Challenges faced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Conflict Transformation: The case of the Lesotho Conflict from 1994-2017

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A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Science in International at Midlands State University Gweru, Zimbabwe.

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DECLARATION

I the undersigned do hereby proclaim that this is a product of my own hands and the research findings and investigations have not been offered anywhere else to serve any purpose. Other related sources of information that the researcher has made use of have been fully acknowledged by means of referencing.

Elson Moyo

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Supervisor: Professor P. Chigora

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family, friends and workmates.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>All Basuthu Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Basutholand Congress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Chiefs Council of Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Christian Council of Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>Coup d’etat (unconstitutional military takeover of government)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Angolan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<td>FMNL</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HNT</td>
<td>Human Needs Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Fund for Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Interim Political Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISPDC</td>
<td>Inter-State Politics and Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>khotso</td>
<td>calm (in Basuthu language)</td>
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<tr>
<td>khutso</td>
<td>peaceful (in Basuthu language)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lesotho Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLA</td>
<td>Lesotho Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Peoples’ Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics Defence and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Provisional Council of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>SAMIL</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community Preventive Mission in Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSPPR</td>
<td>Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union</td>
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ABSTRACT
The post-Cold War period has been characterised by increased intra-state conflicts in most African states which have overstretched the United Nations’ (UN) capacity to respond to all conflicts that occur in various regions across the globe. This has resulted in an observable relative decrease in the involvement of the UN in African internal conflicts and a subsequent increase in African regional organisations being involved in various conflict handling mechanisms within their respective communities as provided for in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Among the mechanisms being adopted is conflict transformation which is a relative new phenomenon. Just like other sub-regional organisations in Africa, the SADC has had challenges in conflict transformation as vindicated by recurrent internal conflicts in the DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique. The study therefore sought to examine challenges being encountered by the SADC in its efforts to facilitate conflict transformation in the region using the Lesotho conflict from 1994 to 2017 with a view to generalise findings to the whole region. The selection of the theory is premised on conflict transformation supported by the human needs theory. The study adopted a qualitative approach to collect and analyse data. In-depth interviews which were conducted in Zimbabwe and Lesotho complemented data collected through desk search.

The Lesotho conflict, which dates back to that country’s independence in 1966, has been recurrent since then. After the transformation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, the regional body has intervened in Lesotho using various means and mechanisms for conflict handling. However, despite SADC’s involvement in trying to transform the conflict in Lesotho, it has remained recurrent. Since the 1994 disturbances, the conflict has continued to recur at various magnitudes of violence, notably in 1998, 2007 and 2014 to 2017. Given Lesotho’s continued turbulent nature, the study identified that SADC had some challenges in its facilitation of conflict transformation in that country. The identified conflict transformation challenges in Lesotho which generally apply to the whole region include the sovereignty of member states, national interests of member states, structural challenges for the SADC institutions responsible for dealing with conflict, the demanding nature of conflict transformation programmes and processes, lack of sufficient funding and SADC’s insufficient grassroots engagement in the transformation process.
The study also noted that there were no relevant provisions for conflict transformation to guide SADC conflict transformation. An urgent need to include conflict transformation in SADC provisions and literature was therefore recommended. The research also identified that conflict transformation is demanding in terms of time, human and material resources as well as funding. The research noted that SADC needs to make detailed conflict analysis, come up with necessary phased programmes and processes, draw budgets for each phase, source and allocate funds for each phase and have a system for evaluation. It was also recommended that SADC needs to consider sourcing funds for specific conflict transformation programmes both from member states and from other external actors who include international organisations, other countries outside the SADC region, donor organisations and the corporate world. In this regard, the study recommended that there was need for SADC to reconsider its position of resisting external funding from donors or other countries around the globe. The research therefore recommended that if SADC was to facilitate successful conflict transformation in the region, there was need for the creation of a deliberate fund for the sustenance of conflict transformation in regional conflicts.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Efforts by Africa’s sub-regional organisations to resolve internal instability within their respective communities have often been overridden by recurrent internal conflicts within member states. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in the two Liberian civil wars which became protracted and recurrent between 1990 to 1998 and 1999 to 2003. Since then Liberia has enjoyed a relatively peaceful environment. The Community was also involved in conflict transformation in Sierra Leone which experienced conflict from 1997 to 2002. ECOWAS has been successful in conflict transformation in Liberia and Sierra Leone which have enjoyed uninterrupted peace and security since the end of the two internal conflicts. In the East African Community (EAC), Rwanda has been argued to have undergone successful conflict transformation which started with the setting up of the United Nations (UN) Tribunal and subsequent local courts to try those involved in the genocide. Burundi seems to be undergoing difficult conflict transformation as relative instability still exists. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) can also be argued to have successfully facilitated conflict transformation in the Madagascar conflict which started in 2009 and continued to 2014.

The SADC has however, not successfully transformed the DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique conflicts. The Lesotho conflict, which dates back to 1966 after the country gained its independence, has continued to erupt and has had some effects on the political, social and economic stability of that country. Since the 1994 disturbances in Lesotho, the SADC has intervened diplomatically or militarily to bring about normalcy. After the 1994 disturbances, conflict recurred in 1998, 2007 and 2014 to 2017. The conflict has often involved the security sector. Given Lesotho’s continued turbulent nature, the SADC seems to have some challenges in its conflict transformation capabilities. This study therefore seeks to explore the SADC conflict transformation challenges using the case of the Lesotho recurrent conflict from 1994 to 2017.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Although the SADC has made tremendous efforts to transform conflicts within the region, recurrent conflicts remain problematic. SADC seems to encounter challenges in conflict
transformation as indicated by recurrent conflicts in the DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique. The Lesotho conflict, which dates back to 1966 when the country gained its independence, has continued to erupt and has had some negative effects on the political, social and economic stability and development of that country. Lesotho’s internal conflict has continued to recur despite SADC’s efforts to transform it. Since the 1994 disturbances in Lesotho, the SADC has intervened using various means to restore normalcy but the conflict has continued to recur. After the 1994 disturbances, conflict recurred in 1998, 2007 and 2014 up to 2017. The conflict has often involved the security sector. Given Lesotho’s continued turbulent nature, the SADC seems to have some challenges in transforming the conflict in that country. This study therefore seeks to explore the SADC conflict transformation challenges using the case of the Lesotho recurrent conflict from 1994 to 2017.

1.3 Justification of the Study

Conflict transformation is a fairly new phenomenon whose implementation particularly within the SADC region needs more improvement, hence the essence of this study. As noted above, the problem of recurrent internal conflicts in some SADC member states remains pronounced which seems to indicate some challenges in the implementation of conflict transformation. As such, the study will identify these challenges and existing gaps to be filled between theoretical and practical implementation of the theory of conflict transformation within the SADC region. The study will also contribute to regional policy makers approach to conflict transformation and will provide valuable input to the discourse of conflict transformation for the academia. Generally, the study will provide a workable framework for conflict transformation in the SADC region and elsewhere.

1.4 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Key concepts guiding this study are mediation, peace, conflict, security, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Conflict transformation and security are the guiding theories while the former is the main theory underpinning the study.

1.4.1 Mediation and Diplomacy

Mediation, which is an essential component of conflict transformation according to Berridge
(2010:235) “is a special kind of negotiation designed to promote the settlement of a conflict. According to Berridge (p.236), “mediation is the active search for a negotiated settlement in an international or intra-state conflict by an impartial third party.” The requirement for an impartial third party to bring the conflicting parties to a negotiated settlement, is at times militated by national interests of member states. Since most state action or cooperation are interest based according to realism, states acting on their official capacity or through regional or international organisations have often been found compromising on their neutrality especially when their interests in the conflict become pronounced.

National, institutional or personal interests present a challenge that regional organisations in particular have to contend with. For example, the United States of America’s (USA) overt support for Israel has been a stumbling block to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestine conflict. It would be therefore inappropriate to have the USA mediating in the Israeli-Palestinian long-standing conflict. Even corporates, individuals, non-governmental organisations, churches, respected elders, former statesmen and women, academics or civil society in general are also likely to be influenced by the interests of the states or institutions they belong to. For example, it has been alleged that the Roman Catholic Church was interested in returning back to Mozambique since Samora Machel, the founding president of Mozambique had banned all religious activities at independence.

As Berridge posits, “All mediators should be perceived as impartial to the specific issues dividing the parties to a conflict; have influence, if not more effective power, relative to them (parties to the conflict); possess the ability to devote sustained attention to their dispute; and be propelled by a strong incentive to achieve a durable settlement...Impartiality enables the third party to be trusted by both parties” (Berridge, p.246). The bottom-line for mediation is that a mediator must at all cost be neutral or impartial especially during negotiations.

1.4.1.1 Track One and Track Two Diplomacy

Berridge (p.238) divides mediation into official or track one and non-official or track two and chooses to ignore the third category which is multi-track diplomacy to prevent confusing the distinction between track one and track two diplomacy. Both track one, track two and multi-track diplomacy have been used in conflict transformation through mediated negotiations aimed at bringing in positive change to the conflict in terms of personal, relational, structural
and cultural dimensions. For example, track two has been useful in the Mozambican conflict while the SADC relied on track one in the Madagascar conflict and multi-track diplomacy brought positive results in Northern Ireland.

1.4.1.2 Track One Diplomacy

Track One diplomacy according to the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy involves official government diplomacy characterised by communication and interaction between governments. It comprises states through heads of states, assigned diplomats as key mediators, or former heads of states and governments. It involves formal negotiations conducted by professional diplomats Berridge, 201: 238-42; Diamond and McDonald, 1991:1). Since it is more formal, track two diplomacy has often involved the top level of Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid. Such an approach is more suitable for mediation in an inter-state not in an intra-state conflict which has several actors, hence the need for the inclusion of the middle and lower levels. This weakness has however, been noted in mediations in internal conflicts masterminded by regional organisations such as SADC where the top level comprising politicians and the military only has been more involved than the grassroots, which creates a gap in conflict transformation.

1.4.1.3 Track Two Diplomacy

The Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy defines Track Two diplomacy as unofficial interaction and intervention of non-state actors. It consists of private individuals, non-governmental organisations (NGOS), business people, academics and other professionals and civil society organisations such as churches and charity organisations, among others, acting in an informal capacity to transform a conflict (Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy). The involvement of Tiny Rowland, the then managing director of London-Rhodesia (Lonrho), multinational company as a private individual in the Mozambican peace deal (Berridge, 2010) may be argued to have been influenced by the potential of business in Mozambique. The combined mediation and funding of the peace process by Tiny Rowland and the Rome-based Catholic Church however, brought about relative peace especially after the 1994 elections in Mozambique, though not really a transformed conflict as vindicated by its recurrence from 2013 (Berridge, p.243). The Mozambican scenario vindicates the essence of Track Two diplomacy through individual and civil society represented in form of the Roman Catholic Church, NGOs and Tiny Rowland.
McDonald and Bendahmane use the term ‘resolve when referring to the conflict, an indication that the two authorities are inclined towards conflict resolution or turn to use it interchangeably with conflict transformation. According to Surphin (2004), during a special briefing on Iraq with representatives of NGOs, it was noted that the US had been unsuccessful in conducting dialogue, developing grassroots relationships and rebuilding infrastructure in Iraq pregnable due the unsuitability of Track One diplomacy in this situation. NGOs were better suited for the mentioned requirements through their use of Track Two diplomacy which is more informal. This vindicates the essence of Track Two diplomacy in conflict transformation.

Montville (2006:19-20) highlights that economic development is essential in conflict transformation since it provides institutional support, incentives and continuity to the political and economic processes. Economic development though can only be observable in the long term, it is extremely necessary since some conflict are fuelled by poverty and lack of livelihood or human needs in general (Obasanjo 1991). A resuscitated economy will often discourage mostly youngsters who may want to continue engaging in conflict to earn livelihood. The Gulf of Aden upsurge in maritime piracy since 2006 can be argued to be aggravated by lack of livelihood. Economic development as mentioned above, enhances subsequent processes of conflict transformation in the medium to long term.

However, Tracks One and Two diplomacy complement each other in conflict transformation as each is applicable at different stages and processes (McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987:10). This combination emanates into Multi-Track diplomacy which is more desirable since it engages all actors directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. SADC has more often adopted Track One which in most cases involves the elite with interests in the conflict as in the case of the conlift in Lesotho. As such, they will flustrate any effort aimed at ending the conflict for the sake of their interest.

1.4.1.4 Multi-Track Diplomacy

Multi-Track diplomacy is according to the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy “a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system and then it comprises interconnected activities involving individuals, institutions, and communities that operate together for a common goal of a peaceful world.” It combines tracks one and two
diplomacy. For example, Track One diplomacy which is more suitable for government to
government negotiations is not so effective in internal conflicts which involve the state and
non-state actors such as terrorists or insurgents who require some informal diplomatic
handling. The need for a more interpersonal approach in addition to official mediation was
therefore realised. The observed inefficiencies of both tracks one and two led to the
development of the multi-track diplomacy which combines all necessary activities and
processes of conflict transformation. This resulted in the development of the 9 track model
which includes diplomacy, NGOs, commerce, peacemaking through personal involvement,
research, activism, religion, funding and peacemaking through information (Mc Donald and
Benedahmane, 1987). Conflict transformation in Northern Ireland which is covered in
Chapter 2, adapted the multi-track approach which included the 9-track model.

1.4.2 Peace
The main reason for conflict transformation is to create a peaceful environment free of
destructive conflict which is conducive for development. According to Stedman (1991:369)
peace “is the presence of political security and stability…, equitable economic relations…,
new prospects for development, and the fulfillment of basic human needs, including the need
for dignity in human relations for peoples of the region.” Galtung (1966) views peace as the
absence of violence. Galtung (1969) distinguishes between negative and positive peace. He
views negative peace as the absence of physical or personal violence which he also refers to
as “direct violence.” Galtung further identifies positive peace as linked to ending indirect
structural and cultural violence, which he also refers to as “indirect violence” threatening the
economic, social and cultural well-being and identity of individual human beings and groups
(Galtung (1969:167-191). It would appear that SADC intervention in Lesotho has
concentrated on what Galtung refers to as negative peace by making efforts to stop physical
violence through cease-fires, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as well as the
holding of elections, while not addressing underlying structural and cultural problems
referred to as positive peace which may contribute to recurrent conflicts. It is essential that
both positive and negative peace as Galtung puts it, are addressed to attain successful conflict
transformation.

Miller (2005) defines peace and outlines its key tenets as follows;

A political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and
informal institutions, practices, and norms. Several conditions must be met for
peace to be reached and maintained; balance of political power among the various groups within a society, region, or, most ambitiously, the world; legitimacy for decision makers and implementers of decisions in the eyes of their respective group, as well as those of external parties, duly supported through transparency and accountability; recognised and valued interdependent relationships among groups fostering long-term cooperation during periods of agreement, disagreement, normality, and crisis; reliable and trusted institutions for resolving conflicts; sense of equality and respect, in sentiment and in practice, within and without groups and in accordance with international standards; mutual understanding of rights, interests, intents, and flexibility despite incompatibilities (Miller 2005:55).

Miller’s mentioned attributes of peace are essential in any conflict transformation. It is the transformation of the mentioned tenets that contributes to successful transformation of a conflict. For example, balance of political power among the various groups within a society or region or sense of equality and respect, just to mention a few, may be essential enablers of conflict transformation. Miller also argues that the absence of war or hostilities does not necessarily mean the absence of conflict. This contrasts with negative conceptions of peace (Galtung, 27:3). However, the essence of undertaking conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation is to end violent conflict and promote peace which is conducive to development.

1.4.3 Conflict
According to Miller (2005:26) conflict is simply “a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends.” Miller further postulates that conflict may be either manifest, recognisable through actions or behaviours or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations or even civil society (www.upeace.org). Zartman (1991) posits that, “conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions,” while North and Choucri (1983:445) contend that conflict occurs “when people seek to satisfy their needs, wants and desires, when they make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people…”

It has however, been argued by some scholars of peace and conflict studies such as Deng and Zartman (1991), Miller (2005), Galtung (1969), Lederach (2003), Otite and Albert (1999), among many others, that not all conflicts are bad. They contend that some conflicts actually influences positive change. Lederach (2003:4) contends that “conflict is normal in human
relationships and conflict is a motor of change.” Similarly, Deng and Zartman (1991), also realise the essence of conflict in society when they argue that it can be used to measure opportunities and costs. Otite and Albert (1999:17) buttress this view by contending that “although conflicts have negative connotations . . . [many] constitute an essential creative element for changing societies and achieving the goals and aspirations of individuals and groups.”

In this regard, conflict remains an integral part of human interaction and it will always exist. What is required is that it is turned into a constructive conflict rather a destructive violent conflict according to Lederach’s view. The idea of transforming a ‘destructive conflict’ into ‘constructive change’ is what Lederach (2003:15) visualises as being achieved through conflict transformation when he asserts that “a transformational approach recognises that conflict is normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships.” In this regard, Lederach’s view is that since conflict will always exist within a community, society or organisation and at times is necessary for the sake of positive change, it cannot be completely resolved but it must be transformed.

Lederach (2003:18) further views conflict as “an opportunity, a gift and a motor of change, which keeps relationships and social structures honest, alive and dynamically responsive to human needs and growth.” A typical example of conflict in the context of ‘a motor of change’ is Rwanda which for years has had conflict based on ethnicity. The conflict culminated into ethnic based genocide which resulted in the death of about 800 000 mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus in just around 100 days in 1994, while about 2000 000 people became refugees according to Akhavan (1996) and Appiah & Gates (2010). To date, Rwanda is realising considerable growth and continues to enjoy relative peace and security conducive to development.

To demonstrate the positive effects of conflict transformation, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Rwanda which according to Trading Economics: 2018, expanded by 4.90 percent in the third quarter of 2017 over the previous quarter. GDP growth rate in Rwanda averaged 2.73 percent from 2000 to 2017, reaching an all-time high of 13.20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2002 and a record low of -2.20 percent in the first quarter of 2013 (ibid.) Such a positive change can be argued to be emanating from successful conflict transformation, which seemingly transformed attitudes and perceptions towards opposing ethnic groups.
involved in a violent ethnic cleansing in 1994. Development to an extent enhances the realisation of human needs which further strengthens conflict transformation.

1.4.3 Security

In its realistic, original meaning and scope, security was considered to apply to the safety of states from the threat of war. The view of security in the traditional sense which dominated the period before the end of the Cold War has been therefore biased on the state as the main referent object in the system with war as the prime security concern. On the contrary, the period after the Cold War has been characterised by a holistic approach to the concept of security and has been adopted leading to the inclusion of the human security paradigm. The new approach to security has also become multi-faceted, multi-actor, multi-dimensional and multi-sector.

Stedman (1991) summarises the contemporary broad approach to security when he points out that, “security has two senses which are; freedom from danger concentrating on protection and defence and freedom from fear and anxiety which stresses on the feeling of being secure from political, economic, social, environmental and even psychological threats” (Stedman, 1991:370-71) It can be argued that most internal conflicts in Africa have either been prolonged or recurred probably due the feeling of being insecure from political, economic, environmental and psychological threats. The feeling of being alienated is also a major cause of fear and anxiety which eventually lead to conflict as one group seeks to protect its self or to realise its desires. The conflict in the Great Lakes region can be likened to the above view.

The traditional view of security has relied on the first sense where it has to be assured through military action. This view has ignored the second view relating to human security which encompasses security from political, economic, social, and environmental threats affecting the individual. Stedman (ibid:372) further argues that security must connote both the achievement of protection, that is freedom from physical danger arising from military, economic, or environmental threats; and the attainment of a sense of safety, that is freedom from fear and want. In the period after the War, security has encompassed both human and state security. Most governments in Africa have not given maximum attention to human security which is a major cause of internal conflicts.
Collins (1982:1319) defines security as “the state of being secure; assured freedom from poverty or want,” while Buzan (1991:432-33) views it as “the pursuit of freedom from threats and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity…” For Buzan, the bottom line of security is survival of the state and the mention of freedom from threats in this definition contributes to the broadness of the concept to encompass the traditional and human security views. Collins’ definition to some extent also makes a holistic approach to security by referring to being secure and freedom from poverty and want. The mention of freedom from poverty and want fits well into human security prerequisites. Buzan (ibid) points to five factors, which are political, military, economic, societal and environmental security as variables determining the security environment. These factors, according to the constructivist theory, are variables which shape the post-Cold War security environment and help to determine conflict transformation.

1.4.4 Conflict Management, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation

A number of scholars have endeavoured to make a distinction between conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation which have often been used wrongly interchangeably. This is based on the perception of many scholars with regard to what each concept aim to achieve in terms of handling conflict and attaining a peaceful environment. Conflict transformation approaches differ from those of conflict management or conflict resolution (Berghof Foundation Handbook, 2010). To understand the theory of conflict transformation, it is essential to discuss the concepts of conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. Miall (2004) distinguishes conflict between the traditional approaches to handling conflict transformation. He argues that each term suggests a progressively larger and more ambitious scope of action and what each concept aims to achieve as far as conflict is concerned. Conflict management aims to regulate and contain conflict, but not necessarily to end it. Conflict resolution aims to resolve the issue or incompatibility that divides the parties. Conflict transformation goes further in aiming for a change in the fundamental relationships, social structures and contextual conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place (Miall, 2004:4). The four terms are further conceptualised and distinguished by various scholars and practitioners of peace and conflict as follows:
1.4.4.1 Conflict Prevention

In Miall’s view, conflict prevention which is also known as preventative diplomacy, aims to address causal grievances to prevent escalation of violence or to curtail re-occurrence of violence. Its purpose according to Miall is to resolve a conflict at hand or to prevent escalation or violence. It recognises that to avoid the catastrophes associated with strife, particularly violent upheaval, change is usually necessary. Such change can be through new institutions, revitalised processes or the sharing of power (Miller, 2005:25). A typical example of conflict prevention is what happened in Gambia in January 2017, when ECOWAS diplomatic efforts backed by the threat of military intervention, forced Yahya Jammeh who had refused to cede power to Adama Barrow, the winner of elections held on 1 December 2016. Yahya Jammeh was finally persuaded to step down and leave Gambia for the incumbent winner to take over (BBC: 19 January 2017).

Efforts to prevent the escalation of hostilities or violent conflict fit well into the realm of conflict prevention. The term conflict prevention is often confused with other terms such as conflict management and conflict resolution. The most effective method of conflict prevention in Miall’s view, is accountable governance in which citizens and various groups have access to effective avenues and mechanisms for resolving the range of disputes and conflicts that ordinarily arise within societies. Miller (2005:25) further highlights that the conflict prevention also incorporates civil society and business communities. This is an area where SADC needs to improve as it has often dealt with governments through heads of state and governments leaving the grassroots in its facilitation of conflict transformation. The 1987 Unity Accord between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) can be argued to have prevented the escalation of conflict in Zimbabwe through facilitation of reconciliation.

1.4.4.2 Conflict Management

According to Miall (2007) conflict management regulates and contains conflict. It does not necessarily end the conflict. Conflict management entails interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts. Conflict management is further defined as;

*The positive and constructive handling of differences and divergences. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical,*
In Miall and Zartman’s views, conflict management recognises that conflicts are rarely resolved completely and in most cases they are only reduced, downgraded or contained. Such developments can be followed by a reorientation of the issue, reconstitution of the divisions among conflicting parties, or even by a re-emergence of past issues or grievances. Conflict management when actively conducted is, therefore, a constant process. Conflicts are frequently managed directly by the society in which they occur. When not possible or when conflicts become national in scope, government normally assumes the task, provided it is not a party to the conflict. In cases where a government is unable or unwilling to intervene, international organisations increasingly assume the role of conflict managers (Miller, 2005; Zartman 2000, 1997).

Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) view conflict management as the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergences. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, conflict management deals with the management of the conflict, addressing questions such as; how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of differences. In this regard, it can be noted that conflict management does not eliminate conflict in total but only manages it while conflict transformation endeavours to transform the conflict. With an upsurge in recurrence conflict in the region, it would appear that SADC has adopted a management biased approach to the Lesotho conflict without really addressing root causes, which explains why the conflict continues to recur.

According to Harris and Reilly (1998), conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergences. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, conflict management addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict such as: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical and achievable cooperative system for the constructive management of differences (Harris and Reilly (1998:18; www.berghof-center.org). By referring positive and constructive handling of differences and divergences, Harris and Reilly seem to be relating conflict management to conflict transformation.
However, as observed by Miall (2007:3) conflict management “aims to regulate and contain conflict, but not necessarily to end it.” Conflict management therefore does not play any transformative role as far as the conflict is concerned.

Since conflict management does not end the conflict and leaves the underlying causes unresolved, the result has been recurrence of the conflict in question. What the United States of America (USA) and the UN did in Somalia from 1991 to 1993 may be argued to have been in the realm of conflict management which is possibly the reason why it has remained fully fledged. The same may be said of the conflict particularly in Eastern DRC and South Sudan, just to mention a few examples.

1.4.4.3 Conflict Resolution

Miller (2005) views conflict resolution as a variety of approaches aimed at resolving conflicts through the constructive solving of problems distinct from the management or transformation of conflict. Azar and Burton (1986:159), explain that “conflict resolution is about how parties can move from zero sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcomes.” What this implies is that conflict cannot be removed totally but can only be transformed into a non-violent conflict. This argument is supported by a number of scholars of peace and conflict studies such as Miller (2005) who argues that not all conflicts are harmful and that some may ultimately result in positive social change. Otite and Albert (1999: 17), among many others, support this view of conflict being necessary to a certain degree in a society or community. This therefore contradicts the conflict resolution approach since conflict will always exist and at times it is necessary.

