted, Khama’s government became extremely critical of Mugabe and his government.\textsuperscript{22} According to Stensland (2009:65), Botswana called for the imposition of sanctions on Mugabe and his ZANU PF government and also the expulsion of Zimbabwe from sub-regional and regional organisations namely SADC and AU.

While attending an AU summit at Sharm el-Sheik in July 2008 and at subsequent SADC summits during the same period, President Khama and his Foreign Minister Phandu Skelemani repeatedly stated that they did not recognise the legitimacy of President Mugabe (Stensland, 2009:65). Khama went to the extent of boycotting SADC meetings on Zimbabwe preferring to visit the US to meet President Barack Obama in November 2009 when the rest of the SADC heads of state were at a summit deliberating on the Zimbabwe issue (Reneilwe and Ganetsang, 2010). Most scholars concur that Khama tried and failed to marshal any major African leader to his corner (Reneilwe and Ganetsang, 2010; Badza, 2009; Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014 and Malila and Molebatsi, 2014).

While continually refusing to recognise President Mugabe as the legitimate leader of Zimbabwe, Botswana was affording Morgan Tsvangirai the opposition leader presidential

\textsuperscript{21} Virtually all respondents who contributed to this study through interviews or questionnaires concurred that the stand-off between Harare and Gaborone became much more pronounced during the Ian Khama presidency. Professor Hasu Patel pointed this out in an interview with the author in Harare (14 September 2015). The same point was also noted by Lt Col J Geza (Msc International Relations/ Head of Research at Zimbabwe Staff College) in a questionnaire he completed for this study (Harare, 8 September 2015).

\textsuperscript{22} This point was initially noted by Mr Mediel Hove in a questionnaire completed for this study (Harare, 5 June 2015).
treatment. Jonas et al (2013:4) quotes a South African newspaper City Press as alleging that President Ian Khama had supplied an aircraft to Tsvangirai which he was using to travel to and from South Africa. Besides providing logistical support, Botswana also provided Tsvangirai advice in the negotiations that led to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe, such advice which according to Jonas et al (2013), Tsvangirai ignored by agreeing to the terms of the GPA.

As the age old English adage says, it takes two to tango. Zimbabwe naturally reacted to the criticism by Botswana with some venom of its own, thereby setting the two neighbours on a collision course. Zimbabwe accused Botswana of being agents of regime change. According to Jonas et al (2013:3), Botswana which in 2008 was hosting the MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai was alleged to have “availed its territory, material and logistical support to Mr Morgan Tsvangirai’s faction for the eventual destabilization of Zimbabwe to effect illegal regime change.”

Botswana vehemently denied these allegations and its Foreign Affairs Minister was quoted in a local daily saying “the Government of Botswana totally rejects these unsubstantiated allegations, which are obviously nothing more than an excuse to engage in acts of intimidation and harassment of innocent Zimbabweans and a desperate attempt to divert attention from the real issues facing Zimbabwe today” (Jonas et al, 2013: 3). What was clear at this point was that the two nations’ diplomatic relations were sinking to unprecedented levels.

Reneilwe and Ganetsang (2010), note that the relationship between Zimbabwe and Botswana was further complicated by threats from the Zimbabwean President. They allege that Mugabe had reacted to a military build-up by Botswana on the Zimbabwean border by issuing a stern

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23 An anonymous ZDF Senior Officer during an interview with the author in Harare (9 September 2015), indicated that this was the first in a long list of political clashes between Mugabe and Ian Khama.
warning to his neighbours to be careful about provoking his government. According to Reneilwe and Ganetsang (2010), Mugabe stated that, “If there are some who may want to fight us, they should think twice. We don’t intend to fight any neighbours. We are a peaceful country, but if there is a country, a neighbouring country that is itching for a fight, ah, then let them try it.”

While these statements could have been dismissed as mere rhetoric, the February 2010 events that followed up the arrest, detention and trial of some Botswana wild life officials that had trespassed into Zimbabwe, served as an indicator of how low diplomatic relations had really gone. According to Reneilwe and Ganetsang (2010) the issue of the three armed wild life officials that strayed into Zimbabwe caused a diplomatic row that resulted in Botswana taking the decision to recall its Defence and Intelligence Attaches to Zimbabwe as a protest signal to the Zimbabwe government officials.

Following the 2013 Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections which were won resoundingly by Mugabe’s ZANU (PF), Botswana again described the elections as not free and fair despite the fact the elections were endorsed by all the observer groups that had been invited to witness the elections. Botswana again petitioned SADC to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe a move which it quickly abandoned after realising that it was the only SADC and AU member state that did not recognise Robert Mugabe as the legitimate Zimbabwean President.

**2.2.4.3 Strong bilateral ties or just neighbourly co-existence?**

The Botswana Ambassador to Zimbabwe Kenny Kapinga aptly summed up the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations by stating that, “Relations are basically good, both countries accept that we are neighbours and we have to live with one another”

Whether it was deliberate or entirely coincidental, Ambassador Kapinga’s statement appears to be a

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paradox that attempts to paper over the apparent diplomatic tensions whilst at the same time acknowledging the existence of frosty bilateral ties between the two former allies.

Moreover, despite the valiant attempt by the diplomat to remain “diplomatic” through the use of the phrase “good”, the language and tone of the sentence suggests the existence of two entities that like Siamese twins are merely tolerating each other due to their biological or rather in this case geographical make up. What can be gleaned from Ambassador Kapinga’s statement is that the relationship between Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period 2000-2013 was premised more on tolerance than mutual interests, understanding or respect. The relations were, functional but not cordial or friendly.25

Ambassador Kapinga’s sentiments and indeed the sentiments highlighted in various academic and media articles some of which were cited above point to deteriorating ties between Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period under study. This position was corroborated by several scholars and political analysts interviewed and those who responded to questionnaires for the study. Virtually all the interviewees and respondents concurred that relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana had been strained during the period 2000-2013. “Hostile and undiplomatic” was the response from one respondent when asked about the state of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana as from the year 2000-2013.26

Different interviewees and respondents cited various incidences most of which were discussed in the previous section as evidence of frosty bilateral ties between the two states during the period under study. One such incidence was the 2010 row between Zimbabwe and Botswana over the alleged illegal crossing into Zimbabwe of some Botswana wildlife

25This is how the relations were summed up by an anonymous ZDF Senior Officer during an interview with the author in Harare (9 September 2015).

26Analysis courtesy of Dr H Chingono in a questionnaire she completed for the study (Harare, 5 June 2015). Mr Mediel Hove in a discussion with the author (Harare, 5 June 2015) described the relations as sour. Col Cosmore Allen Kaondera in an interview with the author (Harare, 3 September 2015) felt the relations during the period under study were relatively bad.
officials that resulted in Botswana recalling its intelligence and defence attachés and threatening to close its embassy in Harare.\(^{27}\)

While most academics confirmed the existence of sour bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana, most politicians were not as blunt as the academics preferring to remain diplomatic. For example, President Robert Mugabe on several occasions played down the existence of strained bilateral ties between the neighbours dismissing it as mere constructions of the media. There were a number of analysts who also subscribed to this school of thought that while there were some tensions, the media had blown issues out of proportion.\(^ {28}\)

Most politicians could neither support nor refute claims that relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana were strained as from 2000-2013. In the same vein as the President and as the Ambassador Kapinga, they maintained that bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana have been good despite attempts by the media to depict them as contrary by blotting the few occasions where Harare and Gaborone seemed to disagree over some issues. As one analyst explained, “bilateral relations were politically strained but cordial in several areas of mutual concern.”\(^ {29}\) He cited the Bilateral Trade Agreement signed between Zimbabwe and Botswana in 2011 as evidence of the cordial bilateral relations. Through the BIPPA, Botswana pledged a 500 million pula (US$ 76 million) credit facility to Zimbabwe.\(^ {30}\)

However, despite attempts by some politicians and analysts to deny the existence of sour bilateral ties between Zimbabwe and Botswana, the research established that there was

\(^{27}\)News Day, 26 February 2010, “Zimbabwe and Botswana meet over ranger’s row”, available at https://www.newsday.co.zw/news/national/foreign-affairs/ (Accessed 1407Hrs on 9 November 2014). This incidence was also mentioned by Lt Col J Geza in a questionnaire he completed for this study (Harare, 8 September 2015).

\(^{28}\)View posed by an anonymous Botswana Government official who was resident in Zimbabwe during the period of study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 8 September 2015).

\(^{29}\)Interview with anonymous ZDF Senior Officer (Harare, 9 September 2015).

overwhelming evidence to support the hypothesis that Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties deteriorated during the period 2000-2013. Most of the primary data gathered through interviews, questionnaires and presentations corroborated the secondary data that was obtained from documents such as journal and newspaper articles that Zimbabwe-Botswana relations deteriorated during the period under study.

Whilst there was widespread concurrence on the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period of study, differences were noted on the factors that were proffered by various individuals as having influenced the sour relations that most acknowledged. The fact that virtually all respondents were Zimbabweans could have led one albeit wrongly so to the conclusion that the respondents would be biased by being sympathetic to the Zimbabwean position. What emerged could be summed up as deviant since there appeared to be more respondents who were more sympathetic to the Botswana position than the Zimbabwe position. This was perhaps a genuine reflection of the polarised nature of contemporary Zimbabwean society.

Generally, those respondents that identified with the Botswana position acknowledged the sour ties and felt that Zimbabwe had contributed to this state of affairs more than Botswana. The contested elections, government operations such as Operation Murambatsvina, the illegal influx of Zimbabwean economic refugees into Botswana and the contestations on the conduct of the FTLRP such as the violence, the failure to compensate genuine owners of farms and the racial overtones of the whole programmes were some of the factors cited as justifying Botswana’s stance towards Zimbabwe.31 Those that subscribed to this line of thinking generally felt that if Zimbabwe and not Britain, USA or Botswana had contributed more to the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period under study.

31 The author is indebted to Mr Mediel Hove for his analytical contribution through a questionnaire and a subsequent discussion in Harare (5 June 2015).
It is worth noting that these factors which were often cited by those respondents who felt that Botswana was justified in its criticism of Zimbabwe were often similar to the factors cited in most Western discourses on Zimbabwe. Therefore, one could be forgiven for inferring that there is a possibility of British discourses or Western discourses influencing the ideas of some locals on the issue of Zimbabwe-Botswana or Zimbabwe-Britain relations.

On the same note, there were apparent similarities between the responses provided by most respondents who were sympathetic to the Zimbabwean position and the official Zimbabwean government explanation. This again pointed to evidence of the population being influenced to adopt a position propagated by the Zimbabwean government. For example, most respondents who felt that Botswana was not justified in its criticism of Zimbabwe also agreed that Botswana was being influenced into criticising Zimbabwe by Britain and USA since this criticism was uncharacteristic and was a break from Botswana’s traditional diplomacy.

