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Approval Form

The undersigned certify that they have supervised the student Tholakele James R142743G dissertation entitled: *An assessment of the effectiveness of Southern African Development Community (SADC) in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis from 2000-2016*. It is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of Bachelor of Arts in Development Studies.

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Declaration

I Tholakele James registration number R142743G declare that, this research project is a result of my work and all other sources are acknowledged. It has never been submitted anywhere before for any degree purposes or examinations in any other university. It is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honours Degree in Development Studies, in the faculty of Arts at Midlands State University.
Dedications

This dissertation is dedicated firstly to my parents who have always been there for me during my studies, my husband who has always been supportive throughout the course and my daughter. May God Bless you all.
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My acknowledgement goes to my project supervisor DR D Munemo, parents and my husband. I thank them all for their support and encouragement. I also would like to thank the Almighty, God who has taken me this far.
Acronyms

AIDS……………………Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome
ANC……………...African National Congress
ASAS………………..Association of Southern African State
ASEAN…………..Association of South East Asian Nations
AU……………………African Union
BACOSSI………………Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention
CZC…………………..Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
DRC……………………Democratic Republic of Congo
DDR…………………..Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOWAS……………..Economic Community of West African States
ESAP………………..Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU……………………European Union
FTLRP……………….Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP……………………Gross Domestic Product
GNU……………………Government of National Unity
GPA………………….Global Political Agreement
HIV……………………Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
ICJ……………………International Court of Justice
IGAD…………………..Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISDSC………………Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
JOMIC……………….Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
MDC………………..Movement for Democratic Change
SADC…………………..Southern African Development Community
SATUCC………………..Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination
SIPO……………………Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
STREP………………….Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme
UN…………………….United Nations
UNSC…………………….United Nations Security Council
WHO………………….World Health Organization
ZANU-PF……………Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZEC…………………Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
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Abstract

Zimbabwe after independence was hailed as the breadbasket of the Southern African region. Today the country has become dependent on other states in the Southern region and beyond Africa. Zimbabwe from the period of 2000, faced a multidimensional crisis which negatively impacted on the Zimbabwean population leading to many people migrating to neighboring states in search for greener pastures. The crisis in Zimbabwe also tremendously affected the southern region prompting SADC’s intervention. This study assesses the SADC’s efforts in resolving the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. It interrogates the methods or strategies which SADC used to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis, as they gave South Africa the mediating role between conflicting political parties. The study uses Transformative Mediation theory as an analytical framework. Transformative Mediation theory is based on empowering the disputing parties, and enhancing each party's recognition of the other. Empowerment and recognition are two key concepts of Transformative Mediation. These concepts are essential analytical tools in evaluating whether or not SADC’s mediation efforts succeeded in resolving the crisis.
INTRODUCTION
The study explores and analyzes the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis from the year 2000 to 2016. The study adopts Transformative mediation theory in seeking to understand the means of conflict resolution as well as establishing the Zimbabwean crisis as an ongoing phenomena. Data was collected through document analysis and unstructured interviews. Snowballing and purposive sampling methods were used. The respondents were not randomly selected considering the sensitive nature of the area under study. Consequently, specific respondents with expert knowledge were chosen. The research has four chapters aimed at bringing about literature on the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis, how SADC resolved the crisis, establishing whether the efforts and strategies of SADC were effective or not as well as exploring ways of enhancing SADC’s effectiveness in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The global village has witnessed crisis and conflict evolving over the years affecting development. Historically, these conflicts perpetuated the formation of international organizations with the intention and desire to restore order. To be specific, regional bodies across the globe play a pivotal role in resolving the conflicts and crisis so as to maintain peace and security. However, conflicts have persisted in which one can question the effectiveness of these regional bodies and their conflict resolution methods depending on the type of conflicts. According to Sesay (1998), the effectiveness of the regional bodies can be measured based on its mandate and protocols that is, if its objectives or mandate is to promote respect for human rights, it will be judged ineffective if it ignores gross abuse of human rights in member states. The researcher studied the background of different regional bodies around the globe on how they resolve crisis and conflicts in member states proffering a comparative approach with SADC.

To begin with, the researcher made an analysis on the background of the European Union (EU) on how it responds to crisis paying particular attention to the EU’s response to the Syrian civil war and crisis. According to Blanchard (2012), the Syrian civil war of 2011 occurred as a result of revolts made by the Arab Spring against the government led by President Bashar al-Assad. He further states that the revolt was as a result of the grievances of the masses about high levels of
unemployment, widespread corruption, lack of political freedom and state repression under President Bashar al-Assad, who succeeded his father, Hafez, in 2000 (Blanchard, 2012). President Bashar al- Assad responded by attacking the revolts and this resulted in the killing of many people in the country hence civil war erupted. The Syrian conflict affected development in the country and had spillover effects on the neighboring states such as Jordan and Lebanon. This is because Syrian citizens fled to these countries as refugees. Blanchard (2012), alludes that the EU called for an end to the violence in Syria, which had caused the suffering of millions of Syrians and immeasurable destruction of infrastructure. Attacks on cultural heritage were also an unfortunate consequence of the conflict. The Syrian conflict remained an ongoing crisis although the EU did remarkable efforts in trying to end the conflict.

The EU is a full member and active participant in the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). The EU fully supported the United Nations (UN) led process, notably the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Syria. The EU further imposed sanctions on the Syrian government as a way of putting an end to the conflict. The sanctions included oil embargo restrictions on certain investments, freeze of assets on the central bank within the EU, export restrictions on equipment and technology that could be used for repression and on equipment and technology for monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications (Haran, 2016). Haran (2016), further states that a travel ban was imposed on 235 politicians and 67 entities over the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria. The EU in Syria was at the front in putting Syrian chemical weapons under international control. According to Haran (2016), in March 2016, the EU provided funding of £4.6 million to the organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) special mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

According to Temmo (2017), the EU further provided humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Syria. Two million people gained access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene, 850 000 people received food, 1 million people received non-food items, shelter and 350 000 children were covered by child protection programmes (Temmo, 2017). The EU’s humanitarian aid was impartial, independent and it was given to people in need regardless of ethnic or religious considerations. The EU’s humanitarian aid was channeled through the United Nations, and international NGO partners.
It is against this background that the researcher gathered that at times these regional bodies use cohesive means as a strategy to end the conflicts and resolve the crisis. In Syria the EU imposed sanctions because the government was not willing to put an end to the conflict. It becomes evident that regional bodies offer humanitarian assistance to countries experiencing conflicts or are in a crisis. However, despite all these efforts by the EU, the Syrian conflict remained an ongoing crisis.

Furthermore, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is also another regional body that plays a role in resolving crisis in South East Asian nations. The researcher paid particular attention on the ASEAN response to the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict. According to Kanparit (2013), the Cambodia–Thailand border dispute between 2008 and 2011 centered on a long running conflict over the 11th-century Preah Vihear temple, which both countries claimed. Kanparit (2013), further states that in 1954, Thailand had occupied and claimed the temple, leading Cambodia to take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959. In 1962, the International court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Cambodia had sovereignty over the temple, citing as the primary basis for the decision a Franco-Siamese map of 1908. The ICJ further ruled that Thailand should withdraw its troops from the area and return to Cambodia any artefacts removed from the temple during the occupation. Despite the clear ICJ ruling on the issue, the conflict was not fully resolved.

In 2008 the dispute resurfaced when Cambodia decided to list Preah Vihear as a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) world heritage site (Stratieva, 2014). While the Cambodians were celebrating this, in Thailand ultranationalists and the pro-established Yellow T-shirts argued that the Thai government led by Prime Minister Samak Sunduravej had committed treason (Stratieva, 2014). Both the Cambodia and Thai governments sent troops to the border and some temples there. On the 3rd of October in 2008 low level confrontations led to the exchange of gun shots and many civilians were displaced as a result of the conflict. While all this took place ASEAN did not do anything because they were in respect of the non-interference policy of the regional body. It was only in 2011 when the United Nations mandated the ASEAN to take action and intervene between these two countries when Indonesia took the lead and sent observers to assist and support the two parties with the end view of preventing further armed clashes (ASEAN, 2011). Stratieva (2014), argues that the change in relations between these
countries occurred after the new government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s Pheu entered into power and it is only in 2013 when the ICJ ruled again that Cambodia had sovereignty over Preah Vihear.

In light of this, it can be noted that ASEAN did not do anything tangible in a bid to resolve the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict. Tepohatri (2012), argues that this was due to the non-interference policy that the regional body adhered to. He further states that the desire for peace was constrained by both ASEAN’s internal framework, which protected the sovereign rights of its members from external interference, and its reluctance on the regional level to open itself to third-party involvement, especially from non-ASEAN countries (Tepohatri, 2012).

In addition, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional body in the horn of Africa which plays a fundamental role in the resolution of crisis in the region. According to International Crisis Group (2008), in 1986 the countries in the Horn of Africa formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). After a decade the body was transformed into IGAD with a mandate to promote peace, security and stability. It is mandated to create mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts through nonviolent means. The researcher explored how IGAD responds to conflicts paying particular attention to the Somalian crisis. According to Keck (2009), Somalia has been in a state of political and socio-economic crises since the demise of the central government in 1991. After the collapse of the state there was an escalation of violent civil wars among various political players supported by external powers. The intra-state conflict in Somalia was as a result of fights over access to scarce resources, ethnicity and competition for political power. The civil war invited the intervention of regional and international actors seeking to restore peace and order in the country.

According to Kidist (2009), IGAD in 2002 mandated a group of member states led by Kenya to undertake peace and reconciliation efforts for Somalia. The group was successful in the mediation process and managed to establish the Eldoret Peace Agreement that resulted in the signing of the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities. There was also the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government as a legitimate government in Somalia in 2004. However, Knife (2006), argues that the efforts of IGAD were successful at the beginning but the multiplication of political factions in Somalia, absence of commitment and lack of consensus
among the members of the IGAD obstructed IGAD’s efforts in implementing the agreement processes. Lack of finances also made the implementation and consolidation of the peace processes to be ineffective. In light of the above, the researcher realized that lack of finance is a major factor that affected IGAD’s conflict resolution efforts as well as lack of consensus among the member states concerning the Somalian situation.

More so, the African Union (AU) also plays a pivotal role in resolving conflicts in the African continent. The researcher assessed how the AU responds to conflicts in Africa paying particular attention to AU’s involvement in Burundi. According to Ayebare (2010), Burundi had a long-lasting political violence since its independence in 1962. However, the most recent violent conflict in Burundi was triggered on October 1993 after the elected president, President Ndadaye Melchior was assassinated (Bolshoff et al., 2010). This led to revenge attacks on Tutsis across the country, which in turn provoked vengeance against Hutus by the Tutsi dominated armed forces (Peen, 2012). In Burundi, the clashes between the parties of dispute, Tutsis and Hutus, costed the lives of an estimated 300,000 people, most of them were civilians and up to 1.3 million were made refugees and internally displaced (Bolshoff et al., 2010). This made Burundi one of the top ten refugee-producing countries around the world. Crisp (2006), further states that the catastrophic consequences of the Burundian conflict reached genocide levels and were considered by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as genocide against Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

The African Union intervened in the Burundi crisis and the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was successful in restoring peace and stability in Burundi, although the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) component of its mission was not achieved. The willingness of the African Union to send a peacekeeping mission as a stabilizing force within an ongoing conflict showed that the organization was serious about tackling security issues on the continent. However, the AU faced challenges in what is called the ‘triangular area of tension in African peacekeeping that is, the AU’s ambitions versus the AU’s peacekeeping capacities versus member states’ political will and agendas (Bolshoff et al., 2010). It became crystal clear that the AU faced challenges in resolving the crisis in Burundi due to lack of capacity to carry out the peacekeeping mission as well as lack of will of the member states and also having different interests and agendas within the AU.
More so, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is also another regional organization that plays a role in responding to conflicts in its region. The researcher assessed how ECOWAS responds to conflicts paying particular attention to its involvement in the Mali crisis in 2012. According to Amnesty International (2012), the Mali crisis was as a result of the country’s political history as well as the long-standing distrust between different ethnic communities. Economic frustration, political resentment and strategic opportunity-taking, all of them rooted in the fragmented nature of the country, played a pivotal role in the crisis. Armed groups rose against the government and Mali underwent the fourth Tuareg uprising of its post-colonial history, an Islamist takeover of all the northern cities and an improvised military coup. In March 2012 a military coup by Captain Sanogo ousted Malian President, Amadou Toumani Touré dissolving the constitution. According to Aiereff and Johnson (2012), the coup was motivated by government’s failure to allocate adequate resources towards the people of the north who were predominantly ethnic, Tuareg separatists and Islamist extremists.