The aim of conflict resolution according to Otite and Albert (1999) is to provide options acceptable to parties in dispute for resolving conflict. Miall (2005) points out that conflict resolution involves recognition by parties involved in the conflict of each other’s interests, needs, perspectives, and continued existence. He further notes that conflict resolution aims to resolve the issue or incompatibility that divides the parties. It can be argued that rarely has conflict been completely resolved. In most cases it has only been managed only to resurface later, hence the evolution and development of conflict transformation. Various scholars perceive conflict resolution slightly differently though in the context of resolving a conflict or bringing it to an end. For Mitchel,
Conflict resolution involves a contention that an acceptable and durable solution to the issues in a particular conflict between adversaries has been discovered or mutually created by the parties themselves, possibly with some assistance from other ‘third’ parties or possibly through their own efforts and sometimes with local assistance from ‘insider partials’ (Mitchell, 2002:2).

According to Miall (2007:3) conflict resolution aims to resolve the issue or incompatibility that divides the parties. Burton (1990:2-3) slightly differs from Miall’s view as he posits that “by the resolution of conflict, we mean the transformation of relationships in a particular case by the solution of the problems which led to the conflictual behavior in the first place.” Burton’s view of conflict resolution seems closer to conflict transformation but it is not wholesome in approach as it only refers to transformation of relationships and leaves other aspects which also need to be transformed to achieve a peaceful environment.

Burton also points out that conflict resolution also aims to provide a solution to problems which led to the conflict which is related to dealing with the root cause(s) of the conflict since failure to address underlying causes of the conflict has often contributed to recurrent conflicts. Transforming relationships only is not enough to realising a peaceful environment, but it should include transformation of personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions (Lederach, 1997:83). It may be observed from Lederach’s explanation of conflict transformation that it involves complex, multi-dimensional, multi-faceted and multi-actor processes.

As Lederach (1995a) contends that conflict resolution has been a more widely recognised term. He further posits that “perhaps unintentionally, this term carries the connotation of a bias toward ‘ending’ a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently concerned with the deeper structural, cultural and long-term relational aspects of conflict” (Lederach 1995a: 201). In essence, conflict resolution provides short term solutions to a conflict. Mitchell (2002:19) differentiates conflict resolution from conflict transformation basing on the involvement of all levels or actors in conflict which Lederach (1997:39) describes through a conflict pyramid.
Mitchell (2002:2-3) postulates that [conflict] resolution has tended to deal with conflicts by operating close to official efforts and to deal with decision-making elites or at least, with opinion-makers and influencers. This may be argued to apply to SADC which has often engaged influential high ranking officials in its bid to transform specific conflicts in the region more often ignoring the grassroots. It has also been observed that resolution of conflict normally concentrate on the immediate and the short term solutions to the conflict. Proponents of the conflict resolution approach argue that dealing with issues and interests producing a current situation of intractable conflict is enough of a problem in itself hence do not focus on the long term of the conflict (scar.gmu.edu). The arguments raised on conflict resolution against the necessity of certain conflicts and the intractable nature of post-Cold War intra-state conflicts contributed to the evolvement and development of the theory of conflict transformation.

1.4.4.4 The Theory of Conflict Transformation

1.4.4.4.1 A Synopsis of the Theory of Conflict Transformation

Lederach (2003:14) posits that “conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increases justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.” Malebang (2014) further explains that the conflict transformation theory emphasizes on the transformation of factors that contribute to the conflict with a view to end violence. The theory also includes processes which deal with all areas of the conflict precisely. In this regard, Miller (2005) explains that conflict transformation involves all or any of the following matters regarding a conflict: the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned.” Gert (2005:2) also postulates that conflict transformation “looks at the roots of conflict and may offer valuable insights into the sources of conflict, and thus possible resolutions.” Proper identification of root causes of a conflict could be an area SADC has not managed well in handling conflicts in the region.

Miall (2004:4) postulates that conflict transformation aims at the structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of the conflict. This implies that it leaves no aspect of the conflict
unattended and also addresses what Galtung (1969) refers to as “negative and positive peace.” According to Galtung (1969), negative peace is the outcome of efforts to stop physical or personal violence which he terms “direct violence” while positive peace is the goal of efforts to end indirect structural and cultural violence, which he refers to as “indirect violence” threatening economic, social and cultural well-being and identity of individual human beings and groups (Galtung (1969:167-191). The SADC intervention in Lesotho has concentrated on negative peace by making efforts to stop physical violence while not addressing underlying structural and cultural problems referred to as positive peace.

Lederach (1997:39) argues that effective conflict resolution should bring about ‘change’ in the conflict which consists of personal change (individual attitudes, behaviours, identity and perceptions), relationship change (communication, intergroup cooperation and decision-making processes), cultural change (the way conflict is viewed and understood) and structural change (inequalities and all forms of discrimination). Miller (2005) further views conflict transformation in the context changes in all, any, or some combination of aspects of a conflict which include the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned.

Lederach (1997:83) posits that “conflict transformation represents a comprehensive set of lenses for describing how conflict emerges from, evolves within and brings about changes in the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions and for developing creative responses that promote peaceful change within those dimensions.” According to Lederach the main attribute of conflict transformation which makes it different from other approaches to dealing with conflict situations is that it is transformational or changes the personal, cultural, relational and structural dimensions of the conflict. For example, when relationships are transformed changes in perceptions for individuals or groups may occur. The individuals or groups may begin to accommodate each other despite previous differences. Once such a scenario has been attained then it can be said that relations have been transformed, though this is extremely difficult to achieve.

In the same context, Väyrynen (1999) suggests that conflicts can be transformed through four types of changes which include; actor transformations, issue transformations, rule transformations and structural transformations. Lederach (2003:15) further postulates that,
“A transformational approach recognises that conflict is a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships,” hence it cannot be ended or resolved completely, but can be transformed into what he terms ‘a constructive conflict which brings about positive change.’ This is the main point of departure between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. The latter argues that conflict is inherent in human societies and at times is useful when it brings about positive change, hence it cannot be ended completed but rather it should be transformed while conflict resolution aims at resolving the conflict which has not been possible in most conflicts. Its either it appears its resolved but has often resurfaced at an opportune moment. By referring to ‘constructive conflict and positive change’ as the end-state, Lederach conforms to what Galtung (1969) refers to as ‘positive peace’ being the goal of efforts to end indirect structural and cultural violence, which he calls ‘indirect violence.’ Indirect violence threatens the economic, social and cultural well-being as well as the identity of individual human beings and groups (Galtung 1969:167-191).

Lederach’s transformational approach to conflict also recognises the need for structural and cultural transformation, among other dimensions of conflict. In the foregoing, conflict transformation changes the nature of the conflict from being destructive into a constructive one which is characterised by positive peace. Emphasis in conflict transformation as Lederach observes, is on transforming or changing personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions to develop creative responses that promote peaceful change within those dimensions and not necessarily ending the conflict. Proponents of the transformation school criticise the conflict resolution approach since conflict should not and cannot be resolved in total but transformed for the better (op.cit).

Austin (2013) views conflict transformation as:

A generic, comprehensive term referring to actions and processes seeking to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular conflict over the long term. It aims to transform negative destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict and deals with structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of conflict. The term refers to both the process and the completion of the process. As such, it incorporates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict resolution and goes farther than conflict settlement or conflict management (Berghof Foundation, 2010; Miall 2004:10).

The definition of conflict transformation provided by the Berghof Foundation seeks to address all aspects of a conflict. It conforms with Lederach’s definition and explanation of
conflict transformation to a large extent. In both definitions it can be observed that conflict transformation involves actions and processes which facilitate change in various characteristics and manifestations of conflict. The processes involved in conflict transformation as outlined the Berghof Foundation definition are directed at altering various aspects and manifestations of a particular conflict. This may be related to what Lederach (1997: 83) refers to as “bringing about changes in the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions and for developing creative responses that promote peaceful change within those dimensions.” The other important aspect which seems silent in Lederach’s definition is that conflict transformation also addresses the root causes of a particular conflict over the long term.

According to the Common Ground “conflict transformation initiatives are often characterised by longtime horizons and interventions at multiple levels, aimed at changing perceptions and improving communication skills addressing the roots of conflict, including inequality and social injustice.” Dukes (1999:48) further views conflict transformation as being multifaceted and having “accrued a number of meanings, including transformation of individuals, transformation of relationships, and transformation of social systems large and small.” Similarly, Kriesberg, Northrup and Thorson (in Botes 2003) point out that conflict transformation relates to a fundamental change in the relationship between parties and a change in recognising each other’s ethnic and national aspirations. They also observe that “societies are transformed when fundamental social and political changes are made to correct inequities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs.” Botes (2003) adds that [conflict] transformation is viewed as the restructuring of social institutions as well as a redistribution of power from high-power groups to low-power groups and that transformation also refers to changes in individuals.

Although more scholars seem to agree with the adoption, relevance and suitability of theory of conflict transformation, a number of theorists in turn view it differently. Scholars such as Burton (1990), Väyrynen (1991), Galtung (1995), Rupesinghe (1995), Schwerin (1995), Spencer and Spencer (1995) and Dukes (1999) view conflict transformation as a significant departure from conflict resolution, whilst others like Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999), among others, are of the view that conflict transformation is a further development of conflict resolution. This latter group of scholars argues that conflict resolution aims to transform conflict and at times view conflict transformation and conflict resolution as
semantics since to them the terms are the same and have the same end-state.

Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999), also contend that conflict transformation provides some utility regarding the understanding of peace processes in the sense that the theory denotes a sequence of necessary transitional steps. Such a transformation represents not only removing the sources and causes of the situation that brought about the conflict, but also necessitates a psychic transformation in the attitudes and relationship between the parties (Botes 2003). However, as observed by the increasing number of theorists and scholars who portray the same understanding of the conflict transformation theory and what it aims to achieve, it can be argued that only a few are yet to understand the differences between the two terms and what they aim to achieve.

The above definitions explain the differences in handling the conflict between the three concepts. It is important to note that the terms are distinct and aim to achieve different end-states. For example, conflict management assumes that it is not possible to eradicate conflict completely but rather manages the manifestations of the conflict. As such, the underlying causes of conflict remain unresolved hence chances of recurrence remain high. Conflict management may further be argued to be related to what Galtung (1966) refer to as ‘negative peace’ which aims to stop a violent conflict but does not deal with the actual root causes of the conflict which may be structural or cultural in nature. Since Galtung’s concept of ‘negative peace,’ does not resolve the problem behind the conflict, it is more susceptible to outbreaks of violent conflicts as in South Sudan or in the DRC, for example.

Addressing the underlying or root cause(s) of the conflict according to Galtung falls within the realm of ‘positive peace.’ For example, in Yemen cease-fires may be held as ‘negative peace’ but as long as the underlying causes of the conflict which is religious or ethnicity are not resolved, no lasting peace will be realised. The resolution of the underlying causes of conflict among other things amounts to what Galtung calls ‘positive peace.’ Most African conflict seems to have recurred due to aspect related to positive peace being left unresolved. Conflict transformation is an approach to conflict which addresses aspects of the conflict including the underlying causes.

1.4.4.2 Tenets of Conflict Transformation

Although some sources such as TransConflict prefer the term principles of conflict
transformation, this study will use tenets, attributes or characteristics of conflict transformation instead of principles. This is based on the view that the under-listed are descriptive or characteristic in nature and are not real principles. Tenets or characteristics of conflict transformation according to transconflict.com are as follows:

- Conflict should not be regarded as an isolated event that can be resolved or managed, but as an integral part of society’s on-going evolution and development;

- Conflict should not be understood solely as an inherently negative and destructive occurrence, but rather as a potentially positive and productive force for change if harnessed constructively;

- Conflict transformation goes beyond merely seeking to contain and manage conflict, instead seeking to transform the root causes of a particular conflict;

- Conflict transformation is a long-term, gradual and complex process, requiring sustained engagement and interaction;

- Conflict transformation is not just an approach and set of techniques, but a way of thinking about and understanding the conflict itself;

- Conflict transformation is particularly intended for intractable conflicts, where deep-rooted issues fuel protracted violence

**Source:** www.transconflict.com (accessed: 5 January 2018).

The tenets should be considered throughout the processes of conflict transformation. For successful transformation of a conflict, there is need to conceptualise and apply the tenets to guide the whole process. It has been observed that in most failed conflict transformation, the involved actors have not seriously considered and accommodated the tenets to guide the whole process. Similarly, the root causes of a conflict in question need to be identified and addressed if it is to be transformed successfully. In Somalia, the peace efforts were only applied by the international community from 1991 to 1993 and the possible transformation of the conflict was abandoned. Since then little or no interest at all has been displayed by the international community yet conflict transformation is a long-term, gradual and complex
process, requiring sustained engagement and interaction. If the UN had been guided by this tenet in the Somali engagement it would have not withdrawn within such a short period especially with the understanding that conflict transformation is a long-term, gradual and complex process which requires sustained engagement and interaction.

Conflict transformation is more than mere containment and management of a particular conflict, but also strives to identify and address root causes of the conflict. It can be argued that since most African internal conflicts seem to emanate from unmet human needs which result from corruption, bad governance, alienation, greed leadership and the colonial legacy, human security deficit remains a major root cause of conflict in Africa. In this regard, Clark (2013:11) posits that “Prevention of conflict requires investment in good governance, improving the conditions in which people live, reducing inequality and addressing political, social and economic exclusion...”

What Clark alludes to as necessary to prevent conflict are root causes of most internal conflicts in Africa. The same root causes need to be seriously considered during conflict transformation. Lastly, though not mentioned on the above list, conflict transformation is demanding in terms of resources or sustenance in general. In particular, funding has been a major challenge for African regional organisations involved in conflict transformation. This may be one of the reasons why the African Union (AU) has struggled to transform the Somali conflict after the UN pulled out of Somalia at the end of 1993 and has not shown any willingness to transform that war-torn country. As such, in the majority of cases, regional organisations have to rely on donor funding which is not guaranteed throughout or the process is taken over by the UN.

1.4.4.3 Basic Stages or Steps in Conflict Transformation

Johan Galtung arranges conflict transformation into basic stages or steps. The steps are essential for successful conflict transformation planning, implementation and evaluation. The stages basically involve a number of processes depending on the prevailing situation or the nature and underlying causes of the conflict in question (Galtung, 2000:5). The stages according to Galtung are as follows;

- Mapping the conflict formation: This stage encompasses all parties, goals and all issues involved in the conflict;
- Bringing in forgotten parties with important stakes in the conflict;
- Having highly empathic dialogues (mediation/negotiations) with all parties singly;
- Each conflict worker/mediator may specialize on one conflict party;
- In the dialogues (or mediation) identifying acceptable goals in all parties;
- Bringing in forgotten goals that may open new perspectives;
- Arriving at overarching goals acceptable to all parties;
- Arriving at short, evocative, goal-formulations;
- Helping define the tasks for all parties with goal(s) in mind;
- disembedding the conflict from where it was, embedding it elsewhere,
- bringing in forgotten parties and goals;
- Verifying how realizing a particular goal would realize parties' goals;
- Helping parties meet at the table for self-sustaining process (mediating);
- Withdrawing from the conflict, go on to the next, being on call.

**Source:** Galtung (2000:5-6).

Galtung’s sequencing of the conflict transformation theory seems to be mediation dominated. It is however, important to note that the stages put the facilitator such as the SADC OPDS, in this case, in a clear position of how to go about the planning and processes to be involved in a specific situation of conflict transformation. It must also be born in mind that although the given steps are basic and case-specific, they help the visualisation, planning and subsequent sequencing of specific steps preferably including required resources in each step. It is essential therefore for SADC to ensure it tries to follow these basic steps in conflict transformation.
1.4.4.4 Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid

Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid divides society into three levels, namely; the top leadership with high visibility comprising the military, political and religious leaders, the middle range leadership consisting leaders respected in sectors such as academics and intellectuals, ethnic and religious leaders and humanitarian leaders or NGOs (Lederach, 1997). The NGOs referred at this level are regional or international while those in the grassroots are local. It is in level 2 that the civil society is engaged. Level 3 is the grassroots leadership which consists of the local respected leadership. Lederach’s Conflict Transformation pyramid is as shown below:
The grassroots level leadership according to the Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid consists of the local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, community developers, local health officials and refugee camp leaders. In the African perspective the local respected leadership may also include village heads, chiefs and elders (www.geocities.com accessed: 29 March 2018). For example, in Somalia, according to the researcher’s experience during his tenure in that country as a peacekeeper in 1992, elders are very much respected and influential in controlling any disorder and have been successfully used in negotiations to quell inter-ethnic/tribal violence. The grassroots leadership can also in the African context include powerful old women who are respected in a particular society or community as well as teachers since they are close to the community.

Conflict transformation is inclusive of all three levels and all actors in the conflict. However, during negotiations as part of seeking a solution for conflict settlement, it has been observed that most regional organisations have often engaged the top level only leaving the middle and grassroots level leadership, who are normally on the receiving end of the conflict and its

negative effects. Equally SADC has largely concentrated on engaging with the top level at the expense of the middle and grassroots levels. The concentration on the top level in negotiations is perhaps linked to the involvement of heads of state and government, government officials and former statesmen and women who represent their respective states or acting under the armpit of regional organisation or global organisation. The middle level which includes among others, civil society such as church leaders, is not fully engaged in the conflict settlement process. The same applies to the grassroots which is even more privy to the conflict but in the majority of cases left out of the settlement process. In most cases, underlying causes to conflict are more associated with the grassroots level that bears the blunt end of the conflict. Ignoring the middle and grassroots levels can therefore be argued to contribute to recurrence of internal conflicts.

Conflict transformation as portrayed in Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid is an inclusive process which deals with all levels of actors and dimensions of the conflict precisely. Miller (2005) highlights that conflict transformation involves all or any of the following matters regarding a conflict: the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament, or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned. Miller further points out that conflict transformation aims at generating opportunities for conflict resolution or conflict management and ultimately more equitable outcomes, particularly where a given conflict is considered intractable or where it has encountered a seemingly insurmountable impasse. Military intervention, mediating, dealing with elections or amending the constitution as has been done by SADC is not enough in conflict transformation but forms part of the the processes involved in conflict transformation. Conflict transformation must include all aspects of the conflict.

Conflict transformation also aims at changing perceptions and even the conflict itself from a destructive to a constructive one. Conflict transformation, in contrast to conflict resolution, does not only seek to resolve the contradiction in a conflict setting. It also aims at addressing structural and social root causes by challenging injustices and restoring human relations and it deals with ethnical and value-based dimensions. Conflict transformation is not only an approach or a tool but primarily a mindset (The Institute for Conflict Transformation and Peace-building). Also basing on the notion that conflicts are never ending or that they are intractable, Galtung is of the view that conflict transformation is more applicable than conflict resolution since conflict is an ongoing human interaction hence cannot be resolved.
completely but can only be transformed into what Galtung (1969) refers to as ‘positive peace.’ Overall, as opposed to providing a solution to the conflict, conflict transformation is about transforming various aspects of the conflict to bring about peaceful change or ‘positive peace.’

Aspects that deal with positive peace have rarely been dealt with satisfactorily in most internal African conflicts where structural or cultural issues which include the colonial legacy, poverty, withdrawal or reduction of financial and military aid to African dictators after the Cold War, exploitation of ethnicity, corruption, political-economic and social exclusion, population explosion, corrupt and incompetent governments, politics of democratisation, unemployment, competition for scarce resources, inequality, economic decline/shock, state failure/collapse and economic dependence on natural resources contribute to conflict (Konteh, 2006: 257). General Obasanjo (in Deng and Zartman, 1991: xiv-xv) buttresses this observation when he notes that “there is a link between the level of poverty in Africa and the level and incidences of violence and conflict in the continent.”

The observations above can be proved of most poor African countries where there has been socio-economic inequality and unfair distribution of meagre resources or where resources and positions of authority have been the preserve of the elite based on client-patron relationships. Once a group in a country feels it is not being treated fairly or is being alienated at the expense of a certain group or clan, then conflict occurs and if the underlying cause is not adequately addressed, recurrence continues as has happened in Rwanda and Burundi between the Tutsi and the Hutu (www.nou.edu.ng, accessed: 30 March 2018). Obasanjo further argues that “understanding root causes for Africa’s violent conflicts is critical before identifying any settlements for such conflicts.”

The need to fully understand underlying causes of a conflict with a view to address them accordingly seem to remain a challenge to African sub-regional organisations and may be argued to contribute to the prolonged and recurrent nature of some conflicts. This explains why there has been a paradigm shift from conflict management which focuses on the removal of the manifestation of violence, to conflict resolution which endeavours to resolve the conflict without success to conflict transformation which tries to transform the conflict, the environment in which it occurs including underlying causes and the actors involved. On the overall, conflict transformation involves complex, long and expensive processes which constrain regional organisations such as SADC’s efforts to implement it in conflict situation
within the region.

### 1.4.4.5 The Human Needs Theory (HNT)

Human needs theorists argue that conflicts are caused by unmet or unfulfilled human needs. Proponents of the HNT such as Gert (2005) and Rosenberg (2003), among others, argue that violence occurs when certain individuals or groups do not visualise any other way to meet their needs or when they require understanding, respect and consideration for their needs. Gert (2005:2) contends that the HNT “looks at the roots of conflict and may offer valuable insights into the sources of conflict, and thus possible resolutions.” Similarly, Rosenberg (2003:20) argues that “violence is a tragic expression of unmet human needs,” which implies that all actions undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs. It can be argued that conflict transformation considers the environment in which the conflict occurs including underlying causes of the conflict through the process of conflict analysis which identifies root causes of the conflict among other things. This enhances proper conflict mapping and transformation of identified problematic and contentious areas.

Human needs against unequal distribution due to corruption, alienation or few resources may be argued to perpetuate conflict in most African countries. For example, it can be noted that various influential individuals and groups seem to believe that the only option to get resources is through controlling of positions in politics and the government. Clark (2013:11) posits that “Prevention of conflict requires investment in good governance, improving the conditions in which people live, reducing inequality and addressing political social and economic exclusion...” It may be argued that the main causes of African conflicts are related to issues to do with good governance which this study will examine with regards to Lesotho. Improving the conditions in which people live refers to the human security paradigm which addresses such issues as poverty. The identification of root causes of a conflict is critical during conflict analysis as it enhances the transformation of conflict areas. The HNT will therefore augment the conflict transformation theory to strengthen the study.

### 1.4.4.6 Collective Security

According to Buzan (1998:3) collective security entails “a regional or global security arrangement in which a group of states are convinced and accept that the security of one
member is the concern of all and therefore agree to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of the peace.” Kegley and Witkopf (2011:2) argue that “for collective security to function properly, all threats to peace must be a common concern to everyone which implies that peace becomes indivisible.” The assumption here is that peace becomes a fundamental foreign policy objective for each state and that each member state should act collectively against any threat on a member of the community. This is portrayed by Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which stipulates that “an attack on one member is an attack to all.” SADC also has a similar provision through Article 6(1) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact which states that “An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action,” is typical of collective security (Article 6(1) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact).

Article 6(3) which further stipulates that each State Party shall participate in any manner it deems appropriate, according to Ngoma (2005:205) leaves room for minimum participation in collective response to threats or not participating at all. For example, most states in the SADC region chose to support the DRC intervention morally leaving Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to intervene. In the 1998 Lesotho crisis only Botswana and South Africa intervened as SADC member states. This may be argued to contradict the application of collective security. It must however, be noted that the participation of a member state in a collective security arrangement is based on its national interests rather than cooperation according to realism.

It may also be argued that conflict transformation cannot be successfully implemented if SADC does not act as a group. If some members do not participate in peace and security efforts, then the sub-region may fall short on its strength in terms of human and material requirements especially in the event of economically and military powerful states abstaining.

1.5 Literature Review
contained in the SADC Protocol of 1996, does not clearly make any provision for conflict transformation. For example, the fourth objective of the OPDSC is to; cooperate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution” (SADC Protocol, 1996). The absence of conflict transformation from the SADC literature terms of reference is probably due to the theory being relatively new. However, conflict transformation seems to be implied in (k) of the OPDSC which is “to promote political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security (ibid). However, the need to include relevant provisions on conflict transformation in SADC literature and provisions is critical if its successful implementation is to be realised.

Although Article 24 of the United Nations (UN) Charter confers upon the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, Annan (1998:3) notes that “the UN lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all conflicts that arise in Africa.” Similarly, Needling (2002:2) observes that “African sub-regional economic organisations have identified the need for maintaining peace and security within their respective communities as the only way to foster development.” Intervention by sub-regional organisations in internal conflicts falls under what Boutros–Ghali (1992:14) refers to as “regional arrangements” authorised by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this regard, Article 5 of the SADC Treaty outlines the promotion and defence of peace and security in the sub-region as one of SADC’s objectives (SADC Treaty 1992; Omeje 2008:84). The OPDSC and the Troika are key institutional mechanisms for dealing with matters relating to peace and security in the sub-region.