2.3 Conclusion

The chapter sought to provide an overview of Zimbabwe-Botswana relations from the days of colonisation right through to the period under study. The objective was to trace the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana relations at different stages in the history of the two states so as to provide a benchmark for noting aspects of continuity and change in the bilateral relations during the period under study. Wary of its geographical position, stuck in between white minority ruled states of Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa, Botswana adopted a policy of non-interference in the affairs of their militarily and economically superior neighbours. Moreover, Botswana’s economy was heavily dependent on that of Rhodesia and as such it could not publicly rebuke Rhodesia’s racially discriminatory policies. For fear of military attacks, Botswana could not overtly support the liberation movements that were fighting in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Therefore, Botswana and Rhodesia had normal trade relations and very little if any diplomatic relations. After the attainment of independence by
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zimbabwe established full diplomatic relations and continued to cooperate in various sectors of bilateral relations including trade. However, signs of strained bilateral ties began emerging in the early 2000s. These bilateral relations reached their lowest point during the Ian Khama presidency. The next chapter will analyse what different discourses proffer as the factors that led to the deteriorating bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana. The purpose is to prove or disprove the key proposition of this study that Britain influenced the deterioration of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana.
CHAPTER THREE: EVALUATING BRITISH INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF DETERIORATING ZIMBABWE-BOTSWANA BILATERAL RELATIONS, 2000-2013

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations from the early years of Botswana’s independence right through to the contemporary period. The aim was to establish if indeed the relations between the two neighbouring states deteriorated during the period under study by assessing aspects of continuity and change between the historical bilateral relations (pre-2000) and the contemporary bilateral relations (2000-2013). Having confirmed the deterioration of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period under study, this chapter aims to analyse the factors that influenced the deterioration in bilateral relations between the once friendly neighbours. The purpose is to evaluate the possibility of Britain overtly and covertly influencing the national interest preferences of the two states in their interaction with each other.

In international politics, proving scientifically the extent that one variable influences another variable has always been a challenge due to the limited use of experiments in the discipline. However, by tracing various events throughout the political history of both Zimbabwe and Botswana one can be able to establish the existence of British influence in the foreign policy formulation and implementation process of the two states. Furthermore, by juxtaposing what British and Western discourses prescribed and encouraged as the right, moral and legitimate courses of action towards Zimbabwe and the eventual foreign policy stance adopted by Botswana in relation to Zimbabwe, one can be able to establish whether or not there was any direct or indirect influence from Britain.

This chapter is divided into 2 sections. The first section analyses Botswana’s foreign policy framework toward Zimbabwe during the period under study. The aim is to determine the influence behind the dominant Batswana discourses and behaviour towards Zimbabwe. This
was done through comparing what discourses originating from Britain and the West prescribed as the right behaviour for states in dealing with Zimbabwe to Botswana’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe. Conversely, the second section analyses Zimbabwe’s foreign policy framework towards Botswana. The purpose is to determine the possibility of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards Botswana being influenced more by Zimbabwe’s frosty relations with Britain rather than genuine contending issues between the two states. Issues of identity are crucial in this analysis due to the fact that Zimbabwe identified Botswana as an extension of the West and Britain in particular. Hence it meted out to its neighbour treatment similar to the one it was continually dispensing to Britain and its allies. The dynamic nature of identity and interest resulted in Zimbabwe and Botswana assuming totally divergent identities and interests in the period 2000-2013, this is in spite of the fact that the two had several common characteristics.

3.2 Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe 2000-2013

For Hill (2003: 3) Foreign Policy is the first line of defence of any state and it is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.” Speaking in 2012, Botswana’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Relations as quoted in Malila and Molebatsi (2014:16) observed that, “Foreign policy is intended to help protect a country’s national interests, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. It is therefore through foreign policy that, as a country, we can become an effective and influential player on the global stage.”

National interests are generally considered to be the fabric from which foreign policy is made. Questions have thus been posed as to what constitutes the national interests of “militarily weak, economically underdeveloped and sometimes politically unstable small states” (Nkiwane, 1999:200). Put simply, what principles guide the foreign policy of small weak states such as Botswana?
Professor John J Okumu (1971) as cited in Dale (1978:7) asserts that, “The foreign relations of any African state are a function of its colonial history ….” Similarly, Mandaza (2005) in Chigora and Chisi (2009:151) concurs with Okumu by stating that most African states are so historically and economically tied and compromised into an intricate web of dependency on the northern hemisphere especially their former colonial masters. The perspective of these two African academics provides scholarly justification that the foreign policies of most African states are guided by a combination of internal factors such as history and geography and external factors such as the structure of the global political economy and Botswana is no exception.

3.2.1 The guiding principles

Malila and Molebatsi (2014:17) posit that Botswana’s foreign policy has traditionally been guided by a set of well-known internal principles namely democracy, development, unity and self-reliance and other principles such as peaceful co-existence, good neighbourliness, peaceful resolution of conflicts and territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations. For Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014: 6), the core principles that have guided Botswana’s foreign policy behaviour since independence have been amongst other principles, political tolerance, democracy and good governance, respect for human rights and rule of law for achieving peace, security and stability, and commitment to international cooperation.

While there is consensus in most foreign policy texts that Botswana’s interactions have largely been shaped by the a-fore mentioned principles, there has been more asymmetry than symmetry between principle and practice in Botswana’s foreign policy. The argument is that the norms and ideas such as democracy, good governance, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty that Botswana discourses claim to be shaping their behaviour internationally since independence have been largely absent in their actions internationally.
Instead, what emerges throughout Botswana’s history is a foreign policy guided more by cost-benefit analysis of the international environment than by adherence to some principles or ideology. Rational choice and national self-interest have been shaping Botswana’s foreign policy even during the Ian Khama era. Contrary to proclamations by scholars such as Malila and Molebatsi (2014) that Botswana adopted a normative or ethical foreign policy in the Ian Khama presidency; inconsistencies in the Botswana’s behaviour have led many to the conclusion that Botswana’s flirtation with norms and ideas was merely a calculated strategy rather than a commitment to an ideational foreign policy.

3.2.1.1 Rational versus idealist principles

As highlighted in the previous chapter, Botswana’s foreign policy during its early years of independence was more informed by material interests rather than norms or ideologies as most Botswana foreign policy discourses for example Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014) and Malila and Molebatsi (2014) would wish to suggest. While other SADC states that were in close geographical proximity with the racist white minority governments in Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa such as Zambia and later on Mozambique and Angola openly risked their material interests by overtly criticising these governments, Botswana put its national self-interests first and opted to be neutral. As a result, Botswana suffered very little negative impacts of the armed struggles in Rhodesia and South Africa as compared to the other three states of Zambia, Mozambique and Angola.

Botswana chose the more rational way of minimising risks to its economy, infrastructure and population, whereas the other Front Line States opted for the normative and ethical direction of resolutely standing behind their belief in ideologies such as the right to self-determination, independence and non-racialism. Norms and ideas thus trumped material interests as the interests that shaped the interactions of the Front Line States with the exception of Botswana which put material interests ahead of ideas. Such events in the history of the SADC region provide the earliest examples of ethical and normative foreign policies in the region.
Furthermore, the example of the sacrifices made by the rest of the Front Line States glaringly exposes the desperate but futile attempts by Botswana foreign policy discourses to portray Botswana’s Ian Khama’s as pioneering a normative or ethical foreign policy within the SADC sub region. Contrary to claims by Malila and Molebatsi (2014) and Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014), the pioneers of an ethical foreign policy in Africa were Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Samora Moises Machel (Mozambique), Mwalimu Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Agostinho Neto (Angola) and not Ian Khama.

Peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness are some of the normative principles that are cited in Botswana foreign policy discourses as guiding Botswana foreign policy. However, on several occasions throughout their history, the state of Botswana has exhibited somewhat aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours. Botswana’s actions towards its neighbours have been a far cry from the peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness that some scholars wish to advance as the guiding principles of Botswana’s foreign policy. It can be argued that Botswana did not in any way exhibit peaceful and neighbourly behaviour towards its Western neighbour Namibia during the Sedudu and Sitingu islands dispute in the 1990s (Le Roux, 1999).

Botswana began to lay claims to the Sedudu islands on the border with Namibia in 1991. Le Roux (1999: 54) notes that Botswana went on to station troops on the island that had been used by Namibians since 1907 without any objections from Botswana. Many saw this move by Botswana as aggression and at one time, there was a fire fight between troops from both countries. While Botswana could have been justified in claiming the territory, it was the aggressive manner in which they went about their business that was criticised by many. Namibia accused their neighbour of “taking land through the barrel of the gun” Le Roux, 1999:57).
Botswana was to behave aggressively towards its neighbour in 1997 when it used its military in proclaiming ownership of the Sitingu Island (Le Roux, 1999). As with Sedudu, Sitingu had long been used by Namibian citizens for centuries. However, in 1997 BDF troops “invaded” the island, harassed and arrested some Namibian citizens and when to erect the Botswana flag on the island.

As early as 1996, Botswana’s aggressive behaviour and increased military spending was already a cause of concern for other SADC states. At the 1996 SADC summit held in Harare, it was pointed out that Botswana’s massive expenditure on arms had the potential to destabilise the region since the only regional threat had been dissolved with the removal of the apartheid South African government in 1994 (Le Roux, 1999:62). It can be argued that the increased military spending was to support Botswana’s aggressive tendencies some of which include the seizure of the islands of Sedudu and Sitingu.

It was not just the increased military spending that made some of Botswana’s neighbours within SADC uneasy, the increased intimacy between Botswana and the West or to be more specific the close ties that Botswana had forged with the USA in particular was viewed as a security threat to the region. Le Roux (1999: 63) notes that concerns of increased Western presence in Botswana’s defence and security sector started emerging in 1992 when a well-informed British publication on Africa reported that the US government and the Botswana government with some financial support from the French were constructing a massive airbase at Molepolele some 75 kilometres to the north of Gaborone. This is the same airbase that Botswana continued to deny its existence. The onus now lies with Botswana to allay its’ neighbours’ concern.

Moreover, the construction of a voice of America relay station at Selebi-Pikwe in 1992 was another example of the increased Botswana-US ties. Le Roux (1999) alleged that the relay
facility was a powerful eavesdropping facility for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which they used for spying on the whole of central and southern Africa.

The ill treatment of Zimbabwean refugees and illegal immigrants at the hands of Botswana officials such as the immigration officials, police and army personnel is yet another example of unneighbourly behaviour by Botswana. Several scholars have over the years highlighted the plight of these Zimbabweans that have been subjected to inhumane treatment including public flogging by Botswana paramount chiefs for offences such as trespassing.

The construction of a 500 km electric fence on the Zimbabwe-Botswana border has been castigated by many as a move that does not reflect good neighbourliness on the part of Botswana. Mukumbira (2006) notes that many in the region have likened the fence to the cordon sanitaires that were created by the Rhodesian and apartheid South African regimes along the borders with Zambia and Mozambique as a measure meant to prevent the movement of freedom fighters in and outside Rhodesia and South Africa. For Zimbabweans, the fence is seen as encouraging the stigmatisation of Zimbabweans by the Batswana.

Environmentalists have also been highly critical of the electric fence describing its construction as a futile and bizarre move. The environmentalists argue that the construction of the fence is quite astonishing since it comes at a time when other countries in the region had removed fences to create transnational parks and game reserves such as Great Limpopo Transnational Park (GLTP) between South, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Mukumbira, 2006). Botswana’s fence was therefore, seen as an impediment to the free movement and reproduction of wildlife in the region.