The ECOWAS suspended Mali from the regional grouping in March 2012 and imposed sanctions on the coup leader. This saw the restoration of constitutional rule where interim President Diancouda Traore came into office and the suspension being uplifted. The regional body further deployed 6 167 troops for peacekeeping in Mali. France, in 2012 launched airstrikes on the rebels justifying its intervention on protecting the Malians from rebel groups (Chamber, 2012). However, ECOWAS failed to end the crisis given the prolonged timeframe of the crisis. The coming in of France to the aid of ECOWAS showed the failure of the West African regional body to resolve the crisis. This was due to a number of challenges which impacted negatively on ECOWAS’ efforts to end the crisis. These included financial and technical incapacities, lack of consensus, trust and language barriers between ECOWAS member states.

The Southern African Development (SADC) is another regional body which plays a role in resolving conflict and crisis in member states. The study analyses the role of SADC in response to conflict paying particular attention to how it responded to the 1994 Lesotho conflict. According to Moffat (2008), in January 1994, fighting erupted between rival factions of the Lesotho army. The eruption of violence was eminent due to Lesotho’s history of political instability and military intervention in politics. The conflict in Lesotho raised regional concern as the SADC Heads of States feared the spillover effects of the conflict to South Africa which
during this time was having elections between the majority blacks and Apartheid regime government (Moffat, 2008).

More so, according to Moffat (2008), the SADC called for an emergency meeting of Southern African states to try and come up with ways to diffuse the tension. The SADC Heads of States agreed to support the democratically elected Basuto Congress Party (BCP). On May 23 1998, Lesotho held a general election which resulted in the ruling party winning the elections. The opposition party could not accept the election results citing that they had been rigged in favour of the ruling party. In response to these allegations the SADC set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the opposition allegation but found no evidence of fraud (Moffat, 2008). The opposition party was not satisfied with the SADC’s conclusions and hence turned to the army for support. In September 1998 there was an attempted coup and the situation prompted the SADC again to intervene in the political crisis in Lesotho. A SADC force led by South Africa was sent to Lesotho for peacekeeping and this restored order in the country. However, Moffat (2008) points out that a solution was quickly reached in Lesotho because the country is small. He further states that, such an approach can never be used in resolving conflicts in bigger countries such as Zimbabwe (Moffat, 2008).

In a nutshell, it can be noted that these different regional bodies around the globe failed to effectively resolve the crisis in member states. The researcher through this background gathered that the regional groupings experienced similar challenges that hindered their effectiveness in conflict resolution processes. These challenges include the non-interference policies thus respect for the sovereignty of states, lack of consensus, inadequate finances and resources and political divisions. It is against this background that the researcher assessed the effectiveness of SADC in resolving crisis in member states paying particular attention to the Zimbabwean crisis from 2000 -2016.

**STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Crisis and conflict affect development as they lead to economic decline, political instability, capital flight, decline in a country’s GDP, poverty and among other negative impacts. To be specific, Zimbabwe’s crisis and conflict affected growth, and undermined development as there was economic decline, political instability, decline in the country’s GDP and poverty levels increased. One of the chief objectives of SADC as an organization is to resolve crisis and
conflicts in member states so as to promote regional development. Zimbabwe has been on the SADC agenda for years as political conflicts and economic crisis in the country impacted negatively in the region. Therefore, the study assesses how SADC as a regional body has been effective in resolving crisis and conflicts in the region so as to promote development paying particular attention to the Zimbabwean crisis from the period of 2000 to 2016.

OBJECTIVES

1. To explain the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis.
2. To assess the effectiveness of SADC in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis.
3. To explore ways of enhancing SADC’s effectiveness in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What are the causes of the crisis in Zimbabwe?
2. How effective was SADC in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe?
3. How can SADC enhance its effectiveness in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Gibson (1986: 143), “theory and research are closely intertwined parts of a coherent body of knowledge and a paradigm that can assist in selecting and interpreting facts”. The research study is designed and contextualized within the framework of transformative mediation theory. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010), a theoretical framework is the foundation of a research and it is the basis of the hypotheses that one develops. According to Agbu (2006), transformative mediation theory is based on the values of “empowerment” of each of the parties as much as possible. That is enabling the parties to define their own issues and to seek solutions on their own. The value of “recognition” by each of the parties’ is also of paramount importance in transformative theory that is enabling the parties to see and understand the needs, interests, values and points of view of one another. Bush and Folger (2005), point out that the transformative mediation theory states that human beings do not only seek to satisfy their individual needs but they also have a desire for connectedness. Transformative mediation theory addresses the way people resolve conflict rather than the solution. Thus according to Durbin and Doogue (1999), it is more concerned about the process rather than the content. More so the
theory is aimed at addressing the structural roots of the conflict by changing existing patterns of behavior and creating a culture of non-violent approaches to conflict resolution.

Transformative mediation theory is based on the values of "empowerment" of each of the parties as much as possible. In the case of Zimbabwe empowerment of parties was not fully done because Thabo Mbeki was biased towards the ZANU- PF party. This was because of the colonial ideologies that he shared with the president of the ruling party President Robert Mugabe. Hence, because of this brotherhood the mediation process was affected and that is why the parties never complied with the terms of the Global Political Agreement (GPA).

Secondly, it should be noted that central to transformative mediation theory is the idea that human beings do not only seek to satisfy their individual interests. However Malimela (2010), alludes that in the Zimbabwean situation this was different because Thabo Mbeki as the leading mediator was safeguarding the interests of one party by conducting the mediation process in a de-colonial perspective thus basing the mediation process on the principle of “African solutions for African problems”. He avoided the western influence in resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis.

Durbin and Doogue (1999:2), state that, “the theory states that in conflict or crisis mediation is a process in which a third party works with parties in conflict to help them change the quality of their conflict interaction from negative and destructive to positive and constructive”. However Malimela (2010), argues under the notion that third parties mediate because they have certain interest to protect more than resolving the crisis. This was seen through Thabo Mbeki in Zimbabwe who mediated in the Zimbabwean crisis because he had South African interests to protect. He wanted to stabilize the situation in Zimbabwe so as to protect South Africa from spillover effects of the Zimbabwean crisis to South Africa such as the xenophobic attacks on refugees. More so, Green (2007), argues that, transformative mediation is best suited to on-going situations. With this argument, it can be inferred that transformative mediation was best suited to the Zimbabwean crisis which is an on-going crisis.

The theory is very relevant to the research topic as it paved way for the researcher to critically assess the mediation role that Thabo Mbeki under SADC played in the Zimbabwean crisis so as to establish whether the mediation was a success or not. It also enabled the researcher to assess whether the strategy of quiet diplomacy that he employed was best suited for the Zimbabwean situation.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Makochekwana and Kwaramba (2009), defines the Zimbabwean crisis as a complex and inter-related multi-layered crisis that its long term origins lie in the colonial inequalities that characterized the country in its ninety years of colonial rule, especially pertaining to the land question, that made an armed liberation struggle necessary and led to the development of liberation movements which, because of the very nature of their struggle exhibited anti-democratic tendencies and to be intolerant of dissenting viewpoints. They further alludes that, poor policies that the government adopted such as the ESAP in the 1990s, paying of war veterans large amounts of money which was never budgeted for, land redistribution, the formation of the Movement for Democratic change (MDC) party, country’s intervention in the DRC war in 1998 contributed to the crisis. More so, from 2000 the Zimbabwean government took a number of decisions that resulted in hyperinflation, the near total collapse of the economy, a massive humanitarian crisis with 7 million people on food aid and a third of the population migrating to other neighboring countries. This resulted in the intervention of the South African government under the auspices of SADC in 2008 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011).

Moreover, the crisis in Zimbabwe transformed a previously leading Southern African nation into an internationally dependent state. Although popularly referred to as the ‘Zimbabwean crisis’, Muchanja (2010), states that what has been occurring in the country since the turn of the new millennium is a complex and inter-related multi-layered and pervasive catastrophe that can, best be described as a series of ‘Zimbabwean crises.

According to Hanke (2008), the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 challenging ZANU-PF’s dominance created a sense of panic within the ruling party which resulted in ruthless efforts to destroy the opposition party. The ruling party saw the MDC as the face and the representatives of the western nations. To them the MDC party was a threat because it wanted to bring about regime change in Zimbabwe. Hanke (2008), further states that, the ZANU-PF party was convinced that the MDC party was a front for the whites and was there to protect white interests. The ruling party resorted to widespread use of violence as a way of undermining the newly established political party. The ruling ZANU-PF party further conducted a Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) under the banner of the Third Chimurenga economic war as a way of protecting their interests and support base. However the manner in
which the Fast Track Land Reform was conducted was unconstitutional and was characterized by violence and intimidation as white farmers were forcibly chased away from their farms without compensation. The abuse of human rights of the whites during the 2000 land reform programme raised international concern and due to this Zimbabwe was isolated internationally. Financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF suspended Zimbabwe from borrowing money. International bodies such as the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe and such measures affected the economy of the country.

More so, another factor that worsened the crisis situation in Zimbabwe was the paying of war veterans by the ruling ZANU-PF. According to Masunungure (2009), huge sums of money were paid as compensation for going to war of liberation. He further states that, the money that was used to pay the war veterans was never budgeted for. This was an impulse decision that was taken by the ruling government as a strategy to keep their support base against the newly formed MDC party. With this it can be noted that the crisis in Zimbabwe was caused by the poor decisions that the ruling ZANU-PF took in response to the formation of the MDC opposition party which it saw as a threat to its dominance in Zimbabwe.

According to Makochekwana and Kwaramba (2009), the Zimbabwe crisis occurred due to poor polices that the ZANU-PF led government adopted in the 1990s. The government of Zimbabwe adopted the IMF and World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) which impacted negatively on the economy of the country. The ESAPs advocated for the liberalization of the economy, 40% devaluation of the Zimbabwean currency, decentralization, deregulation and privatization of public services and such measures crumbled the economy of the country. The service delivery sector was affected as the government health spending declined by 6.4% in 1990. Education fell by 36% and teachers’ wages fell at 26% between 1990 and 1993. User fees that were introduced led to school drop outs in the country. By 2000 only 70% of children completing primary education were proceeding to secondary school (Makochekwana and Kwaramba, 2009). Literacy levels declined in Zimbabwe and people lost their jobs as industries were retrenching their workers. This led to high levels of unemployment in Zimbabwe and this worsened the poverty levels in the country.