According to Ngoma (2005:165-167), SADC intervened in the DRC from 1998 to 2003 and in Lesotho, in 1994 and 1998. It has however, not been successful in transforming the conflicts in those countries. SADC has continued to engage in conflict resolution in Lesotho whose conflict remains recurrent. Cawthra (2010) observes that SADC’s conflict management role through the appointment of Chisano, the former Mozambique president as mediator and subsequent threat of sanctions and suspension of Madagascar during its crisis which erupted in 2009. The handling of the Madagascar conflict by SADC though it involved other international players such as the African Union (UN) and UN, may be argued to have been successful. However, SADC continues to face challenges as vindicated by internal recurrent conflicts in the DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique. In the Lesotho crisis, SADC has been involved in efforts to transform the recurrent conflict but to no avail.
Some scholars, including Cohen (1995; 1996), Duala (1984), Ake (1985) and Okoyo (1977) consider the numerous conflicts in Africa as a natural consequence of Africa’s colonial past. Okoyo (1977:93), for example, posits that “political instability is rooted in the very structure of society and, for most new countries, in the colonial past.” Duala (1984:10), subscribes to this point of view by asserting that “the problems being experienced by modern African states are based on our colonial experience.” Cohen (1995:11) also agrees that “the sources and consequences of Africa’s internal conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the subsequent processes of de-colonisation and state formation and the ensuing crisis of nation building.” Cohen further notes that the colonial state was fraught with contradictions, which were passed on to the new state and the modern African state was created by colonial powers out of ethnic and regional diversities and rendered conflictual by gross inequities in power relations and in the uneven distribution of national wealth and development opportunities.”

Achankeng (2017) concurs with Cohen that the colonial factor is the main underlying cause of African conflicts and probably their recurrent nature. Achankeng argues that the conflict resolution in Africa is approached from a variety of purposes and interests and with policies that are often replete with ambiguities and contradictions, a situation which according to him may be the reason why many African conflicts are silenced but remain largely unresolved, hence recur (www.accord.org –accessed: 29 March 2918). Zartman (2000:3) seems to support Achakeng’s view when he posits that “...efforts at conflict management (in Africa) have not been effective or efficient in overcoming the disasters that have brought them to the continent.” Achakeng’s view is linked to addressing root causes of conflict if real transformation is to be realised.

Zartman seems to imply that African conflict resolution efforts have not addressed underlying causes that bring about the recurrent conflict. International relations scholars generally agree that most African conflicts are caused by several factors, which include colonial legacy, poverty, corruption, political-economic and social exclusion, population explosion, politics of democratisation, unemployment, competition for scarce resources among others (Konteh, 2006: 257). Understanding root causes of a particular internal conflict may contribute to successful conflict transformation.

Vhumbunu (2015) notes that, “Lesotho has a long history of political instability and has experienced high levels of factionalism, political tension and violent conflict especially
during and after elections since its independence in October 1966.” Since the founding of the SADC in 1992, Lesotho has experienced conflict of various magnitudes since 1994 to 2017. SADC has employed several conflict resolution methods which include among others, mediation, military interventions and setting up of tribunals but the conflict has remained recurrent. This study examines challenges faced by SADC in its efforts to transform the intractable conflict in Lesotho from 1994 to 2017.

1.6 Main Research Question

1.6.1 Why does SADC experience challenges in conflict transformation in the region?

1.7 Objectives

The objectives of this study are as follows:

- To explore the SADC’s conflict transformation challenges in the region.

- To examine the SADC challenges in the Lesotho conflict transformation from 1994 to 2017.

- To proffer scholarly and strategic policy recommendations on a sustainable model to the SADC’s conflict transformation challenges.

1.8 Research Questions

The study seeks to provide answers to the following questions:

- Which conflict transformation challenges has SADC encountered in the region?

- Why is SADC encountering challenges in the Lesotho conflict transformation from 1994 to 2017?

- Which scholarly and strategic policy recommendations on a sustainable model to the SADC’s Conflict Transformation capability can be proffered?
1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design
Basing on Creswell (2007), the study adopted a qualitative research design for collecting and analysing data on SADC conflict transformation challenges in Lesotho. It used a qualitative, descriptive, case-study design to identify, describe and analyse SADC’s conflict transformation challenges in the Lesotho recurrent conflict from 1994 to 2017. In-depth interviews with selected informed diplomatic officials, academics, political analysts, politicians, the civil society, military and police officers, the royal family and selected respondents from the grassroots were conducted locally and in Lesotho to collect data on SADC conflict transformation challenges in Lesotho.

1.9.2 Research Methods
Creswell (2003), contends that since qualitative methods are exploratory, and are useful in uncovering underlying opinions, circumstances and motivations behind certain actions, they allow for comprehensive, detailed description of phenomenon and behavior. Disadvantages of qualitative methods include time consuming, difficult to generalise findings, to other scenarios while findings can be affected by the researcher’s (Sekaran, 2003). For this study the advantage of the qualitative method outweighed the disadvantages given that focus was on social phenomenon, hence the need for a methodology that allowed for examination of challenges encountered by SADC in conflict transformation in Lesotho. This study adopted a qualitative method to collect and analyse data on challenges to SADC conflict transformation in the region using the Lesotho recurrent conflict as a case study. Merriam (2002b:8) defines case study as “an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or social unit such as an individual group, institution or community.”

1.9.3 Population and Sampling
1.9.3.1 Study Population
Polit and Hungler (1999:37) define a study population as “an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications.” This study drew respondents from Zimbabwe in general and Lesotho in particular. These included diplomats, retired military and police senior officers, politicians, civil society leaders, traditional leaders and academics. The table of showing coded respondents is at appendix 1.
1.9.3.2 Sampling Techniques

According to LoBiondo-Wood and Haber (1998) sampling is the process of selecting a portion of the population to represent the entire population (LoBiondo-Wood and Haber 1998:250).

1.9.3.2.1 Purposive Sampling

Purposive sampling affords the selection of experts on the basis of their knowledge and experience (Black 1999:118). The selection of respondents was dependent on the researcher’s individual judgment, hence subject to bias. To mitigate bias, a wide range of respondents was interviewed. Purposive sampling was used to select respondents who underwent in-depth interviews.

1.9.4 Data Collection Methods

1.9.4.1 Qualitative Methods

The study used qualitative methods for data collection and analysis.

1.9.4.1.1 Documentary Search

Documentary search was used to categorise, investigate, interpret and relate data on the subject under investigation (Bailey, 1994). The method enhanced the collection of data on SADC conflict transformation challenges in Lesotho from 1994 to 2017. Books, journals, newspapers, conference minutes, the Internet and reports were examined. The method enabled the researcher to consult a variety of sources cost-effectively. It was used to explore the SADC’s conflict transformation challenges in the region and to examine the SADC challenges in the Lesotho conflict transformation from 1994 to 2017. Since the method produces huge amounts of unnecessary data for various purposes, the researcher had to check the origins, purpose, validity and intended audience of the documents and made use of inferences to collect relevant data according to (Scott, 1990).

1.9.4.1.2 In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviews, which according to Creswell (2007) involve the researcher and expert respondents on a topic under investigation to explore individual knowledge and perceptions,
was used to collect data from selected key informant respondents on SADC conflict transformation challenges in the region in general and in the Lesotho conflict in particular from 1994 to 2017. The method afforded probing or follow-up questions, enhanced access to valuable data from informed experts or key informants and facilitates diversity which provided a wide range of perspectives on the subject under study. It also provided a more relaxed atmosphere for respondents who felt comfortable having a conversation with the researcher on their experiences (Royce and Neale, 2006).

The method is however, prone to individual judgment, subjectivity and bias (Ross, 1987). A key informant interview guide with open-ended questions was to mitigate and minimise bias. Face-to-face, phone and Internet in-depth interviews were used to collect primary data to complement secondary data from documentary search. Internet and telephone interviews afforded convenience, saved time and costs while face-to-face interviews facilitated non-verbal communications. The interviews took no more than 50 minutes per interviewee.

The researcher read the questions to individual respondents who in turn responded accordingly. The researcher made follow up questions as he deemed necessary. Locally, respondents interviewed included Botswana’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe Lieutenant General Fisher, who is also an academic, Ambassador James Manzou, an official in the Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for the SADC Desk and Doctor Anyway Mutambudzi who is Director of Urban Communications in the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services.

In Lesotho, participants included the Arch Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church, former Commissioner of the Lesotho Police who served from 1966 to 1986, a member of the royal family, former Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) Commander and Prime Minister who was in the company of his Foreign Affairs Minister a retired colonel, Bishop of the Anglican Church in Lesotho, an academic and political analyst, female politician and former secretary to the Defence Council, a traditional leader (chief) and a representative of the youths. The selected respondents included all the three levels and actors as portrayed in Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid already discussed. A total of 14 out of the targeted 17 participants were interviewed, four in Harare, Zimbabwe and 10 in Lesotho representing 82.4 per cent. The key interview guide and interview schedule are at appendices 1 and 2. All the interviewees signed letters of consent as indicated at appendix 4.
1.9.4.3 Data Analysis Techniques

1.9.4.3.1 Content Analysis

Content analysis was used to analyse data collected through desk search and in-depth interviews. This afforded data interpretation, objectivity, inter-subjectivity, explicability, reliability, generalisability and hypothesis testing on the study (Neuendorf, 2002). It however, involves voluminous irrelevant data, hence research questions guided the researcher to ensure only relevant data were analysed.

1.9.4.3.2 Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis focuses on the data patterns, themes or headings that are used to identify, organise, describe, analyse and interpret patterns of themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006:77). Since this technique is flexible, easy for summarising key features of a large body of information and offers a description of the data set, it was used to analyse data from documentary search and in-depth interviews on SADC conflict transformation challenges in Lesotho. The study managed the problem of irrelevant themes by sticking to set research questions.

1.10 Validity and Reliability Testing

1.10.1 Reliability

According to Phelan and Wren (2005), is the degree to which an assessment tool produces stable and consistent results. It refers to dependability, repeatability or consistence of results over a given period. In this study, reliability was guaranteed by comparing themes derived from desk search and survey on SADC conflict transformation capabilities in the Lesotho conflict from 1992 to 2017.

1.10.2 Validity

Handfield and Nichols, (1999) define validity as the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure and perform as it is designed to perform, bringing out the correct results. It refers to how well a test measures what it is purported to measure (Phelan and Wren, 2005). The researcher used triangulation of theories, methods, data collection, interpretation and analysis to ensure validity.
1.11 Ethical Considerations

Ethics according Polit and Beck (2004:717) is a branch of philosophy that deals with issues of morality in research. It refers to the quality of research procedures, with regard to adherence to professional, legal and social obligations for research participants. Since this study involved a number of participants, it had to adhere to ethical principles as stipulated by Burns and Grove (2001:200-201), such as, the right to self-determination. The right to self-determination emphasised respect for the respondents by giving them adequate information regarding the research and ensuring that they willingly chose and voluntarily consented to participate. The purpose and objectives of the study were clearly explained on the questionnaires and participants were informed that they were free to withdraw from the interviews at any time and that they were not obliged to answer any question they felt was not in their interest to do so.

Respondents willingly signed a written consent form which is at Appendix 3, provided by the researcher before interviews. Participants were assured of confidentiality by ensuring that information they provided was not divulged without their authority and that unauthorised access to collected data was guarded against. Participants were also informed that their names (identity) would not be divulged neither would the researcher link particular information to a specific participant as stipulated by the principle of anonymity unless if they wished to. Collected data was safely secured and all used papers were destroyed by shredding and burning while tapes were be kept in a locker. The researcher also maintained privacy by not revealing names of participants against their feelings, beliefs or attitudes and opinions unless they wanted to be associated with their responses.

1.12 Limitations of the Study

The study encountered limitations particularly with regards to responses related to the national interests of a particular respondent or incidents involving the respondent. The researcher relied on a variety of data sources such as documentary search for data collection.

1.13 Scope of the Study

The study was confined to Lesotho as defined by its geographical boundaries. Although the conflict dates back Lesotho’s independence in 1966, the study was restricted to 1992 when SADC was founded up to 2017.
1.14 Outline of Chapters

Chapter 1 provided an introduction of the study, highlighted the background to the study and statement of the problem. It also provided justification of the study, literature review as well as conceptual and theoretical framework. It also covers the main research question, research objectives, research questions, limitations and scope of the study, assumptions, definition of terms and layout of chapters, methodology and ethical considerations.

Chapter 2 provided a historical background of conflict transformation according to Lederach, the pronounced proponent of conflict transformation. It also covers the global approach to conflict transformation by briefly examining selected case studies. The examined cases include El Salvador, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia. Somalia represented failed conflict transformation. The Chapter then identifies challenges encountered by global and regional organisations in conflict transformation.

Chapter 3 examined conflict transformation in the SADC region. In particular, it provided an overview of regionalism to put the SADC into perspective. The chapter then gives a historical background to the formation and objectives of the SADC and its peace and security roles in the region. It briefly analysed SADC provisions on conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution and demonstrates why the regional body needs to or is shifting to conflict transformation. It further examined SADC’s institutional structures and mechanisms for dealing with conflict in the region and the suitability of such institutions and mechanisms for conflict transformation. The chapter also analysed the SADC approach to conflict transformation in the region and also identifies gaps in the provisions, mechanismsstructures and implementation of conflict transformation.

Chapter 3 further briefly highlighted case studies of conflict transformation in the SADC region to identify challenges in this regard. The challenges were categorised into root/underlying causes of internal conflict, structural, hegemonic, financial and problems related to the approach to conflict transformation especially the involvement of all actors in the conflict according to Lederach’s Conflict Pyramid (Lederach 1997). Brief synopsis of conflict transformation by SADC was provided on Angola (1992 to 2004), the DRC (1998 to 2017), Madagascar (2009 to 2014) and Mozambique (1992 to 2017). The chapter then identified conflict transformation challenges from the case studies and demonstrated how the
constraints impacted on SADC conflict transformation capabilities.

Chapter 4 examined SADC’s conflict transformation in the recurrent Lesotho conflict from 1994 to 2017. The chapter gave the background to the Lesotho conflict and identified root causes to the conflict. It identified challenges being encountered by the SADC in its efforts to transform the Lesotho conflict. In particular, Chapter 4 answered questions such as; Which conflict transformation challenges has SADC encountered in Lesotho from 1994 to 2017? Why has the SADC continued to encounter challenges in the Lesotho conflict transformation? To answer these questions, Chapter 4 examined historical, institutional, structural and geo-political-socio-economic challenges. The challenges are examined from the SADC and Lesotho perspective. Root causes of the Lesotho conflict were also examined in the context of SADC conflict transformation challenges in that country. In addition to data obtained from available literature on SADC institutions and mechanisms for conflict transformation in Lesotho and geographical-political-socio-economic challenges that make transformation of the conflict difficult, additional data was collected from various interviews conducted in Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

Chapter 5 covered findings on SADC conflict transformation challenges in the region.

Chapter 6 provided the future of SADC conflict transformation. It made a summary of recommendations on SADC conflict transformation challenges in the region. It also proffered academic and policy recommendations on SADC conflict transformation particularly in Lesotho and in the region in general. Chapter 6 went on to suggest areas for further study.

Finally, Chapter 7 concluded by drawing together the major arguments of this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

This chapter covers the origins and development of conflict transformation. Selected cases of conflict transformation have been briefly examined with a view to identify challenges encountered during the implementation of the theory. The selected cases are El Salvador, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia. Conflict transformation appears to have been successful in all the cases mentioned with varying degrees less the case of Somalia which has been used as a failed transformation.

2.1 The Origins of Conflict Transformation

Lederach (2003:3), the first pronounced proponent of conflict transformation posits that he began using the term conflict transformation in the 1980s in Central America. He explains that, his use of conflict management and conflict resolution was queried by his Latin American colleagues. As Lederach further postulates, to his Latin American colleagues, conflict resolution has the danger of co-opting an attempt to get rid of the conflict when people were raising important and legitimate issues. It was viewed as effecting quick solutions to deep socio-political problems and not meeting the purpose of the conflict. Rather than conflict being conceived as destructive and it was supposed to be seen in light of constructive change especially when transformed (Lederach 2003:3). Lederach highlights that as a result of his interaction with his Central American colleagues and his experience while in Central America in the 80s, he adopted the term conflict transformation instead of conflict management or conflict resolution. Since then, conflict transformation, has increasingly been adopted.

A number of proponents of the conflict transformation theory such as Galtung (1995), Rupesinghe (1995); Schwerin (1995), Spencer and Spencer (1995) and Väyrynen (1991), Wallensten (1991), Mitchell (2002), Miller (2005) and Miall (2007), among others, to a large extent concur with what Lederach (1995a:201) refers to as “a shift” towards conflict transformation instead of conflict resolution. A brief overview of selected cases where the theory of conflict transformation was adopted will help identify the challenges encountered during the implementation of the theory.
2.2 An Overview of Selected Conflict Transformation Cases

Conflict transformation has been conducted in a number of internal conflicts particularly in the post-Cold War period. Some conflicts have been successfully transformed as proved by considerable peaceful environment in countries formerly affected by protracted internal conflicts or civil wars. In some cases, such as in Somalia, international efforts to transform the conflict have been futile. This section briefly examines conflict transformation processes and the outcomes in El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Cambodia, Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia. It analyses actors involved, processes undertaken or on going, challenges and the outcome in each case.

The history of El Salvador has been characterised by conflict based on socio-economic inequality which dates back to the 1920s. The conflict erupted into a fully-fledged armed conflict from 1979 after a military coup in that country. The Salvadoran Civil War as Wood (2003) explains, involved the military-led government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a coalition or an umbrella organisation of several left-wing groups. According to Valle (2009) El Salvador has been dominated by the rightist parties which expropriated communal land for coffee farming in the last quarter of the 19th century. Valle further highlights that the elitist coffee farm owners accumulated vast wealth and had little concern for the lower classes that provided low-cost, forced labor. The armed conflict was characterized by massacres, tortures and assassinations and it escalated throughout the 1980s (Wood, 2003).

Valle further postulates that the El Salvadorian conflict, which had reached a political-military stalemate was overcome through the UN-mediated negotiations that led to the peace agreement signed in Mexico on 16 January 1992. Among the positive outcome of the peace accord were the end of armed confrontation, the beginning of a process of democracy-building, full respect for human rights and the reconciliation of a polarised Salvadorian society. It also involved the improvements in politics and society in terms of freedom of speech and association and the separation of military and public-security forces (Valle 2009).

The mentioned processes, in essence represent conflict transformation, although more processes which Lederach (1997) highlights need to be undergone contrary to Valle’s assertion that the victory of the leftist FMLN, in the 2009 presidential elections in El Salvador, spearheaded by the 1992 peace accord represented conflict transformation in that
country. It was in essence part of conflict transformation which is still ongoing. The assertion by Valle that the peace accord did not address the root cause of the conflict means that more needs to be done in terms of the transformation. Valle further observes that the conflict has undergone a transformation from within as it no longer an armed one, but a political one. This is indicative of how involving conflict transformation is and also conforms to Lederech’s view of conflict transformation that it must cover all aspects of the conflict and that it is a long process.

Studemeister (2001) buttresses Valle’s views on conflict transformation in El Salvador since the signing of the peace accord to end the protracted armed internal conflict in 1992. Studemeister further notes that the implementation of the accords initiated a transition from war to peace and profoundly transformed political life in El Salvador. According Studemeister, the peace settlement provided for a cease-fire, demobilisation of military and guerrilla forces, the transformation of the FMLN from a guerrilla movement to a political party and the reintegration of its combatants into society. He further notes that there were changes in the nature, responsibilities and size of the country’s armed forces and the creation of a new national civilian police force and an intelligence service separate from the military. Also transformed were according to Studemeister (2001) human rights measures, electoral and judicial reforms and limited social and economic programs primarily benefiting members of the demobilised forces and war-ravaged communities, all constituting transformation of various aspects of the conflict.

Major accomplishments of the transformation were the end of hostilities and political violence, the disarmament and demobilisation of the FMLN and the retreat of the military from politics, the downsising of the army which also became subjected to civilian control and its constitutional role confined under national defense. The passing of an amnesty law favored by both sides of the conflict exempting all those responsible for extrajudicial crimes during the war was typical transformation, though not a permanent one since the pardoning of those involved in crimes related to the conflict remained in the memories of the affected. As such, it was necessary that all involved in war crimes were tried accordingly. The transformation of the FMLN into a political party and electoral reform as mandated in the accords led to unprecedented levels of political pluralism, highly competitive political processes, and free and fair elections. It also led to vibrant political debates in El Salvador where politics had been marked by partisanship (Studemeiste 2001). Studemeister (ibid)
also observes that the UN played a critical role in the transformation of El Salvador conflict. It was involved in verifying the implementation of the peace accords, contributing to institution-building and mediating to overcome a number of significant crises that arose during implementation. Both Valle and Studemeister clearly identify processes involved in conflict transformation in El Salvador to transform the bitter and protracted devastating intra-state conflict.

Conflict transformation processes in El Salvador according to Popking (in Studemeister, 2001), benefitted immensely from international donors. The USAID supported the restructuring of the attorney general’s office and provided extensive training to both prosecutors and public defenders. Popkin further postulates that “the Salvadoran peace process benefited from enormous international involvement, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the United States (US). He highlights that between 1993 and 1998, El Salvador received almost $41 million from the U.S. rule of law funding, making it the third largest recipient in the world during that period.” This demonstrates the role played by powerful states such as the US with vested interests in transforming a particular conflict, the role of NGOs and donors in general in the funding of certain processes involved in conflict transformation. However, the fact that the US contributed immensely to conflict transformation in El Salvador, no doubt promoted hegemony based on American interests.

The SADC, like most African regional organizations faces challenges in funding conflict transformation processes if no donors or powerful states are willing to sponsor such programmes. However, the need to address the root cause of the protracted conflict in El Salvador which is mainly based on expropriated communal land given to the elitist coffee farmers, though worsened by the Cold War ideological tension, should not be taken for granted if recurrence of the violence conflict is to be averted at all cost. Basing on the foregoing, the conflict transformation in El Salvador represent a worth case to be considered for comparative purposes in this study.

Cambodia may be argued to also have gone through conflict transformation after a protracted civil war which was also linked to the Cold War tension between the East, spearheaded by the former Soviet Union and the West led by the USA. The armed conflict pitted the forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea also known as the Khmer Rouge, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Viet Cong. These fought against government forces of the Kingdom of Cambodia and, after October 1970, the Khmer Republic, which was
supported by the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam also known as South Vietnam (Chandler, 1991). After several efforts by the international community to resolve the conflict, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) assisted in the transformation of the conflict in Cambodia. The activities and processes undertaken by UNTAC, to a large extent signify conflict transformation.

The UNTAC, which may be argued to have facilitated the transformation of the Cambodian conflict from 1992 provides an example of conflict transformation through its processes. According to Ndulo (1993:9), “UNTAC was involved in the verification of foreign troops, the cease-fire, demobilisation of belligerent troops and related measures.” It was involved in a number of activities which can be linked to conflict transformation. The activities according to Ndulo (ibid) included control (and resuscitation) of existing structures and (institutions) such as foreign affairs, defence, finance, public safety and information as well as monitoring and control of local civilian police and the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental liberties. UNTAC also monitored elections. However, as Bultmann (2015), observes, the disarmament process did not completely cover all Khamer Rouge fighters leading to resuscitation of the conflict. The same situation may be argued to exist in Mozambique where the disarmament process was incomplete thereby contributing to recurrence of the armed conflict since 2013.

UNTAC also initiated the establishment of a tribunal in 2004 for the trial of Khamer Rouge leaders involved in atrocities during the violent conflict. The required funding for the trials which only commenced in 2004 was 43 million US dollars provided by donors while the Cambodian government provided 13.3 million dollars. The first trials only commenced in 2007. In the foregoing, it can be observed that conflict transformation is not a quick fix process and it requires sustainability especially funding. Funding has often been the main constraint to regional organisations’ conflict transformation efforts which is why it has normally been taken over by the UN. For example, UNTAC cost over $1.6 billion (The Economist 2017), an amount which African regional organisations may be found wanting if they were to sustain similar conflict transformation processes. Because of lack of adequate funding mechanisms, most African regional organisations have relied on donor support to effect conflict transformation which does not augur well for the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems.’ Funding constraints therefore remains a major challenge for the conduct of effective conflict transformation by African regional organisations, the SADC
Northern Ireland is another interesting case for conflict transformation. Dr. Timea Spitka of the Hebrew University proposes four ways to classify the conflict in Northern Ireland: religious, ethnic, political- economic or colonial (Spitka 2016: 3). At first glance, the reason for conflict appears to be a religious division between Protestants and Catholics. The Protestants are English colonisers, and the Catholics are the native Irish citizens whose country was invaded by colonising settlers. The two parties have always identified themselves along political rather than religious lines which complicates the conflict transformation.

Between 1920, when Northern Ireland was created as a separate entity, and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998, the government discriminated against Irish Nationalists in the areas of housing, land ownership and employment. Ninety percent of the police were Unionists who discriminated against the Nationalists and favored their own community. The electoral system restricted the voting rights to homeowners while restricting the Nationalists’ right to own houses virtually disenfranchising the latter. Boundaries of counties were changed in order to prevent the Nationalists from achieving a majority of seats in any county. Therefore, political and the economic discrimination were central to the conflict between two national groups, one dominating and wanting to be part of Britain, and the other subordinated and wanting to be part of Ireland (Salem 2017).