While most Batswana discourses (Malila and Molebatsi, 2014 and Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014) would wish to attribute the shift in Botswana’s foreign policy such as criticism of some regional leaders squarely on Ian Khama and his government, there is plenty of evidence that this was not a phenomenon common to Khama alone as his predecessor
Mogae also exhibited such tendencies. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Mogae just like his successor Ian Khama was highly critical of Robert Mugabe and his government. Throughout his 10 year term as president (1998-2008), Mogae was highly critical of the policies of Harare.

Mogae criticised the Fast Track Land Reform in the year 2000 something that Malila and Molebatsi (2014) and Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014) either chose to ignore or were not aware of. Mogae in criticising Harare expressed his commitment to respect for private property rights and described the situation in Zimbabwe as regrettable (Saunders, 2004:93).

Mogae was also critical of the 2002 Presidential elections in Zimbabwe. Saunders notes that, after the 2002 elections, while chairing the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration, Botswana began to identify itself with tougher measures against Zimbabwe.

Despite the claims that Ian Khama initiated the hostile foreign policy towards Botswana’s neighbours, the above examples clearly show that past presidents had less than friendly relationships with the neighbouring states. For example, it was Masire who oversaw the “invasion” of the two islands of Sedudu and Sitingu in 1992 and 1997 respectively. It was Masire who was responsible for the arms race that took place in the 1990s and it was again Masire who was responsible for the increased Western presence in the region through increased US military presence in Botswana. All these factors were to prove critical to the deteriorating bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana.

It was Mogae and not Khama who began the Mugabe and Zimbabwe criticism. Mogae and not Khama was the first African leader to criticise Harare for its alleged bad governance, human rights abuses and land policy. It was under Mogae’s leadership that allegations of the abuse of Zimbabwean migrants surfaced. It was Mogae who constructed the 500 km fence that was described as another Gazza strip by Zimbabwean authorities.
Mogae was the first Botswana president to identify himself with a tougher stance towards Zimbabwe at a multilateral level in the Commonwealth. It was Mogae through his spokesman American Jeff Ramsay who wrote a letter withdrawing Botswana’s support for the unanimous SADC decision to return Zimbabwe to the Commonwealth at the 2003 Abuja Summit (Froese, 2013). Therefore, while Ian Khama departed more from the supposed guiding principles, the other three predecessors had on several occasions exhibited unneighbourly behaviour that was not in line with the guiding principles.

3.2.1.2 Ian Khama: Maverick or just naïve?

Most scholars such as Ntibinyane (2013), Malila & Molebatsi (2014) and Osei-Hwedie & Mokhawa (2014) agree that Khama’s foreign policy towards his neighbours has deviated from that of his predecessors. However, the previous section highlighted how Botswana’s foreign policy towards its neighbours had been less than friendly even before Khama’s presidency. While there were signs of strain in Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties, Khama’s presidency was the epitome of deteriorating Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties. What has not been highlighted is whether Khama’s foreign policy marked a shift in Botswana’s national interests and guiding principles.

It would appear as if Ian Khama was not at all concerned with issues such as good neighbourliness, co-existence and non-interference into the affairs of a sovereign state. Khama’s foreign policy could be assessed to be one that was inspired by normative issues such as good governance, democracy and human rights. For that reason, Botswana under Khama was quick to condemn and publicly criticise the March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe over alleged election irregularities.

Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014: 12) note that Khama withheld recognition of President Mugabe’s government, called for suspension from regional organisations including SADC and the AU and the UN. Furthermore, Khama protested SADC’s failure to take punitive...
measures against Zimbabwe by boycotting SADC meetings (Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014).

Claims that Botswana’s foreign policy had taken a normative turn under Khama were further bolstered by Botswana’s condemnation of the Madagascar coup. The quick recognition and subsequent invitation to Botswana of Ivory Coast’s Allassane Quattarra at a time when the election results were still disputed, the criticism of the alleged human rights abuses by the governments of Egypt, Syria and Libya all supported the commitment to the norms of human rights by Botswana (Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014). Perhaps the strongest indicator of Botswana’s beliefs in norms such as good governance and human rights was when Botswana severed diplomatic ties with Libya following the alleged violent quelling of the Arab spring by the Gaddafi regime (Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa, 2014).

With regards to the International Criminal Court (ICC), Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014) note that Khama again exhibited deviant behaviour from the rest of Africa by offering to arrest any African leader wanted by the court such as Omar Al Bashir of Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. Khama was again a firm supporter of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle contrary to most African leaders who perceive this as an attempt by the West to justify intervention into sovereign states. Khama also condemned the Morsi government in Egypt for what he termed undemocratic actions. In 2013, Khama again condemned the Zimbabwean harmonised elections and once more called for punitive measures against Mugabe.

3.2.1.3 Inconsistencies in Ian Khama’s foreign policy

 Critics of Ian Khama’s foreign policy have rightly noted that, while there are strong inclinations towards upholding norms of democracy and human rights, there are several inconsistencies in Botswana’s behaviour under Khama. Critics have noted that while preaching democracy and human rights internationally, domestically Khama has failed to
uphold the same principles. Within Botswana, Khama is seen as exhibiting authoritarian, dictatorial and even vengeful tendencies (Good, 2010 and Ntibinyane, 2013). Under his leadership, decision making has been centred in the presidency contrary to the tenets of democracy that advocate for inclusiveness. Malila and Molebatsi note that with Khama as president, democracy has been placed under great strain in several areas (2014:11).

Moreover, the continued human rights violations of the Khoi-San people by the Botswana government under Ian Khama has also been cited as evidence that Khama’s insistence on the observance of human rights is nothing but a facade. If he was truly committed to human rights, as the head of state, Khama would have and should have guaranteed the minority rights of the Khoi-San who after all are the original inhabitants of the land.32

Internationally, Khama has selectively applied the norms of democracy, governance and human rights leading some to the conclusion that the normative or ethical foreign policy was targeted towards Zimbabwe only. Ntibinyane (2013) questioned why Botswana only speaks out about some countries and not about others. If Botswana had adopted a normative foreign policy that was guided by a firm belief in norms of democracy, good governance and human rights, then Botswana would have condemned Swaziland’s King Mswati whose country remains Africa’s last remaining absolute monarchy. According to Ntibinyane (2013), the Swazi people live under an oppressive and ruthless regime and in an ideal world Botswana would publicly condemn Swaziland too. Khama has visited Swaziland twice since he became Botswana president in 2008.

Khama was never critical of Malawian Bingu wa Mutharika despite allegations of bad governance and human rights abuses that were levelled against Mutharika. Malila and Molebatsi (2014:13) note that Khama actually hosted Mutharika on a three day state visit to

32This point was also noted by an anonymous ZDF Senior Officer during an interview with the author (Harare, 9 September 2015).
Botswana. The visit was condemned by the media and the opposition in Botswana perceived Mutharika to be a “dictator” in the same vein as Gaddafi, Al Assad and Al Bashir.

Such inconsistencies have added weight to claims that under Khama, Botswana’s foreign policy has been incoherent and impulsive. Malila and Molebatsi (2014:19) argue that in criticising Zimbabwe, Botswana was merely grandstanding and that Botswana’s position on most foreign policy issues including the ICC reflects a lack of statecraft and diplomatic finesse on the part of the Botswana. Malila and Molebatsi have suggested that within Botswana there are sectors that affirm that Botswana’s foreign policy has been built around President Ian Khama’s personal preferences rather guided by national strategic interests or goals. This view was also shared by Professor Hasu Patel who felt that the personality and the values of the leader determine the foreign policy thrust of a nation.33

### 3.2.2 Botswana’s Zimbabwe policy: Home grown or imported?

The principle of sovereignty affords each state the right to chart its own course domestically and internationally. However, Africa’s history has been littered with several examples of direct and indirect interference in the domestic issues of most African states by external actors. From colonialism right through to what Kwame Nkrumah termed neo-colonialism, foreigners have been prominent in determining the policy preferences of most African states. This was especially so during the Cold war, when according to Gadzekpo (2001:37), “Africa became the battle-field for super power proxy wars for the expansion of capitalism from the West led by the United States and for Socialism from the East led by the Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites as well as China.”

There are many who affirm to the proposition that Botswana’s behaviour in the international system as from 2000-2013 strongly suggests that Botswana has not been spared from foreign

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33Foreign policy is personality driven; as such different leaders will define and project their own national interests. Analysis came courtesy of Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
influence, especially British and Western influence in general. Some have gone further to suggest that the views expressed in Botswana’s national interests are not those of Botswana but rather reflect the presence of foreign interests. Several respondents subscribed to the notion that Western views were predominant in Botswana’s national interests and foreign policy during the period under study. It’s obvious that the Western voice speaks volumes in Botswana’s national interests. They do what they are told to do by the West. Another respondent felt that the USA and Britain had a big say in Botswana’s national interests and foreign policy as a result of grants and ownership of diamond companies such as Debswana.

Scholars, such as Dale (1978), Patel (1985) and Nieman (1993) all concur that foreign policy making in most African states has been a privilege of the elite ruling class and as such the national interests of most states have been the interests of the leaders. Botswana foreign policy despite the country’s claims to democracy has sadly been dominated by the presidency which has overshadowed all other institutions (Malila and Molebatsi, 2014).

The close links that Botswana’s two leaders during the period under study had with Britain naturally led to speculation especially within the ZANU (PF) led government of Zimbabwe that Mogae and Khama were socialised into the British way and hence were bound to align more with the British norms than African norms. As noted by Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa (2014) both Mogae and Ian Khama were British trained. Mogae trained as an economist in Britain while Khama trained as an officer cadet at Sandhurst Royal Academy. Such a background perhaps explains the tendency by both leaders to align with British norms and

34 Dr Heather Chingono was of the respondents who were of this opinion in a questionnaire she completed for the study (Harare, 5 June 2015).

35 View expressed by Col Cosmore Allen Kaondera (Zimbabwe Staff College, Academic Division, PhD candidate with Midlands State University) in an interview with the author (Harare, 3 September 2015).

36 This point was highlighted by an anonymous government of Zimbabwe senior official who was once resident in Botswana during the period under study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 11 September 2015).

37 Professor Hasu Patel concurred during an interview with the author that views of Ian Khama and the ruling BDP were the views reflected in Botswana’s national interests and foreign policy. These sentiments were also shared by Lt Col J Geza in a questionnaire he completed for this study (Harare, 8 September 2015).
values especially with regards to Zimbabwe. This perhaps provides some justification to those that allege the presence of British influence and interests in Botswana’s foreign policy actions especially during the Mogae and Ian Khama presidency.

Under Festus Mogae and Ian Khama, Botswana’s foreign policy stance on all global issues from Zimbabwe right through to the ICC were synonymous with the British or Western position. The position adopted by the West would in most cases be the exact position that Botswana adopted. Whether by default or by design, the trend was that London would initially take a foreign policy stance that would be replicated by Gaborone leading many to the conclusion that Britain and the West were directly and indirectly influencing Botswana’s foreign policy.