Murithi and Mawadza (2010), allude that the intervention of Zimbabwe in the DRC war caused the crisis in Zimbabwe. In August 1998 President Mugabe unilaterally decided to send
Zimbabwean soldiers into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in support of the government of Laurent Kabila, which was under attack by local opposition forces. This decision resulted in large war expenditures which had not been budgeted for and which negatively impacted on the country’s economy. They further state that, President Mugabe’s intervention in the DRC war was motivated by personal interests in DRC. The DRC is a mineral rich country and the President had interests in these minerals and thus he assisted Kabila in fighting with the rebels so as to benefit from the country’s minerals. On the other hand Muchanja (2010), alludes that when the DRC war erupted, the President of Zimbabwe was chairing the SADC Organ for Defense and Security Cooperation and was obliged to assist the DRC government to fight against the rebels although other SADC states had refused to be involved in the DRC war. With this it can be noted that the involvement in the DRC war in 1998 caused the economic crisis in Zimbabwe as the government diverted funds to military expenditures and this impacted negatively in the country’s economy.

The defeat of the Government by an MDC-led campaign in the 2000 constitutional referendum precipitated the crisis when the government unleashed a wave of terror against supporters of the MDC and white commercial farmers whom it blamed for having sponsored the new opposition party. Such Violent measures were also the reason why the international community criticized the government of Zimbabwe and imposed sanctions on it. From the 2000 elections up to the 2008 elections, violence and intimidation were the order of the day. All the Zimbabwean citizens that supported opposition parties were brutally beaten and opposition parties were denied freedom of expression and freedom of assembly through acts such as Public Order and Security Act (POSA). In the March 2008 elections and the re-run June 2008 elections, the violence and intimidation was too much and this led to one of the candidates Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC withdrawing from the elections (Rivero, 2008). Such political instability in Zimbabwe scared away investors and some businesses closed down. Political instability worsened the crisis in Zimbabwe as businesses closed down. This was because investors were saying the political environment in Zimbabwe was risky for business.

Makochekwana and Kwaramba (2009), argue that by 2008 the Zimbabwean economy had undergone a veritable meltdown, with all indicators signifying a country in severe distress. According to Makochekwana and Kwaramba (2009:8),
inflation rates were estimated in percentages of hundreds of millions, while the country’s currency, now denominated in quintillions, becoming virtually worthless and by 2007, per capita GDP was estimated at $200, compared to $900 in 1990, while over 80% of the Zimbabwean population was reported in 2005 to be living on less than $2 a day. Exports, which in 1997 had accounted for 33.5% of the country’s GDP were worth only 9.9% of the GDP in 2007. Unemployment in 2008 stood at 90%, while once the breadbasket of the entire region, Zimbabwe was now importing basic foodstuffs to feed its population.

Zimbabwe had the world’s fastest shrinking economy for a country not at war. Citizens experienced this meltdown directly through crumbling social services and infrastructure, frequent power cuts, factory closures, a worthless national currency, and perhaps the most life threatening, intermittent domestic water supplies and the breakdown of the country’s urban water reticulation systems and the infrastructure supplying clean water to urban households; resulting in the dreadful cholera outbreak in 2008. Tinhu (2013), states that the epidemic claimed thousands of lives and it became the ultimate incontrovertible indicator of the total collapse of the Zimbabwean health sector and evidence that the system’s governance, economic, political and social structures had deteriorated to the extent of not being able to provide even basic clean drinking water to its citizens.

More so, by 2008 the country had reached hyper-inflation due to economic decline. Noko (2011), states that by June 2008 inflation had reached its peak leading to the abandonment of the Zimbabwean currency. He further states that by mid-November 2008, the rate of inflation was estimated at 79, 6000,000 %. This resulted in US$1 becoming equivalent to the staggering sum of Z$2, 621,984, 228 (Noko, 2011).

According to the Demographic Health Survey (2006), the health of children in Zimbabwe declined drastically. More than 70% of children in Zimbabwe suffered from stunted growth and in one province, stunted growth among children increased by 38 percent between 1999 and 2006. The number of children receiving all of the recommended vaccinations dropped by 21 percent between 1999 and 2006 (Demographic Health Survey, 2006).

More so, according to WHO (2006) report, Zimbabwe had the highest incidences of HIV/AIDS and had the lowest life expectancy in the world. According to the report, Zimbabwe was one of the 10 countries that had the highest levels of HIV/AIDS. It further states that, people living in Zimbabwe had one of the lowest life expectancies in the world. Since 1994, the average life expectancy for women in Zimbabwe had fallen from 57 years to 34 years and for men from 54
years to 37 years. According to the report, 3 500 Zimbabweans died every week through the deadly combination of HIV/AIDS, poverty, and malnutrition (WHO, 2006).

It is against this background that the researcher observed that the crisis in Zimbabwe is a multi-layered and inter-related series of crises which led to the country’s underdevelopment. It is against this economic decline, political instability that raised concern by the African Union and the SADC in 2008 as SADC was mandated by the AU to begin mediation between the ruling ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) as it is now known has its origin in the regional organization of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The southern regional body was established on 1 April 1980 following the Lusaka Declaration. SADCC according to SADC (1992), was started by Front Line States whose aim was political liberation of Southern Africa. The formation of SADCC was as a result of agreements between the leaders of the then majority ruled countries of Southern Africa. These countries were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia. In 1992 the held a summit in Windhoek, Namibia. In this summit the heads of states signed the SADC Treaty and declaration. This Treaty and Declaration transformed SADCC to SADC. More so, economic integration was added as another objective of the regional body following the independence of the rest of the Southern African countries (SADC, 1992).

When SADCC was formed it was only aimed at reducing member states dependence and implementing programmes and projects with national and regional impact. It was also aimed at promoting collective self-reliance as well as promoting African liberation from colonialism in Southern Africa (SADC, 2001). However, Nyakudya (2013) alludes that, SADCC was a loose coalition of newly independent states. He further states that it used a decentralized approach to regional cooperation and the responsibility for planning and implementation as well as funding was given to individual states. There was no administration nor legal status and by so doing each member had equal stake in the organization regardless of the degree of economic and political power. According to Nyakudya (2013), the SADCC then decided to create a more effective organization with a legal status hence the leaders of the region decided to formalize SADCC and transform it from a coordination conference to a regional community. The SADCC countries had
also seen the need to promote trade in the region as well as foreign investment and the private sector so as to promote economic development in the region. He further articulates that the focus of SADCC members shifted from coordination to regional integration and co-operation. By so doing in 1992 SADCC was transformed to SADC and established an internationally recognized organization with an identity. The regional body established different institutions which include the Secretariat, the Summit, Council of Ministers, SADC Tribunal and SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security. These institutions complement each other in the works of SADC.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The continuity of political instability, economic decline, capital flight and poverty in Zimbabwe had affected growth and development. SADC’s mandate as a regional body is to promote peace and security, economic growth and eradicate poverty in member states, however in Zimbabwe poverty, political instability and economic decline were persistent and this motivated the researcher to carry out an assessment of the SADC in resolving crisis in Zimbabwe from 2000 up to 2016. The purpose of the study was also to add to the existing literature on the effectiveness of SADC in resolving the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Many scholars have written about the role of SADC in the Zimbabwean crisis but there still remains a shortage of research materials that focus on the effectiveness of SADC in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe using Transformative mediation theory. The purpose of the research was also to add on the existing gap on the literature on the ways in which SADC can enhance its effectiveness in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. The study also aimed at giving suggested recommendations on a more befitting resolution method as it suggested the use of Transformative mediation vis a vis the quiet diplomacy that Thabo Mbeki employed in a bid to resolve crisis in Zimbabwe. The research also aimed at giving suggested recommendations on how SADC can effectively resolve crisis and conflicts in member states and maintain peace and stability which are major factors in promoting growth and development, learning from its experiences in Zimbabwe.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis was approached in two different approaches that is the formal and the informal approaches. He articulates that the informal approach is that of South Africa involving its self in the Zimbabwean crisis because of its role as a regional hegemony both politically and economically (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Due
to historical ties that the President Mugabe of Zimbabwe had with the President Mbeki of South Africa, they were in communication about the crisis. However he criticize this approach because it was not a public procedure, but an excuse for delay in the face of a crisis because South Africa endorsed questionable successive election results in Zimbabwe since 2000 and provided of a lifeline in terms of energy and financial resources to Zimbabwe at the chagrin of the international community. Mudzamiri and Mudzamiri (2013), further state that the formal approach only started when SADC mandated South Africa to mediate conflicting political parties in Zimbabwe. It is against this background that the research aimed at critiquing South Africa’s informal approach to the Zimbabwean crisis because it was based on secret meetings, private talks that did not involve the opposition parties and this displayed biasness of South Africa towards President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party.

Alden (2010), points out that the SADC intervention approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe suffered the political leeway nor the financial resources required to provide a lasting solution to the land issue in Zimbabwe and the regional leaders carefully avoided provoking Mugabe and putting at risk their own political legitimacy among their electorates. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), SADC members knew that the way Zimbabwe had conducted the Fast Track Land Reform programme of 2000 was wrong and had resulted in the violation of human rights of the white minority but could not openly criticize the exercise due to fear of being misinterpreted by the citizens of their countries who shared the same history with Zimbabwe of being colonized thus endorsing colonial imbalances. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), further states that for SADC member states, criticizing the land reform policy would be interpreted as preempting to their populations that they would not consider engaging in such a policy. This position explained why SADC was not vocal about the Third Chimurenga despite the concern that the land reform process was initially accompanied by violence. SADC’s intervention in Zimbabwe demonstrated the challenges of multilateralism in conflict resolution given that the regional institution comprised different member states that had different interests, histories and abilities.

Malimela (2010), on the other hand is of the view that SADC played a pivotal role in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. Malimela (2010), alludes that the mediation role of SADC resulted in power sharing, that is the Government of National Unity (GNU) between the ruling party and the opposition parties in Zimbabwe. The mediation brought an end to the conflicts that had erupted
because of the March 28 and June 29 2008 elections. An Inclusive Government was formed through the mediation talks that were facilitated by the SADC mediators Thabo Mbeki and later on Jacob Zuma. She explores the impact that the SADC mediation had in bringing about a resolution to the long standing conflict in Zimbabwe. She further argues that, the quiet diplomacy strategy that was adopted by Thabo Mbeki was successful in bringing about the power sharing deal between the ruling party and the opposition parties in Zimbabwe. Malimela (2010), argues that the mediator was there to facilitate negotiations leading to the Government of National Unity. She further states that the implementation of the GPA was a success meaning that the role that SADC played was a success. She further states that it would not be reasonable to measure the success of the GPA by looking at how the government duties were performed because the results rested with parties to the deal hence to her SADC was successful. Malimela (2010), recommends that SADC members should not delay intervention in conflicts in the region and they must not allow their differences to affect the motive to act as a collective in conflict resolution on member states.