At the beginning there were seven months of separate negotiations between each party and Senator George Mitchell, the mediator without the parties to the conflict meeting face-to-face. This led to the Good Friday Agreement (Mallie and McKittrick 2001:253). Until 2007 there was no stable joint government. Without going into details, it can be said that the results of the internal conflict transformation process in Northern Ireland were that; the parties to the conflict made a reassessment of their national ethnic goals. Constitutional reforms were made towards flexible citizenship, political norms based on human rights, consent and self-determination were created. Non-violence and the rule of law in all the political activities were insisted on. Joint grassroots activities were developed in order to create positive community relations. Efforts were being made to follow up on the economic, historic injustices and inequalities that characterised Northern Ireland. However, gaps still existed in the following areas: 1) The split between the political groups is still going on; 2) the contradiction between the narratives and the continuation of hostilities between the
International involvement also played an important role. The decision by the U.S. President Bill Clinton to help resolve the conflict was crowned by the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as a mediator between the parties. An International Fund for Ireland was established in 1986 by a joint decision of the British and Irish governments, and the U.S. and a number of EU and other countries donated a significant amount of money to support 5,800 economic development and joint civil society ventures (International Fund for Ireland). After the Good Friday Agreement, the EU created the Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation (SSPPR) with a large budget to facilitate the process towards conflict transformation in Northern Ireland known as Peace 1. This program is still going on. The budget for Peace 2 (2007-13 was €332 million while the current Peace 3 phase (2014-20) had a budget of €282 million (europarl.europa.eu). The US according to Salem (2017) also played an important role in facilitating the transforming of the conflict in Northern Ireland is another external actor that has actively contributed to the Northern Ireland peace process. In particular, as Salem highlights, since 1986, the US has donated US$500 million to the fund and has also made major investments in the economy of Northern Ireland and between 2002 and 2007 American companies invested over US$1 billion and created over 4,000 jobs in Northern Ireland (Salem 2017).

The assistance rendered by the US, though may be argued to be interest based, created a conducive socio-economic environment for further transformation. These external factors reflected the existence of a united international position that combined the use of political and economic incentives and the U.S. practice of introducing a neutral and unbiased mediator to convince the parties that power-sharing was the only way out. The case also demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-track diplomacy in negotiation, the role played by individuals, regional and global organisations as well as prominent states in facilitating conflict transformation (ibid).

Northern Ireland is a case in which various actors comprising the international community brought together a coloniser community and an indigenous community who lived in the same geographical area into a power-sharing system. The international community asked the two communities to create a joint transformative reconciliation process towards integration. It also enhanced the way towards joint self-determination in the same territory. Both the American and the EU experiences of creating equal citizenship between peoples who have
different national and ethnic origins can be seen as a model for that process. To this day it is still questionable whether the communities there will be able to integrate. But it is beyond all doubt that the example of Northern Ireland still demonstrates that reconciliation is an important process of conflict transformation. It also demonstrates that funding particularly for post-conflict reconstruction is critical if conflict transformation is to be attainable. Finally, the case also demonstrates the importance of funding to sustain various programmes critical for human needs such as livelihood in general.

In Liberia, after the Liberian rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire to overthrow President Samuel Doe. In December 1989, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened (nou.edu.org –accessed on 30 March 2018). The intervention was facilitated through the establishment of a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to resolve the conflict diplomatically. On 7 August 1990, the SMC established the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to deal with the worsening conflict (Tuck, 2000:2). Klay (2001) states that after Charles Taylor won the elections in 1997, the international community supported a disarmament program and ECOWAS troops withdrew. Leaders from former antagonists’ groups, such as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), were given important government posts in return for disbanding their rebel factions. This was an important conflict transformation step.

However, within two years, tensions between ethnic groups and Taylor’s troops recurred. The immediate causes of the recurrent conflict according to Klay were corruption, repression of dissent, exploitation of ethnic divisions and abject poverty for most Liberians. Findings of a survey carried out on causes of the Liberian second civil war also revealed that there was a high degree of socio-economic inequality between Greater Monrovia and the rest of the country. Access to information only improved at the end of the second civil war while education, health and employment remained critical (Klay, 2009:1; Talking-Peace-June-2011).

The main challenge to the Liberian conflict transformation was the existence of many factional groups splitting on ethnic lines (Clayton, 1995:17; Tuck, 2010: 2). The alignment of some ECOWAS member states to various Liberian factions was a constraint to conflict transformation. As Olonisakin (2008:8) postulates, Charles Taylor’s NPFL was supported by
Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso both of which are Francophone members of ECOWAS while France and Libya though not members of the Community are also alleged to have provided external support to Taylor. Adibe (1995:17) similarly asserts that Nigeria supported factions opposed to Charles Taylor such as AFL, ULIMO and LPC. The support of factional groups by some members of ECOWAS though unavoidable due to national interests of member states, impinged on impartiality and neutrality required in peace support and at times affected effective decision-making during the intervention. The existence of multiple factions and EOMOG members’ lack of neutrality complicated the transformation of the Liberian conflict as there were many actors in the conflict whose mindset, attitudes and perception towards each other needed to be transformed.

Similarly, sustainability constraints particularly funding presented challenges to the transformation of the conflict in Liberia. Ero (1995:2) postulates that ECOMOG was mainly funded from Nigerian resources while it was provided with considerable aid from the USA. Financial constraints in particular have been a major challenge to regional conflict transformation whose programmes and processes are long and demanding in terms of funding. Also, of importance was the rehabilitation of child soldiers which was an important process in the transformation of the Liberian conflict.

The Liberian conflict transformation also involved women as actors in the processes. First was their involvement as mediators in the conflict. It is essential to note that women actively participated in negotiations which helped in bringing adversaries together and also started transforming the mindsets, attitudes and perception of various factions involved in the fighting. Perhaps this may have contributed Liberia becoming the first country in Africa to have a female president. The first major participation of women in peace support operations was also in Liberia through the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) which took over from ECOMOG from 1994. Female peacekeeper played a vital role in the rehabilitation of child soldiers in Liberia and it was in Liberia where the role of women in conflict transformation was realised (Whitman and Fleischman: 1994: 65).

The given scenario of the Liberian conflict indicates a complex conflict transformation which involved multiple factions based on tribal lines and the development of the conflict into a resource sponsored conflict. The continued manifestation of root causes to the first civil war which ended in 1997 in Liberia was evidenced through Taylor’s use of ethnic scapegoating and hatred in general, the new regime's human rights abuses and its failure to tackle the
chronic social and economic problems. All the mentioned weakness indicates that conflict transformation was far from being implemented in Liberia after the end of the first civil war in 1997 which indicates that conflict transformation processes are protracted.

In the foregoing, the second Liberian Civil War began in 1999 when a rebel group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), crossed from Guinea to launch armed attacks through the northwestern regions of Liberia on 21 April 1999. Taylor government launched counter-attacks against the insurgents, thereby setting into motion the second Liberian civil war. It can be established that the root causes of the second Liberian civil war, which were not very different from those of the first one are linked to human needs or the human security paradigm. It can also be noted that the underlying causes had not been resolved or were not being taken care of by the new regime and that no meaningful conflict transformation had taken place in Liberia from 1990 to 2003. Although the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia withdrew in 2015, it can be argued that conflict transformation processes are still going on in that country.

Rwanda has also been going through conflict transformation since the 1994clans-based genocide, it has experienced conflict transformation through various processes which include reconciliation and transitional justice, among others. The general peaceful environment that has continued to prevail uninterrupted in that country though does not always mean the absence of conflict but bears testimony of ongoing transformation processes. Mutisi (2011) and Rugeje (2016) recognise the relevance of traditional methods and institutions of conflict resolution as slowly gaining an audience among policy makers and practitioners of conflict resolution (www.sipd-zw.org accessed; 28 March 2018). The gacaca trials which were conducted at local level proved to be useful in the transformation processes. Clark (2008:316) posits that “the combination of truth-telling and empowerment led to a sense of healing for many survivors.”

The mention of a sense of healing by Clark demonstrates how the gacaca trials contributed to changing the mindset of adversaries in terms of perceptions, attitudes and even view of the conflict. The system also enhanced truth-telling which is related to the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions like the one established in South Africa at the end of the apartheid system which had the effect of various groups transforming their perception towards each other to forge the way forward as a nation. The use of traditional mechanisms
for conflict transformation may be useful in most recurrent conflict in Africa. This is based on the notion that the approaches are easily accepted as locally owned and are based on traditional known values and ethics.

In Somalia, according to Menkhaus (2007), the armed conflict dates back to the fall of Siad Barre, the military junta who took over power through a coup in 1986. The mostly clan-based armed opposition groups overthrew Barre’s government in 1991 and various factions began competing for control and influence in the power vacuum that ensued (Menkhaus 2007). As a result of the chaos and lack of security including human security, more Somalis resorted to criminal activities such as maritime piracy to earn a living. Lang (2011:2) is of the view that “lack of job-creating investments in the context of widespread insecurity and the destructive effect of the conflict on Somali society create a vicious circle.” Lang further posits that “The lucrative nature of piracy as an illicit business in Somalia against the backdrop of poverty resulting from lack of job-creation in an insecure environment can be argued to have fuelled maritime piracy by mainly Somalis in the Gulf of Aden.” The fact that some Somalis are earning a living from illegal activities such as piracy contributes to difficulties of transforming the conflict as beneficiaries would want to continue exploiting it for their benefits.

According to Kebede (2011:21) the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) among other regional, global organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been engaged in efforts to transform the Somali conflict since 1991. No visible success of conflict transformation has been noted as violence continues with no effective central government in place. In this regard, Henderson (2014) argues that gaps and differences between Somali religious groups and clans, reunion seems unlikely in the near future. He observes that while the international community and regional powers prop up so-called ‘moderate Islamists’, both at the centre in Mogadishu and in the regions such as Jubaland, the extremist fringe has been further radicalised and broadened its recruitment base as well as sphere of activities.

Henderson posits that a more comprehensive policy approach would require an analysis of not just the Somali political actors but also of the role of regional and international powers and the impact of their policies on the fragmented and broken country. It can be argued that due to religious and clan divisions as well as exploitation of the conflict by regional and
international actors, all which are predominant in the Somali conflict, conflict transformation has not been successful. Even chances of a successful conflict transformation in future as Henderson posits, are doubtful as long as the given scenario continue to prevail.

2.3 Leasons Learnt

Several lessons can be drawn from the selected case studies of conflict transformation. The conflict transformation processes, include among others; DDR programs, transitional justice mechanisms, reconciliation measures as well as legal, political, social/cultural and economic reforms which emerge after formal hostilities cease. It can be observed that for any conflict transformation to be successful there is need for negotiations which involve all parties to the conflict. The negotiations are supposed to be spearheaded by neutral parties though it was observed that it is not so easy to be neutral since the actions of states are influenced by national interests, hence national interests was identified as a major challenge to conflict transformation.

However, despite the issue of hegemonic interests, negotiations have often contributed to successful transformation. It has also been observed that all forms of negotiations be they track one, two or multi-track diplomacy contribute to various stages of mediation which is crucial in conflict transformation. The study also noted that most regional organisations particularly SADC have often concentrated on track one diplomacy which involves politicians and the military or simply elites who are interested parties to the conflict. By so doing, it was observed that the grassroots are left out of the settlement process. Attributes of an ideal mediator vary with the nature of the conflict, and at times the stage reached by the conflict or by mediation process. Mediators should be impartial to be more acceptable to the antagonistic parties, should be influential and have effective power relatives to the conflicting parties, and strong incentives to achieve a durable settlement. The issue of a powerful mediator is demonstrated by the US role in the El Salvador and Northern Ireland conflict transformation where it provided lots of funding through its agencies to sustain various programmes.

It was observed from most of the cases studied that conflict transformation includes complex and demanding processes which should be sequenced according the conflict analysis. The processes require a lot of funding which most African regional organisations are found wanting as they lack the relevant source of funds besides donor funding. The need for
funding mechanisms for the AU and other regional organisations is therefore essential if conflict transformation is to be successfully conducted on the continent.

It has also been established as in the case of Liberia and even the ongoing violent conflict in Somalia that identifying the root causes of a particular conflict is critical and should form part of the conflict analysis which is a precursor process to conflict transformation. When it comes to meditation, neutral mediators are more preferable though this has been found to be difficult due to the question of national interests as demonstrated by ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict where it ended up being party to the conflict. Similarly, the existence of multiple actors in the conflict as in Somalia and Liberia has often made conflict transformation difficulty. The issue of hegemony and divisions within the regional body as was the case in the Liberian conflict where Nigeria was seen to dominate, though at times it is necessary to have a lead nation, has some effects on contribution of other regional members to the conflict transformation in question.

External interests in particular of foreign powers have also been observed to impact negatively on conflict transformation. The DRC, Somalia and South Sudan internal conflicts, among others, are to a large extent also influenced by more powerful external interested parties. Also noted is that conflict transformation processes particularly when the conflict has turned into an armed violence, the need for thorough DDR, transitional justice through the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and trial of perpetrators of violence and other political-socio-economic transformation are necessary processes of successful conflict transformation. Finally, as seen in Rwanda, conflict transformation is more successful if it is locally owned and adopts local systems acceptable to the actors. The ‘gacaca’ traditional court employed as part of conflict transformation processes is a typical example. Lastly, from all cases examined, conflict transformation is better handled by UN rather than at regional level.

The chapter also established that conflict transformation requires a lot funding and is not a quick-fix solution to a conflict since it involves a number of processes some of which may require to be implemented in the medium to long term. It was noted that the multi-track diplomacy approach seems to be more effective at the negotiations stage of conflict transformation. The overview of case studies undertaken revealed the complexity and financial demands of the conflict transformation processes. The main conflict transformation challenges identified in this chapter are impartiality especially for mediators against national
interests, funding constraints especially for regional organisations, prevalence of hegemony within regional actors, the existence of multiple factions in a conflict and the prevalence of external interested parties. The identified challenges contribute to failure of conflict transformation particularly at regional levels. On the overall, local ownership of the conflict transformation processes is more acceptable to conflicting parties than externally induced processes.
CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN THE SADC REGION

The chapter reviews the challenges in conflict transformation in the SADC region by briefly examining conflict transformation in the DRC, Mozambique and Madagascar.

3.2 Regionalism

Plano and Olton (1988:309) view regionalism as, “nations situated in a geographical area, sharing common concerns and cooperating with each other through limited membership to organisations to meet military, political and functional problems, among others.” Either (1998:11) defines regionalism as “the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that shape collective action within a geographical region.” Having conceptualised regionalism, it is necessary to understand the term regional organization of which the SADC is one. A regional organisation according to Bennet (1991: 216) is made up of members (states) brought together by a common set of objectives based on one of the following; territorial, social, cultural, economic or political relations, and has a formal structure for which provision is made through an intergovernmental agreement. Generally, states join regional or international organisations for their specific interests and will always try to preserve these interests which may have some effects on security cooperation and to some extent present challenges to security cooperation. The given definitions and attributes of regionalism qualify SADC as a regional organisation.

However, it does not always follow that states in a regional organisation must share common boundaries to become bounded to the same organisations and to share common values and at times interests. As Labuschagne (2003:112) notes, regional awareness of common interests and agreed-upon values as well as states’ realisation of their national interests, regional organisations are formed on the basis for regional cooperation. Labuschagne further posits that although national self-interests are the primary motivator for states to engage in cooperation, other factors such as territorial proximity are also important. He however, argues that proximity is not an important motivational factor (for a state to join a regional organisation) but aspects such as cultural and political affinity of states in a particular region, the degree of trust and communication, as well as the consensus which exists about values and objectives (Labuschagne, 2003:112). For example, Chad joined SADC countries in the
DRC intervention despite its being located in Central Africa. This can be argued to have been influenced by common values and shared interests.

Similarly, the SADC membership of Tanzania and the DRC whose geographical locations are in East and Central Africa, respectively, vindicates Lubuschagne’s argument that proximity is not always important for nations to join a particular regional organization but common interests and values. For example, as Cawthra (2010) observes, Tanzania, Angola and DRC lie outside the AU’s regional definition of Southern Africa but are members of SADC. The same applies to Comoros which was admitted into SADC in 2017. Angola and Tanzania’s membership to SADC may be argued to have originated in their membership of the Front Line States (FLS), which had common aspirations and values on the liberation of the rest of Southern Africa especially the then Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. The common values and aspirations to liberate Southern Africa in which a few states were still under white minority rule were enhanced through the FLS which initially comprised Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia as founder members. The FSL alliance was later joined by Botswana, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe (Ngoma 2005: 96). For the DRC, its membership may have been out of the realisation that its security interests especially against an invading Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebel force would be better saved through joining SADC. Indeed, SADC intervention in the DRC conflict in 1998 saved the DRC from external aggression.

According to Cillers (2001:43), it is now more acceptable among donors and Africans themselves that sub-regional organisations are well suited to deal with continental conflict prevention and mediation since instability in one country reduces stability of the rest of the community. This view also conforms to conflict transformation initiatives being undertaken by African regional organisations within their respective geographical locations to deal with any unfolding threat to security particularly the general increase in intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War period. However, Olonisakin (2000) identifies major constraints or challenges encountered in African regional security cooperation, which also pause challenges to conflict transformation as follows;

*Sub-regional economic organisations encounter various political problems in conflict management. The first is that they are structurally unprepared for peace-making and peacekeeping roles and suffer from human and financial resource constraints. Secondly, they find it difficult to play a neutral and impartial role, especially where hegemony enters the picture. Finally, there are numerous operational problems*
Most African regional organisations were founded on the basis of economic and development cooperation. For example, ECOWAS and SADC which were not tailor-made for interventions in conflict-affected member states have adopted structures and institutional mechanisms for security cooperation within their respective communities. The adopted institutional mechanisms are tailor-made for conflict prevention; conflict management and conflict resolution hence need to be refined to mitigate the prevailing challenges especially with regards to conflict transformation. Even some of the adopted structures have presented challenges of smooth linkage with other existing institutional structures. ECOWAS used the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence adopted on 29 May 1981 and the Protocol on Non-Aggression to intervene in Liberia in 1990. Both protocols had no clear provision for intervention in internal conflicts and upheld the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter (Ero 1995). Another example, is the problem of seniority and probably coordination between the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) adopted by SADC in 1996 as an independent Organ and the Summit which created friction between Zimbabwe as chair of the Organ and South Africa at the helm of the Summit.

The same can be said of funding constraints especially with regards to conflict transformation processes which require huge amounts of money to be realised. African regional organisations are found wanting in this regard, more so if donor funding is not forthcoming. Issues of hegemony and impartiality, which hinges on national interests of member states, have also presented challenges to conflict transformation. Also, a major challenge to successful conflict transformation by African regional organisations as observed by Olanisakan is the neutral and impartial role required for such initiative. For example, during ECOWAS intervention in the first Liberia civil war from 1990 to 1997 the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was accused by Charles Taylor for harbouring support to ULIMO and refused to disarm thus effectively undermining the Yamoussoukro agreement (Ero, 1995).

Nigeria, a dominant member of ECOMOG is also alleged to have supported the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), troops loyal to ousted president Samuel Doe and ULIMO. A group of at least 500 ECOMOG troops sent into the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
territory to prepare for the programme of disarmament and encampment were subsequently captured and held under surveillance by NPFL. Similarly, Guinea and Cote d’ Ivoire, both member states of ECOWAS, are alleged to have supported the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in the second Liberian civil war from 1999 to 2003 (Ero 1995). ECOMOG’s impartiality may be argued to have contributed to a failed DDR processes and the collapse of the cease-fire. There was also noticeable friction between and disharmony particular between Anglo-phone and Franco-phone member states of ECOMOG which to some affected ECOWAS cooperation during the Liberian intervention (ibid).

Disharmony mainly caused by unnecessary power politics by influential states in a security community is one main reason behind the failure by member states to have consensus over the problem at hand to successfully cooperate in conflict transformation in a conflict-ridden member state. In this regard, Baregu (1999:155) is of the view that the failure by South Arica and some SADC Member States to participate in the DRC intervention was due to lack of a clearly defined problem. Although the sovereignty of the DRC was at stake, there was no clear mandate to justify the intervention which supports Baregu’s argument. However, it would have been impossible to intervene if SADC was to wait for a mandate. The distress call by Laurent Kabila for assistance was enough justification. Nieuwerk (2001) also identifies other challenges to regional security cooperation which encompasses conflict transformation when he argues that:

Two realities inhibit regional cooperation. The first is the old-fashioned politics where national decisions with regional implications are based on seductive appeal of the national interests or alternatively on sovereignty. The second is the politics of greed where profits are extracted by exploiting situations of intractable conflict. These realities impose limitations on the implementation of regional security cooperation (Nieuwerk (2001:16)).

As observed by Nieuwerk, regional peace initiatives which includeconflict transformation face challenges emanating from national interests of member states since according to realism, all states cooperate through regional or international organisations on the assumption that their interests will be realised. As such, the behavior of particularly dominant states within a regional organisation may present challenges to regional conflict transformation.
3.3 The Establishment of SADC

Ngoma (2005:96) explains that early displays of unified action on regional security issues included monthly meetings between a small number of leaders initially just between Kaunda (Zambia) and Nyerere (Tanzania), later included Mobutu SeseSeko (Zaire), Jomo Kenyata (Kenya) and Milton Obote (Uganda). The grouping which became known as the ‘Mulungushi Club’ in the mid-1960s was a precursor to the Front Line States (FSL) formed in the mid-1970s (Cillers 1995: 2-3; Ngoma, 2005:96). The membership of the FLS consisted of a fairly small group of heads of states such as Kaunda, of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, Masire of Botswana, the Mozambican president Machel, Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Neto of Angola. According to Cillers (ibid.p4) both the Mulungushi Club and its successor the FLS were informal and their relative small size allowed them to meet at short notice. The question of informality and small membership of the Mulungushi Club and the FLS seem to have been passed on to SADC institutions such as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) especially through the Troika. For example, the Troika comprises the outgoing, the incoming and the present chair of the Organ who quickly assemble to discuss any urgent security threats in a member country.

According to Chakaodza (1990:66) it comprised “those countries which because of geographical proximity and for diplomatic, political and security reasons were involved in efforts to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe,” while Blumenfield (1991:44-45) describes it as “a strategic, political, and economic alliance aiming at the decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique.” The descriptions of the FLS emphasise among other reasons the decolonisation of those countries in Southern Africa which were still under colonial white minority rule. The two definitions however, do not mention Namibia and South Africa which were also under colonialism. Khadiagala (1994:24) summarises the objectives of the FSL as “inter alia concerned with regime stability, black majority rule and the creation of regional economic institutions to reduce their (the Southern African independent states) dependence on (apartheid) South Africa.”

The need to promote economic independence and development among the independent African states in Southern Africa and reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa became one of the main objectives of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.
(SADCC), which succeeded the FLS in 1980 and it eventually transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in 1992. Observably, the regional block seems divided between two groups, namely; those countries which got their independence through a protracted armed struggle which comprises Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe while the other group consists of those countries which got independence through negotiations. The participation of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC intervention in 1998 may be argued to demonstrate cooperation based on shared history of having gained through an armed struggle. When conflict erupts in one group, there is a tendency to downplay intervention and assist in conflict transformation especially when the state in question treats the problem as internal. This is perhaps the reason why the recurrent conflict in Mozambique from 2014 has not attracted voices for intervention within the region. Groupings are also at times based on interests. For example, Botswana and South African interests in Lesotho may be argued to have led to their military intervention in 1998. The groupings along historical background, interests and common security concerns have had some challenges to security cooperation required for effective conflict transformation (Cawthra: 2010).

3.3.1 An Overview of the Southern African Development Community

As Vhumbunu (2015) observes that the SADCC at its formation in 1980 in Lusaka, aimed to advance the cause of liberating Southern Africa and reducing its dependence on the then-apartheid South Africa. These objectives were carried over from the FLS alliance. The SADC, which originally had been a 15-member regional organisation with Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe as member states, has increased its membership to 16 with the admission of the Union of Comoros into the Community on 20 August 2017 (Southern African News, 20 November 2017). The SADC member states less the Comoros are shown on the map below:
3.3.2 SADC Institutional Mechanisms for Conflict Transformation

To identify SADC’s conflict transformation challenges, it is essential to briefly examine the institutional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution since no mention on conflict transformation is made in all SADC provisions. Article 5 (c) of the SADC Treaty outlines the “promotion and defence of peace and security” in the sub-region as one of SADC’s objectives (SADC Treaty 1992; Ngoma 2005; Omeje 2008:84). In 1992, the SADC had the following structures; the Summit of Heads of State or Government, the Council of Ministers, Commissions, the Standing Committee of Officials, the Secretariat and the Tribunal (SADC Treaty 1992).

It may be observed that despite article 5 (c) of the objectives being to promote peace and security in the region, no institutional structure for enhancing such an objective was included as part of the SADC structure during its inception in 1992. The Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) was later established in 1996 mainly to cater for peace and security in the region. It is however, observed that no mention of conflict transformation is made in any of the OPDS objectives. This is probably due to the concept being relatively new implying
that it needs to be included in all SADC terms of reference. It may also imply that the regional body is yet to fully embrace the concept of conflict transformation as a mechanism for dealing with conflict in the region.