3.2.2.1 Mogae on Zimbabwe’s land policies and elections

Britain condemned what it termed the violent seizures of white owned farms in Zimbabwe in the year 2000. The Fast track Land Reform in Zimbabwe was triggered by a failure by the government of Zimbabwe to fulfil the expectations of Ranger (1985) called a land hungry people that expected an immediate solution to their land hunger. However, 20 years on the government had failed to resolve the land question and the result was nationwide invasions of farms belonging mainly to whites but also some that were owned by government and ZANU (PF) officials (Chigora and Guzura, 2008).

While there is little consensus about the origins, nature and conduct of the land reform in Zimbabwe, what is clear is that it strained bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Britain. Britain, USA and other Western states condemned the violent nature in which the programme was conducted which included in some cases the murder of white farmers (Chigora and Guzura, 2008). It again condemned Zimbabwe’s failure to uphold private property rights in amending the law to legitimise the compulsory acquisition of land. For Britain and the West, what was prevailing in Zimbabwe was a breakdown of the rule of law. The West accused the
Zimbabwean government of being undemocratic and not upholding the proper principles of good governance. There was fatal politicization and tragic internationalization of the land issue (Chigora and Dewa, 2009).

However, what is worth noting is that Botswana adopted a pro-British position on both the issue of land and elections. While the rest of the developing world expressed solidarity with Zimbabwe whom they felt had a sovereign right to determine her future independent of any outside interference, Botswana’s stance was uncharacteristically similar to Britain’s. This led many to suspect that Botswana had been influenced by Britain into adopting such a stance.

There were glaring similarities between Botswana’s positon and that of Britain. In fact, some of the phrases that Mogae chose to use in expressing “his” feeling towards Zimbabwe’s land reform were like a continuation of the British statement. In a document that highlights the issues raised by the Foreign Affairs Committee on Zimbabwe and the official British government responses to these issues, the British Secretary of State for foreign and Commonwealth Affairs told the British parliament that, Zimbabwe’s

so-called fast track programme is chaotic, violent, unsustainable and little more than the arbitrary seizure of private property…. It is important that Parliament and the public understand that the real crisis in Zimbabwe is bad governance. (Crown copyright, 2002: 1).

Mogae seemed to read from the same leaf as the British. In common with the British, Mogae described the Fast Track Land Reform as a “seizure of white owned farms”, “regrettable” and a “failure to uphold private property rights”. The similarities in the language used by Mogae and that of the British government points to some form of British influence on Mogae.

Moreover, Mogae was highly critical of both the 2000 Parliamentary Elections and the 2002 Presidential Elections. He also advocated for the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. Mogae’s views regarding these issues appeared to have been informed by the British position. According to the Crown (2002:1) the British Government welcomed the,
general endorsement of UK policy on Zimbabwe, in particular Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth, the Government’s decision to reject the outcome and management of the Presidential election in March, and the EU’s decision to impose targeted sanctions against 79 senior members of the Zimbabwe regime.

The apparent U-turn by Botswana to adopt a pro-British position regarding Zimbabwe’s reinstatement into the Commonwealth was yet another indicator of British influence on Botswana’s foreign policy actions. All the SADC member states that were also members of the Commonwealth, Botswana included took a stance to support Zimbabwe’s reinstatement bid at the Abuja summit. However, Botswana wrote to the Commonwealth to inform them that it was withdrawing from the SADC position and would no longer support the Zimbabwean bid for reinstatement.

The similarities between the Botswana and British positions with regards to Zimbabwe could have been dismissed as mere coincidence was it not for the British admission that it had interests in Zimbabwe and that it was working with and through other states to apply pressure on Zimbabwe. Part of the British government’s statement read,

Zimbabwe deserves better. The United Kingdom is under a particular obligation to assist, not primarily because white farmers with British forebears are under threat — although that is a matter of great and proper concern — but because as a former colonial power it still has a residual responsibility. Yet because it is the former colonial power, the United Kingdom’s actions are viewed with suspicion and mistrust; for the time being, it must therefore work with and through other countries and international agencies. In time, the relationship will surely change. We hope, for the sake of the people of Zimbabwe that time comes soon. Crown copyright (2002:6)

Two issues can be gleaned from the British statement. The first is the partial admission that the primary motivation for the British involvement in Zimbabwe was the threat to the white farmers “with British forebears”. This clearly shows that there were British interests in Zimbabwe and that was the reason why Britain was vocal about the human rights abuses and breakdown in rule of law in Zimbabwe but silent about the Rwandan genocide where close to a million black Africans were massacred in less than 2 months. Why intervene in Zimbabwe where only a handful of whites had allegedly been murdered and not in Rwanda where close to a million people had been slaughtered? The answer is simple; the interests of their kith and
kin were at stake in Zimbabwe. While it is understandable for Britain to be hostile towards Zimbabwe, it is difficult to understand the hostility of Botswana towards Zimbabwe.

The second point is that Britain openly admitted that it was working with and through other states to ensure that its actions as a former colonial power of Zimbabwe were not viewed with suspicion. Given the position that the US and the rest of the Western world adopted towards Zimbabwe, Britain had managed to use the US and the other Western powers to pressurise Zimbabwe without raising any suspicion. As Robert Mugabe once noted, Britain had managed to transform an otherwise bilateral issue to a multilateral one (Chigora, 2006). The US imposed ZIDERA as a result of the British influence and the EU imposed multilateral sanctions on Zimbabwe as a result of British influence (Grebe, 2010).

Similarly, it can be argued that Botswana became highly critical of Zimbabwe as a result of British influence. While the rest of the developing world expressed solidarity with Zimbabwe, it was only Botswana and Senegal that could be cited as one of the states that Britain referred to as “working with and through” in their attempts to bring regime change to Zimbabwe. Therefore, claims from various sectors within Zimbabwe that Botswana was a British agent in its regime change agenda find justification from such actions.38

While the US and EU actions could be explained in terms of them performing their role in line with their identities as democratic states whose duty is to ensure that the world is made safe for democracy by democracy, the same cannot be said for Botswana. As a state, Botswana weather under Festus Mogae or Ian Khama hardly fits the description of a democracy. It could also be argued that as a British trained economist, Festus Mogae was cultured into the capitalist way of thinking and hence he would identify more with British values and Western norms such as respect for private property rights and the Western

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38This was the view expressed by most Zimbabweans who could be argued to be sympathetic to the ZANU (PF) led Zimbabwe government’s position.
prototype of democracy. Therefore, the presence of British influence in Mogae’s Zimbabwe foreign policy cannot be undermined.

3.2.2.2 Khama’s ‘ethical foreign policy’

Like Mogae before him, Ian Khama’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe was similar to that of Britain resulting in renewed claims of British influence on Botswana’s Zimbabwe foreign policy. Reneilwe and Ganetsang (2010) note that, “Among many SADC leaders there was a sense that Khama was playing to the gallery of Europe and the United States of America.” These leaders and indeed many others were justified in having such perceptions of Khama and Botswana given Botswana’s actions towards Zimbabwe and towards other dominant global issues at the time.

Britain and the West condemned the March 2008 Harmonised elections in Zimbabwe and Khama followed suit going a step further by being the only African leader who did not recognise President Mugabe as the leader of Zimbabwe, a position that was synonymous with the West. President Ian Khama supported the opposition parties in Zimbabwe a project which had been started by Britain. Khama played host to Morgan Tsvangirai affording him head of state treatment when the later was not one. Just like Britain and the West, Khama called for sanctions to be imposed on Zimbabwe.

Moreover, Khama also desperately tried to convince other African states to isolate Zimbabwe in the same manner that Britain and the West had done. In what can be argued to be advice from Britain, Khama boycotted meetings protesting Zimbabwe’s presence at the SADC summits. Tony Blair had also previously boycotted an EU-ACP summit in protest over Zimbabwe’s presence at the summit.

39An anonymous ZDF senior officer also intimated that Botswana’s direct support of the MDC-T had raised suspicion that it was being influenced by Britain due to the fact that Prime Minister Gordon Brown had also initially openly admitted that Britain was supporting the opposition in Zimbabwe so as to cause regime change in the country (Harare, 9 September 2015).
Khama became Tsvangirai’s chief advisor during the negotiations that led to the signing of the GPA. When Britain again criticised the July 2013 Harmonised elections in Zimbabwe that had been endorsed by all the teams invited to observe the elections, Khama again followed suit. In protest to other SADC leaders for their refusal to accept his bid to sanction Zimbabwe, Khama issued a statement to the extent that Botswana was withdrawing from participating in any SADC or AU Election Observer Missions. On the ICC, Khama offered to arrest any leader indicted for crimes against humanity.

Interestingly, Botswana made these pronouncements after Britain had made theirs and in almost all these events, Botswana’s stance was surprisingly similar to that of Britain. Botswana ended up being a pariah within SADC due to its divergent stance on virtually all issues. When most African states were stressing the importance of home grown solutions, it would appear as if Botswana was determined to import solutions contrary to Ali Mazrui’s principle of Pax-Africana or the spirit of Pan-Africanism. Moreover, in meddling in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, Botswana was infringing upon the very tenets of democracy which it claimed to be preaching to the rest of Africa.

It can be argued that being a British trained military man himself; Ian Khama adopted a combative stance towards Mugabe and the ZANU (PF) government which at times reflected the rigidity of a subordinate soldier undertaking orders from his superior. It has been argued in Batswana discourses that Khama’s experience as a military officer made him a ‘hard man’. However, most argue that instead of being hard on ideas such as human rights and democracy, Khama has been hard on an individual (Robert Mugabe) hence his inconsistent treatment of Zimbabwe and Swaziland both states considered to be undemocratic by Western standards of democracy.40

40 The author is indebted to Mr Mediel Hove for this analysis during a discussion in Harare (5 June 2015).
3.2.2.3 International Socialisation or British strategy of manipulation?

While some scholars have attempted to explain Botswana’s foreign policy in terms of fulfilling its role as a democratic state, inconsistencies in Botswana’s behaviour internationally have thrown doubts into this school of thought. If Botswana had truly been socialised into observing democratic norms then it would have acted indifferently towards any state that infringes upon the democratic ethos. However, as the previous section highlighted, Botswana selectively applied the principles of democracy a feature that is uncommon in states that uphold as certain social identity and role in the international system.

Had Botswana been socialised into a democratic identity and role, then it would have acted in a manner consistent with the expected behaviour of states with the same identity and role that Botswana perceives itself to be, that of being a democracy (Harnisch, 2011). Therefore, given Botswana’s inconsistent behaviour internationally, it is difficult if not impossible to attribute the tendency for Botswana’s foreign policy action to follow that of Britain and the West. Therefore, Britain and the West’s influence on Botswana was not a subject of socialisation.

While there are apparent similarities between British and Western discourses on Zimbabwe and Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, the idea that Botswana was socialised by the international community into adopting a normative foreign policy stance is partially valid. This is due to glaring inconsistencies in Botswana’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe and indeed towards other states with a worse normative profile than Zimbabwe such as Swaziland.

If Botswana was not socialised into adopting a democratic identity and role, how then did Britain manage to influence Botswana into being its follower. The answer, I believe lies in the history of the state of Botswana and the personality of its leader Ian Khama.
3.2.2.4 A case of history shaping future interactions?