In line with the above argument Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), are of the view of praising SADC’s role in trying to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis. Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009:1), examines the impact that the Zimbabwean crisis had on the SADC region and they argue that, through Thabo Mbeki’s mediation efforts, SADC was successful in bringing about the Global Pact Agreement (GPA) of 2008 that committed the parties to work together in order to improve the situation in the country and create a sustainable, permanent and nationally accepted solution to the Zimbabwean situation. On the other hand, Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), state that the Zimbabwean crisis showed the limitations of the regional pressure in dealing with states that break democratic rules knowingly in the regional body. It is against this background that the research aimed at adding literature on the limitations of SADC when dealing with member states that openly violated the democratic rules of the regional body. The president of Zimbabwe openly violated the terms of the GPA before the GNU was inaugurated. The parties haggled over ministerial allocations, and before consensus could be reached, ZANU-PF renewed the terms of office of the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the Attorney-General, and Provincial Governors without Mutambara and Tsvangirai’s consent. All this happened under SADC’s watch and due to the lack of consensus among member states they did nothing to address this issue.
According to International Crisis Group (2012), the SADC mediation in Zimbabwe provided a litmus test for the regional body’s capacity to resolve conflicts using mediation as a constructive and non-violent tool. It states that there was no doubt that some success was scored, however the main mistake SADC made was that it did not establish impartial structures to effectively monitor and evaluate the implementation of the GPA, which it had so painstakingly helped to negotiate. Instead, a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), comprising members of the three coalition partners, was established to ensure the parties’ compliance with the GPA. The JOMIC was however a toothless bulldog in the sense that there was little interaction between the JOMIC committee and SADC. SADC failed to put in place a SADC monitoring Committee that would have effectively monitored the implementation of the GPA rather than to let the involved parties to self-monitor the progress of the GPA.

Dzenesa and Zambara (2010), acknowledge that Thabo Mbeki with his quiet diplomacy brought about progress in the negotiations between the conflicting parties in Zimbabwe. However the method that he used in the mediation process was greatly criticized both in SADC as well as internationally. According to International Crisis Group (2010), the approach that Thabo Mbeki used was soft on the President of Zimbabwe who was also the president of the ZANU-PF party. The International Crisis Group (2010), also argues that Mbeki was reluctant in breaking away from the quiet diplomacy and always avoided to criticize President Robert Mugabe in public. To add on, Dzenesa and Zambara (2010:3), further state that:

“….the SADC regional body is merely a club of anti-colonialists. The liberation parties within SADC not only galvanize around a shared history, but they continue to develop and strengthen their relationships as evidenced by the creation of the Southern African Association of Liberation Movements in 2001.”

As a result of the notion of ‘African solidarity’, SADC’s public criticism of Robert Mugabe was difficult given the pivotal role that he played in supporting liberation movements in the region. It is against this background that the researcher observed that SADC failed to effectively criticize President Mugabe for his unconstitutional actions because of the brotherhood relationship that most SADC leaders have due to the colonial history and ideologies that they share. This made the president of the ZANU-PF party to openly breach the agreements of the GPA.

Furthermore, according to Bailiyeva (2013), SADC’s conflict resolution in Zimbabwe was weakened by the policy of non-intervention. The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and
Security Cooperation underscores a commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and good neighborliness, among other values and hence the respect of the sovereignty of states affected the intervention of SADC in Zimbabwe. To add on, the Protocol emphasizes the preference for peaceful means for conflict resolution by adopting methods such as conciliation, negotiation and mediation. Since SADC is not a supra-national entity, it had to rely on persuasion rather than outright intervention. This also explains why the efforts of SADC in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis were not effective. The regional body was in line with the terms of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation although it portrayed the regional body as incapable of using force or sanctions as a strategy to deal with the lack of cooperation of the ZANU-PF party.

According to Cawthra (2010:6), “SADC seemed to have cordial views concerning the Zimbabwean crisis”. He argues that during the period of the crisis SADC did not do any visible action towards coming up with tangible solutions to the crisis and it was only in 2007 when the African Union (AU) directed SADC to conduct mediation between the conflicting parties as a solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Cawthra (2010), further argues that, the appointment of Mbeki proved to be controversial, with the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and the Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M). They argued that Thabo Mbeki was pro- ZANU-PF and this was because of ZANU-PF’s pan-African inclination which is shared by many liberation political parties in the Southern African region, including the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and Thabo Mbeki was the member of ANC. He further contends that SADC remained openly silent on issues of human rights, and it did not effectively encourage the promotion of free and fair elections, it failed to exercise any criticism of the electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Moreover, he contends that SADC generally presented a united front, which most observers interpreted as being in support of the incumbent regime, and it was widely criticized internationally for failing to take a public stand against human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law and repression by the ZANU-PF led government.

Alden (2010), further argues that the SADC intervention strategy in the Zimbabwean crisis was crystallized around the philosophy of the African Renaissance. Thabo Mbeki through the mediation process, was determined to show that Africa was able to take charge of her destiny and use African solutions to solve African problems and thus the intervention was based on the
de-colonial philosophy. He employed the quiet diplomacy so as to deny the western interference in the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis. This affected the outcome of the mediation in the sense that the leader of the ZANU-PF was also in support of the de-colonial philosophy which Thabo Mbeki was employing whilst facilitating the mediations and the other two MDCs were not in line with it hence such shared ideologies made the mediator Thabo Mbeki to be soft on President Robert Mugabe.

More so, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011), praises SADC for its office by stating that President Jacob Zuma after taking over from Thabo Mbeki continued to engage with ZANU-PF and the two MDCs. According to him, the Post-GPA facilitation role of President Zuma was meant to ensure that the major provisions of the 2008 Global Political Agreement were implemented. It became evident that SADC took a dedicated stance towards ensuring that the political agreement was monitored and also follow ups were done particularly on the constitutional review, design of an electoral roadmap as well as facilitating discussions on security sector reform.

Nyakudya (2014), argues that the intervention of SADC in Zimbabwe had some successes although they were over ridden by its weaknesses. Through the formation of the GNU, the political parties were able to produce a draft constitution that was signed by the Management Committee and later the Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) and subsequently was presented at the second all Stakeholders’ Conference in October 2012. He further states that the revision of the Zimbabwean constitution was surrounded by controversy and this caused its delay as the political parties had not agreed on certain issues like the presidential powers and so forth. This research added literature on how mediation improved the behavior and the attitude of the political parties. Despite the controversies in the drafting of the constitution the political parties managed to produce the constitution, hence the parties were able to recognize and empower each other which is emphasized in the Transformative mediation theory.

The above mentioned review highlighted key features of debates on the effectiveness of the SADC in resolving the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. A few scholars such as, Murithi and Mawadza (2010), Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), Malimela (2010) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011), praises the role of SADC in its efforts to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe. They argue that the efforts made by SADC were successful because they resulted in the formation of the GNU through the signing of the GPA. These authors however did not take into account that
although the GPA was signed there was lack of genuine partnership between ZANU-PF and the opposition parties as they still saw each other as political enemies even after signing the Global Political Agreement. This study addressed this gap by suggesting ways in which SADC could increase genuine partnership among the conflicting parties, through empowerment and recognition of the other.

Scholars such as Dzinesa and Zambara (2010), Palotti (2012), Cawthra (2010), criticise the role of SADC in resolving the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. They argue that SADC failed to criticize the Zimbabwean government for gross human rights violations and that SADC did not sufficiently encourage the promotion of free and fair elections in the country. They also point out that SADC lacked sufficient funding and effective regional monitoring mechanism to oversee the full implementation of the GPA.

In a nutshell, this section argued that there was lack of research that focused on the issue of whether the mediation efforts that SADC took in Zimbabwe were effective or not. The study evaluated the effectiveness of SADC’s mediation efforts in the Zimbabwean crisis, and analyzed Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy strategy in trying to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

According to Given (2008), methodology refers to ways of obtaining, organizing and analyzing data. Given (2008), further argues that methodological decisions depend on the nature of the research question. In this study the word methodology referred to how the research was done, the techniques and methods that were used as well as the logical sequence. They included the research design, research sample and procedure, and data collection instruments. The research mainly used qualitative research method. Data collection tools such as unstructured interviews and document analysis were used as well as personal observations were used in the study to collect data.

Qualitative Research

Qualitative research is a type of research that collects and works with non-numerical data and that seeks to interpret meaning from these data that help us understand social life through the study of targeted populations or places. Denzin and Lincoln (2005), describe qualitative research as involving an interpretive naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. It is against this background that the researcher employed qualitative research.

**Document Analysis**

Documentary analysis was used to gather data from published materials. Documents such as books, newspapers, journal articles and internet sources were used. However, some documents were biased. The researcher conducted thorough analysis and verification of quite a number of articles and their sources.

**Unstructured Interviews**

According to Minichiell et al (1990), unstructured interviews are interviews in which neither the questions nor the answers are predetermined. They rely on the spontaneous generation of questions in the natural flow on an interaction. Patton (2002), describes unstructured interviews as a natural extension of participant observation because they often occur as part of ongoing participant observation field work. It is against this background that the researcher used unstructured interviews to gather data.

**POPULATION AND SAMPLING**

According to Given (2008), a population can be considered to be the focal group from whom the researcher wants to learn something. Schell (1992), on the other hand defines population as including all people or items with the characteristic one wishes to understand. Given (2008), further notes that population is the totality of all the objects and subjects that meet the requirements of a specific situation. As such, the researcher focused on officials from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of health and Child Welfare, Political parties, NGOS and Political journalists.

According to Field (2005), a sampling frame is the list from which the potential respondents are drawn. Field (2005), further highlights that the sampling frame must be representative of the population under study. The list of government ministries, list of political journalist and Non-governmental organizations and list of political parties were used as a sampling frame for the study.
Schell (1992), argues that, because there is very rarely enough time or money to gather information from everyone or everything in a population, the goal becomes finding a representative sample (or subset) of that population. According to Given (2008), sampling can be defined as a process of selecting a part of the population to represent all of the population. A sample is a smaller (but should be representative) collection of units from a population used to determine truths about that population (Field, 2005). Schell (1992), notes that sampling is very vital in the sense that it minimizes the resources that will be used such as time and money and also reduces unnecessary workload. In light of this, the study used purposive sampling and snowballing sampling.

Purposive sampling which can also be called judgmental sampling relies on the judgement of the researcher when it comes to selecting units that are to be studied (Palys, 2008). The researcher used purposive sampling because it required a small sample and targeted only those relevant to the subject under study. Thus it required little time and it was cost effective.

Snowballing is a technique for finding research subjects. One subject gives the researcher name of another subject who then provides the name of a third and so on (Vogt, 1999). Snowballing is used in qualitative research. The method yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest. The method is well suited for a number of research purposes and is particularly applicable when the focus of study is on a sensitive issue, possibly concerning a relatively private matter, and thus requires the knowledge of insiders to locate people for study (Coleman, 1958). It is a method uniquely designed for sociological research because it allows for the sampling of natural interactional units. It is against this background that the researcher used the snowballing sampling technique.

**DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

The research focuses on assessing SADC in resolving crisis with specific focus on SADC’s response to the Zimbabwean crisis from 2000 to 2016. The purpose of this research is to assess SADC’s effectiveness in resolving political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe from the period of 2000 to 2016. Therefore the study is mainly going to focus on the political and economic crisis from the period of 2000 to 2016.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Dawson (2002), argues that research ethics can be defined as the minimum standards that researchers should observe and abide by to their logical conclusion. As such, there are ethics that were observed during data collection process. Such ethical considerations as confidentiality, anonymity and informed consent were observed during data collection. The purpose and objectives of the study were fully explained to the selected participants. This means that participation was voluntary thereby ensuring informed consent was observed. Given the nature of the research topic, most participants were allowed to use pseudo names. This was to ensure anonymity and to make research participants comfortable to share their views.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter 1 An Exposition of the Zimbabwe Crisis

The first chapter outlined and described the background of the Zimbabwean crisis paying particular attention to the nature of the crisis and also the causes of the crisis. This chapter mapped the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe by bringing a range of literature from various scholars about the nature and causes of the Zimbabwean crisis.

Chapter 2 Understanding the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The second chapter of the research gives the historical background of SADC, its mandate as well as its aims in the Southern region. It also gives an overview of the members of SADC and their diverse ideologies.