The OPDS whose instructional structures included 4 main layers namely; the Summit, Ministerial, Defence Chiefs and Technical levels, was until 2001, designed to operate independently from other SADC structures. The Summit level is under the chair which rotates on an annual basis. It also consists of a rotating Troika which consists of the current, outgoing and incoming chairpersons. The troika normally meets at short notice on an ad hoc basis to discuss any threat to peace and security in the region. The Ministerial level comprises a Foreign Affairs Committee and a Defence and Security Committee which are instrumental in handling conflicts in the region (op.cit.).

The OPDS presents a framework through which member states coordinate, issues to do with conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-building and conflict transformation. It has two major committees which make key decisions on peace and security matters. These are the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). The ISDSC was also made integral to the OPDS as the operational component of the OPDS. Its mandate is to reinforce democracy, by becoming a leading institution of SADC mandated to address issues relating to political stability, conflict prevention, conflict management, democracy and human rights as well as issues pertaining to peace (SADC Communiqué, 28 June 1996).

The objectives of the OPDSC (SADC Communiqué, 1996) which seemingly conform to conflict transformation are to;

   e) Mediate in inter-state dispute and conflicts. However, no mention is made for meditation in internal conflict in this objective despite most of the conflicts affecting the region being internal or intra-state in nature.

   f) Use preventive diplomacy to preempt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system.

   h) Promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charter and Convention of the OAU and UN.
k) Promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security (SADC Communiqué, 1996).

The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) (SIPO: 2010), adopted in 2002 provides guidelines for the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation on a five-year basis. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was adopted in 2001 as an institutional framework through which member states coordinate policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence and security. The mentioned areas are critical considerations for conflict transformation in the SADC region. Key to SIPO is its emphasis on the common security agenda for SADC stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty in particular “promotion and defence of peace and security.” It also observes the SADC Mutual Defence Pact as a regional commitment towards collective self-defence and the preservation of peace and security in the region and upholds the principle that ‘an armed attack against one (member state) shall be deemed a threat to regional peace and security’ (SIPO: 15-17).

The Plan also includes strategies for the sustainability of its activities consisting of partnership for cooperation with non-state parties and international organisations and funding (SIPO: 73). SADC seems to have challenges with non-state parties, particularly, the civil society. It is critical to note that the observance of the critical role played by the civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and private individuals in contemporary mediation through Track Two diplomacy cannot be over-emphasised. In Mozambique, for example, the Roman Catholic Church in Italy and individuals such as Tiny Rowland played pivotal roles in facilitating the 1992 Peace Accord which ended the protracted civil war in that country (Berridge 2010:243).

An observed problem pertaining to SADC conflict transformation is lack of full involvement and engagement of private players such as the civil society especially during negotiations and implementation of other processes. This does not conform to Lederach’s conflict transformation model which encourages the involvement of both non-state and state actors at all levels of the conflict which includes the top, middle and grassroots (Lederach 1997: 39).

The SIPO provides for funding, budget management and financial audit. It stresses those activities of the Organ, will as a matter of principle, be funded through assessed contributions
from Member States. Funding may also be obtained through special funds, endowment funds and other external sources as the Summit may decide. The provision for funding clearly stipulates that external funding shall be in line with the provisions of Article 10 of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC SIPO, op.cit.). The main provision for funding from Member States’ contributions has been a problem due to some members’ inability to provide the required funding. Similarly, funding of conflict transformation processes from donors has also had its own challenges since, the fund providers have tended to use the opportunity to further their interests, which the Summit may not allow.

The promotion of democratic institutions and practices as well as the promotion of the observance of human rights are critical in the promotion of peace and security in the region since these are some of the main causes of intra-state conflict in the SADC. This also relates to structures which Lederach (1997) says need to be transformed as part of conflict transformation processes. However, this seems a major challenge in the SADC region due to what Cawthra (2010:7), refers to as ‘incumbents,’ which entails a club of states or presidents, in most cases sharing the same historical backgrounds. For example, some SADC states tend to support incumbents in power and the leaders of such states act in mutual support of each other. As such, the SADC through the Summit or OPDS has not been strong enough to criticize fellow heads of states and government where undemocratic governance, abuse of human rights or at times misrule problems may be evident.

Cawthra (2010) also states that SADC countries share one thing in common, they were all colonised though in different ways and by various imperial countries namely; Britain, France, Germany and Portugal. Cawthra further postulates that these colonial histories have left important legacies in terms of culture, language and political systems, which complicate initiatives for peace and security. Liberation struggles also took different forms, and the dividing line between those countries which laboured under apartheid or settler colonialism and took up armed struggles, and those which were able to slough off the colonial yoke without resort to violence, remain strong. To further complicate matters, after independence some states (such as the Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique and to some extent, Zimbabwe) attempted to take the ‘socialist road’ and allied themselves with the Soviet Union and its partners, while others were more pro-Western; and in the cases of Angola and Mozambique civil wars took place in part as a result of this clash of ideologies (Cawthra: 2010:10).
The amendment of the SADC Treaty in Mach 2001 established additional institutional mechanisms which are key to the delivery of the organisation’s mandate. Among these mechanisms were the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the related Troika. The OPDSC, established in 1996 as an independent organ of SADC, was placed under the Summit in 2001. The question of the relationship of the Organ and the Summit created problems between President Mandela of South Africa as SADC chair and the then President Mugabe of Zimbabwe as chair of the Organ during the DRC intervention (Chimanikire, 2002).

Against this background, Chimanikire (2002:9) points to friction between South Africa and Zimbabwe as an issue which amongst other things paralysed South African attempts to lead a SADC initiative to resolve the Great Lakes Crisis arising from the Rwanda-Zaire conflict in the second half of 1996. The friction between member states as noted in the DRC intervention has been a challenge to conflict transformation in the region. Similarly, the question of dominance based on national interests has also presented challenges to SADC conflict transformation. However, in realist terms states cooperate in international or regional organisations on the assumption that their interests are catered for or to realise their interests. Hans Morgenthou, in Ngwenya (2002:32) advances the argument that states are usually in conflict with one another or are in constant competition and place much emphasis on their own interests rather than regional cooperation. Morgenthou further observes that states maximise their power through international organisations. The same can be argued of states in the region whose participation in the Lesotho conflict transformation is guided by national interests.

3.3.2 Internal Conflict Trends in the SADC Region

The SADC region, though relatively peaceful, has been characterised by conflict emanating from anti-colonial liberation struggles, apartheid destabilisation, ideological and proxy wars, ethnicity, civil wars, mutiny and election disputes (Ngoma: 2005). In addition, Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:9) point out that “the Southern African region has extensive experience of external involvement in promoting violent conflict and other threats to its security. Baregu (2003:19) buttresses Ngoma and Van Nieuwkerk’s observations by pointing out that the SADC region is defined and structured by a history of conflicts. These conflicts of the post-Cold War period, which Kaldor (1999) refers to as ‘new wars,’ have complex causes rooted in history, political, economic, domestic governance and international relations
and have continued to impact negatively on the socio-economic development of the region. As Cawthra (2010:10) postulates, the SADC has not hesitated to play a conflict resolution role in the region. It has been partially active in conflict resolution, mainly through the appointment of mediators (either typically serving or by retired African presidents) and was active in attempting to resolve the crises in countries such as Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC. These interventions have been met with very mixed results at best and SADC intervention did not reach the expected results yet, but it has not failed.

In the foregoing, SADC has played a significant role in conflict situations adopting various mechanisms for dealing with conflict. The mechanisms include preventive diplomacy, conflict management, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building and conflict transformation as mechanisms for promoting peace and security in the region. SADC has acted diplomatically mainly through the appointment of mediators, sending observers and at times has used military interventions as in the DRC and Lesotho. It has used preventive diplomacy such as in the dispute between Botswana and Namibia of the Sidudu/Kasili Island (Omeje, 2008).

The SADC has adopted suspension of membership and the threat of sanctions as was the case in Madagascar from 2009 to 2014. In some occasions SADC has resorted to military intervention as peace-enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter like in the DRC from 1998 to 2003 and in Lesotho in 1998. However, SADC has been not been successful in transforming the DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique internal conflicts as shown by recurrent internal conflicts in those countries. This is probably attributed to resource constraints especially funding, disharmony within member states, hegemonic tendencies by dominant states and structural problems.

3.3 An Overview of SADC Conflict Transformation Case Studies in the Region and Challenges Being Encountered

The SADC has demonstrated the zeal to resolve conflict in the region through various approaches. It has responded to conflicts in Angola, the DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe and to some extent, in Mozambique. The study made some brief synopses of SADC conflict transformation in Angola, the DRC, Madagascar and Mozambique with a view to explore challenges encountered or being met.
3.3.1 SADC Conflict Transformation in Angola

The Angolan civil war which commenced immediately after independence in 1975 and continued for 27 years up to 2002, and continued with some interludes, was the longest and bloodiest conflict in Africa. The civil war was essentially a power struggle between two former liberation movements, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The armed conflict also served as a surrogate battleground for the Cold War. Due to the proxy nature of the conflict, it became characterised by large-scale direct and indirect international involvement by opposing powers such as the Soviet Union and Cuba on the MPLA government side while South Africa and the United States were aligned to UNITA (Guimarães, 1998; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2018). At the end of the Cold War, the UNITA continued to fight against the MPLA government up to 2002. The conflict thrived on resources such as diamond hence the quest by UNITA to control resource-rich areas. Although the Angolan conflict experience involved both the AU and UN, the SADC made several efforts aimed at transforming the conflict to attain sustainable peace and security (Guimarães, 1998).

According to Ngoma (2005:161), the SADC efforts in the Angolan protracted civil war has since the establishment of the OPDS in 1996, been through several summits, ministerial committees and an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meetings. For example, among the summits held on the Angolan conflict was the one held in Maseru on 24 August 1996. It was resolved at this Summit that, UNITA was responsible for the non-implementation of the Lusaka Protocol which among other areas stipulated “the selection and integration of UNITA forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), the return of UNITA generals into the FAA, the removal of obstructions to the free movement of people and goods, and the restoration of the authority of the state throughout the national territory” (SADC Communiqué, 1996:73) the areas mentioned in the Communiqué are typical of some of the processes of conflict transformation. This vindicates how SADC was to some extent involved in the Angolan conflict transformation since the inception of the OPDS in 1996. The Lusaka Protocol was also a SADC sponsored initiative.

Ngoma (ibid:162) further postulates that the general trend in all SADC summits and other sponsored meetings were inclined towards an inclusive solution which entailed a government of national unity and the integration of UNITA combatants into the Armed Forces of

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In 1992 SADC, which had just reformed from the SADCC, intensified calls for sanctions on UNITA to force it to the negotiation table and appealed to the government and UNITA to return to negotiations in a spirit of national reconciliation. After three failed peace agreements, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) mainly based on the Lusaka Peace Protocol of 1994 was signed by the Angolan government and UNITA on 4 April 2002 as the final step towards ending the protracted and recurrent conflict (Ngoma, 2005:164).

3.3.1.1 Challenges of Conflict Transformation in Angola

As part of the post-conflict reconstruction, after the cease-fire according to Polgreen (2003), Angola faced a humanitarian crisis which threatened political stability. The Angolan armed conflict created a disastrous humanitarian crisis which was a major post-conflict transformation process. There were reports of food shortages and poor conditions in demobilisation camps while internally displaced persons as well as refugees needed resettlement and creation of conditions for their livelihood. It was estimated that the conflict internally displaced 4.28 million people, almost a third of Angola's total population. The UN estimated in 2003 that 80% of Angolans lacked access to basic medical care, 60% lacked access to water, and 30% of Angolan children would die before the age of five, with an overall national life expectancy of less than 40 years of age (Polgreen, 2003). The Angolan government is reported to have spent $187 million settling internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 4 April 2002 and 2004. The UN contributed $33 million to continue the settling process (Human Rights Watch 2002).

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that fighting in 2002 displaced 98,000 people between 1 January and 28 February alone. IDPs comprised 75% of all landmine victims. The IDPs, unacquainted with their surroundings, frequently and predominantly fall victim to mines. It was estimated that approximately 15 million had been laid in Angola by the end of the war. Angola had become one of the worst mined countries after Cambodia. The HALO Trust began demining Angola in 1994, and had destroyed 30,000 landmines by July 2007 (Bobb: 2009). Both UNITA and government forces were reported to have utilised child solders while numerous women were also reported to have been sexually abused (op.cit.). All these required rehabilitation as part of post-conflict transformation.
The overwhelming demands for a large population which required to be resettled called for a lot of money as indicated above. Similarly, the demining programme is an expensive exercise which SADC would not afford. By the end of June 2002, the demobilisation of about 80000 UNITA troops was reported complete but only 26700 weapons were reportedly surrendered (Polgreen, 2003). The implication of cached or hidden weapons is that disarmament is incomplete and is a major challenge to peace-building as former combatants can easily resort to their weapons and a relapse into conflict occurs. This has been the scenario in Mozambique where RENAMO former fighters have often reverted to their bases to retrieve their weapons and resumed fighting.

The Angolan scenario also presents a critical challenge to conflict transformation such as DDR, dealing with the resultant humanitarian crises, promoting the spirit of reconciliation, creating an environment of normalcy, facilitating human security and holding of democratic elections, all which require funding. The involvement of powerful interested parties in the conflict also meant that it required the UN and the AU to facilitate conflict transformation. However, SADC may be argued to have played an essential role in the Angolan conflict transformation, through mediation and negotiations which facilitated the evolution of transformation of the conflict by bringing the war to an end in 2002.

3.3.2 SADC Conflict Transformation in the DRC
According to Kisangani (2012:152), on 2 August 1998, Laurent Kabila’s former Rwandan and Ugandan allies launched a rebellion to topple him allegedly after he had requested them to return to their respective countries. SADC through Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe sent troops on the request of Kabila while Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda supported rebel factions. Multilateral peace talks to end the war were held between Joseph Kabila’s government and a number of rebel groups in 2002. The then South African President Thabo Mbeki, as facilitator played a critical role to encourage major parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) to sign a Global and Inclusive Agreement in which Joseph Kabila would share power with former rebels during political transition (Kisangani 2012:152). An agreement was signed on 17 December 2002, paving the way to the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on 2 April 2003 (Kapinga 2015)
3.3.2.2 Conflict Transformation Challenges in the DRC

The SADC was not very much involved in conflict transformation efforts especially after the intervention. The main efforts signifying conflict transformation were through the ability of the SADC to bring the warring factions and the government to negotiations by appointing a facilitator through (Track One diplomacy) which eventually led to cessation of hostilities in the greater part of the DRC less the eastern part. The DRC conflict presents a challenge of handling multiple factions, the involvement of a number of states in the conflict and the recurrent nature of the conflict especially in the Eastern part. The main complication in Eastern DRC emanates from seemingly moribund armed militias who continue to perpetuate the conflict.

The presence of ‘stateless’ armed militias in eastern DRC complicates conflict transformation processes as they may feel being armed is their survival. Some of the militia are not originally from DRC hence their reintegration requires the cooperation of neighbouring countries who are not SADC member states. With SADC having been involved in the conflict, it may not be easy to facilitate a transformation role despite being involved in mediations. Also with the multiplicity of actors involved and funding constraints on the part of SADC, the UN is better placed to facilitate conflict transformation in the DRC. Finally, as Rugeje (2016) postulates, due to underfunding, SADC’s role has largely been limited to moral support in meetings and making ethical claims which at times have not been supported by requisite action. The OPDSC decisions are also not legally binding.

SADC Conflict Transformation in Madagascar

As for the Madagascar conflict, the country has had a history of periodic political upheavals and military interventions. In 2001 Marc Ravalomanana established his grip on presidential power, using his position of mayor of Antananarivo and his business empire as a power base. In 2008 Andry Rajoelina, another businessman, became mayor of Antananarivo and began challenging Ravalomanana eventually forcing him out of office after a military intervention in 2009. Both SADC and the AU reacted strongly to unconstitutional change of government. SADC set itself up as one of the principal mediators in an international coalition, eventually leading to an agreement for a transitional government. There were no major ethnic, political or social causes for the crisis, and that Madagascar’s dependence on international aid gives
the international community considerable influence over the course of events. SADC was able to act decisively because of its policies opposing unconstitutional changes of government, and its lack of economic and other interests in Madagascar (Cawthra, 2010).

The handling of the Madagascar conflict transformation by SADC though it involved other international players such as the AU and UN, may be argued to have been successful. The SADC’s conflict management role through the appointment of Chisano, the former Mozambique president as mediator and subsequent threat of sanctions and suspension of Madagascar contributed to some form of transformation in the conflict (ibid). It may be noted that the SADC had a common position on the Madagascar conflict probably due to lack of national interests in that country for most member states save for South Africa. It can also be observed that SADC’s standpoint of rejecting unconstitutional governments prevailed while the threat of expulsion and enforcement of sanctions may also be argued to have produced results to a successful conflict transformation. Also observed was that the source of the conflict was not based on ethnic, political or social causes (ibid) but may be argued to be based on gaining power for the expansion of business empires. From the given observations, it may be argued that no major challenges were encountered by SADC in its contributions to conflict transformation in Madagascar from 2009 to 2014. The country has since been readmitted into SADC.

SADC Conflict Transformation in Mozambique

The conflict in Mozambique dates back to its independence from Portugal in 1975 when in 1975 the country was engaged in a protracted civil war between government forces led by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and a rebel movement, the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO). The conflict lasted for 16 years and the Rome-brokered 1992 Peace Accord brought about an end to the civil war. However, 21 years later in 2013, RENAMO resorted to arms and resumed fighting in the central and Northern provinces. Economic activities in these provinces which have thrived on recently discovered coal and natural gas have almost been brought to a halt as a result of ambushes of vehicles and railway wagons carrying commodities to Beira for export (Queface, 2013; Rupiya, 2015).

Rupiya (2015) postulates that the Mozambican conflict and attempts to bring about a lasting peace are best understood within a broad historical and international framework. From the initial stirrings of nationalist sentiments under Portuguese colonial rule, through the immense
developmental challenges facing the newly-independent state, to the subsequent war of destabilisation waged by the RENAMO and its backers, efforts to find peace have remained largely out of the hands of Mozambicans themselves. Root causes of the recurrent conflict in Mozambique can be argued to be alienation of RENAMO and in particular its leader Alphonso Dhlakama, FRELIMO's tight grip on the apparatus of state and RENAMO’s greater demands to have a greater say in decision-making and alleged electoral fraud or rigging as observed by Tump (2013).

According Tump (2013) RENAMO has been severely disadvantaged in past elections. In the 1998 presidential elections there was massive electoral fraud. Hundreds of thousands of votes in the RENAMO strongholds were declared invalid." This bears testimony to the existence of electoral fraud which allegedly disadvantaged RENAMO. According to Carboni and Leo (2016), the proximate causes of the recent wave of fighting lie in the increasing political isolation of RENAMO after the 2014 elections. After the outbreak of hostilities in 2013 over council by-elections which were boycotted by RENAMO, a brief cessation of hostilities led to the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 which RENAMO claimed were rigged in favour of FRELIMO and hostilities peaked in March 2015.

Dhlakama declared that six central and northern provinces namely; Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambezia, Nampula and Niassa were to be governed by RENAMO (International Business Times, 1 March 2016). Similarly, RENAMO’s conflict activities are concentrated mostly in Mozambique’s central and Northern provinces which have been traditionally RENAMO’s traditional power base. Dhlakama has demanded that RENAMO should appoint governors in the above provinces and FRELIMO has constantly rejected the demand. It is also in the same provinces that RENAMO has been getting more votes as compared to FRELIMO.

The discovery of vital minerals such as coal, natural gas and ongoing prospecting for petroleum in the same areas seem to give RENAMO appetite for control of these provinces. Guebuza’s tough stance against RENAMO’s demands during his tenure as president from 2004 to 2014 increased the assertion of ruling party power and blurring the lines between the ruling party and the state increased demands for political inclusion by RENAMO. FRELIMO’s dominance of political and economic life increased under Guebuza (Manning, 2015).

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The economic stakes of political inclusion, including access to the spoils of Mozambique’s natural resource boom, RENAMO’s demands tied in part to the party’s perception that the government had failed to honour key provisions of the 1992 peace deal, including most importantly the integration of RENAMO militiamen into Mozambique’s security forces are some of the alleged causes of the resurgent conflict (Manning, 2015). Successive regimes in Mozambique have not addressed poverty and unemployment in a country which heavily depends on donor funding (Hanlon and Keynes: 2015). The argument by Obasanjo (op.cit) that poverty is the main root cause to violent conflicts in Africa, to a large extent conforms to the Mozambican scenario where absolute poverty according to Queface (2013) affects about 59.6% living on below $1 per day.

Conflict Transformation Challenges in Mozambique

The SADC has not done much in terms of transforming the recurrent internal conflict in Mozambique, except discussing the situation at various forums. The seeming inaction by SADC over the relative violent conflict in Mozambique can arguably be linked to the behaviour of actors involved in the conflict, notably; the FRELIMO government and RENAMO who have engaged different countries of their liking. RENAMO for example, has requested observers from the West and Kenya while the government has opted for observers from most SADC member states. The seemingly background approach by SADC may also be argued to be associated with the ‘grouping’ behavior which groups countries according to their independence history.

Summary of SADC Conflict Transformation Challenges

Most African regional organisations, the SADC inclusive were founded on the basis of economic and development cooperation. The organisations were not tailor-made for interventions in conflict-affected member states hence they adopted structures and institutional mechanisms for security cooperation within their respective communities. The Summit, OPDS, Troika and various ministerial committees are key institutions for conflict transformation in the SADC region. The OPDS is mainly responsible for coordinating peace and security activities within the region. It is curtailed by funding challenges which affects the SADC conflict transformation capability. Disharmony mainly caused by unnecessary power politics by influential states in a security community is one main reason behind the failure by member states to have consensus over the problem at hand to successfully
cooperate in conflict transformation in a conflict-ridden member state. Hegemonic trends based on national interests have also been noted as a challenge to SADC conflict transformation capability.
CHAPTER FOUR: SADC CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION CHALLENGES IN THE RECURRENT LESOTHO CONFLICT FROM 1994 TO 2017

This chapter discusses conflict transformation challenges faced by SADC in Lesotho. The challenges are identified under sovereignty, national interests, structural challenges, funding and internal institutions in Lesotho.

4.1 An Overview of Lesotho’s Geography

According to Monyane (2009:1), Lesotho, officially known as the Kingdom of Lesotho is a landlocked country (in Southern Africa) and is completely surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho measures 30 355 square kilometers in size and according to the 2016 estimates, it has a population of around 2 203 821 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017). As Monyane (op.cit.) posits, only about 13% of Lesotho’s soil is arable and it is found mostly in the western strip which is highly populated. The extremely skewed distribution of arable land explains the excessive population concentration in the western arable areas (ibid). The map of Lesotho is shown below.

**Figure 1: The Map of Lesotho**

In order to put the conflict into perspective, the study broke the background of Lesotho into pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history.

4.1.1 Pre-Colonial History: 1822 to 1868

According to interviews conducted, the present Lesotho, which was previously known as Basutoland, emerged as a single polity under King Moshoeshoe I in 1822. Between 1821 and 1823, during the ‘mfecane,’ which was associated with Tshaka’s reign, Moshoeshoe and his close family followers are said to have settled in the mountains of Lesotho. The interviews revealed that this is why the population of Lesotho is homogeneous almost entirely made up of the Sotho (Basuthu) people. Moshoeshoe resisted both the Zulu attacks and the colonial efforts orchestrated by the Dutch and the British who were moving from the Cape Colony (Monyane, 2009). Attempts by both the British and the Boers, in particular, to occupy Lesotho vindicate the long history of South African interests in that country.

4.1.2 Colonial History: 1868 to 1966

Both literature review and interviews revealed that King Moshoeshoe sought protection against the Boers from the British thereby becoming a protectorate. The proclamation of British Protectorate on 12 March in 1868 secured Lesotho, by then Basutoland from Boer aggression. It did not however, end Lesotho’s problems, since conflict within the Kingdom and between the Basotho and the British was to resurface (African Democracy Encyclopedia Project: 2007). In 1910 Basutoland was placed under the jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner in South Africa. A Basutoland Council was introduced to defend the Basotho interests in the event of incorporation into the Union of South Africa. The Council comprised 100 members, 94 of whom were appointed by the King (Columbia Encyclopaedia 2007; Lye and Murray 1980: 82-83).

In essence, Lesotho was never colonised in the same manner applicable to most African countries but it became a protectorate of the British. In this regard, the British gradually exerted influence in that country. For example, when it became independent from Britain in 1966, according to interviews, it adopted the Westminster type of government headed by a prime minister. This governance system was to co-exist with the traditional monarch system.
with a king at the helm, almost similar to the current British setup. The incompatability which continues to exist between the two systems can be traced back to the influence gained during the period when Lesotho was under British control.

It was also revealed during interviews with Morena Seeiso that Christianity, initially spearheaded by French missionaries also emerged during the same period. He further asserted that the growing influence of the Roman Catholic Church on the royal family continues to be experienced in present day Lesotho (interview with Murena Seeiso; Morrison). Eldredge (1993:94-95) also relates to the growing influence of Christianity in Lesotho when they assert that in 1843 the French missionaries who were only 393 increased to 13,733 by 1894. By 1904 church members in Lesotho had increased to 13,733 representing 5.5% of the population.