As highlighted earlier in the study, unlike most other African states, Botswana was not colonised by the British as some would like to believe. Botswana as a state actually invited the British to protect them from the Boers in 1885. What emerges then is a scenario different from what was prevailing on the rest of the continent where force was used to expropriate land and other resources from the Africans by the British and other colonial powers. For Patel, this differential history could have a bearing on Botswana’s contemporary interactions.41

After several years of “British protection”, when Botswana felt it was ready to protect itself, Britain easily obliged to handing over independence to Botswana on a silver platter a fact that was acknowledged by Botswana’s first president Seretse Khama during an address to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Khama (1970:5) stated that, “For many African countries independence came only after a struggle which sometimes, as in Kenya, involved violence. Botswana's political independence was peacefully negotiated.” In the same address, Seretse Khama went to great lengths in trying to absolve the British of any blame for the underdevelopment that Botswana had experienced under British “colonial rule.” Khama (1970:3) remarked that, “British financial aid and technical assistance has made a fundamental contribution to safeguarding our independence.” As noted by Oitsile (2010:32), despite being “independent” Botswana remained financially dependent on Britain to cover its full cost of administration and development until 1971. Therefore, it can be argued that historically the relationship between Botswana and Britain had been cordial. More so because Seretse Khama himself heir to the Bangwato throne had married a British woman Ruth Williams in 1948 (Oitsile, 2010:28). As noted by Patel, it is difficult to completely rule out

41View expressed by Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
“positive” British influence on Seretse Khama and his son Ian Khama given their personal association with Britain.42

It could be argued that there have never been ill feelings between the Britain and Botswana throughout their history. The Batswana it would seem are eternally grateful for the protection and support afforded to them by the British. Similarly, the British expect Batswana support on several foreign policy issues. Could it be that a dependent relationship was forged between Britain and Botswana which unfortunately Britain continues to manipulate? Britain-Botswana bilateral relations could be summed up as being what Barston (2006:38) termed “dependent bilateral relations.” Barston explains that in dependent bilateral relations, “the dependent power maybe vulnerable to coercive diplomacy and corresponding loss of foreign policy control, as the main power seeks support on wider foreign policy issues, as the ‘price’ of favoured bilateral status.” Therefore, if Barston’s line of thinking is anything to go by, then Botswana is just paying its dues for the decades of British and Western economic and military support.

History again provides all the evidence to support such a claim. For example when Britain, the Commonwealth and the UN imposed economic sanctions on Rhodesia, Britain proposed that Botswana be exempted from observing the sanctions due to the negative economic impact that cutting economic ties with Rhodesia would have on the Botswana economy and people in general (Oitsile, 2010). Again when Botswana sought to balance militarily and economically against other regional states in the 1990s, it forged very close economic and military ties with the Western including Britain, USA and France. This was a period when Botswana was trying to wean itself of its dependency on South Africa and Zimbabwe and forge its own course (Nieman, 1993). However, in untangling itself from regional dependency, Botswana may have been integrated deeper into the Western web of dependency. As the saying goes that there is no free aid; could it be that Botswana had to

42Idea came courtesy of Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
repay all the economic and military support that it received from Britain, USA, France and the rest of the Western world even if the price they had to pay was regional isolation?

When faced with criticism from other SADC leaders regarding the Zimbabwean 2013 Harmonised Elections, Botswana was quick to mention that “it was not afraid to go it alone.” More than anything, this is an indication of Western and in particular British support in the event of SADC or AU isolation for Botswana. In an interview with Stephanie Hanson in 2007, the then Botswana Minister of Foreign Affairs who was to be Vice President under Khama, Lt Gen Mompati Merafhe went to great lengths in praise of US presidents past and present. In appreciation of the huge funding that Botswana had received, Merafhe stated that, “I have yet to come across, in my waking life, a president who has been supportive of Africa like President Bush…in the case of Botswana we are talking about millions… His record, I think is unparalleled.” With such statements it is not surprising that Botswana would be prepared to cut a lonely figure in African diplomacy and be the lone dissenter.  

While Ian Khama and most Batswana continue to claim that their foreign policy especially their Zimbabwe policy was wholly theirs, several doubts still linger. For example, it is difficult to really ascertain which side President Ian Khama belongs to since he represents both the colonial and indigenous Botswana being the son of a Bamangwato paramount chief and a white woman of British origin. Moreover, Ian Khama’s use of his father’s name has also raised speculation as to the reasons why he has to use his father’s name before his own. Is it that he draws his legitimacy as a Batswana from his father given the fact that he himself is of mixed race? Does he not feel Batswana enough by simply being Ian Khama? It is not

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44Ibid.

45Professor Hasu Patel questioned which norms Ian Khama values, the British norms of his mother or the African traditional norms of his father? (Interview with the author in Harare on 14 September 2015).

46President Ian Khama is officially referred to as Seretse Khama Ian Khama.
really Bangwato custom for someone to use his father’s full name first and then his own.\footnote{Views courtesy of a discussion between the author and an anonymous Botswana government official resident in Zimbabwe (Harare, 22 September 2015).}

Despite all these doubts, President Ian Khama and indeed most Batswana believe that he is one hundred percent Batswana and his foreign policy is one hundred percent home grown.\footnote{Sentiments expressed by an anonymous Botswana Government official who was resident in Zimbabwe during the period of study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 8 September 2015).}

3.2.2.5 Botswana: A consistent African democracy?

While there is abundant evidence to support the assumption that Botswana was influenced by Britain and the West to adopt a hostile stance towards Zimbabwe, another school of thought exists that disputes and challenges the validity of such an assumption. This discourse which the Zimbabwean authorities have dismissed as Western propaganda affirms that Botswana’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe is consistent with Botswana’s record historically as the longest standing African democracy.

For proponents of this school of thought, there is no evidence of any external influence in Botswana’s actions towards Zimbabwe.\footnote{Ibid.} They argue that Botswana has acted consistently in conformity with its record as a democracy. Botswana was one of the African states that condemned the undemocratic white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa (Khama, 1970 and Oitsile, 2010). Botswana again condemned the human rights violations that were being perpetrated by the Smith regime on Africans in Rhodesia and neighbouring states such as Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana itself.\footnote{Discussion with Mr Mediel Hove in Harare (5 June 2015).}

Moreover, Botswana’s domestic record as a democracy is beyond reproach. For many, Botswana is a shining example of a true African democracy and as such it ranks highly in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) and various indices that measure democracy.
and human rights.\textsuperscript{51} Botswana’s has respected all the tenets of democracy including holding regular free and fair elections, maintenance of freedom of association, media freedom, human rights. With such a democracy and human rights record, it can be argued that Botswana is justified to preach to others whom they see to be violating the tenets of democracy.

Proponents of the line of thinking are of the opinion that it does not take any foreign influence to notice and condemn undemocratic and despotic practice. A country with a consistent democratic and human rights record such as Botswana can and should condemn any actions that are undemocratic and that infringe on human rights as part of its international moral obligation. Therefore, there is nothing sinister about Botswana being highly critical of Zimbabwe’s human rights record. Moreover, there is no rule that bans an African state from criticising a fellow African state. History has plenty of examples of African states that have been highly critical of what they felt as undemocratic and authoritarian rule by other African states. African leaders have long condemned the practice of coup d’états and have come up with regulations that punish those that use undemocratic and unconstitutional means to come to power. Does condemning Zimbabwe’s democratic and human rights record mean that Ian Khama and Botswana are puppets?\textsuperscript{52} Definitely not, it takes more for one to be branded a puppet of the West than just these condemnations of undemocratic practices. As one respondent explained, “Botswana’s only crime in all this is that it criticised a neighbour honestly.”\textsuperscript{53}

Several respondents rightly noted that, implying that due to the fact that Botswana is an ally of Britain then all she does comes from Britain is a flawed way of analysing

\textsuperscript{51}Views highlighted in a questionnaire completed by Mr Mediel Hove (Harare, 5 June 2015).

\textsuperscript{52}Question asked by Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with the author in Harare on 14 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{53}Views of an anonymous Botswana Government official who was resident in Zimbabwe during the period of study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 8 September 2015).
things.\textsuperscript{54} Zimbabwe is an ally of China and Russia, who vetoed a decision to specify Zimbabwe as a threat to international peace, yet no accusations of Eastern puppetry have been levelled against Mugabe, or the ZANU (PF) led Zimbabwean government. Botswana and Zimbabwe were for a long time both allies of Britain without any objection from either state. This only became an issue for Zimbabwe when her relations with Britain became sour. It should be noted that it is not within the rights of Zimbabwe to decide who Botswana can and cannot befriend. One respondent noted that, “Botswana is a sovereign state; therefore, will not allow herself to be used to represent views of other states.”\textsuperscript{55} Historically, Botswana has forged an independent course free of any influence a fact that Nieman (1993) acknowledged. Furthermore, there is little hard evidence to point towards Botswana being directly influenced by Britain or any other power to act in the manner that she did towards Zimbabwe during the period under review.

What if Ian Khama really is a maverick? It should be noted that Khama and Mogae’s criticism of Zimbabwe were of issues that can be argued to be real. For example, Khama and Mogae called on Mugabe to respect the tenets of democracy and uphold international law and provisions of Zimbabwe’s constitution. For proponents of this school of thought, Khama’s criticism is not as far-fetched as other sectors have sought to portray. Botswana is simply saying to Zimbabwe, uphold the provisions of the 2004 SADC Protocol Governing Democratic Elections to which Zimbabwe is a party to, uphold human rights and respect your constitution. Khama may genuinely believe that Zimbabwe should be more democratic than it was during the period under study.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} Mr Mediel Hove, the anonymous Botswana Government official and Professor Hasu Patel all concurred that assuming that Botswana was influenced by Britain in her foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe is a misguided way of analysing issues.

\textsuperscript{55} Sentiments echoed by an anonymous Botswana Government official who was resident in Zimbabwe during the period of study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 8 September 2015).

\textsuperscript{56} Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
Notwithstanding the principle of sovereignty, the fact that Botswana has suffered and is likely to suffer the brunt of any civil disturbance that happens in Zimbabwe through an influx of refugees and migrants qualifies her to be an interested party in Zimbabwe’s affairs. Therefore, it would be unjustified for anyone to dismiss Botswana as an outsider. Botswana was a recipient of refugees and political exiles from Rhodesia during the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and it remains a recipient of Zimbabwean refugees.\textsuperscript{57} History has taught Botswana that it should be concerned about events in Zimbabwe as they have a direct bearing on Botswana’s political economy.

3.3 Analysing Batswana discourses on Zimbabwe

Even though Batswana and Western discourses have tried to portray Botswana’s Zimbabwe and Third World Foreign policy as originating from Botswana, there is evidence that Botswana’s foreign policy could be anything else but not home grown. Despite the presence of texts like Botswana “can think and act for themselves” and “unafraid to upset the applecart”, there is evidence that Khama had on some occasions been leashed by Britain.\textsuperscript{58} However, to dispel such thinking and ideas, there have been obvious attempts in Batswana discourses to portray Khama as this brave leader, who is acting independently of any influence and who is not afraid to challenge his more senior statesman within SADC.