Chapter 3 SADC and the creation Government of National Unity (GNU)

The third chapter is the main crux of this study which analyzes the role of SADC in the political and economic crisis of Zimbabwe. This chapter applies transformative mediation theory to examine if SADC played an effective role in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe. The study also compares the different stances that Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma took in their efforts to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 4 The Zimbabwe crisis after the Government of National Unity (GNU)
The fourth chapter of the research analyzed the situation in Zimbabwe after creation of the GNU. In this chapter the researcher studied whether the Government of National Unity brought about change in Zimbabwe in its duration from 2009-2013. The chapter also assessed the Zimbabwean situation after the 2013 elections up to 2016.
CHAPTER 1 AN EXPOSITION OF THE ZIMBABWE CRISIS

1.1 Introduction

As a preface to understanding SADC’s intervention in Zimbabwe it is very crucial that one understands what the Zimbabwean crisis involves. This chapter is descriptive in nature as it establishes the historical background of the Zimbabwean crisis. In this chapter the researcher explored the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis and also the effects it had in the country and the southern region. The researcher explored the various linkages of the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis. These include, the DRC intervention, drought of 1992, land invasions in 2000, hyperinflation, bad governance, weakness of opposition parties and election violence. Following Machakanja’s (2010:5) submission, which argues that the Zimbabwean crisis should be understood as “a complex and inter-related, multi-layered and widespread disaster”, and as such it is better labeled as “a series of Zimbabwean crises”. More importantly the chapter provides an outline of key features of the Zimbabwean crisis.

1.2 Mapping the Zimbabwe Crisis

The Zimbabwean crisis is deep-rooted in the country’s historical legacy which is characterized by violence. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), Zimbabwe succeeded an autocratic system of governance from its former colonialist which was undemocratic, had great inequality and the land question is a signifier of the inequality. There was unequal distribution of land between the white minority and the black majority and there was no pretence by the settler colonial government to create democratic institutions that embraced the Africans. It is against this background that Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), articulates that the ZANU-PF led government inherited the culture of intolerance, intimidation and violence derived from the liberation struggle. The struggle itself contingently demonstrated anti-democratic tendencies given that the ZANU-PF led government had to take control by force from the colonialists. He further states that the ZANU-PF certainly prides itself in its violent past and its capacity to deploy the violent politics to those who dare challenge it (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003).

More so, the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party in 1999 had an impact on the Zimbabwe’s political environment. According to Moyo and Matondi
(2003), the ZANU-PF political party by that time was used to political hegemony. They had been in power since the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the party had exceeded a decade being the ruling party. The country was now at a point where by it was now transforming to a one state party. Hence the formation of the MDC posed as a threat to power on the ZANU PF led government. The ZANU PF government viewed the MDC party as a western supported party which sought to fulfill the western interests in Zimbabwe. This is because the MDC party had new ideologies which were opposite to those of the nationalist party.

The ruling party further embarked on a controversial Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 as a way to gain more support against the MDC party. The conflict situation in Zimbabwe was worsened by the isolation of Zimbabwe by other international organizations such as the Common Wealth and the European Union. The situation was further worsened by the imposition of sanctions by western countries after the conduction of the land reform programme in 2000. Western countries cited that, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme was unconstitutional and was characterized by gross human rights abuses (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). Palloti (2004), further backs this notion by stating that, the manner in which the land reform was conducted was unconstitutional as they removed the white minority land owners from their farms by force and some were brutally attacked. One of the main challenges associated with land reform in Zimbabwe is the fact that although there was transference of land, there was no transference of skills and knowledge on how to run these farms. The disorderly and hurried way in which the land reform program was carried out contributed greatly to a decrease in production. From then on, agricultural output, which was once Zimbabwe’s pride, began to fall drastically (Hawkins etal, 2008). It became clear that the Zimbabwean crisis is rooted in structural political-economic legacies of colonial rule combined with the legacies of African nationalist politics but gained momentum in the specific context of a major threat to the political future of the ruling party ZANU-PF.

Adding on to this, Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), further state that the economic view of the Zimbabwean crisis can be traced from the 1990s where the ZANU PF led government adopted the IMF and World Bank’s Economic Structural Adjustment Policies (ESAPs) that affected the country’s economy negatively. They led to the decline in health service delivery, education system and the rapid de-industrialization that necessitated the retrenchment of many people
leading to the rise in the levels of unemployment in the country. More so, the droughts that occurred in 1992 worsened the situation as they greatly affected the country’s economy as well as the social aspects of the people of Zimbabwe. The experienced droughts caused food insecurity in the country. These events left the country in a state which Masunungure et al (2009), labels as the “Crisis in Zimbabwe”.

According to International Crisis Group (2001), the involvement of Zimbabwe in the DRC war in 1998 also worsened the crisis. It further states that, most of the SADC countries had refused to participate in the DRC war and Zimbabwe by that time was chairing the SADC Organ for Defense and Security Cooperation. It argues that President Mugabe saw this as an opportunity to assert regional leadership in SADC, especially over South Africa and hence he sent 12 000 troops to assist President Kabila in fighting the rebels. Makocekwana and Kwaramba (2009), on the other hand argue that the president of Zimbabwe got involved in the war in DRC because of its wealth. However the intervention in DRC faced great criticism in the region as well as internationally since the expenditures in the DRC were partly the blame for the decline of the Zimbabwean economy. It became crystal clear that the involvement in the DRC war was not a great move for the country as it caused economic crisis.

More so, poor policies that the government embarked on also played a pivotal role in exacerbating the crisis in the country. Taking for instance the ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (restore order) of 2005 which according to UNICEF (2005), resulted in an estimated 700 000 people losing their homes and livelihood, thus worsening the crisis situation in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the ongoing economic decline, high inflation, poor agricultural production, the high levels of HIV and AIDS, limited donor support for development programmes and depleted capacity in the social service sectors severely compromised the well-being of people throughout the country. Doctors left the country to other countries, most health workers in hospitals were always on strike and the health services became poor. According to Murithi and Mawadza (2010), the water authority did not have sufficient amount of chemicals to purify drinking water. Cholera, easily prevented and cured under normal circumstances, broke out, thus compelling the government to declare a humanitarian emergency. It is against this background that the SADC declared that Zimbabwe was in a crisis and was in need of humanitarian assistance.
The country was characterized by human rights abuses as the ZANU-PF led government attacked people who supported opposition parties and elections in Zimbabwe were characterized by violence (Rivero, 2008). There was the suppression of opposition parties through press censorship as they were denied space and the opportunity to conduct their campaigns to the Zimbabwean citizens through acts such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). From the 2000 up to the 2008 elections violence and human rights abuses were the order of the day in Zimbabwe. The March 2008 elections were characterized by an increase in political violence. According to Chiroro (2008:1), “elections in politics are supposed to be a civilizing activity, when countries carry out democratic elections in which there is an agreeable electoral system and an accommodative political culture, elections need not shed a drop of blood. Electoral mechanisms that include the electoral system and election administration can condition incentives and disincentives for violence”. The Zimbabwean situation was the opposite of what Chiroro (2008) alludes.

According to Dzinesa and Zambara (2010:1), “the MDC-T won the elections with 47.9% of the votes to ZANU PF’s Mugabe with 43.2% votes’. The results of the votes had taken three weeks before they were announced and such delay brought about criticism by the western states, the AU and SADC about the credibility of the results as well as the Zimbabwe electorate Committee (ZEC). The ruling party could not accept the outcome of the elections which then led to the runoff elections which were held on the 29th of June in 2008. Supporters of the MDC-T formation were attacked and brutally beaten by the ZANU-PF members and this was the reason why one of the candidates Morgan Tsvangirai the leader of the MDC-T withdrew from the elections. Mugabe won the elections as he was contesting alone. Dzinesa and Zambara (2010), refer to it as a one man race and it is against this background that the African Union (AU) mandated SADC to take a mediation role as a strategy to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe and stabilize the situation. That is when the South African government was given the role to mediate in the Zimbabwean political crisis.

Zimbabwe also experienced high inflation levels which exploded into hyperinflation in 2007. The rising inflation was caused by political instability as well as the fleeing of investors because of the unstable environment in the country which was risky for businesses. According to Noko (2011:339), “inflation was caused by the unruly printing of money by the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the quasi-fiscal deficits”. In 2007 the inflation rate was so high to an extent that prices of goods were constantly rising and this impacted heavily on the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe. The government as a way to try and curb the rising inflation, alleviate the suffering of the people implemented the price control strategy which had a long term impact in the economy. Due to price controls, manufactures and companies were forced to close down since they were making losses (Noko, 2011).

More so, the government implemented the Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI) strategy to alleviate poverty. The BACOSSI strategy was not successful because imported food hampers were sold at highly subsidized prices and there was loss due to the fact that foreign liabilities exceeded foreign assets. Furthermore, according to Makocekwanza and Kwaramba (2009), the BACOSSI strategy had little impact since only the ZANU-PF members benefitted from the goods meant for the whole country under the National Basic Commodities Supply Enhancement Programme. It became evident that the BACOSSI strategy only benefitted the politically affiliated citizens and hence it was not effective in alleviating poverty in Zimbabwe.

Furthermore, according to Durden (2011), the government also implemented poor policies such as the Indigenization Policy. The Indigenization Bill was passed in Parliament with the aim of shifting 51% of ownership of companies to the Zimbabweans. This bill was criticized because it scared away investors at the time when they were needed most since the country was in deep economic crisis. Foreign companies were not willing to invest because they were afraid that their companies would be nationalized and this resulted in reduction of foreign currency in the Zimbabwean economy.

The Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation ended when multi-currency regime was introduced. The South African Rand, Botswana Pula and the United States Dollar were recognized as legal tender in Zimbabwe. “The adoption of multi-currency regime restored economic stability and rebuilt monetary credibility as well as budgetary discipline” (Noko, 2011: 339). The introduction of multi-currency regime was part of the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STREP) which was introduced in 2009 and that is when the Zimbabwean dollar was abandoned. According to Solidarity Peace Trust (2010:4), “this programme aimed at stabilizing the economy, and thus it laid the foundation for a more transformative short and long-term economic
recovery”. The multi-currency system also managed to remove price distortions in both foreign exchange and goods markets, it established business confidence and it ensured monetary strength and credibility.

The adoption of multi-currency system managed to curb inflation, it however faced a lot of challenges which are also affecting Zimbabwe to the present date. According to International Monetary Fund (2010:1), “the multicurrency system poses a number of challenges for example, prices and wages are usually agreed and quoted in U.S. dollars, while South Africa is Zimbabwe’s main trading partner and country of origin of capital inflows”. Movements in the U.S. dollar or rand exchange rate had effects on Zimbabwe’s competitiveness and international investment position. More so, the shortage of small-denominations of the US dollar bank notes and coins affected business in Zimbabwe especially on retailers and the general public. Noko (2011: 352) states that, “the retail sector is often unable to give customers change, forcing customers to purchase additional goods, normally sweets, biscuits, and to take a credit note for future purchases”. The government introduced bond coins in a bid to resolve the issue of small denominations. Noko (2011), further states that the circulation of money was very limited and some US dollar notes and South African rand notes were extremely worn out due to being overused and consumers were forced to find their own ways of getting the currency.