Lye and Murray (1980, 67), buttress Morena Seeiso’s point of view that Christianity has continued to impinge on the traditional system in Lesotho, just like any other African countries, when they point out that “missionary opposition to many traditional cultural practices subverted the power of the chiefs and weakened the cohesiveness of Sotho culture and so aroused the ire and opposition of traditional leaders.” Lodge et al (2002: 89) conform to Lye and Murray’s point of view when they highlight that religious rivalry was introduced with the establishment of Catholic missions from 1862. Though progress was initially slow, under the patronage of the monarchy the Catholic Church made a rapid stride among the chiefs in the early 20th century. The resultant effect of this development was social and political conflicts between the traditional chiefs and the mission-educated elites based on religious divisions. This conforms to the views of respondents such as Morena Seeiso; retired Major General Lekanya and Mrs Morrison that colonialism is partially to blame for Lesotho’s conflict through its Western democracy which reduced the effectiveness of the traditional system to settle disputes.

4.1.3 Post-Colonial History: 1966 to 2017

According to Karen and Mariken (2004) Lesotho, gained its independence from Britain and became the Kingdom of Lesotho on 4 October 1966. Since independence according to Matlosa (2007) and Vhumbunu (2015), Lesotho has been characterised by conflict and has
experienced high levels of factionalism, political tension and violence especially during and after elections. Since the transformation of the SADCC into SADC in 1992, Lesotho has continued experiencing conflict of various magnitudes. The main relative violent conflicts occurred in 1994, 1998, 2007 and 2014. Since then up to 2017 Lesotho has continued to experience incidents of conflict of various magnitude (Monyane, 2009; Vhumbunu, 2015). SADC has employed several conflict handling mechanisms which are within the realm of conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. It has often adopted mediation, preventive diplomacy, military intervention, sending of observers, monitoring elections, institutional reforms and setting up of tribunals, among others, but the conflict has remained recurrent.

4.3 A Chronology of the Lesotho Conflict

To understand the conflict in Lesotho, it is essential to trace it in the context of the country’s historical background, colonial legacy and its political, social and economic factors. The fact that Lesotho has been characterised by conflict since its independence in 1966, leads scholars to want to explore the root causes of the conflict in the context of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial or independence periods. During interviews, most respondents, among them Ambassador Fisher, Dr Mutambudzi and Mrs Morrison, concurred with the assertion by Matlosa and Vhumbunu that the violent conflict in Lesotho is often related to elections since independence. They refer to the “the opposed elections syndrome” where most of the violent incidents have occurred after elections in which the outcome has either been rejected or the opposition may be leading. However, some respondents such as Mathela argued that elections were only immediate causes but there were other underlying causes to the conflict some of which were deep-rooted in Lesotho’s history, its geographical location which is completely surrounded by South Africa, structural and institutional as well as socio-politico-economic factors.

Vhumbunu (2015) chronicles the history of Lesotho’s conflict from independence in 1966. He posits that the outcome of the first elections won by the Basotho National Party (BNP), was disputed resulting in post-election violence. In January 1970, the ruling BNP lost the first post-independence general elections to the Basutho Congress Party (BCP). Prime Minister Leaboa Jonathan refused to hand over power to the BCP. He dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution and imprisoned the leadership of the BCP which triggered massive protests. As mentioned during interviews, the BCP is said to have been involved in the initiation of an
insurgent group, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) from 1976 to around 1990. The LLA is said to have been sponsored by the then apartheid regime in South Africa (Interview with retired Police Commissioner Mathela in Lesotho, on 12 March 2018). This vindicates how South Africa has been unavoidably involved in Lesotho primarily for the sake of its national interests in that country.

While it is normal for South Africa to have such interests like any other country, it is not ethical for the same country to lead the mediation efforts in Lesotho under the auspices of SADC which has mostly been the case.

The reason behind the foregoing is that due to its observed interests in Lesotho, South Africa is likely to have a biased approach particularly during mediatisation which it has always taken the lead. For example, as noted during interviews, South African dislike of Mosisili in favour of Thabane bears further testimony to its interests-based approach in Lesotho. It was however, mentioned by some respondents that no conflict transformation can be successful in Lesotho without the full engagement of South Africa due to its links with Lesotho and its geographical location. It was however, stressed that whereas South Africa was essential in the Lesotho conflict transformation, it was not supposed to appoint its nationals as mediators which has been the case in most cases. It may preferably be necessary that it plays a supporting role within the SADC auspices while another member state takes the lead.

In 1986, Lesotho experienced its first coup, ousted the BNP government and established a seven-year military rule through the Transitional Military Council (Matela, 2018; Vhumbunu, 2015). The Transitional Military Council that assumed power granted executive authority to King Moshoeshoe II, who was until then a ceremonial monarch. The executive powers granted to the King according to some respondents, created some antagonism between the prime minister and the king who had lost executive powers (interview with Lerotholi and Morrison; 2018). This has arguably resulted in divided loyalty towards the king and the prime minister which has sucked in the security sector. It was also highlighted during interviews that the then apartheid South Africa also wanted to discourage the leadership in Lesotho from supporting the liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) which were fighting for the end of apartheid and majority rule in South Africa hence had a hidden hand in the creation of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), an insurgent organisation that operated in Lesotho from around 1986 to early 1990 (ibid.).

Vumbunu further highlighted that the 1993 elections which were won by the BCP were also disputed resulting in an army-backed ‘palace’ coup in August 1994. The coup was preceded
by the assassination of the deputy Prime Minister, Selometsi Baholo and a mutiny involving the army and the police. King Letsie III dissolved the democratically elected BCP government and Parliament and replaced it with the Provisional Council of State which resulted in widespread violent protests. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, (SADC member states) jointly facilitated a peace process in 1994 which resulted in the restoration of the BCP-led government (Vhumbunu, 2015; interviews conducted in Lesotho). This was the first effective diplomatic intervention for conflict prevention by the SADC in Lesotho since its transformation from the SADCC in 1992 (Vhumbunu, 2015).

In 1997, the ruling BCP split over leadership disputes. Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle formed a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The LCD had a huge support from members of parliament, which enhanced the prime minister to form a government. Pakalitha Mosisili succeeded Mokhehle as leader of LCD which won the general elections in 1998. Despite the elections being pronounced free and fair by local and international observers and a subsequent special commission appointed by SADC, the results of the elections were rejected by the opposition political parties resulting in protests which turned violent in August 1998 (Likoti, 2007).

In September 1998, SADC intervened militarily through Operation Boleas, which involved South Africa and Botswana (reportedly) to prevent anarchy and restore order (Neethling, 1999; Vhumbunu, 2015). Most respondents especially those interviewed in Lesotho were skeptical of military intervention of August 1998 by Botswana and South Africa, presumably under the auspices of SADC. Some sections of the Lesotho population actually referred to the military intervention by Botswana and South Africa as an ‘invasion.’ One respondent interviewed argued that it was undertaken whilst there was burning and looting in Maseru but the South African forces deployed first at the dam site, where there was no violence. It was revealed that the deployment at the site was preceded by the killing of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) troops guarding the site. Violent clashes ensued resulting in a number of deaths and destruction of property (interviews with Lerotholi, Matela, and Morrison in March 2018). Lerotholi (2018) was of the view that South Africa deployed in Lesotho in 1998 to protect its national interests which is mainly water. Lerotholi further argues that if South Africa had intervened to restore normalcy in Lesotho, it would have deployed in Maseru first to save the capital from the violence and looting that was going on.
Similarly, the interviews revealed that even Botswana’s participation in the intervention was also informed by national interests based on water supply. Whereas it is true from a realistic perspective that states participate in security cooperation within regional organisations on the assumptions that their national interests will be realised or enhanced, the intervention by Botswana and South Africa in 1998 had no authority from SADC although various observers and analysts have had mixed feelings over the intervention (Neethling, 1999; Likoti, 2007; Ngwawi, 2014).

Literature reviewed shows that no SADC provisions authorised unsanctioned military intervention in a sovereign member state. This is clearly spelt out in the guiding principle (g) of the OPDS which stipulates that “Military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all possible political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the AU and the UN.” On the same note, objective (g) of the OPDSC also stipulates that;

\[ \text{Where conflict does occur, to seek to end this quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means fail would the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed in a protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict resolution (SADC Communiqué, 1996).} \]

Basing on the provisions above, it may be noted that military intervention in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa in 1998 was not authorised by the regional body, hence was illegitimate. Vhumbunu (2015) summarises Lesotho’s violent conflict with post-electoral contestations. However, contrary to the notion that Lesotho’s violent conflict is always associated with elections, Bishop Lerotholi was of the view that the 2012 elections were probably the most successful and relatively peaceful. He argued that the success of the 2012 elections in Lesotho was due to an agreement in which SADC played a pivotal role to bring together all political parties and the clergy to sign. The agreement also included an election pledge which was to be respected by all stakeholders. However, the resultant coalition government collapsed due to what Lerothioli refers to as mistrust between parties (interview with Lerotholi, 2018).

It can however, be argued that SADC has provided short term solutions which are in the realm of conflict management than transformation. Consequentially, on 30 August 2014, an alleged abortive military 'coup' which was reported to have forced the then Prime Minister Thomas Thabane to flee to South Africa for three days occurred (BBC 30 August and 3
September 2014; Ngwawi, 2014). As revealed during interviews, the 2012 National Assembly elections, when the then Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s Democratic Congress (DC) failed to attain the required outright majority, resulted in a three-party coalition government. Respondents revealed that the coalition, which was frequently referred to as the ‘uneasy coalition’ comprised the All Basotho Convention (ABC) led by Thomas Thabane, the LCD of Deputy Prime Minister Metsing and the BNP. Vhumbunu (2015) further highlights that the deputy prime minister alleged that Thabane was making crucial government decisions without consulting the other coalition partners which affected the coherence of the coalition government.

Interviews conducted in Lesotho also revealed that after efforts to call for mediation by the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) were not fruitful, Metsing withdrew from the coalition and entered into an alliance with Musisili. In response, Thabane extended Parliament, preferably to avoid a vote of no confidence by the newly formed coalition. The prolongation of parliament was approved by King Letsie III. Resultantly, factions emerged, with Thabane backed by the police and Metsing having the support of the military. The prime minister’s decision to fire the LDF commander, Lieutenant-General Kamoli and replace him with Brigadier Mahao was argued to be unprocedural and politically motivated (Vhumbunu, 2015; Lerotholi, 2018).

The observable violent conflict trends especially after the June 2017 elections eventually led the deployment of the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL) on 2 December 2017. SAPMIL comprising 207 soldiers, 15 intelligence personnel, 24 police officers and 12 civilian experts as part of the SADC efforts to create a conducive environment for the implementation of constitutional, security sector, public service, media and governance reforms in line with its recommendations. The Mission is also meant to assist the LDF in the management of the security crisis in that country (Lesotho Times, p.4),

The view on the elite obsession with power conforms to Ambassador Fisscher’s observation when he said, “The main problem is the control of power so as to distribute the meagre resources.” He asserts that to get power the politicians have turned to using institutions such as the military since 1966. The fact that the military had become part of the problem according to some respondents means that the implementation of the security sector reform, as part of SADC was still necessary and integral to conflict transformation in Lesotho. The
reported rejection by the Lesotho government of opposition demands which include; the formation of a government of national unity, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and the release from jail of Lieutenant General Tlali Kamoli, the former commander of the LDF together with his acolytes (op.cit. p.2). The refusal by the Lesotho government to give in to some of the opposition demands is indicative of the challenges the SADC is facing in the transformation of the conflict in that country since it appears there is no change in attitudes and perceptions towards each other and the conflict, among other requirements of conflict transformation.

Similarly, despite the Interim Political Authority (IPA) charged with reviewing the electoral structure in the country being created in December 1998, the review of the constitution and the Defence Act as well as some form of Security Sector Reforms (SSR), the violent conflict in Lesotho continues to erupt. The situation in Lesotho remains defined by what Bishop Leretholi describes as “khotso” implying calm or “khutsi” meaning peaceful. This refers to a situation that is ever changing and not permanently peaceful an indication of ineffective conflict transformation.

Some respondents such as Bishop Leretholi further highlights that, SADC was only involved in Lesotho when the conflict turned violent and left when there was calmness. They even urged SADC to move away from short engagement in Lesotho which they referred to as “hit and run tactics.” Long –term presence was according to the respondents critical in the transformation of the conflict in Lesotho. However, this would require funding which was difficult for SADC unless if donors were to chip in. Permanent presence would also impinge on sovereignty which most respondents identified as a major challenge for SADC conflict transformation in Lesotho. Having gone through a chronology of the Lesotho internal conflict, it is essential to understand the underlying causes to the conflict. The root causes may contribute to the identification of conflict transformation challenges faced by the SADC in its endeavour to transform the Lesotho conflict.

4.4 **Underlying Causes of the Conflict in Lesotho: 1994 to 2017**

To identify challenges being faced by SADC in the Lesotho conflict transformation, it is necessary to first identify root causes of the conflict since some of the underlying causes have a bearing on the conflict. The root causes are categorised historical, geographical position of Lesotho in relationship to South African as well as socio-polical and economic factors.
4.4.1 The Geographical Position of Lesotho and South African Interests

The geographical location of Lesotho and the abundance of water in the Lesotho Highlands make South African interests in that country unavoidable. Successive South African governments including the apartheid era have shown vested interest in the Lesotho Highlands water projects which now supplies vast amounts of water to the Gauteng industrial hub. Some academics and analysts interviewed were of the view that with persistent drought in the Cape area and water shortage in Cape Town, considerations by South Africa to draw water from Lesotho were highly likely. The geographical location of Lesotho completely surrounded by South Africa is shown on the map below:

**Figure 2: The Geographical Location of Lesotho**

Interviews conducted with respondents in Lesotho revealed that the geopolitical positioning of Lesotho and the availability of water catchment areas in its highlands are major factors in South African interests in that country. It was argued that South African interests were part of the problem in Lesotho. Some respondents revealed during interviews that South Africa, driven by its interests in Lesotho, right from the days of apartheid though not directly linked to the conflict had an underhand in the fuelling of the conflict to its advantage. For example

**Source:** https://www.bing.com/images/search (accessed: 10 February 2018)
it was noted that when Leabowa Jonathan, the then prime minister of Lesotho seemed reluctant to allow apartheid South Africa to construct a dam in the Lesotho highlands catchment area for the supply of water to South Africa, a coup seemingly covertly masterminded by the South Africa was executed in 1986.

The coup resulted in the removal of Leabowa Jonathan and the retired Major General Lekanya took over. He is alleged to have signed a contract with apartheid South Africa to allow the construction of the dam in Lesotho (interview with the Bishop of Catholic Church). As observed, although South Africa is not directly linked to the conflict in Lesotho, its inherent interests in Lesotho which are primarily based on supply of water and to an extent security concerns given the position of Lesotho, arguably contributes to challenges which SADC faces in its efforts to transform the conflict in Lesotho. This is more so given the leading role which South Africa has always played through mediation and even military intervention.

Obasanjo (in Deng and Zartman, 1991: xiv & xv) buttresses the Afrocentric school of thought by referring to poverty as the main source of conflict in Africa when he posits that “there is a link between the level of poverty in Africa and the level and incidences of violence and conflict on the continent.” He further argues that understanding root causes for Africa’s violent conflicts is critical before identifying any settlements for such conflicts. According to the 2017 African Economic Outlook (in African Development Bank 2017), Lesotho’s gross domestic product (GDP) was at 3.1 per cent while unemployment and inequity have intensified poverty to 56.2 per cent of the population which is around 2 million people. Against the given background, poverty may be argued to be one of the underlying causes of conflict in Lesotho as various groups and individuals try to enhance livelihood and compete for scarce resources. It is difficult for SADC to amicably deal with poverty in Lesotho given the financial constraints the organisation faces.

International relations scholars generally agree that most African conflicts are caused by several factors, which include the colonial legacy, poverty, withdrawal or reduction of financial and military aid to African dictators after the Cold War, exploitation of ethnicity, corruption, political-economic and social exclusion, population explosion, corrupt and incompetent governments, politics of democratisation, unemployment, competition for scarce
resources, inequality, economic decline/shock, state failure/collapse and economic dependence on natural resources (Konteh, 2006: 257).

Although most institutional factors responsible for democratic breakdowns in the past have been overcome, the socio-economic variables such as poverty, weak civil society, small middle class and socio-economic inequality will continue to hinder consolidation of democracy (in Africa) for a long time to come (Monyane, 2009: v). Of interest to this study is the politics of democratisation where for example, Lesotho being a monarch, has had Westminster governance or Western democratic system imposed on the traditional governance system. This system of governance adopted at independence in 1966, has not been in conformity with the existing tradition political system.

The incompatibilities between the traditional and the Westminster governance systems are probably demonstrated by the notable polarisation between the Prime Minister and the King. Also critical in Lesotho colonial legacy which created the existing system of governance, competition for scarce resources which observers argue is linked to the power struggle by the elite, corruption and incompetent government, the socio-economic variables such as poverty, weak civil society, small middle class and socio-economic inequality. These variables including the military factor were referred to by a number of respondents during interviews as underlying causes to the recurrent conflict in Lesotho.

To identify root causes of Lesotho’s recurrent conflict, there is need to explore its historical, structural, institutional and socio-political-economic factors. Historically, the nature of the Lesotho society and its political systems is largely informed by colonial legacy. The socio-political-economic causes include the nature of the society, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or growth, unemployment, inequality, source of livelihood including dependence on migrant workers in South Africa and politics as the means for survival and distribution of resources. Internal institutions in Lesotho have also been argued to contribute to the conflict. According to the Lesotho Times, institutions identified by SADC as requiring reforms since these are argued to contribute to the recurrent conflict in Lesotho include the constitution, the security sector particularly the military and the electoral system (Lesotho Times, 15-21 March 2016).

However, during interviews, the majority of respondents particularly in Lesotho argued that reforms of the institutions were not the problem since, most of them had been reformed in
1994 but the conflict remained recurrent. On the contrary, respondents interviewed in Zimbabwe argued that these institutions in Lesotho needed to be reformed as part of structural and institutional transformation. For example, the military which has since been indulging in politics by supporting certain prominent individuals to attain or retain power and had indulged in the unconstitutional removal of governments through coups, needed to be reformed.

Cohen (1993:7) argues that “any attempt to resolve the conflicts must also transcend the concepts of new institutions that will increase participation, legitimacy, redistribution and good governance and also address other root causes of the problems. Any discussion of ‘internal or national governance’ therefore cannot exclude the structure of the state and the political leadership as inherited from colonialism, given that the basis for African states and political leadership in most of the continent is colonial.

Colonial legacy which created the Westminster governance system to operate jointly with the traditional monarch was argued by some respondents as contributing to the conflict. The two systems remain incompatible hence a source of conflict. For example, the king has on occasions exercised executive powers which the prime minister feels otherwise. Weisfelder (1992) argues that Lesotho’s democratic breakdowns even during those early days of independence were the consequence of the faulty Westminster type of democracy. He maintains that a highly politicised population exists in an environment of abject clashes between modern democracy and traditional systems.

Against this background, retired Major General Lekananya lamented during interviews that “The most expensive export of the Americans is the ballot box democracy,” implying that Western democracy had some contradictions with traditional African societies which contributes to conflict. For example, during an interview with the young brother to the King of Lesotho, it was observed that the colonial legacy facilitated the manipulation of the local chiefs to the advantage of the Westminster governance system. As such, there has been a problem of the control of institutions between the King and the government. The removal of the King as commander-in-chief was sighted as an example.

It was also highlighted during interviews in Lesotho that as per the current situation the royal family is virtually in the background. Since Miller (2005:26) defines conflict as “a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive
means or ends,” the observable incompatibility between the king and the prime minister, is tantamount to conflict which manifests in various forms. For example, it was noted during interviews that after the coup which ousted the BNP-led government in 1986, a seven-year military rule was established. After the disputed elections in 1993, which were won by the BCP, an army-backed ‘palace’ coup took place in August 1994. King Letsie III subsequently dissolved the democratically elected BCP government and Parliament and replaced it with the Provisional Council of State. This provoked widespread protest in Lesotho (Vumbunu, 2015).

Interviews conducted also revealed that the King was trying to correct some excessives in the government of Major General Lekanya and his ruling Provisional Council of State. It was highlighted that the King was viewed as interfering in politics and in the resultant ‘palace coup’ he was stripped of the executive powers and sent to exile. He was replaced by his son, Letsi II (Interview with Mrs Morrison). In the Lesotho conflict, the ‘means or ends’ as mentioned in Miller’s definition of conflict can be argued to be central to the recurrent conflict. For example, retired Lieutenant General Fisher postulated that “In Lesotho the situation is about who has the power also control the distribution of resources” (interview with retired Lieutenant General Fisher: 26 February 2018). It was mentioned during some interviews that Lesotho does not have a lot of resources and that the main means of livelihood is through government employment.

It was also observed that politics has become the main means of distributing and controlling resources in Lesotho. This conforms to Miller’s definition of conflict since there has been competition for power by the elite since Lesotho’s independence in 1966. In the same interview it was also highlighted that prominent politician canvassed for military support in order to ascend to power in Lesotho. The military becomes the means to an end and have eventually also supported individuals who are favourable to their interests. In this regard, the military have become part of the conflict hence the need for security sector reforms.

Monyane, (2009: v), also posits that “although most institutional factors responsible for democratic breakdowns in the past have been overcome (in Lesotho), the socio-economic variables such as poverty, weak civil society, small middle class and socio-economic inequality will hinder consolidation (of democracy) for a long time to come.” Manyane’s argument is supported by the 2012 Human Development Index which highlights that “about 40 percent of Lesotho’s population lives below the international poverty line of US$ 1, 25 per day.” It is rated among the ‘Low Human Development’ countries at 160 out of 187 on the
Human Development Index as classified by the UNDP, with 48.2 years of life expectancy at birth (Human Development Index, 2012). The same can be argued for Mozambique where absolute poverty according to Queface (2013) affects about 59, 6% living on below $1 per day. The argument by Obasanjo (1991) that poverty is the main root cause to violent conflicts in Africa, to a large extent conforms to the Lesotho scenario.

However, most Basutho respondents did not agree with this assertion. They argued that the conflict in Lesotho does not involve the grassroots but was an elitist struggle for power. It was further highlighted that the ordinary person in Lesotho had nothing to do with the conflict neither did they know what it was all about. It was further argued that this was vindicated by the fact that the people of Lesotho have never demonstrated against the government but only demonstrated against what they perceived as South African invasion in the SADC 1998 intervention in that country. It can however, be argued that a conflict is in most cases between the elite who want to control power and who in turn use the people as means to an end.

Mahao (1997), Makoa (1996), Mothibe (1999) and Matlosa (1995) provide detailed insights into Lesotho’s military meddling in politics, its lack of cooperation with the democratically elected civilian administration and the poor civil-military relations after the 1993 elections, staging of coups, the assassination of the Chief of Defence on 5 September 2017, among others, supports this assertion. It has always been argued that lasting transitions from military rule are hard to secure because the military retains the capacity to step back into politics long after returning to the barracks (Huntington, 1991:120). Huntington (1998) contends that coups occur in states that suffer economic hardships. For Lesotho, it can be argued that poverty causes all influential institutions and individuals to opt for powerful positions in government, hence the meddling in politics by the military.

Abuse of the military by powerful individuals to gain inroads in politics has also been argued to influence military meddling in politics. This can also be argued to be a contributing factor to military involvement in politics. In this regard, Decalo (1976) and Biemen (1978) similarly argue that the intervention of the military in politics could be linked to corporate interests and the fragmentation of party politics. Gill (1993:289) further notes that as militaries claim to promote stability, they are often used as political instruments by the victorious parties to suppress opposition or sometimes they sympathise with the losing parties as they refuse to accept the election outcome.
In view of the foregoing among other reasons, Lesotho has experienced a number of coups since its independence in 1966. Coups or alleged military take over of government occurred in January 1986, November 1990, May 1991 and in August 2014 (Vhumbunu, 2015). This makes Lesotho to be the worst country in the region with the highest number of military overthrow of government. Continued meddling in local politics by the military has caused disharmony with some sections of the ruling elite. The appointment, dismissal and reduction in rank for Chiefs of Defence in Lesotho have been problematic. Each time there is a change in the Head of Government, new commanders are appointed while the former commanders are either retired, flee the country or are reduced in rank as happened in 2017. For example, when Tom Thabane took over as head of state he dismissed General Tlali Kamoli who had been appointed by the previous Prime Minister Mosisili and replaced him with General Mapaapape Mahao. Mahao was however assassinated in 2015 and replaced by General Motsoomotso who also fell victim on 5 September 2017. The fact that each incoming Head of Government has his own favourite appointee, seem to have contributed to divided loyalty amongst the forces in Lesotho which is cause for concern. As such, the need for security sector reform cannot be over-emphasised in Lesotho (Philander, 2000; Malebang, 2014; Vhumbunu, 2015).

On the whole, root causes of the Lesotho conflict which SADC needs to understand in order to be able to facilitate its transformation are linked to most of the above causes. These problems are summarised by Monyane, (2009: v) when he posits that “although most institutional factors responsible for democratic breakdowns in the past have been overcome (in Lesotho), the socio-economic variables such as poverty, weak civil society, small middle class and socio-economic inequality will hinder consolidation (of democracy) for a long time to come.” This therefore means that any conflict transformation which does not address the aforementioned root causes of conflict in Lesotho is bound to fail.