Khama has been depicted as the pioneer of an idealist or ideological foreign policy when clearly several SADC leaders had adopted that policy way before Khama did. However, it would not be very difficult to trace the influence behind such portrayals of Ian Khama. The influence is obviously not from within Botswana due to the existence of another discourse that depicts Khama as a novice statesman and diplomat who uses megaphone diplomacy in an

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.

impulsive manner (Ntibinyane, 2013; Dingake, 2011). Malila and Molebatsi (2014:7) note that the number of critics within Botswana is increasing.

But how could the number of critics be increasing? The answer again lies in Britain and its Zimbabwe foreign policy. After the defeat of the MDC in the 2013 Harmonised Elections, Britain appeared to have dumped the MDC formations as the agent of choice for the regime change agenda in Zimbabwe and so too with it went the funding. As part of the British regime change agenda sponsorship was guaranteed to all journalist that advanced the British interests as was depicted in this British Foreign Affairs document which stated that,

We recommend that the Government pursue all appropriate means of supporting the work of independent journalists in Zimbabwe — including working through its EU and Commonwealth partners — by encouraging and enabling them to continue to report events and to stand up for democratic values. Crown Copyright (2002:2)

It is possible that the Botswana position over the period 2000-2013 was dictated to them by Britain and the West and as such it affected Botswana’s bilateral relations with other African states such as Zimbabwe. Regionally, British and Western influence on Botswana has made Khama’s state a pariah in Africa. For someone without a deep understanding of geo-politics, Khama’s views regarding global issues such as R2P and the ICC would appear radical. Africa has viewed his stance as British and Western sponsored and thus they have isolated Botswana within the SADC and AU framework. As Malila and Molebatsi (2014: 7) aptly noted Botswana’s “new policy at best is naïve and at worst detrimental to the national interest.” Due to the negative influence of Britain, Zimbabwe-Botswana relations have deteriorated.

3.4 Conclusion

A close analysis of British discourses and Botswana discourses on Zimbabwe highlighted that there was evidence of British and Western influence on Botswana’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe. This is mainly so due to Britain’s apparent admission that in order for her not to be viewed with suspicion due to her past as Zimbabwe’s colonial master, Britain was going to work with and through other states in the developing world in order to effect regime
change in Zimbabwe. However, with almost all the developing states exhibiting support and solidarity with Zimbabwe with the exception of Botswana and Senegal, it was easy for one to assume that Botswana was the developing state that Britain had chosen to work with and through in order to effect regime change in Zimbabwe.

While there could be truth in the above assumption, it however neglects Botswana’s historical record as a democracy. As a democracy itself, Botswana did not need someone to influence her to identify a violation of the tenets of democracy. When the Smith regime in Rhodesia was violating the human rights of both black Rhodesians and Batswana, Botswana was critical of the Rhodesians. Moreover, to assume that by being an ally of Britain, all that Botswana does would come from Britain would be making an academic error. Therefore, while there is evidence of British influence on Botswana’s foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe, one cannot conclusively assert that Britain influenced the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations due to the presence of other intervening variables.
CHAPTER FOUR: UNDERSTANDING HARARE’S RESPONSES TO GABORONE’S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS, 2000-2013

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter evaluated the possibility of British influence in Botswana’s foreign policy actions during the period 2000-2013. The present chapter assesses responses by the Zimbabwean government to Botswana’s foreign policy actions as from 2000-2013. It looks at Zimbabwe’s foreign policy framework from 2000-2013 paying particular to issues such as the guiding principles. The chapter further explains Zimbabwe’s responses to issues such as the refugee issue and increased military spending.

4.2 Zimbabwe’s foreign policy framework, 2000-2013

Zimbabwe’s post 2000 foreign policy has been a cocktail of measures designed to survive the British onslaught on Zimbabwe. Virtually all the measures taken by the state have been a reaction to the British and Western isolation as from the year 2000 onwards. For Nkiwane (1999:200) “small states’ foreign policies have generally been aimed at ensuring that their sovereignty and independence are respected.” Nkiwane notes that most states of Sub Saharan Africa have been least capable of developing truly independent foreign policies due to the negative factors emanating from the legacies of colonial exploitation and deprivation.

4.2.1 The Guiding Principles

“Unlike the foreign relations of many other small states, Zimbabwe’s external relations have been robust, active and daring” (Nkiwane, 1999:199). In his inaugural speech at the UN General Assembly in August 1980, Robert Mugabe then President of Zimbabwe expounded on the five key principles of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy:

According to Chan and Patel (2006: 176) there are other principles that have been incorporated into the above principles namely, “nationalism, Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, solidarity, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, multilateralism, and the Look East Policy.”

The above principles and most importantly sovereignty and equality among nations have been stressed and have largely shaped Zimbabwe’s interactions within SADC, the AU and other international state and non-state actors (Badza and Rusike, 2005: 59). Mudyanadzo (2011: 18) asserts that,

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy during the period 2000-2008 was influenced by a complex interplay of history, geography, past experiences, perceptions of the ruling ZANU (PF) party elite of what constituted the national interest and the ideological consciousness of the ruling elite in addition to domestic, regional and international affairs which impacted on the nation.

Chan and Patel (2006), Nkiwane (1999) and Badza and Rusike (2005) all concur that Zimbabwe has since independence, jealously guarded its sovereignty, even at great cost. In the 1980s Mugabe’s government was consistent in condemning acts by more powerful states that tended to trample on the sovereignty of others (Nkiwane, 1999). Zimbabwe condemned the US intervention in Panama and Grenada and equally condemned the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia and when a fellow NAM member Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990; Mugabe did not mince his words in condemning Iraq (Nkiwane, 1999: 205).

When faced with Western pressure that included sanctions, Zimbabwe refused to give up its sovereignty but instead reinvigorated it through dispersing dependency (Chan and Patel, 2006). Zimbabwe did not hesitate to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of fellow SADC states Mozambique and the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC) when they were under threat (Badza and Rusike, 2005:63).

Youde (2007:6) posits that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is best analysed from a normative perspective. For Youde, the events in Zimbabwe’s interactions with the outside world reflect a commitment to an ideology rather than to material aspects such as power in the form of
military and economic capability. Zimbabwe’s belief in racial equality was the sole motivation for the strong stance against apartheid, despite the negative impact that this could have had on her economy (Youde, 2007:7).

Therefore, the perception that Zimbabwe only invoked sovereignty and anti-imperialism as a means of diverting attention from the real issues of democracy and human rights is indeed flawed. The above examples provide ample evidence that Zimbabwe has always been guided by its firm belief in sovereignty, nationalism and anti-imperialism. These beliefs date back to the days of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and it is because of the legacy of the struggle that nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments remain high in Zimbabwe.

As noted by Patel in Chan and Patel (2006), Zimbabwe’s increased regard for sovereignty, nationalism, pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism is not a product of the post year 2000 era as some quarters tend to suggest. Instead, the nation has consistently been guided by its strong beliefs in the principles of nationalism, sovereignty and anti-imperialism. Anti-imperialist sentiments are high in Zimbabwe due to the legacy of the liberation struggle.59

4.3 Explaining Zimbabwe’s responses to Botswana’s foreign policy actions

Since 1980, Zimbabwe’s relations with Botswana have been characterised mainly by cordial ties with occasional tension here and there. However, since 2000, the bilateral relations between the two states have been strained. This has largely been due to Botswana’s criticism of Zimbabwe’s democracy and human rights record and also Zimbabwean perceptions that Botswana was an ally in Britain’s and was being used an agent in the regime change agenda.

4.3.1 The refugee and illegal immigrants’ issue

The issue of Zimbabwean refugees and illegal immigrants has been a thorny issue in Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties since 1982 when Zimbabwean refugees started flocking into Botswana. These refugees were fleeing the insurgency in the Matabeleland and Midlands

59Questionnaire completed by Mr Mediel Hove (Harare, 5June 2015).
Provinces of Zimbabwe (Saunders, 2004: 93). Zimbabwe accused its neighbour of harbouring the dissidents that were causing havoc in Zimbabwe. However, as of 1989 all Zimbabwean refugees had been said to have returned to Zimbabwe (Saunders, 2004).

The issue of Zimbabweans in Botswana was to resurface in the 1990s, this time in the form of illegal immigrants. With the escalating political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the number of illegal immigrants crossing into Botswana ballooned as from the year 2000. Botswana complained that Zimbabwean illegal immigrants where placing a heavy burden on the Botswana budget.\textsuperscript{60} With the increase of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants, cases of the ill-treatment of Zimbabweans were reporting to be increasing as well. Zimbabwe expressed concern over these alleged cases of ill-treatment and through the use of the then ambassador Phelekezela Mphoko tried to lobby for better treatment of the Zimbabweans in Botswana. There were several efforts by Zimbabwe to try and prevent the ill treatment of Zimbabwean immigrants.

Botswana is however, not beyond reproach. International law demands that foreign citizens must be treated humanely by a host country and as such Botswana should have seen to it that the Zimbabwean immigrants were treated humanely. The practice of flogging Zimbabweans and then hiding behind culture is unacceptable for a state like Botswana that prides itself of being a progressive state that upholds the norms and principles of human rights.\textsuperscript{61}

While Zimbabwe was highly critical of Botswana’s treatment of Zimbabwean refugees, there is need to acknowledge Zimbabwe’s liability in the creation of the refugee situation in the first place. International law demands that each state be responsible for guaranteeing the human rights of its citizens by providing a decent living for its citizens. In the Zimbabwean case, the argument from some analysts is that, had Zimbabwe guaranteed its citizens of a

\textsuperscript{60}Sentiments expressed by an anonymous Botswana Government official who was resident in Zimbabwe during the period of study in a questionnaire he completed for the study (Harare, 8 September 2015).

\textsuperscript{61}Interview with an anonymous ZDF senior officer in Harare, on 5 September 2015.
decent living, the influx of Zimbabwean economic immigrants into Botswana could have been avoided and relations between the two states would not have been strained. Therefore, the onus is on Zimbabwe to mend its economy and prevent the illegal influx of Zimbabwean refugees into Botswana. This would go a long way in normalising the strained Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations.

With regards to the construction of the border fence, again Zimbabwe missed the plot in faulting Botswana over this issue. This is because Botswana explained that the fence was not meant to create a Gazza strip as purported by the Zimbabwean government but was meant to stop the spread of foot and mouth a deadly disease that affected cows, buffalos and wildebeests. Even if the fence had been meant to control the influx of Zimbabweans into Botswana, it was still within Botswana sovereign rights to protect its borders and national interests. After all Zimbabwean illegal immigrants had become an economic and security burden” to Botswana. Moreover, another aspect which Zimbabwe seemed to have missed in criticising Botswana for trying to close its borders is that Botswana was not obliged to support Zimbabwe by taking in its refugees. As noted by Patel, the fact that Botswana had supported Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle did not mean that it had to continue supporting her in this current crisis.

4.3.2 Increased military spending and Western intimacy

Zimbabwe’s initial response to increased military spending by Botswana either reflected a fervent belief in the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state or downright naivety. According to Le Roux (1999: 64), in June 1996, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence responded to Botswana’s increased military spending in the 1990s by stating that, “Zimbabwe does not feel threatened by Botswana’s arms purchases.”