1.3 Unpacking the Zimbabwe Crisis

According to Hanke (2008), the Fast track land reform of 2000 by the ZANU-PF destroyed the mainstay of the economy which was agriculture, for instance annual wheat production declined from over 300,000 tons in 1990 to less than 50,000 in 2007. Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), articulates that by 2007, per capita GDP was estimated at US$200, compared to US$900, while over 80% of the Zimbabwean population was reported in 2005 to be living on less than US$1 a day. The country’s export fell from 33.7% of GDP in 1997 to 9.9% of the GDP in 2007. Due to these alarming statistics, the World Bank states that Zimbabwe had “the world’s fastest shrinking economy for a country not at war” (World Bank, 2007)

According to the Demographic Health Survey (2006), the health of children in Zimbabwe declined drastically. More than 70% of children in Zimbabwe suffered from stunted growth and in one province, stunted growth among children increased by 38 percent between 1999 and 2006.
The number of children receiving all of the recommended vaccinations dropped by 21 percent between 1999 and 2006 (Demographic Health Survey, 2006).

More so, according to WHO (2006) report, Zimbabwe had the highest incidences of HIV/AIDS and had lowest life expectancy in the world. According to the report, Zimbabwe was one of the 10 countries that had the highest levels of HIV/AIDS. It further states that people living in Zimbabwe had one of the lowest life expectancies in the world. Since 1994, the average life expectancy for women in Zimbabwe had fallen from 57 years to 34 years and for men from 54 years to 37 years and 3,500 Zimbabweans died every week through the deadly combination of HIV/AIDS, poverty, and malnutrition (WHO, 2006).

Another event that revealed the government’s inability to provide health services was the cholera epidemic of 2008. Through the interviews that were conducted at the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare in the Bulawayo province, the findings were that, the epidemic which claimed thousands of lives was the ultimate incontrovertible indicator of the total collapse of the Zimbabwean health sector and evidence that the system’s governance, economic, political and social structures had deteriorated to the extent of not being able to provide even basic clean drinking water to its citizens.

According to Noko (2011), by June 2008 inflation had reached its peak leading to the abandonment of the Zimbabwe currency. He further states that by mid-November 2008, the rate of inflation was estimated at 79, 600,000 %. This resulted in US$1 becoming equivalent to the staggering sum of Z$2, 621,984, 228.

1.4 Impact of the Crisis on the Neighboring Countries

The crisis in Zimbabwe had spillover effects on the neighboring countries. In 2007 most of the unemployed masses of the Zimbabwean population had left the country in search for greener pastures. People migrated to neighboring countries in the Southern region as well as abroad. The researcher conducted interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offices in Bulawayo and the findings were that, in 2007, more than 3 million people had migrated to South Africa alone and it had the highest number of Zimbabwean refugees. This put a strain in the South African national budget and it led to the rise of xenophobic attacks by the South African citizens against foreigners especially the Zimbabwean refugees because they were claiming that the Zimbabwean
people were taking their jobs in the country. It became evident that the crisis in Zimbabwe had spillover effects on neighboring states as South Africa began to experience civil unrest due to the xenophobic attacks. According to Rivero (2008), the South African Rand also began to lose its value in response to the Zimbabwe crisis.

More so, in South Africa, the increased influx of refugees put an overburden on government social services such as hospitals and water sanitation. The increased influx of foreigners overstretched provision of basic public services such as health, water and sanitation in some South African cities. For instance, in the border town of Messina according to Rivero (2008), most health patients treated in this town were Zimbabweans and not South Africans. Provision of health services in this particular town were even further overburdened following the cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe in 2008 as most victims crossed the border to be treated in Messina. It became evident that the crisis in Zimbabwe overburdened the neighboring states and the southern region as a whole.

Furthermore, the influx of foreigners in the neighboring states of Zimbabwe according to Nyakudya (2013), led to an increase in violence and organized crimes. This was because the influx of foreigners had resulted in increased unemployment levels in most cities and towns of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia just to mention a few. Such increased levels of unemployment resulted in increased violence and organized crimes as a way of surviving. Increased organized crimes ranged from car hijacks, armed robbery, murder and these were recorded in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Nyakudya, 2013). It became crystal clear that the migration of people from Zimbabwe to neighboring countries increased the levels of crimes and levels of unemployment in these countries.

1.5 Conclusion

In a nutshell, the Zimbabwean crisis was as a result of different causes that are interlinked. Poor policies that the ZANU PF led government implemented such as ESAPS, intervention in the DRC war as well as the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme which affected the agricultural production of the country, Operation Murambatsvina (restore order) which left masses of Zimbabweans homeless and the Indigenization policy which scared away investors. The abuse of human rights by the ruling party through the violation of the white minorities also led to the isolation of Zimbabwe from the international groupings. The imposition
of sanctions crippled the economy of the country. Political violence was the order of the day and it also worsened the situation. Donor funding was stopped in Zimbabwe because of the unconstitutional running of the country by the ruling party and such an environment chased away investors as they cited that the political environment was risky for business. Zimbabwe also experienced humanitarian crisis as there was an outbreak of cholera which killed a lot of people. More so, the crisis in Zimbabwe had negative spillover effects in the Southern region and it was against this background that SADC intervened in the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008.
CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter describes SADC’s origins and the evolution of its institutions, functions and objectives. This is relevant to the topic because in order to assess the SADC in resolving crisis and conflict, it is of paramount importance to understand its mandate as a regional body as well as its origins and the reasons that led to its formation. The chapter also describes and gives a detailed overview of why SADCC transitioned to SADC in 1992.

2.2 Formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) as it is now known has its origin in the regional organization of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) which was established on 1 April 1980 following the Lusaka Declaration. SADCC according to SADC (1992), was started by Front Line States whose aim was political liberation of Southern Africa. The formation of SADCC was as a result of agreements between the leaders of the then majority ruled countries of Southern Africa. These countries were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia. In 1992 at their Summit which was held in Windhoek, Namibia, the SADC Heads of states signed the SADC Treaty and Declaration which transformed Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) into Southern African Development Community (SADC). They added economic integration as another objective of the regional body following the independence of the rest of the Southern African countries (SADC, 1992).

2.3 Transition to Southern African Development Community (SADC)

When SADCC was formed it was only aimed at reducing member states dependence and implementing programmes and projects with national and regional impact. It also aimed at promoting collective self-reliance as well as promoting African liberation from colonialism in Southern Africa (SADC, 2001). However, according to SADC (2001), SADCC was a loose coalition of newly independent states. SADC (2001), further states that it used a decentralized approach to regional cooperation and the responsibility for planning and implementation as well
as funding was given to individual states. There was no administration nor legal status hence each member had equal stake in the organization regardless of the degree of economic and political power.

According to Nyakudya (2013), the SADCC decided to create a more effective organization with a legal status hence the leaders of the region decided to formalize SADCC and transform it from a coordination conference to a regional community. The SADCC countries had also seen the need to promote trade in the region as well as foreign investment and the private sector so as to promote economic development in the region. He further articulates that the focus of SADCC members shifted from coordination to regional integration and co-operation. In 1992 SADCC was transformed to SADC and established an internationally recognized organization.

2.3.1 Members of SADC

SADC has 15 members which joined the regional body in different years and these are Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, DRC, Seychelles, South Africa, Mauritius and Madagascar. The Southern region is a multi-cultured region and DRC being the country with the largest population in the region (SADC, 2013). More so, in the SADC, there is a strong political unity especially among the revolutionary leaders. Most of these leaders are also heads of the ruling parties in their countries. These parties include Patriotic Front (PF) of Zambia, South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) of Mozambique, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) of Angola, Chama Cha-Mapinduzi (CCM) of Tanzania and ZANU-PF of Zimbabwe. The relationship of these parties together with their leaders dates back to the anti-colonial movements, to the formation of the Front Line States and ultimately the formation of SADC.

These strong relations have affected SADC’s decision making in resolving conflicts in member states. This is because of the brotherhood approach they use in responding to conflicts and crisis in member states. There is a lot of biasness within the SADC towards revolutionist leaders. In the SADC there are also Heads of States who have distanced themselves from the nationalists’ ideologies such as Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia and Ian Khama of Botswana. The differences in
ideologies has made the regional body weak and this has made the regional body experience consensus challenges.

2.4 Objectives of SADC

When SADC was transformed from being SADCC there were objectives that were put in place for the organization by the Heads of States of the Southern region. They sought to achieve economic growth and development in the region, peace and security for all the member states through the regional integration which is embedded on democratic principles, equitable and sustainable development (SADC, 2012). The SADC treaty of 1992 stated clearly the objectives of the regional body in article 5 of the SADC Treaty and they contain the following:

- To achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.
- Evolve common political values, systems and institutions.
- Promote and defend peace and security.
- Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes.
- Promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the region.
- Achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.
- Strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the Region (SADC treaty, 1993).

For these objectives to be achieved the SADC member States are expected to:

- Harmonize political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states.
- Encourage the people of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC.
• Create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilization of requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of SADC and its institutions.
• Develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the region generally, among member states.
• Promote the development of human resources.
• Promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology.
• Improve economic management and performance through regional co-operation.
• Promote the coordination and harmonization of the international relations of Member States.
• Secure international understanding, co-operation and support, and mobilize the inflow of public and private resources into the region.
• Develop such other activities as Member States may decide in furtherance of the objectives of this Treaty (SADC Treaty, 1993).

2.5 Structure of SADC

Since the transitioning from SADCC to SADC, the regional body experienced the transformation of institutions so as to suite its new role and mandate in the Southern region. The following are the different SADC institutions that complement each other in works of SADC so as to promote development as well as resolve crisis in member states.

2.5.1 Summit of Heads of States

The Summit is the highest decision body and is responsible for providing direction and control of functions of the regional body. The Summit comprises of all the Heads of states and it is the highest policy-formulation institution of SADC (SADC, 2012). It makes decisions regarding SADC and when doing so they use the consensus principle that is, the SADC Heads of States cannot make formal decisions or take any action unless all the members agree. The Summit meetings are done annually mostly in August and September and the Summit uses the Troika system to oversee leadership in the SADC that is the current chairperson is supported by their outgoing chairperson and the incoming chair person. Power is conferred in these representatives to take quick decisions on behalf of member states (SADC, 2012).
2.5.2 Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is the second highest level of authority and functional level. The Council of Ministers comprises of one national minister from every member state. The Council of Ministers play an advisory role to the Summit. The Council of Ministers meets before the Summit all the time and their role is to oversee the works of SADC’s executives (SADC, 2012).

2.5.3 Secretariat

In the SADC Structure there is the Secretariat which is the prime executive institution. The Secretariat is responsible for strategic planning, co-ordination and management of the SADC programmes and activities. The role of Secretariat is to implement decisions of the Summit and of the Council of Ministers. It is also responsible for supervising financial and general administrative work and it coordinates the policies and strategies of member states. The main responsibility of the Executive Secretary is to work closely with Commissions and also with institutions. The Executive Secretary also monitors the functioning of different SADC sectors ensure adherence with agreed policies, strategies, programmes and projects (SADC, 2012).

2.5.4 SADC Tribunal

The SADC tribunal was established during the 2000 Ordinary Summit by the Protocol of the Tribunal in Windhoek in Namibia. It was only in August 2005 that it was officially established in Gaborone, Botswana. The SADC Tribunal consists of appointed judges from member states. The functions of the SADC Tribunal is to ensure that there is adherence to the SADC Treaty as well as proper interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty. It is also responsible for deciding and settling upon disputes among member states (SADC, 2012). However according to SADC (2013), in 2010 the Tribunal works were affected because it was de facto suspended by the Summit because of some of its judgement ruling against the Zimbabwe government. It was however reinstated at the Maputo Summit of 2012. Its mandate was revised to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between member states.