4.5 Dimensions of Conflict Transformation

Lederach (1997:39) contends that effective conflict transformation should bring about peaceful changes in personal, relational, structural and cultural. He views personal change in terms of individual attitudes, behaviour, identity and perceptions; relationship change in the form of communication, intergroup cooperation and decision-making processes; cultural change as the way the conflict is viewed, understood or perceived whilst structural change is about inequalities and all forms of discrimination. Miller (2005) further perceives conflict
transformation as “changes in all, any, or some combination of aspects of a conflict such as the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned.” Miall (2004:9-10) categorises conflict transformation into five types namely context transformations, structural transformations, actor transformations issue transformations and personal changes of heart and mind within individual leaders and small groups (Miall, 2004:10; Berghof Handbook http://www.berghof-handbook.net accessed: 17 January 2018).

Context of conflict includes the society in conflict and the wider international and regional level. Within the society, crucial background aspects are culture, governance arrangements, institutions, social roles, norms, the rule and codes in place in a society, and its path of development. Context transformations refer to changes in the context of conflict that may radically alter each party’s perception of the conflict situation, as well as their motives (ibid.). The types of conflict transformation explained by Miall will be traced in the identification of challenges faced by SADC in the Lesotho conflict transformation.

4.6 SADC Conflict Transformation Challenges in Lesotho from 1994 to 2017

Two schools of thought examine why Africa in general and SADC in particular face challenges in conflict transformation in the sub-region particularly in Lesotho. The first school of thought is the Afrocentric School, whose scholars such as Achankeng (2017), Zartman (2000), Cohen (1995;1996), Ake (1985), Duala (1984) and Okoyo (1977) argue that challenges that Africa faces in conflict transformation which also apply to the SADC efforts to transform the Lesotho conflict are externally instigated. The second school of thought is the Eurocentric School whose proponents such as Clark (2013), Chimanikire (2002), Nieuwkerk (2001), Southall (2001), Ononisakin (2000), Baregu (1999) and Ngoma (1985) contend that the challenges that Africa and in particular the SADC faces in transforming conflicts are internally induced and they revolve around lack of commitment to enforce governance and democratic values by the sub-regional organisations, structural challenges for conflict transformation and conflicting national interests of member states within the sub-regional organisations. This latter school of thought further argues that the structure of the SADC conflict transformation and mechanisms in particular the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) is to blame for the weaknesses and challenges in its
conflict transformation (Ngoma 2005).

The SADC’s seeming failure in the Lesotho conflict transformation may be linked to what Martin Luther King Jr (1963), refers to as “being contented with the superficial kind of social analysis that deals mainly with effects and does not grapple with underlying causes.” The SADC approach to the Lesotho conflict transformation may be argued to be managing violence without dealing with root causes. Clark (2013:11) buttresses this assertion by arguing that “Prevention of conflict requires investment in good governance, improving the conditions in which people live, reducing inequality and addressing political, social and economic exclusion...” It can be argued that issues of governance, human security and the feeling of alienation by some sections of the population have contributed to internal conflict in Lesotho. As long as the SADC does not identify and manage root causes of the Lesotho conflict, it will remain difficult to transform the conflict. Even if the underlying causes are identified, resources constraints particularly funding various programmes involved in transforming the conflict, the challenge will remain.

Basing on review of available literature on African conflicts in general and the Lesotho conflict as well as interviews conducted during the study, the main challenges to SADC conflict transformation in Lesotho, can be identified according to the five types of transformations as postulated by Miall (2004: 9-10), which are; contextual, structural, actor issue and personal transformations. For example, in terms of personal changes no change of attitudes, perceptions and minds has been observed among the elite who are central to the conflict in Lesotho. Similarly, with regards to all other forms of transformations, there seems to be no observable change which perhaps the reason why the conflict in Lesotho remains recurrent. This observable no change in the Lesotho conflict also indicates SADC’s constraints in the transformation of the conflict in Lesotho since Lederach (1997) and Miall (2004), among others, point out that for conflict transformation to have taken place there must be changes in the mentioned attributes.

Since there is no observable change in the Lesotho internal conflict, there must be some challenges which SADC has been facing in the facilitation of the Lesotho conflict. Olonisakin (2000) identifies major constraints or challenges encountered by African regional organisations in security cooperation, which also applies to SADC conflict transformation in Lesotho as follows;
Sub-regional economic organisations encounter various political problems in conflict management. The first is that they are structurally unprepared for peace-making and peacekeeping roles and suffer from human and financial resource constraints. Secondly, they find it difficult to play a neutral and impartial role, especially where hegemony enters the picture. Finally, there are numerous operational problems associated with deploying a multinational peace force (Olonisakin, 2000:16).

The mentioned structural, resources constraints as well as impartiality and the hegemony which are propelled by national interest were all identified during the study as equally affecting the Lesotho conflict transformation. The identified challenges faced by SADC in its facilitation of conflict transformation in Lesotho are as follows:

4.6.1 Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the Internal Conflict Conflicts of Sovereign States

The main challenge that SADC faces in the transformation of the Lesotho conflict is the limitations imposed by sovereignty. The study found out that the main challenge to SADC conflict transformation in Lesotho evolved around sovereignty of member states as guided by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member states (SADC founding Treaty of 1992). This principle of non-interference in internal conflicts of (sovereign) states which is also stipulated in the UN Charter through Article 2(7) and articulated in the AU Charter, Article iii (b) imposes limitations on efficacy of SADC conflict transformation. Both the AU and SADC observe the sovereign equality of states as part of their principles. The principle of sovereignty upon which “non-interference in the internal affairs of states” is based, was revealed as the main challenge to SADC’s successful implementation of conflict transformation in Lesotho.

Most respondents interviewed, among them, Ambassador Fisher, Ambassador Manzou and Professor Makoa concurred that the question of sovereignty which leads to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of ‘sovereign’ member states was a major challenge to SADC conflict transformation of the intra-state conflicts in the region. For example, it was highlighted that SADC was limited in its endeavour to implement and enforce decisions such as the required reforms which include the security sector. Instead, SADC relies on pursuassion since Lesotho was a sovereignty state. Similarly, SADC has limitations in the enforcement of certain decisions which required action by the sovereign government of Lesotho.
It was also observed during in-depth interviews in Lesotho that most of the Basothu people felt that as a sovereign state, Lesotho was to be left alone to solve its own conflict. It realized that the Basotho were even skeptical of SADC’s conflict transformation role in Lesotho. To them the transformation of the Lesotho conflict was supposed to be an internal process spearheaded by the Council of Churches, Council of Chiefs and civil society in general while SADC acted as a mediator or facilitator. The notion of internal ownership of the conflict in Lesotho, though based on sovereignty, conforms to the assertion by Lederach (1997) and Miall (2004) that conflict transformation is more successful when it is handled internally. In this regard, the SADC may want to consider how best the conflict transformation of the conflict in Lesotho is internally conducted by all the people of that country while it (SADC) remains a facilitator or mediator.

Local ownership and implementation of conflict transformation in Lesotho, conforms to what proponents of the conflict transformation theory argue. It was also revealed during these interviews that most of the locals in Lesotho preferred locally owned conflict transformation rather than processes which were being initiated by SADC. The main challenge in this regard, is lack of sufficient resources especially funding by SADC. Rather, such conflict transformation initiative which is locally owned would only be sponsored by the UN and the donor community. Once the donor community gets involved through funding of conflict transformation in Lesotho, then the national interests of big powers that sponsor the donors would prevail.

A number of interviewees also mentioned that most of the elite have occupied various key positions in government since 1966. It was therefore difficult to transform the Lesotho conflict as such key individuals wanted to safeguard their interests at all costs through politics. They would therefore make the transformation efforts futile. During interviews in Lesotho, it was observed that the youth had not been actively involved in Lesotho politics neither had they held influential positions since the old veterans continue to be recycled or changing posts. With the constraints pauses by sovereignty, SADC cannot enforce transformation processes which the elite perceive as tempering with their interests and neither can SADC suggest for the inclusion of the youth in the government of Lesotho to bring in new ideas.

Examples of such elitist individuals who have dominated political events in Lesotho as important actors in the conflict since independence were identified as Major General
Lekanya, Mosisili and Thabane, among many others. According to Miall (2010:10), actor transformation which include among others, leadership changes, is critical to successful conflict transformation. This implies that SADC needs to tackle the problem of the elitist power struggle in Lesotho and has informed its engagement with the top-level leadership of Leaderch’s conflict transformation at the expense of the grassroots levels. However, the main constraint to this is sovereignty where besides engaging the elite, SADC cannot do anything further to ensure leadership change. This engagement, as revealed during interviews should be spearheaded by the grassroots through traditional chiefs and the church or civil society while SADC should only play mediatory role.

4.6.2 National Interests
The prevalence of national interests and the resultant hegemonic tendencies seem to contribute to SADC’s weaknesses in the Lesotho conflict transformation. The existence of national interests, especially South African interests in Lesotho has had some effect on SADC conflict transformation in that country. For example, South Africa has used its influence to lead mediation efforts in most cases when it is an interested party.

Lack of harmony is perpetuated by hegemonic tendencies which are displayed by dominant states in the sub-region who want to project their national interests. In the case of the Lesotho conflict, South Africa has often led in the mediation process which is viewed as protecting its national interests in that country. Zimbabwe on the other hand, is according to interviews perceived as trying to counter-balance South Africa and projecting its influence in the region. Olonisakin (2000:16) sums up major constraints encountered in African sub-regional security cooperation, which also apply to SADC as; “The first is that they are structurally unprepared for peace-making and peacekeeping roles and suffer from human and financial resource constraints. Secondly, they find it difficult to play a neutral and impartial role, especially where hegemony enters the picture.” SADC also seems to have limitations in understanding root causes of the Lesotho conflict to successfully transform it.

4.5.3 Institutional Challenges in Lesotho
The majority of respondents interviewed in Lesotho pointed out that the solution to the country’s conflict was not primarily based on reforms contrary to what SADC has always insisted on. The respondents argued that electoral, security sector and constitutional reforms had been carried out since 1994 but the conflict continues to errupt implying that the solution
is not based on reforms of key institutions but on reforming the attitudes, perceptions and minds of the elite who are central to the conflict since independence. It was also argued that the institutions in place in Lesotho were workable but the problem lay in the elite’s obsession with power using institutions such as the military as means to ascend to power and then control resources. As such, the military in Lesotho had become mingled in politics and were now part of the conflict.

On the contrary, some respondents interviewed both in Zimbabwe and Lesotho expressed the view that since the security sector, particularly the military were part of the problem and were involved in abductions, assassinations, criminal and corrupt activities, there was need for the government of Lesotho to implement reforms in the security sector to bring it in line with democratic norms where it should be non-partisan and subjected to total civilian control. This on its own is a challenge on the part of SADC since Lesotho being a sovereign state can only be encouraged to undertake such reforms wholesomely which is very unlikely given the fact that the elite has used the military as the means to ascent to power and retain it.

Despite sovereignty being an impingement to SADC enforcing or ensuring that the security sector reforms are implemented in total in Lesotho, the regional organisation lacks the enforcement capability to compel the Lesotho government to implement such reforms. SADC therefore is forced to rely on persuasion rather than enforcement of its decisions on conflict transformation in Lesotho. On the other hand, if such reforms were to be undertaken funding to cater for the demobilised members of the force for example, would be a major constrain for SADC. Unless provided by donor nations, funding for such reforms would be a major challenge to SADC.

4.5.4 SADC Structural Challenges

Article 5 of the SADC Treaty outlines the promotion and defence of peace and security in the sub-region as one of SADC’s objectives (SADC Treaty 1992; Omeje 2008). The Summit of Heads of States and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) the Troika are key institutional mechanisms for dealing with matters relating to peace and security within the sub-region (SADC Treaty, 1992). The Summit is responsible for the policy direction and control of the functions of SADC. Created by the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit on 28 June 1996, the Organ has become a critical structure for peace and security in the sub-region (Ngoma: 2005). The main purpose of the OPDSC is collective security.
Objective (d) encourages full cooperation in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution, (e) facilitates mediation in inter-state disputes and conflicts and (f) encourages use of preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system (http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/oaucharter.htm accessed: 20 December 2017).

Conflict transformation weaknesses at Summit level can be summarised as lack of political will by some member states, disharmony within Member States, disproportionate use of force, impartiality, hegemony and lack of adequate human and material resources. These constraints affect the successful execution of conflict transformation in the region. For example, according Southall (2001), the 1998 unauthorised intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho and use of force without rules of engagement were influenced by national interests rather than regional security cooperation. In this regard, Nieuwkerk (2001:16) notes that these realities impose limitations on the implementation of regional security cooperation. The limitations of security cooperation may be in the form of hegemony which may affect the desired end-states or failure to cooperate by some member states which see the intervention in the conflict as not cost-effective or beneficial to the national interests. The existence of national interests may be argued to contribute to SADC challenges in transforming the Lesotho conflict. The geographical position of Lesotho means that any insecurity in that country will obviously have spill-over effects on South Africa in particular. Economically, the Lesotho Highlands Dam provides water and electricity to South Africa among, other economic interests. For this reason, South Africa normally plays a leading role as a lead nation in the Lesotho mediation besides being an interested party. Zimbabwe has also been viewed as playing a leading role in handling conflict situations in the region.

In the foregoing, Chimanikire (2002) and Baregu (1999) are of the view that friction between South Africa and Zimbabwe, amongst other things created discord between South Africa as chair of the Summit and Zimbabwe as chair of the Organ. It is argued that the discord resulted in only three Member States intervening militarily in DRC. In the Lesotho conflict, the same discord based on national interests and hegemony has existed at the detriment of conflict transformation. At times the disagreement has been on the approach to conflict transformation. In this regard, Hans Morgenthau, (in Ngwenya 2002:32), advances the argument that states are usually in conflict with one another or are in constant competition.
and place much emphasis on their own interests rather than regional cooperation. He further observes that states maximize their power through international organisations.

### 4.4.5 Funding Constraints

The other constraint to SADC’s conflict transformation in Lesotho was identified as lack of adequate resources particularly financing. In terms of human and material resources constraints which Nieuwkerk (2001) refers to as one of the constraints to sub-regional security cooperation, SADC suffers from lack of financial resources in particular. Conflict transformation is a demanding process in terms of funding since it requires various financial needs which are part of the whole process. Since funding is a major problem, SADC finds it difficult to successfully implement conflict transformation on its own, unless funded by donors or the UN. It was observed during interviews with Ambassador Fisher that SADC has not been interested with foreign funding of its programmes and activities due to fear of interference. In this regard, the researcher pointed out that Zimbabwe especially under the previous government led in the non foreign funding policy.

Lack of funding was identified to have therefore continued affecting the efficacy of SADC efforts to the Lesotho conflict transformation. For example, to eradicate poverty in Lesotho and create better livelihood such as employment, a lot of financial resources are required which the regional body does not have. Similarly, to facilitate the security sector reforms, funding is required to sustain the programme. Lesotho may not have that money hence the programme will fail. The challenge caused by resources constraints particularly funding, needs to be resolved if SADC conflict transformation efforts in Lesotho are to be realised. The establishment of a fund for conflict transformation purposes which may partly be internally funded and also rely on donor funds may need consideration.

### 4.6.6 Other Challenges to Conflict Transformation in Lesotho

The other identified challenge to SADC conflict transformation in Lesotho as revealed during interviews held in that country with the civil society and traditional leaders is lack of trust and proper coordination between the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) and the Council of Chiefs, (CC) both of which are influential civil organisations which represent the grassroots. During in-depth interviews with some leaders of the church and chiefs, it was clearly revealed that there was disharmony, disagreement and mistrust between the CCL and the CC both of which are key to the required national reconciliation dialogue recommended by
SADC. The interviews revealed that the required national dialogue for reconciliation according to the civil society was not to be spearheaded by political parties to avoid bias based on respective parties’ interests. As such, most respondents were of the view that SADC was to make frantic efforts to unite the CCL and the CC to spearhead the national reconciliation dialogue.

As such, the approach to conflict transformation in Lesotho by the SADC can be argued to be based on treating the symptoms without dealing with the cause which results in the ailment resurfacing, in this case the recurrence of the conflict. Weisfelder (1992) argues that Lesotho’s democratic breakdowns even during those early days of independence were the consequence of the faulty Westminster type of democracy. He maintains that a highly politicised population exists in an environment of abject clashes between modern democracy and traditional systems. SADC needs to take into account the problem of contradictions between the Westminster and monarchy governance system which coexist in Lesotho but lack congruence.

Against the given background, the adoption of the Westminster governance system which is alien to the traditional monarchy that has been in place in Lesotho can be argued to have created incompatibilities as the two systems have not complemented each other. As a result, a situation exists in Lesotho where some sections of the population are more aligned to the King while others are more loyal to the Prime Minister. After the 1998 electoral crisis, the monarchy was stripped of its executive powers, a development which has caused further tension (Matlosa: 2006). The gradual erosion of the monarchy’s influence coupled with the promotion of democracy after the 2007 election led to the clash of pro-Westminster democracy and pro-traditionalist proponents. Any conflict transformation in Lesotho needs to tackle the problem of incongruence between the Westminster and monarchy governance system.
CHAPTER 5: SADC CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION CHALLENGES IN THE REGION

Chapter 5 covers findings on the SADC conflict transformation challenges. The findings on the challenges are primarily based on the generalisation of those found in the case study of the Lesotho’s recurrent conflict from 1994 to 2017. In particular, the chapter highlights findings on the SADC’s conflict transformation challenges in the region. Challenges highlighted include the impact of sovereignty together with the provision on non-intervention in internal conflict, national interests of member states in particular and of the global community in general, structural challenges for the SADC institutions for conflict transformation, funding and sustenance of programmes and presses, the nature of conflict transformation, concentration on the hierarch at the expense of the grassroots and reform of institutions in Lesotho.

5.1 Summary of SADC Conflict Transformation Challenges
The main identified conflict transformation challenges that SADC encounters in the region are the impact of sovereignty of states, national interests mostly of member states, SADC structural and institutional challenges, funding constraints, the demanding nature of conflict transformation processes, lack of full involvement of the grassroots in Lesotho and Lesotho institutional constraint.

5.1.1 Sovereignty of Member States and the Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affair of States
The study found out that the main challenge to SADC conflict transformation in the region evolved around sovereignty of member states as guided by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. This principle originates from the UN Charter, Article 2(7) and is found in the AU Charter, for which SADC is subordinate to. On the principles of the AU, Article iii (b) which provides for; “non-interference in the internal affairs of states,” (AU Charter), is also found in the SADC founding Treaty of 1992, which stresses “non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another” (SADC Treat, 1992). Both the AU and SADC observe the sovereign equality of states as part of their principles. The principle of sovereignty upon which “non-interference in the internal affairs of states” is based, is main challenge to implementation of conflict transformation processes in member states.
Most respondents interviewed, among them, Lieutenant General Fisher, Ambassador Manzou and Professor Makoa concurred that the question of sovereignty which leads to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of ‘sovereign’ member states was a major challenge to SADC conflict transformation of the intra-state conflicts in the region. However, Adeniji (1992:4) observes that the relaxation of the of the UN insistence on non-interference in states’ domestic affairs, as a significant development. This is further buttressed by the then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who while addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1991 said;

*Intervention that is primarily aimed at securing the protection of human rights and respect for basic principles of peacefully coexistence is a prerogative of the international community which must have the power to suspend sovereignty whenever it is exercised in a criminal manner (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Hindell, 1991).*

Boutros-Ghali (1992), the then UN Secretary General also supports this view when he asserts that:

*Respect for [a state's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity, [is] crucial to any common international progress. Nevertheless, the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed, for that matter, its theory never matched its reality (Lyons and Mastanduno, 1993).*

What this entails is that SADC, just like any other international organisation, involved in conflict transformation may need to consider relaxing certain requirements of sovereignty to be successful. The recurrent conflict in Mozambique since 2013 where SADC seems not to be doing much while the situation remains unabated, bears testimony on how sovereignty and the resultant ‘non-interference in internal conflicts of member states’ principle, has impinged on the successful implementation of SADC conflict transformation in the region. Similarly, it may be argued that due to considerations of sovereignty, SADC has remained silent in the current impasse in the DRC where President Joseph Kabila has vowed to serve for a third term which has triggered some unrest in that country.

The same limitations imposed by sovereignty were also noted in the recurrent internal conflict Lesotho. There are some conflict transformation processes such as change of leadership or some actors as part of actor transformation (Miall, 2004:10). It was realised during interviews that the same actors have dominated politics in Lesotho since its independence in 1966. No new players have occupied key decision-making positions in
Lesotho. The old elite which has rotated in key positions were said to be safeguarding their interests at all cost hence could not relinquish power to new comers with transformational ideas. The SADC as a regional body is curtailed by sovereignty to enforce such reforms and neither can it force Lesotho to implement certain structural and institutional reforms. What SADC can only do is to encourage Lesotho to implement the required reforms. All this hinges on the sovereignty constraint imposed on SADC’s conflict transformation.

It was also observed during in-depth interviews in Lesotho that most of the Basuthu people felt that as a sovereign state, Lesotho was to be left alone to solve its own conflict. It realized that the Basuthu were even skeptical of SADC’s conflict transformation role in Lesotho. To them the transformation of the Lesotho conflict was supposed to be an internal process spearheaded by the Council of Churches, Council of Chiefs and civil society in general while SADC acted as a mediator or facilitator. The notion of internal ownership of the conflict in Lesotho, though based on sovereignty, conforms to the assertion by Lederach (1997) and Miall (2004) that conflict transformation is more successful when it is handled internally. In this regard, the SADC may want to consider how best the conflict transformation of the conflict in Lesotho is internally conducted by all the people of that country while it (SADC) remains a facilitator or mediator.

5.1.2 National Interests of Member States
It was noted during interviews and review of relevant literature on challenges that SADC faces generally in the region and particularly in Lesotho those national interests imposed challenges to the transformation of conflicts in Southern Africa. It was revealed by a number of respondents such as; Major General Lekanya, Mrs Morrison and Dr Ralitapole, among others, that South African national interests were contributory to SADC conflict transformation challenges in Lesotho. The interests were argued to be based on the geographical position of Lesotho and the availability of water which has been nicknamed ‘white gold’ to demonstrate its importance to South Africa. The discovery of diamonds in Lesotho had also added to interests of South Africa.

South African interests in Lesotho can be traced right from the apartheid era, when the then South African governments made various efforts to ensure the administration in Lesotho supported the construction of a dam on the Lesotho Highlands and the subsequent pumping of the water into South Africa. In 1986, the same, year that construction of the dam commenced, a coup, alleged to have been masterminded by South Africa to remove Leaboa.
Jonathan who did not want to sign a contract on the construction of the dam, was undertaken. Leaboa was replaced by Major General Lekanya who appointed a seven-member Transitional Council, forced the king into exile, replaced him with son and stripped the king of his executive powers. Also, in 1986 as was mentioned during interviews with Mrs Morrison, the South Africans are said to have masterminded the formation of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) which was primarily a destabilising force. This was just a typical example of how South African national interests were part of the Lesotho conflict.

The existence of national interests, especially South African interests in Lesotho was also argued to have had some effects on SADC conflict transformation in that country. For example, South Africa has used its influence to lead mediation efforts in most cases when it is an interested party. This can be proved by a number of statesmen and former statesmen such as Mandela, Bishop Tutu, Mbeki and Ramaphosa who have mediated in the Lesotho conflict since 1994. It was also highlighted that given the observable South African interests in Lesotho, it will always ensure that the outcome of any conflict transformation in Lesotho does not produce key personalities who will not facilitate South African interests.

It was also highlighted that the stability of Lesotho was critical to the socio-economic and political position of South Africa since instability in Lesotho would have some spill-over effects on South Africa, either through refuges and general economic dustpans. For example, it was highlighted during interviews in Lesotho that in the 1998 disturbances in which Botswana and South Africa intervened militarily, South African troops’ first deployment was at the dam site while the riots where in Maseru (Lerotholi and Morrison, 2015). This shows how South Africa, like any other country, is keen to ensure that its interests are safeguarded in Lesotho irrespective of the implications on conflict transformation in Lesotho.

The study however, observed that no SADC conflict transformation can be undertaken without the involvement of South Africa, given its proximity to that country and its national interests. It was also noted that Botswana, as a dry country seemingly had some interests in the water project in Lesotho, hence its participation in the 1998 intervention. Some participants differed on this view as it was argued that for Botswana it was mere presence and then projection of its military force or it was out of morale values to intervene. The interviews also revealed that during the DRC intervention by three SADC member states, namely; Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, South Africa though not a participant had its national interests hinged on investments in the Congo immediately after the withdrawal of
SADC troops when there was stability in most parts of the DRC.

The research also noted that in terms of national interest, the DRC conflict presented more challenges since, there were other prominent states around the globe such as the USA, France, Belgium, the former coloniser and many others, which had deep rooted national interests in that country. The interests were pointed out to be mainly as a result of the vast strategic minerals that the country has. The involvement of many states within and outside SADC with national interests in the DRC was identified as a major challenge to SADC conflict transformation in that country.

Similarly, in Mozambique, apartheid South Africa supported RENAMO rebels preferably to discourage the Mozambican government from offering sanctuary to the African National Congress (ANC) which was waging a liberation struggle in South Africa. It was further noted that South African interests were further projected through investments in Mozambique after the 1992 Rome Accord. Similarly, Zimbabwe was also argued to have interests in Lesotho like other countries. Its interests were argued to be based on dominance of the SADC or the projection of leadership in the region and counter-balancing South Africa. The same was highlighted for its intervention in the DRC in 1998.