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62Questionnaire completed by Mr Mediel Hove (Harare, 5 June 2015).
63Interview with an anonymous ZDF senior officer in Harare, on 5 September 2015.
64Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
Zimbabwe went on to state that the two states had an excellent relationship and that Zimbabwe was satisfied that Botswana’s militarisation was not spurred by any aggressive intentions and was merely in self-defence.

However, if the then Commander of the Botswana Defence Forces Ian Khama’s response when quizzed about the arms purchases is anything to go by, one can be forgiven for assuming that in purchasing the arms, Botswana had Zimbabwe or the likely threat posed by Zimbabwe in mind. Khama stated that, “Unlike other military forces. We did not inherit anything from the (British) colonial administration. We started from scratch. We had nothing and we developed our force to what it is today” (Le Roux, 1999). Khama seems to be implying that Botswana was balancing against the perceived threat posed by Zimbabwe and its “inherited” arsenal.

While Zimbabwe did not feel threatened by the arms purchases, Namibia which was engaged in border dispute with Botswana saw things differently. The Sunday Tribune (Durban) (1996) as cited in Le Roux (1999) reported that the Namibia Minister of Foreign Affairs labelled Botswana’s arms purchases as “provocative and unnecessary”.

In another case of what could be termed as silent diplomacy, Zimbabwe did not voice any concern with Botswana’s increased military cooperation with the USA. In 1992 alone, Botswana and USA jointly and secretly constructed a massive airbase, a radio relay station apparently for CIA use and also jointly conducted a massive field training exercise codenamed “Operation Silver Eagle” (Le Roux, 1999). While other states in the region such as South Africa and Namibia obviously felt threatened by the increased Botswana-US intimacy, Zimbabwe did not see any potential threat in this alliance. This was obviously a lack of appreciation of geo-politics and diplomacy in general on the part of Zimbabwean diplomats. This is because in diplomacy there is nothing constant, relations evolve.
During the period 2000-2013, Zimbabwe raised a number of security concerns against Botswana. Most of these concerns had their roots in the militarisation phase of Botswana in the 1990s. Zimbabwe accused Botswana of hosting a pirate radio station that was broadcasting anti-Mugabe propaganda into Zimbabwe. The issue of the US air base became of concern to Zimbabwe. Furthermore, Zimbabwe accused Botswana of housing and training MDC insurgents whose intent was to overthrow the government in Zimbabwe. Jonas et al (2013) note that with the increasing hostility between Zimbabwe and Botswana, Botswana mobilised its troops on the border with Zimbabwe and in turn requested for US military support which was turned down by the US.

Events after 2000 proved that Botswana’s militarisation and the increased Western intimacy were to be crucial to deteriorating Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations as from 2000-2013. Arguments are that, with the military and economic assistance of the West, Botswana felt it had hedged the threat posed by Zimbabwe whose economic and military superiority had previously hindered her manoeuvres regionally. Thus, for Botswana and Khama in particular, the time was right to repay the West for the military and economic support rendered over the years and at the same time challenge Zimbabwe’s dominance within SADC. However, as highlighted by Patel, it is not unusual for countries in regional grouping such as SADC to disagree on some issues and this does not necessarily imply that one is under some influence from a global power.

While it could be true that Botswana’s alliance with the West was meant to irk Zimbabwe, it is also true that both Botswana and Zimbabwe were prior to year 2000 beneficiaries of British and Western benevolence and this was not an issue for Zimbabwe. Both countries benefited from British grants including military hardware and technical support such as the British

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65 These are issues that were noted by a number of respondents.

66 Professor Hasu Patel during an interview with the author (Harare, 14 September 2015).
Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) seconded to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had no qualms about this kind of support or British intimacy that she and Botswana were receiving from Britain and the West.

Botswana’s British and Western intimacy only became an issue for Zimbabwe once the British and Western generosity had been withdrawn as a result of the sanctions. Therefore, for Zimbabwe to expect Botswana to sever ties with Britain on the basis of strained bilateral ties between Zimbabwe and Britain was not only selfish of Zimbabwe but a bit naïve as well. Botswana had no qualms with Britain and as such it was only logical that she continues to benefit from the support that both Zimbabwe and Botswana had been beneficiaries of prior to year 2000.

Moreover, Zimbabwe herself was throughout the period of study an ally of Russia and China and no one had throughout the period insinuated that Zimbabwe was under any form of influence from either Russia or China. After all, it was within Botswana sovereign rights to choose its own allies and not be dictated to by a neighbour on who to befriend and who not to befriend. Before the major fallout with Britain in 2000, Zimbabwe was herself an ally of Britain without any complaints from any of her neighbours. Therefore, it can be argued that British intimacy only became an issue of concern for Zimbabwe once she had been isolated by Britain and the rest of the Western world through sanctions. The argument is that British intimacy does not imply that Botswana is under the influence of Britain in all she does.

4.3.3 Gaborone’s criticism of Harare’s governance and human rights record

Gaborone was highly critical of Harare’s governance and human rights record since the year 2000 when the West began to raise concern over events in Zimbabwe which it deemed as retrogressive to the efforts made towards democratisation. The fact that Botswana took a stance similar to the West resulted her being labelled as an ally of the West by Harare. As highlighted earlier there was some justification in Zimbabwe identifying Botswana as a
British and US ally. This is because Botswana was herself a self-confessed admirer of the Western prototype of democracy and hence when Zimbabwean claimed that the land reform was within its democratic rights as a sovereign state, Botswana perceived this move as an infringement of the tenets of Western democracy.

For Botswana, in ‘seizing’ land without compensation Zimbabwe had violated the norm of respect for private property rights. Moreover, for Botswana Zimbabwe’s land reform was an apparent act of constitutionality due to the nature in which laws were amended to suit the intended government actions of taking land without compensation which was again a violation of the tenets of Western democracy. The racial nature of the whole programme and the violence involved again led to widespread condemnation from most Western states and Botswana was again to adopt the Western position. The contested elections of 2002, 2005, 2008 and partly 2013 were again criticised by the West and Botswana was to adopt the Western position. Therefore, for Zimbabwe and indeed for other observers Botswana was under some form of influence from Britain and hence Zimbabwe was justified to view Botswana as a Western ally.

Zimbabwe perceived Botswana’s actions as a violation of the country’s guiding principles and in did the country’s national interests. By criticising Zimbabwe’s domestic affairs, Harare felt that Gaborone was violated several international norms such as sovereignty. Furthermore, for Harare, Gaborone was showing disregard for African norms such as anti-imperialism, pan-Africanism and pax-Africana. Botswana had not shown any solidarity with its fellow African states and this was widely condemned by Zimbabwe.

However, as highlighted earlier, there really is nothing wrong with being a Western ally if Botswana really was one. This is because Zimbabwe herself was an Eastern ally during this period as evidenced by the Look East Foreign Policy adopted in 2004. Furthermore, Botswana has a proven track record as a democracy and as such had the obligation to uphold
democratic norms and critique those who were not doing the same but claiming to be a democracy.

There is also the view that some of Botswana’s concerns about Zimbabwe were genuine concerns that needed to be attended to. For example one academic pointed out that Khama is merely saying to Mugabe please respect international law in terms of the international protocols that you signed up to, respect human rights and mend your human rights record, respect the tenets of democracy then our relations would normalise.

4.4 Conclusion

The chapter established that contrary to claims from Britain and the West that Zimbabwe was only invoking principles such as sovereignty and anti-imperialism as a means of diverting attention from the real issues of governance and human rights, Zimbabwe had throughout its past been guided by norms such as sovereignty and anti-imperialism rather than material interests. Thus in calling on Botswana to respect the notion of sovereignty, Zimbabwe had not deviated from its traditional interests.

The high anti-imperialist sentiments that were depicted in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy thrust towards Botswana and Britain were also traced to be a legacy of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. However, while Botswana had some liability in the deterioration of bilateral ties, Zimbabwe herself also played a part. As the English saying goes, it takes two to tango; Zimbabwe failed to make maximum use of diplomacy to thaw relations with its neighbour and chose the confrontational approach which further strained relations.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide the study’s major conclusions as well as proffer scholarly and policy recommendations for the normalization of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations that deteriorated as from the year 2000 to 2013. The chapter begins by highlighting the major conclusions of the study before discussing some of the measures that could be adopted as ways of improving or normalising the Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties. The aim of the study was to analyse the influence that Zimbabwe and Botswana’s former colonial master Britain had in the deterioration of their bilateral relations during the period 2000-2013. The study sought to determine if indeed the bilateral relations of the two states had really deteriorated during the period under study as had been portrayed in various sections of the media and the academia or it was all media speculation as some politicians and analyst had suggested. The research also had to determine the extent of British influence in the deterioration of these relations.

5.2 Conclusions

From a constructivist approach the research sought to analyse the influence of Britain in the bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Britain as from 2000-2013. The research sought to establish the actual state of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period of study. The other objective of the study was to analyse Britain’s influence in the deterioration of bilateral relations of the two states. The research also sought to proffer policy recommendations on the normalisation of bilateral relations between the two states.

Chapter one was the introduction of the research study. It introduced the research by covering the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, literature review, methodology and ethical issues amongst other aspects.
Chapter two was the literature review and theoretical framework. The first section of the chapter contextualised bilateral relations by analysing existing literature in the area. It also analysed literature on some of the contested concepts in Zimbabwe- Botswana relations such as human rights and sovereignty. The second section discussed the constructivist approach to international relations, especially the theory’s portrayal of the link between identity and national interests. The chapter also discussed the various views held by scholars regarding the use of discourse analysis as a data analysis tool.

Chapter three provided an overview of the aspects of change and continuity in Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. It gave a detailed account of historical and contemporary relations between the two states. By analysing the state of bilateral relations during the pre-2000 era, it became easier to highlight areas of continuity and change in the bilateral relations during the period 2000-2013. The chapter established that indeed most elements of bilateral relations had deteriorated for example the political and social ties had sunk to very low levels. However, some aspects of bilateral relations had remained functional but not cordial with examples being the diplomatic relations and economic ties.

Chapter four discussed the diplomatic relations of Zimbabwe and Botswana during the period under study in the context of national interests. It analysed the influence that Britain had on the national interests of Botswana and how it managed to influence these interests. It also looked at the response of Zimbabwe to Botswana’s actions and the effect it had on the bilateral ties. The research noted that there was a lot of circumstantial evidence to suggest that Britain did influence directly and indirectly the deterioration of bilateral relations between Zimbabwe through its actions and inactions with regards to the two states. However, the research noted that there was no real hard evidence to link Britain to the deterioration of relations between the two states. It was argued that Botswana could have genuinely believed that it could criticise its neighbour’s democracy and human rights record. Whereas, Zimbabwe could have erred in assuming that all criticism had to be influenced by Britain
when Botswana was a sovereign state capable of charting its own independent course. Therefore, the research established that Britain could only be held as partially liable for the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period 2000 to 2013.