2.5.5 SADC Troika Institution

The Troika Institution is the SADC Organ on Defence, Politics and Security and is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region. The Organ in Defence, Politics and Security
reports to the SADC Summit. The Organ on Defence, Politics and Security is headed by a Troika which comprises of a Chairperson, the Incoming Chairperson and the Outgoing Chairperson. Each Minister from every member state who is responsible for Defence, Domestic security, Foreign Affairs and State Security reports to the Chairperson who is responsible for the coordination of the works of the organ and its structures (SADC, 2012). The organ is guided by the key documents of SADC that is the SADC Treaty, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Strategic indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). According to Nathan (2006), the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) was developed to guide the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Within the structure of the SADC Secretariat, the Organ is overseen by the Executive Secretary and the chairperson of the Organ is rotated on an annual basis and the members’ state that would be holding the chairpersonship of the Organ Troika provides Secretariat Services. The work of the organ is advised by the 3 committees that is the Ministerial Committee of the Organ which consists of Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and State Security, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) as well as the Inter-state, Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC).

2.5.6 SADC Security Architecture

The first initiators of the security structure for Southern Africa were the Front Line States in 1975 with an aim of ending apartheid and promoting decolonization of southern African States (Chimanikire, 1999). He further states that in 1992, the SADCC transformed into SADC and revised its mandate and hence it had to reorient its security framework. Peace and Security remained primary goal of the new regional body. This is evidenced by the SADC‘s objectives in the 1992 Treaty which stated that the regional body aimed to promote and defend peace and security.

According to Van Nieuwkerk (2003), in 1996, the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security was established. He argues that the Organ was not structured properly and there were issues about the chairing of the Organ, the permanency of the position and its status. He further states that before it was formally established there were debates and disagreements about how the Organ would operate. Heads of States from the Front Line States had a different views on how the Organ
should operate from that of the Secretariat which aimed at the creation of a non-offensive, non-militaristic security order that would be based on democratic norms. In 1994 the Secretariat at a workshop proposed an independent human rights commission together with a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation. Members of the Front Line coalition opposed it as they proposed the Association of Southern African State (ASAS) to serve independently of the Secretariat (Nathan, 2006). With this it became evident that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was established with great difficulty as the SADC member states had different views on how the Organ should operate.

When the Organ was firstly implemented, it ought to operate at the Summit, ministerial and technical level independently from the other SADC structures and that the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) would be set as its sub structure (Chimanikire, 1999). When it was implemented the president of Zimbabwe Mugabe was appointed as the first chair. The position for the first three years was not going to rotate but after that it was supposed to rotate annually. The debates on the implementation of the Organ had divided the region into two camps that is, the South African camp which was supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania. These countries were of the view that the Organ should be structured in a way that allows cooperation and peacemaking at a political level rather than a military level. The other camp consisted of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia and they were of the notion the Organ should be structured in a military level that is why they preferred a Mutual Defence Pact and military cooperation in response to conflict.

In 2001 at the SADC Summit meeting, the conflict of interests of these countries was resolved. The Organ Protocol was adopted and for the disputes to end it was agreed that the Organ was going to be part of SADC and was to report to the SADC Summit. This move was taken based on the aim of overcoming the challenges that the Front Line states faced taking into consideration its Substructure Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) which was informal rather than institutional (ICC, 2002).The main function of the Organ Protocol was to regulate the structure, operations and functions of the Organ. This included the prevention and resolution of interstate and intrastate conflicts. To deal with issues of defence cooperation and collective response to attack, in 2003 the Summit officiated the Strategic Indicative Plan for the
Organ (SIPO) and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. The Organ constituted an institutional framework for peace and security for the Southern region (Goitsemidimo and Maleban, 2012). The Organ Protocol emphasized the resolution of conflicts through non-violent means such as negotiations, mediation and conciliation and emphasized that, the use of force should be the last option.

Furthermore, another good move that the SADC Organ did was the establishment of the SADC Brigade as an intervention tool for peacekeeping and monitoring. Cawthra (2010), states that, the SADC Brigade supports regional peace operations under the African Standby Force Policy Framework. The Brigade, was launched in August 2008 and consists of military, police and civilian members from SADC Member States. The SADC Brigade serves in peace-building efforts including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization and humanitarian assistance in conflict areas. The SADC Brigade operates as a tool of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and receives its guidance from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence staff and the Committee of SADC Police Chiefs.

Although the Organ is applauded for using the Troika system for its leadership and decision making which is one thing which addressed the challenges that the Front Line States face faced with the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), it however faces criticism for reinstating the Front Line State’s ISDSC structure within the organ. It is argued that because of this, SADC security structure leaves no room for non-state actors and it is state centric in its operations. The Organ also faces criticism for its principle of non-interference (Nathan, 2006). This affected the effectiveness of the Organ because of respect of sovereignty of member states. Cawthra (2010), further alludes that, the lack of common values, mutual trust and shared vision of the security regime were also contributing factors.

According to Goitsemo and Maleban (2012), the decision-making structure of SADC Organ has, in practice, no enforcement mandate and can only be involved in the internal affairs of a member state if invited to do so. Such principles hinders the effectiveness of the Organ in maintaining peace and security in the SADC region. Another weakness of the security structure of the Organ is that it does not have a permanent administrative infrastructure and the incumbent chairperson
of the Organ provides the secretariat. More so, the Organ lacks funding and is highly depended on donor funding for it resources and functions. This affects the efficacy and efficiency of the Organ. More so, the SADC security architecture faces criticism for being state centric in its approach to peace and security. This is further shown by the SADC approach to security under the Mutual Defence pact which largely emphasizes on state security, and sovereignty.

2.6 Conclusion

In a nutshell, SADC is a regional body which has different institutions that work and complement each other in promoting peace and stability in the region. The researcher also realized that the SADC in its operations adopted the state centric approach and this hindered its efficacy. This is because non-state actors have no place in the regional body and it is highly depended on donor funding for its activities and operations. Through the chapter the researcher understood the dominant position and influence that President Mugabe has within SADC. The chapter also explores the security structure of SADC so as to establish the groundwork for evaluating its effectiveness in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis.
CHAPTER 3 SADC AND THE CREATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses SADC’s intervention in the Zimbabwean crisis until the period of the Government of National unity (GNU) between the ruling party ZANU-PF, MDC-T and the MDC-M. The researcher also analyses the role of Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and his team in the Zimbabwean crisis and the effectiveness of quiet diplomacy as a mediation strategy. This chapter reveals the challenges that SADC faced in the implementation of the Global Pact Agreement (GPA) of 2008 and it also discusses the weaknesses of SADC paying particular attention to its response to the crisis in Zimbabwe until the implementation of the GNU in 2009.

3.2 SADC Early Initiatives
The violent and unconstitutional manner in which the ZANU PF led government implemented the FTLRP in 2000 called for regional as well as international concern about the Zimbabwean issues (Ndlovu –Gatsheni, 2011). This issue was discussed at the 2001 SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government. According to SADC (2001), the SADC Heads of States were concerned about the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme on the economy of Zimbabwe. They were also concerned about how the economic decline in Zimbabwe caused by the land reform programme would affect the region. In its concluding communiqué the SADC appointed a team consisting of Botswana and South Africa to work with the Zimbabwe government on the political and economic issues affecting the country. SADC and South Africa also took the initiative to convince the international community to fund the land reform of Zimbabwe as agreed in the Lancaster House Conference of 1979 and the donor Conference of 1998 (SADC, 2001).

This initiative by SADC was not successful because the international community did not fund the FTLRP due to the violent nature of it as well as the disregard of ownership rights of the white farmers. The SADC community openly supported the land redistribution of Zimbabwe regardless of the fact that it was conducted in a violent and unconstitutional manner. More so, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011), argues that South Africa did not contradict the land reform of Zimbabwe
because President Mugabe had agreed earlier to delay the land repossession in Zimbabwe at the time when South Africa was transitioning to democracy so that they could avoid racial flare-up in South Africa, hence the South African government sort of owed President Mugabe support for the land redistribution since he had played a pivotal role in the transitioning of South Africa to a democratic country.

More so, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), following the 2002 elections which were characterized by violence and human rights abuses by the ruling party, the Common Wealth under its Troika function mandated President Obasanjo and President Thabo Mbeki it to mediate between the ruling party and the ZANU-PF. President Obasanjo did not support the actions of the president of Zimbabwe hence he publicly criticized him as he was in line with the western nations who wanted to bring about regime change in Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). However, Thabo Mbeki was tolerant and soft on the president of Zimbabwe because of their longstanding relationship. President Obasanjo wanted Zimbabwe to change its way of ruling and hence Zimbabwe was suspended from the common wealth in 2002 and president Obasanjo declared that president Mugabe was persona non grata at the Common Wealth summit that followed in 2003 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Hence such harshness by the Obasanjo angered Mugabe and it hence led to their fallout. Thabo Mbeki continued to play his role in Zimbabwe in support of President Mugabe.

3.3 Harmonized Elections and the Inconclusive June 2008 Presidential Election Run-Off

In March 2008 the government of Zimbabwe held the harmonized presidential elections. Prior to the March 2008 elections, the ruling party as well as the opposition parties conducted massive political campaigns both in urban and rural Zimbabwe (Dzenesa and Zambara, 2010). When the voting date arrived many Zimbabwean voters went to the poles for voting. During the voting process in most parts of the country the environment was peaceful and calm. According to Dzenesa and Zambara (2010), the opposition party MDC-T won the elections with 47.98% votes and the ZANU-PF party had only 43.25% of votes. However, the ZEC delayed in announcing the election results as people waited for three weeks before they were announced. This raised suspicion on the political opposition parties, civil society organizations, the AU and the SADC. The ZEC faced international and regional criticism as all the interested parties questioned the credibility of these election results.
More so, despite Morgan Tsvangirai’s victory he could not be the president of the country. This was because he did not have 50 plus one votes. This prompted the need for runoff elections between Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T and Robert Mugabe of the ZANU-PF in June 2008. According to Dzenesa and Zambara, (2010), prior to the run-off elections, the ZANU-PF members as a way of demotivating and undermining the opposition MDC party, resorted to using violence and intimidation especially on the rural Zimbabwe. According to Solidarity Peace Trust (2009), 82% of the violence was perpetrated by ZANU PF while other parties accounted for a mere 1%. More so, Makochekwana and Kwaramba (2009) point out that, a total of 197 political violence related cases were recorded from March to June 2008. Morgan Tsvangirai, the president of the MDC-T party was also brutally beaten by the supporters of the ZANU-PF party. People were forced to vote for the ZANU-PF party and this led to Morgan Tsvangirai withdrawing from the elections leaving Mugabe contesting on his own. Scholars such as Dzenesa and Zambara (2010), define the June elections as the one man race. The conflict left many communities torn apart with a high need for peace building.

The situation in Zimbabwe after the run-off elections of 2008, raised international as well as regional concern as human rights were violated. The Zimbabwean masses had been denied freedom of expression and freedom to choose the leader they wanted. Such political instability impacted negatively on the economy of the country as investors fled the country. It is against this background that the SADC intervened in the Zimbabwe political and economic crisis. President Thabo Mbeki was given the role of a mediator in Zimbabwe.