For Angola’s participation in the DRC, it was argued that its main interest was to ensure the cutting off of UNITA fighters from their sanctuary along the border with the DRC from where they were launching attacks into the Kabinda oil rich area. The eventual killing of Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, which may be argued to have contributed to the end of the fighting in Angola, to an extent, proves Angola’s main interests in the DRC SADC intervention. Leader. In the first civil war of 1976 to 1992 in Mozambique, in which Zimbabwe intervened against RENAMO, it was pointed out that its interests were based on keeping its routes to the sea open and safe from attacks. It was also based on morale reasons that the FRELIMO government had offered the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) bases to wage the liberation war against the Smith regime in the then Rhodesia (Rupiya, 2015).

In the foregoing, it can be argued that all states become members of regional international organisations not for the mere sake of cooperation, but to achieve their national interests by so doing. For example, it has been argued that the DRC, not exactly being in Southern
Africa, may have joined SADC for collective security reasons. This is vindicated by the SADC intervention against invading rebels fighting alongside Ugandan and Rwandan forces in 1998. The intervention by SADC saved the country from being overrun. Labuschagne (2003) buttresses this view when he postulates that,

_The reason for the many diverse regional organisations in the international system is the belief of states that their specific interests will be better served at regional than in global or universal organisations. National self-interest is the main motive for states to become members of regional organisations_ Labuschagne (2003:112).

As observed, the fact that every state participates in or joins an international or regional organisation to better realise its interests, presence challenges to conflict transformation for SADC just as with global organisations. There is however, need for states with a regional organisation such as SADC to balance between their national interests and the morale reasons for the transformation of conflicts in member states. However, according to Morgenthau (1978), compromising national interests for the sake of transforming a particular conflict may be a major challenge which SADC will grapple with for some time.

### 5.1.3 SADC Conflict Transformation Institutions and Structural Challenges

The research also identified structural challenges on the part of SADC itself as impinging on the regional body’s conflict transformation capability. All scholars and respondents concur that SADC has all necessary institutions and structures for handling conflict in the region but were not fully operational or activated. It was noted that the institutions such as the OPDSC lacked funding to execute most of its programmes and were largely weak in terms of enforcement of decisions. In this regard, Rugeje (2016), posist that “The OPDSC decisions are also not legally binding.” This relates mainly to lack of enforcement mechanisms. The institutions identified are the OPDSC, SIPO, Mutual Defence Pact, the Tribunal which has since been disbanded and the SADC Brigade. For example, it was highlighted that the request by SADC for the contribution of troops and personnel from member states to deploy in Lesotho as the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL) on 2 December 2017 (Lesotho Times, p.4), demonstrated that the SADC Brigade is not yet fully operational despite being declared as such.

The readiness of the Brigade was queried since it was supposed to provide relevant troops and personnel to deploy in Lesotho and be tested in the region. As for the, Organ, it was
viewed as a toothless bulldog which largely depends on the position of whoever is the chair. This included the OPDSC, The Troika and Double Troika. The Summit, which comprised heads of state and governments, was also argued to be more inclined towards the heads of states or government in conflict and paid little attention to the grassroots. As such, it had become a norm for SADC leaders not to criticise each other even if it was clear the problem was emanating from the top. If that hierarchy is not transformed then it is difficult to implement successful conflict transformation.

It was argued that the major contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of SADC institutions responsible for conflict transformation hinges on national interests of member states were member states would weigh the benefits of being seriously involved in dealing with a particular internal conflict. For example, South Africa would be more interested in the Lesotho conflict because of its proximity and interests in that country while Zimbabwe would be more interested in the Mozambique conflict also based on the same reason. This conforms to Nieuwkerk (2001) assertion that;

Two realities inhibit regional cooperation. The first is the old-fashioned politics where national decisions with regional implications are based on seductive appeal of the national interests or alternatively on sovereignty. The second is the politics of greed where profits are extracted by exploiting situations of intractable conflict. These realities impose limitations on the implementation of regional security cooperation (Nieuwkerk (2001:16).

The mentioned challenge of sovereignty was also noted by a number of respondents who agreed that it was a major stumbling block to SADC conflict transformation in the region. For example, it was argued that some internal conflicts in the region continued unabated while SADC spent time and resources discussing the crisis without real measures being taken. The other reason according to Nieuwkerk (2001) is “the politics of greed where profits are extracted by exploiting situations of intractable conflict.” The DRC conflict for example, was argued by respondents that it continued in the East due to interest in strategic resources found in that country. Similarly, during the conflict in Angola, the exploitation of diamonds and its subsequent exchange for weapons was common.

The same applies to the conflicts in Liberia (timber and diamonds) and Cote d’Ivoire where coffee was exploited taking advantage of the ensuing conflict. In Lesotho, especially during the apartheid, the internal conflict was being exacerbated by South African’s quest for water in the Lesotho Highlands. As revealed during interviews, the 1986 coup in Lesotho was
masterminded by apartheid South Africa to remove Leabowa Jonathan and the King who were both not kin to sign an agreement with the latter for the construction of a dam in the Lesotho highlands. The construction of the dam commenced in 1986 which vindicates how South Africa took advantage of the conflict in Lesotho to further its own interests.

5.1.4 Prolonged Conflict Transformation Programmes and Processes

The study established that conflict transformation involves a number of processes and programmes such as DDR, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced persons, infrastructure rehabilitation, creation of livelihood through investment as was in Northern Ireland, compensation of war victims, demining as was in Angola, Mozambique and the ongoing demining programme in Zimbabwe, 38 years after the end of the liberation war. These programmes and processes which depend on the conflict setting and environment are executed over a long time. As such, conflict transformation is not a quick fix solution to the conflict in question.

The main problem for SADC in this regard, is that it has not been able to maintain presence in a conflict afflicted country and sustain programmes processes related to conflict transformation. In the DRC, the SADC was only involved in military intervention and it withdrew leaving the UN which had taken over. Similarly, respondents in Lesotho clearly sighted SADC’s lack of continued presence in that country. It was noted that it only featured when the situation became violent to calm it down and never bothered to facilitate a permanent solution to what Lederach refers to as “a constructive conflict” (Lederach, 1997).

One respondent referred to SADC lack of prolonged presence in a conflict situation as “hit and run tactics,” normally used by insurgents.

The main reason to this lack of consistence was identified as the conflict prevention, or management approaches which normally provides short term solutions to the conflict. It was observed that there was no precise provision or mention of conflict transformation in all SADC literature. More so, the SADC OPDSC does not precisely make provisions for conflict transformation in its objectives. For example, the fourth objective of the OPDSC is to; “cooperate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution” (SADC Protocol, 1996). Provisions for conflict transformation can however, be argued to be implied in objective (k) (h) of the OPDSC which are to;
(h) “Promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charter and Convention of the OAU and UN.”

(k) “Promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security.” (SADC Communiqué, 1996).

The two objectives of the OPDSC can be argued to be implied to conflict transformation. Transformation of institutions and practices as well as the promotion of human rights can be a panacea for positive change in a conflict. Similarly, the promotion of the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security is also key in conflict transformation within the SADC region. The absence of precise conflict transformation provisions from the SADC objectives and literature terms of reference is probably due to the theory being relatively new. This was argued to imply that SADC has no provision of such an approach for dealing with conflict, hence the adoption of traditional quick-fix short term approaches to dealing with a conflict such as conflict prevention, management and resolution. It was therefore suggested that there was need to include conflict transformation as one of the OPDSC objectives or as an approach to dealing with conflict.

5.1.5 Funding

In line with prolonged and resource demanding conflict transformation programmes and processes and the need for sustained presence in the conflict affected state, it was realised that funding was an important requirement. The essence of breaking the programmes or processes into phases which would be planned for, funded accordingly and evaluated before going to the next phase was also noted. The study found out that conflict transformation processes and programmes require a lot of funding and other necessary resources for implementation and sustenance in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict transformation an International Fund for Ireland was established in 1986 by a joint decision of the British and Irish governments, the U.S. and a number of EU and other countries which donated a significant amount of money to support 5,800 economic development and joint civil society ventures (International Fund for Ireland).

Another example which demonstrates the importance of planning and funding for conflict transformation is El Salvador. According to Popking (in Studemeister, 2001), international donors, particularly, USAID focused on the need to restructure the attorney general’s office
and provided extensive training to both prosecutors and public defenders. Popkin further postulates that “the Salvadoran peace process benefited from enormous international involvement, particularly the UN and the US. Between 1993 and 1998, El Salvador received almost $41 million in U.S. rule of law funding...”

During the Angolan conflict transformation, the UN estimated in 2003 that 80% of Angolans lacked access to basic medical care, 60% lacked access to water and 30% of Angolan children would die before the age of five. The overall life expectancy in Angola by then was less than 40 years of age (Polgreen, 2003). These observations required separate medium to long term programmes which relied on funding. The Angolan government is reported to have spent $187 million settling internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 4 April 2002 and 2004 as part of post-conflict reconstruction. The UN contributed $33 million to continue the settling process (Human Rights Watch 2002). The resettlement of IDPs is one of the post-conflict reconstruction programme which requires sustenance through a lot of funding.

From the above examples which clearly demonstrate the importance of planning and extensive funding for the sustenance of conflict transformation programmes and processes which are normally implemented over a relatively protracted period, SADC has a challenge in this regard. The given examples involved external actors as donor countries, regional organisations such as the EU (for Northern Ireland) and the UN.

It was however, highlighted during interviews that SADC would have problems with foreign or donor funding for conflict transformation just like any other programme. The reason was argued to be based on the belief by most of its member states that any donor country would end up imposing its will and interests in the programme. This was highlighted by Amassador Fisher during interviews when he pointed out that SADC was not interested in foreign or donor funding for its programmes and activities. This included conflict transformation processes despite that all cases reviewed where conflict transformation had taken place have relied on external funding. The same view was supported by the writer who having attended a number of SADC fora noted that the regional body was not interested in foreign funding at all. The writer also revealed that Zimbabwe under the Robert Mugabe government was adamant to foreign funding of SADC activities.

The SADC, like most African regional organisations faces challenges in funding conflict
transformation processes if no donors or powerful states are willing to sponsor such programmes. Although, the SIPO provides that funding shall primarily be from member states contributions, conflict transformation involves a number of processes and programmes which needs a lot of sustained funding. It was also revealed during interviews that such contributions were difficult for extensive demanding programmes, hence funding remained a challenge to SADC conflict transformation. Rugeje (2016) buttresses this observation when he points out that “Due to underfunding, SADC’s role has largely been limited to moral support in meetings and making ethical claims which at times have not been supported by requisite action.” The need for SADC to come up with appropriate funding mechanisms which include external sources is therefore a necessity if the region is to realise successful conflict transformation.

5.1.6 Lack of Involvement of the Grassroots

The research also found out that the SADC has not engaged the grassroots in its conflict transformation efforts. Instead, as revealed during interviews in Lesotho, SADC has concentrated on the elite who are not interested to seeing the conflict coming to an end to continue enhancing their interests. It was also noted that all the key players in the conflict initially belonged to the BCP and fall in the same homogenous set just like the rest of the population. Since they belonged to the same homogenous group or population and had no differences in ideology, what was identified as the main problem was factionalism for the sake of gaining power and control of resources (interviews with Morena Seeiso; Bishop Taaso).

As mentioned in the interviews key players in the conflict such as Lekanya, Mosisili, Mokhehle, among others, have been in government since 1966 and would not want to lose grip on power and influence which makes engaging them in conflict transformation a mere waste of time. It was also highlighted in the interviews that in 2012 the Lesotho Christian Council, the Council of Chiefs representing traditional leaders and some members of the civil society with SADC as facilitator got engaged in some form of national dialogue. The result of the dialogue was a pledge which all parties respected. As such, the 2012 elections were peaceful resulting in a coalition government which was however, dissolved in 2014. Basing on this example, the argument raised by respondents was that the grassroots comprising traditional, churches and civil society leaders, with SADC playing a facilitatory
role could bring the conflicting parties together in a national dialogue. They further argued that the national dialogue was ideally to be owned and guided by the people of Lesotho being spearheaded by the grassroots not SADC. As such, it was realised that SADC needs to shift from concentrating on the hierarch as these are more linked to the conflict. It should instead concentrate on the grassroots level which is forced in the conflict by the elite at the top.

5.1.7 Reform of Institutions in Lesotho

Literature review and interviews revealed that SADC has always made the same recommendations for reforms in Lesotho since the 1994 violent conflict. Institutions to be reformed include the security sector particular the military, the constitution and the electoral system. During interviews it was highlighted that similar reforms particularly of the security sector have been implemented in 1994, 1998, and 2014 and have been recommended by SADC. As for the amendment of the constitution, a number of respondents argued that Lesotho’s constitution was like any other in the region and had been ammended before.

In the fore going, respondents argued that despite all these reforms the conflict in Lesotho continued to erupt. Basing on the fore going, it was argued that reforms were not central to the conflict but the minds, character, interests and perceptions of the elite who want to remain in influential positions. Having disagreed with SADC’s recommendations for reforms in Lesotho respondents recommended an urgent national dialogue almost similar to the one conducted in 2012. On overall, SADC need to engage all actors in the conflict in the region instead of concentrating on the hierarch as has been the case in Mozambique, the DRC, Madagascar and in Lesotho. There is need to carry out thorough conflict analysis before recommending a solution to conflict transformation processes in any conflict in the region.
6.1 The SADC’s Conflict Transformation: The Future

The study identified that conflict transformation, though relatively new, has continued to gain popularity in dealing with the post-Cold War intra-state conflicts in particular. It was revealed by the study that the approach has been used relatively successfully to change violent conflict or destructive to non-violent or constructive conflict according to Lederach (2003) or what Galtungs (1969 and 1995) refers to as negative and positive peace. Overviews of conflict transformation in El Salvador, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, Liberia and Rwanda demonstrated that the approach has been used with varying degrees of success and it continues to be adopted in various conflict situations particularly those that are intra-state in nature. In the SADC region, the Madagascan conflict of 2009 to 2014 is argued to be one successful case of SADC conflict transformation.

Although the Lesotho conflict remains recurrent since the inception of the SADC, the regional body continues with efforts to facilitate the transformation of the conflict. It was also noted that in West Africa, ECOWAS has been relatively successful in conflict transformation in the region. Basing on the highlighted conflict transformation trends and the adoption and implementation of conflict transformation to deal with conflicts against the backdrop of recurrent internal conflicts in the SADC region, particularly in the DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique, SADC is likely to continue with the conflict transformation approach to handling conflicts in the region if it is to realise a peaceful environment which is conducive to development.

However, as highlighted, it was noted in this study that SADC needs to deal with the identified conflict challenges which it has been encountering in conflict transformation in the region. The identified challenges which affect SADC’s transformation of internal conflicts in the region need mitigation if it is to be successful in the transformation of conflicts in the region. The identified challenges which are sovereignty of member states, national interests of member states and other global actors, structural challenges within SADC conflict transformation institutions, conflict transformation programmes and processes, funding and SADC’s lack of grassroots engagement in the transformation process. The challenges are as summarised in the conclusions below:
6.2 SADC Conflict Transformation Challenges in the Region

6.2.1 Sovereignty of Member States and the Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affair of States

The issue of sovereignty of states identified as a major challenge to SADC conflict transformation in the region. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member states as enunciated in the SADC founding Treaty of 1992, which is also guided by sovereignty, was also identified as a limitation to conflict transformation by SADC in the region. The principle of sovereignty upon which “non-interference in the internal affairs of states” is based, was identified as the main challenge to the implementation of SADC conflict transformation in the region. Unless sovereignty is relaxed somehow as Adeniji (1992:4) notes and some interview participants suggest, the sovereignty issue will continue to impose limitations on SADC conflict transformation capabilities in the region.

SADC needs greater integration which would be enhanced by member states surrendering some of their sovereignty. The EU to a large extent and the ECOWAS are typical examples of how SADC could be more successful in facilitating conflict transformation in the region while taking cognisance of the sovereignty of member states. The surrendering of some degree of sovereignty by member states would enhance the implementation of conflict transformation in the region by SADC. Consideration of effects of increased globalisation on sovereignty would also lessen some degree of sovereignty by SADC countries to facilitate conflict transformation.

5.2.2 National Interests of Member States and other Global Actors

The study identified that the major contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of SADC institutions responsible for conflict transformation hinges on national interests of member states where member states would weigh the benefits of being seriously involved or contributing to a particular conflict transformation. National interests of both member states and powerful states or international actors impinge on successful implementation of SADC conflict transformation. From a realistic perspective, SADC member states had various national interests in some regional countries with intractable conflicts. Whereas it is normal according to realism for states to project their national interests, the study observed that, it was only when such interests interfered with conflict transformation decisions, processes and activities that they become challenges. The resultant effect as identified is hegemonic
behaviour and channeling major decisions on conflict transformation in favour of the national interests of a particular member state.

It was also noted that no successful conflict transformation would take place in the region without the involvement of specific member states with particular interests in states with conflict. Some examples given are South Africa in Lesotho and Zimbabwe in Mozambique. The SADC intervention in the DRC in 1998 was also said to have had different national interests by member states. It was also noted that in the DRC, powerful global actors have vested national interests in the conflict and the country itself. This complicates any conflict transformation efforts, hence a challenge to SADC conflict transformation.

6.2.3 Structural Challenges within SADC Conflict Transformation Institutions

The study noted that SADC had all the necessary institutions and structures for conflict transformation but were not fully operational or functional. SADC institutions and mechanisms suitable for conflict transformation were identified as the OPDSC, SIPO, Mutual Defence Pact, the Tribunal and the SADC Brigade. As for the, OPDSC, it was viewed as a toothless bulldog which largely depends on the position of whoever was the chair. This included Troika and Double Troika. The OPDSC was also noted to lack enforcement authority and binding decisions, all of which impinged on the regional body’s conflict transformation. The Tribunal which was never active is now defunct, while the SADC Brigade which was pronounced as fully operational seems to be the opposite.

The Summit, which comprised heads of state and governments, was identified as being more inclined towards a particular head of state or government in conflict and paid little attention, if any to the grassroots. As such, it has become a norm for SADC leaders not to criticise each other even if it was clear the problem was emanating from bad governance. An example of the crisis in Zimbabwe before November 2017 was given where out of all SADC heads of state and governments, only the former President of Botswana, Ian Khama had the courage to challenge former Zimbabwean leader, Robert Mugabe’s misrule. The existence of groups of member states united by same liberation history and interests was also noted as affecting some of the decisions and processes of conflict transformation in some member states.

It was also identified that the OPDSC does not precisely make provisions for conflict
transformation in its objectives. Instead the provision for conflict transformation was said to be implied in objectives (k) and (h). This lack of precise provisions for conflict transformation in the OPDSC objectives was sighted as the one reason why the SADC approaches to conflict handling were inclined towards conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution, all of which were provided for in the OPDSC objectives. The need for SADC to accommodate conflict transformation in its objectives and relevant provisions cannot therefore be over-emphasised. The study stressed that as long as SADC structures and institutions remain as passive as they seem to be, the regional body will continue to have challenges in conflict transformation in this regard.

6.2.4 Conflict Transformation Programmes and Processes

The study established that conflict transformation involves a number of processes and programmes such as DDR, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced persons, infrastructure rehabilitation, creation of livelihood through investment as was the case in Northern Ireland, compensation of war victims, demining as was the case in Angola, Mozambique and the ongoing similar programme in Zimbabwe, 38 years after the end of the liberation war. These programmes and processes which depend on the conflict setting and environment as well as conflict analysis, are executed over a long time. As such, the study established that conflict transformation is not a quick fix solution to the conflict in question. It requires detailed planning and sequences of activities according to identified priorities which are arrived at through the process of conflict transformation.

In the foregoing, the main problem for SADC as identified by the study is lack of prolonged presence in the conflict afflicted member state. In Lesotho, for example, it was highlighted that the SADC has only been present when the conflict turns violent and did not maintain presence in a conflict afflicted country neither did it sustain processes related to conflict transformation. In the DRC, the SADC was only involved in military intervention and it withdrew leaving the UN which had taken over. Since then it was noted that SADC has not been so active in the facilitation of conflict transform particularly in Eastern DRC. What this entails, as the study noted is that the SADC only intervenes to end violence but does not go on to facilitate the transformation of the conflict from “a violent to a constructive conflict” and ensure it does not recur.
6.2.5  Funding

The study found out that conflict transformation processes and programmes require a lot of funding and other necessary resources for implementation and sustenance. It was also identified that all countries which underwent relative successful conflict transformation such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Liberia, among others, all got lots of funding from external sources which include international and regional organisations, states, NGOs and multinational companies. It was observed that the SADC had a challenge in this regards since there was a belief that any foreign funding was tantamount to foreign interests in the processes of conflict transformation. This is likely to continue as a major challenge to SADC conflict transformation unless a paradigm shift to funding is adopted. In this regard, SADC needs to consider appropriate funding mechanisms which include a deliberate creation of a fund and external sources if conflict transformation is to be effective in the region.

6.2.6  Lack of Grassroots Engagement

The research revealed that SADC has not fully engaged the grassroots in its conflict transformation efforts. It has concentrated on the hierarchy which comprises politicians and military leaders, most of whom are involved in the conflict. It noted that the engagement of the grassroots through traditional leaders, elders and religious leaders, with no real interest in the conflict was essential in facilitating a national conference. This was argued to have been successful in facilitating the holding of the 2012 elections which resulted in a coalition government in Lesotho. Basing on this example, the grassroots in Lesotho comprising leaders of the Lesotho Christian Council, the Council of Chiefs and elders should take the lead in national dialogue while SADC plays the role of a facilitator. Similarly, SADC needs to value the participation of the grassroots and civil society in any conflict transformation. It should not lead the transformation processes since it is more effective when it is locally owned while SADC plays the role of a facilitator.

6.3  Recommendations

Basing on the summarized findings of the study, the following academic and policy recommendations are made:

Since no relevant provisions for conflict transformation exist in SADC literature and
provisions and that the approach is already in practice as revealed by the study, there is an urgent need to include conflict transformation as an approach to ending conflict in the region.

The study stressed that as long as SADC structures and institutions remain as passive as they seem to be, the regional body will continue to have conflict transformation challenges, hence the need to ensure modalities of activating the SADC institutions and structures for conflict transformation are put in place.

Conflict transformation programmes and processes are demanding in terms of time, human material resources as well as funding. SADC needs to make detailed conflict analysis, come up with necessary phased programmes and processes, draw budgets for each phase and have a system for evaluation of each phase. As observed in the cases of conflict transformation briefly highlighted, a lot of funding is required. For all cases analysed most of the funding requirements have been provided by external donors including states. Funding presents a major challenge to SADC’s facilitation of conflict transformation since it (SADC) has been reluctant to get its programmes from external donors or other country around the globe. If SADC is to facilitate the implementation of conflict transformation processes and programmes, there is need for the creation of a deliberate fund for the sustenance of conflict transformation processes in regional conflicts.

SADC needs to engage the grassroots and civil society in any conflict transformation. The process should be locally owned while SADC should play the role of a facilitator. The adoption of a multi-track approach would help to facilitate SADC conflict transformation in the region.

Since SADC seems to prescribe the same solutions of transforming institutions in Lesotho such as the security sector, the constitution and the electoral systems since 1994, there is an indication of misunderstanding the situation in that country, hence the need for further empirical studies on the Lesotho conflict transformation.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
The study examined conflict transformation challenges faced by the SADC in the region. It used the Lesotho recurrent conflict as a case study and how SADC has been involved in conflict transformation in the country with a view to identify challenges that have been faced by SADC in its efforts to facilitate the transformation of the conflict. Evidence was obtained both from literature review and in-depth interviews conducted by the researcher with some key informants both in Zimbabwe and in Lesotho itself.

Challenges identified include the impact of sovereignty together with the provision on non-intervention in internal conflict, national interests of member states in particular and of the global community in general, structural challenges for the SADC institutions for conflict transformation, funding and sustenance of programmes and processes, the nature of conflict transformation, concentration on the elites at the expense of the grassroots and reform of institutions in Lesotho. On the whole, it was observed that SADC lacks full and continuous engagement with the grassroots in conflict affected countries regionally. It was revealed that by concentrating on the elites or top level which mainly includes politicians particularly heads of states and governments who were actually the perpetrators of the conflict for their personal interests, SADC continued to face challenges.

The study also realised that the grassroots were only used in the conflict but in the majority of cases the elite were behind it. As observed in 2012 in Lesotho when the church, traditional leaders and elders were engaged in national dialogue resulting in successful elections being held and a coalition government being formed, the importance of the grassroots should not be ignored since they are not really part of the conflict, but are forced into it. Also noted during the study was that most researchers and scholars have not carried out indepth study which are with empirical evidence on underlying causes of the recurrent conflict in Lesotho in particular and the region in general to facilitate conflict transformation. There was need to conduct further studies with empirical evidence on the causes of the Lesotho recurrent conflict and the SADC challenges in its efforts to successfully transform the conflicts in the region. The need to carry out thorough conflict analysis before recommending any solution to a particular conflict transformation and the need for funding were also identified as critical for the SADC approach to conflict transformation.
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