Chapter five analysed the research findings within the framework of the objectives of the study. It analysed in a qualitative manner the major findings of the research such as the issue of national interests of Zimbabwe and Botswana. The following section discusses the study’s recommendations towards the normalisation of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral ties.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the research findings, this study makes the following recommendations towards the normalisation of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. The recommendations include further studies of bilateral relations especially inter-African bilateral relations and suggestions for regional bodies such as the AU and SADC and also suggestions for both Zimbabwe and Botswana.

5.3.1 Strengthening African institutions

In a speech in Ghana during Barack Obama’s maiden visit to Ghana as US President, Obama remarked that Africa does not need strong men, it needs strong institutions. Obama’s analysis was spot on. The weak African institutions have given rise to all the problems bedevilling the continent from war to poverty. Regional political institutions such as the AU have been slow and reactionary in dealing with challenges faced by member states. In the case of Zimbabwe and Botswana, both SADC and AU were silent when there were apparent signs of tension and deteriorating ties that almost led to war.

There is need for strong and viable institutions of African diplomacy that should promote and encourage dialogue amongst African states so as to avoid disagreements between African states deteriorating into armed conflict as was nearly the case between Zimbabwe and Botswana in the year 2008. Moreover, there is need to fully operationalise the conflict early
warning centres established by SADC and the AU so as to enable them to deal with any likely conflicts. This can only be done through careful and constant studies of bilateral relations of African states. Strong African institutions that can provide effective African solutions to African problems would go a long way in reducing external influence into African states’ domestic affairs which hopefully would result in enhanced inter-African relations.

5.3.2 Zimbabwe’s role

It emerged that Zimbabwe was as liable as Botswana in the deterioration of bilateral relations as from 2000-2013. Zimbabwe failed to make maximum use of diplomacy to thaw the souring bilateral relations with its neighbour. Instead, Zimbabwe chose to be confrontational which further strained relations.

5.3.2.1 Political measures

The study recommends that Zimbabwe as one of the concerned nations should address its own shortcomings in order to try and normalise relations with Botswana. As noted in the study, Zimbabwe failed to make maximum use of diplomacy to try and diffuse the tension between the two states.

Therefore, it is recommended that Zimbabwe should initiate diplomatic negotiations aimed at normalising relations between the two states. Zimbabwe could make maximum use of the pacific methods of settling disputes including good offices, facilitation and negotiation. Moreover, Zimbabwe should desist from labelling all critics as agents of regime change and British allies. There is need for Zimbabwe to self-introspect and address some of the concerns raised by their critics rather than simply dismissing all criticism as British propaganda.

Domestically, there is need for Zimbabwe to make an effort to improve its governance and human rights record. This would go a long way in allaying Botswana’s concerns about mal-governance and human rights violations. Moreover, such efforts would convince Botswana and other international actors that Zimbabwe was back on the path of democracy. Zimbabwe
should convince all concerned parties that it respects both international law and its own constitution through the practice of constitutionalism rather than constitutionality.

5.3.2.2 Socio-economic measures

One of the major contestations between Zimbabwe and Botswana was the huge influx of illegal Zimbabwean economic migrants who were fleeing economic hardships as a result of the economic hardships experienced by Zimbabwe during the period under study. For Botswana, the migrants who were estimated to be numbering more than a million were burdening the Botswana taxpayers and economy. Zimbabwe on the other hand accused Botswana of ill-treating these refugees. Economic migrants were therefore, a source of tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana.

There is an urgent need for Zimbabwe to prevent the huge influx of its citizens into Botswana. This is because these citizens are after all the responsibility of the Zimbabwean government and by pushing them on to Botswana, Zimbabwe seems to be reneging on its duties and responsibilities to protect and provide for its citizens. However, this can only be done through resuscitation of the Zimbabwean economy to make it more viable again. There is an urgent need for recapitalisation of most industries through FDI. For FDI to start pouring in there is need for the government to guarantee the investors a stable political and economic environment. It only through FDI that Zimbabweans could be guaranteed of domestic employment opportunities. The onus is on Zimbabwe to improve its economy and stop the influx of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants into Botswana, which would in turn result in the normalisation of bilateral ties between the two states.

Moreover, the government of Zimbabwe should invest more in the social protection of its citizens. This is because some of the illegal immigrants crossing into Botswana have been doing in search of better health facilities and health care and better education opportunities following the near collapse of the health and education systems. There is need for more
investments in these sectors so as to ensure that there are no health and education refugees fleeing into Botswana. Any instability in Zimbabwe would naturally cause problems in Botswana due to the strong historical, geographical, economic and social ties that the two states have. Therefore, strong Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations can only be realised when both states remain politically, economically and socially stable.

5.3.3 Botswana’s role

Botswana was not spared of any liability in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations in the period 2000-2013. This because had a role to play in the souring bilateral ties and as such should also make efforts if the bilateral relations of the two SADC states were to normalise in the near future.

5.3.3.1 Political measures

As long as Zimbabwe suspects Botswana of being an agent of the West and supporting the opposition MDC’s alleged plans for a change of government through unconstitutional means, relations between the two states will never be stable. In fact, relations will continue to deteriorate. Therefore, there is need for Botswana to make an effort to engage its neighbour and convince her that she had no ulterior motives in criticising Zimbabwe and that she is not in support of regime change in Zimbabwe. Only then can the prospect of normalisation of bilateral relations be realised.

Botswana has to be convinced to be hard on ideas and not individuals. This is because Botswana has been consistent in its criticism of Mugabe not in the enhancement of democracy in Africa. While continually criticising Mugabe, Botswana has been silent on other undemocratic practices in Swaziland and Malawi. These double standards by Botswana have resulted in increased belief that Botswana is being influenced by Britain to criticise Zimbabwe. Therefore, for Botswana to convince Zimbabwe and several other states that it is acting on its own accord as an independent, democratic and sovereign state, it has to be
consistent in its criticism of all violations of the tenets of democracy and not appear as if it is targeting individuals.

Furthermore, Botswana needs to show increased regards and respect for the other principles of statehood such as sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic issues of another sovereign state. This is because, throughout the period under study, Botswana showed total disregard for these principles preferring to observe some principles at the expense of others. This selective application of the principles heightened claims that Botswana was being used as a pony in the bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and Britain. In addition, Botswana has to do more to allay the concerns of its neighbours that it is the epicentre of Britain and the US power projection within SADC. Botswana has to prove beyond doubt that it does not host the US airbase and communications centre for the Western militaries.

**5.3.3.2 Socio-economic measures**

Botswana and indeed all the SADC and AU member states need to do more in terms of assisting Zimbabwe to literally get back on its feet. There is need for support in terms of lines of credit to help resuscitate the Zimbabwean economy in the same mould as the 2011 BIPPA that availed lines of credit to Zimbabwe. There is need for Botswana to support the rebuilding of the Zimbabwean through increased trade. Such support would be the best way for Botswana to effectively deal with the challenge posed by the influx of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants.

While such measures would constitute the long term plan to normalise relations, there is need for immediate measures that would improve bilateral ties between the two states. Such measures include improving the plight of Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana. There are sentiments to the effect that Botswana has not done enough in terms of protecting the rights of the Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana. It is argued that if Botswana is seen to be doing more to improve the plight of Zimbabwean citizens in Botswana, relations between the two states would definitely thaw.
5.4 Conclusion

The chapter provided the major conclusions of the study as well as the recommendations. It started by summing up the major arguments of the study and then provided the recommendations for the normalization of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations. It emerged that most elements of bilateral relations did deteriorate during the period under study. The few elements of bilateral relations that did not deteriorate such as the diplomatic and economic ties could hardly be described as cordial, rather they were functional. While there was plenty of circumstantial evidence to link Britain to the deteriorating ties of Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000 to 2013, there was no real evidence to prove beyond doubt that Britain was liable for the deterioration of bilateral ties. What emerges rather is a classic example of the failure of African diplomacy. The few contested issues could have been easily ironed out had the diplomats in the two states as led by the heads of states committed themselves to diplomacy. However, it has to be borne in mind that it quite normal for brothers to disagree over some issues as long as the disagreements are constructive. Whether the disagreements between Zimbabwe and Botswana shall ever be deemed as necessary and constructive or a sheer waste of time shall depend on one’s perceptions of reality. Reality after all is socially constructed.
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Wing Commander K Kunaka (MSIS) (Zimbabwe Staff College) (25 September 2015).

Email commentaries

Dr S Van Hoeymissen, Formely of Midlands State University and now with the University of Botswana (4 November 2014)
Appendix 1: Map of Zimbabwe and Botswana

Appendix 2: Letter of informed consent and questionnaire

Midlands State University
P. Bag 9055
Gweru
Zimbabwe

31 March 2015

Letter of Consent

Dear Participant

My name is Fungayi Promote Maraire (Registration Number: R11225W), a level 2.1 Master of Science in International Affairs (MSIA) student with the Midlands State University conducting a research on the topic: An Analysis of Britain’s Influence in the Deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana Bilateral Relations, 2000-2013. The objectives of the research are:

a. To determine the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations as from 2000 to 2013.

b. To analyse London’s influence in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations from 2000 to 2013.

c. To proffer scholarly and policy recommendations on the normalisation of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations.

I am kindly asking for your analytical responses to the above stated research topic. Please note that this is purely an academic research and all information received will be treated as
such. Your views in this questionnaire will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study. Participation is voluntary and one can withdraw at any time.

If you have any questions you would like to ask or discuss, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher on the following numbers 0778 297 082 or 04-705523 or email address fmarax@yahoo.com. The supervisor Dr S Maeresera, can be contacted at Midlands State University P. Bag 9055 Senga Road, Gweru, Zimbabwe.

Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.

DECLARATION

I……………………………………………………………………………………(full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire .I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

Signature  ……………………………….

Date  ………………………………. 
Master of Science in International Affairs Field Work Research Questionnaire


Instructions

1. Can you please give your most honest opinion on each question by filling in on the spaces provided
2. Where applicable please tick in the boxes or spaces provided

Section A: Designation of Interviewees/Respondents

Please kindly tick against your designation

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Politician</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic Analyst</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Academic/Scholar</td>
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Section B

Objective 1:

To analyse Britain’s influence in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana Bilateral Relations, 2000-2013.

Questions:

1. In your own opinion, how would you characterize Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations during the period 2000-2013?

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2. Briefly explain the reasons that you feel influenced the state of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations highlighted above?

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b. ........................................................................................................................................
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c. ........................................................................................................................................
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Section C
Objective 2:

To evaluate the political, economic, military/security and social dynamics surrounding Britain’s influence to the deterioration of these relations.

Questions:

1. In your own opinion, where do the issues contested by Harare and Gaborone emanate from, i.e. the source? Give a brief explanation.

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2. Who and what was guiding Botswana’s national interests and foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe as from 2000-2013?

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3. Who and what was guiding Zimbabwe’s foreign policy stance towards Botswana as from 2000-2013?

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Section D

Objective 3:

To ascertain the extent of Britain’s influence in the deterioration of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations

Question:

Did Britain or any other state or non-state actor negatively influence the bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Botswana as from 2000-2013? Yes [   ] No[    ]

Please explain your answer?

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Section E

Objective 4:
To proffer scholarly and policy recommendations on the normalization of Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations

Question:
How can Zimbabwe-Botswana bilateral relations be normalized?

The End

Thank you for your participation