3.4 Insecurity rises in Zimbabwe, SADC urges Re-Engagement

Following the 2008 violent election, SADC realized that Zimbabwe was in deep political and economic crisis. This was due to the insecurities within the ruling ZANU-PF party which feared to lose it political control. The ruling party resorted to using violence, repression and intimidation toward the opposition parties especially the MDC supporters. In the rural Zimbabwe cases of political related violence were massive. In the March elections where the ruling party lost to the MDC-T opposition party embarked on a terror where people in all the constituencies where the ruling party had lost (Murithi and Mawadza, 2010). People were beaten and harassed. This was their strategy of inflicting fear on the Zimbabwean masses so that they vote for the ruling party in the run-off elections in June 2008. The violence was too much to an extent that
Tsvangirai the president of the MDC-T party withdrew from the elections as he was also the victim of the violence.

According to Murithi and Mawadza (2010), when the political crisis reached its peak the AU mandated the SADC to intervene in the Zimbabwean crisis stating that re-engagement was needed in Zimbabwe. The SADC gave the mediation role to Thabo Mbeki who was by that time the president of South Africa. Thabo Mbeki mediated patiently with the political parties in Zimbabwe leading to the signing of the GPA which was the bases for the creation of the GNU in Zimbabwe. SADC saw re-engagement as the best solution to the situation in Zimbabwe hence the regional body invited both the African and the western states to support its effort to bring about political stability in the country.

The re-engagement in Zimbabwe meant the restoration of international political and economic relations with all states around the globe. The SADC wanted Zimbabwe to restore its relations with financial institutions such as the MIF and World Bank for economic purposes (Bhengu, 2010). SADC through re-engagement aimed at restoring the relations of Zimbabwe and the western nations after the 2002 elections where the countries imposed sanctions on the government. According to Bhengu (2010), SADC wanted to invite multilateral institutions led by IMF and World Bank so that they resume businesses which were terminated in 1999, so as to promote economic growth.

3.5 Understanding the Mediator Thabo Mbeki

Thabo Mbeki was born on the 18th of June in 1942 in South Africa. He was the second president of the post-Apartheid regime in his country. He became a revolutionist from his early ages and he has worked with many revolutionist leaders in the Southern region such as president Mugabe, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo just to mention a few (Stenford, 2007). The relationship between Thabo Mbeki and the president of Zimbabwe dates back to the 1980s when Mugabe got into office soon after independence. According to Stenford (2007), Thabo Mbeki and Tambo met with Mugabe and his advisor, Emmerson Mnangagwa, in Salisbury which is now known as Harare in 1980. The president of Zimbabwe allowed Thabo Mbeki and Oliver Tambo to move ammunition and cadres through Zimbabwe and Mugabe guaranteed that his government would assist ANC cooperatives in Zimbabwe (Stenford, 2007). More so, Thabo Mbeki shares the same
ideologies with the President of Zimbabwe. They view western influence as the cause of underdevelopment in the Southern region. These two leader view things in a de-colonial perspective as they promote the notion of having African solutions to African problems.

According to Stenford (2007), the relationship between Mbeki and Mugabe was further cemented by Mugabe’s support for his African Renaissance concept. The president of Zimbabwe also played a pivotal role in assisting the South African government to become a democratic country (Stenford, 2007). Therefore such a long standing relationship between these two leaders affected the mediation process and outcome in Zimbabwe. Such a strong bond between these leaders explains why Thabo Mbeki was tolerant of the ZANU-PF led government. He was very sympathetic towards the ruling party as he protected the president against criticism.

3.6 The 2008 Mediation

After the inconclusive 2008 elections the South African president Thabo Mbeki was given a task of mediating between the political parties in Zimbabwe. The SADC through the mediation aimed at bringing about political stability in Zimbabwe. The regional body also wanted to address the abuses of human rights as well as addressing the power struggles between the conflicting parties (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). The research argues that Thabo Mbeki in the Zimbabwean mediation chose to ignore the violent nature of the Zimbabwean politics knowingly as a way to control the outcome of the mediation. The research further establishes that Thabo Mbeki chose quiet diplomacy as a way of disallowing criticism and negative opinions against his mediation style which would affect his progress. This is further supported by Burgess and Burgess (1997), who state that problem solving mediators are often highly directive in their attempts to reach a goal and they control not only the process but also the substance of the discussion focusing on areas of consensus and resolvable issues, while avoiding areas of disagreement where consensus is less likely. Although all decisions are, in theory, left in the hands of the disputants, problem solving mediators often play a large role in crafting settlement terms and obtaining the parties' agreement. Given this, Thabo Mbeki facilitated the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008. The GPA committed its signatories to working together to create a sustainable and lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crisis (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009).

According to Bhengu (2010), Mbeki portrayed quiet diplomacy as a style of negotiating a crisis in foreign countries as opposed to military force or coercion. The principle behind quiet
diplomacy is that, “it should be quiet and it should take place away from critical public and media scrutiny” (Graham, 2006:116). The notion of quiet diplomacy is said to have three vital principles, firstly the intervening party will not humiliate or attack in public either or any of the parties to the conflict and there is no moral grandstanding, secondly, punitive measures are taken off the table, and are not an option and thirdly, talking and dialogue are used to seek an agreement between the warring parties (Alden, 2010). However, Thabo Mbeki adopted the quiet diplomacy mediation style as a way of avoiding to openly criticize and offend President Mugabe throughout the mediation process. The GPA was signed in an assumedly violence-free void where coercion and intimidation were ignored because they were disadvantageous to the progress towards a settlement. Thabo Mbeki focused on what the parties had agreed on and ignored everything that could jeopardize his progress. Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), state that ignoring what matters most in a crisis increases the chances of implementation failure of the settlement and with this it becomes crystal clear that the implementation of the GPA had inherent problems which affected its effectiveness. The researcher gathered that during the mediation process important matters like the abuse of human rights and intimidation were not addressed, they were ignored as they focused on the power sharing deal and thus Thabo Mbeki’s mediation did not provide a meaningful or long-term solution for the majority of Zimbabweans.

More so, Bhengu (2010), further articulates that through his quiet diplomacy, Thabo Mbeki failed to enforce his agenda of African Renaissance. His ignoring of gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe contradicted his notion of a peaceful and inclusive African Renaissance. According to the ICG (2012), Thabo Mbeki refused to publicly criticize Mugabe or condemn increasing violence in Zimbabwe and denied that Zimbabwe was in crisis. This was further endorsed by his denial in the SADC summit where he stated that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe yet masses of Zimbabweans were being brutally beaten by the ruling party in 2008. It is against this background that the researcher observed that Thabo Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy protected President Mugabe and with this it became evident that the notion of having Africans to solve African problems is not very effective.

More so, Thabo Mbeki ignored essential rules of mediation that is, the neutrality and impartiality of the mediator. Heine (2009), points out that “Mbeki’s repeated visits to Harare and meetings with President Mugabe at the State House, where they would enthusiastically hold hands in front
of the press, showed not so much the presence of an international mediator, but a colleague and friend of President Mugabe trying to rescue him from a difficult situation. Furthermore, Heine (2009), highlights Mbeki’s obvious hatred of leaders of the two MDCs Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, whom Mbeki would rarely meet. This further reinforced the perception that he was not an honest negotiator searching for a fair solution (Heine, 2009). However when the researcher interviewed members of the ZANU-PF Women’s League in Bulawayo Province, they defended Thabo Mbeki’s actions stating that Thabo Mbeki’s visits to the State House were social visits which had nothing to do with the mediation process. They further alluded that, Thabo Mbeki was chosen as a mediator in Zimbabwe because he was qualified and had experience to do so, he would never do things that would jeopardize his efforts in Zimbabwe and ruin his reputation. However Heine (2009), articulates that Mbeki’s actions in Zimbabwe reduced his support in South Africa and became very unpopular to the South African people as they saw him supporting and protecting President Mugabe at the expense of the Zimbabwean masses. Thabo Mbeki was removed from office and Jacob Zuma was appointed as the new president of South Africa and he automatically became the mediator in Zimbabwe taking over from Thabo Mbeki. Thus it became evident that despite the different views about Thabo Mbeki’s actions as a mediator, he lost his support in South Africa and was removed from office.

In a nutshell, it becomes evident that the mediation process in Zimbabwe was biased in favour of the ruling party over the opposition parties. Thabo Mbeki broke important of the rules of mediation which include neutrality and impartiality. Thabo Mbeki used quiet diplomacy as the mediation strategy in the Zimbabwean situation. Thabo Mbeki employed the quiet diplomacy as a way of protecting President Mugabe against international criticism. Thabo Mbeki during the mediation process in Zimbabwe, protected the interest of the ZANU-PF party at the expense of the Zimbabwean masses.

3.7 The Global Political Agreement

The mediation between the ruling ZANU-PF party and the two MDC formations led to the signing of the GPA in 2008. The GPA was the guideline for the conflicting parties to form an inclusive government. During the mediation there were a lot of disagreements as the conflicting parties had different interests. This delayed the process of the signing of the GPA in 2008. However with great difficulty the mediator Thabo Mbeki facilitated the talks between the
ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations one led by Tsvangirai and the other by Mutambara. Cawthra (2010), points out that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) resulted in power sharing in Zimbabwe as Mugabe retained the presidency, the main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, was appointed Prime Minister and Mutambara was appointed Deputy Prime Minister.

The signing of the GPA also guided the conflicting parties in coming up with a constitution as stated in the terms of the GPA. The GPA was also the guideline for the political parties as they worked together in creating a peaceful and conducive environment for the 2013 elections. However the successes of the GPA are outweighed by the failures of the GPA as the ruling ZANU-PF party violated the terms of the GPA.

According to Bhengu (2010), ZANU-PF did not adhere to the GPA agreement as Mugabe refused the sharing of power with the two MDC formations. Bhengu (2010), asserts that the GPA had an unequal agreement as ZANU-PF had control over the major levers of the military and security sectors. According to the ICG report (2012:6), “after the signing of the GPA, the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) continuously condemned ZANU-PF’s deliberate violation of the GPA and its unwillingness to implement some of the crucial aspects of the agreement”.

Murithi and Mawadza (2010), argue that another factor which affected the efficacy of the GPA was the failure of SADC to reform the security sector of Zimbabwe. They state that, for the country to have stability there was need for security sector reform. This was because the military and the police in Zimbabwe were being deployed to fight political battles hence the politicization of the security sector. More so, when the GPA was signed a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), comprising members of the three coalition partners, was established to ensure the parties’ compliance with the GPA. This was is weakness in the sense that the monitoring committee comprised of the people who were directly involved in the politics of Zimbabwe. This was further revealed by the members of the ZANU-PF Youth League in an interview that the researcher conducted in Bulawayo province, as they stated that JOMIC was not very effective in monitoring the adherence of political parties to the terms of the GPA. They further stated that, JOMIC was ineffective because it comprised of the members of political parties and there was little interaction between the JOMIC committee and SADC and thus SADC...
failed to put in place a SADC monitoring Committee that would have effectively monitored the implementation of the GPA rather than to let the involved parties to self-monitor the progress of the GPA.

### 3.8 Exit Thabo Mbeki Enter Zuma in Mediating the Zimbabwe Crisis

Thabo Mbeki after his involvement in Zimbabwe, lost his support in South Africa as people did not support the way he had handled the Zimbabwean situation. He also lost support in the in the ANC as he was forced to resign from office. Kgalema Motlanthe was appointed as the new president awaiting elections in South Africa and in 2009 Jacob Zuma was elected into office (Murithi and Mawadza, 2010). After Jacob Zuma was elected into office as the President of South Africa he automatically inherited the mediation role in Zimbabwe. According to Murithi and Mawadza (2010:55), “Zuma continued with the talks initiated by Mbeki, he however appointed a facilitation team which comprised of his old African National Congress (ANC) comrade-in-arms, Mac Maharaj and one of his senior advisors, Lindiwe Zulu, to remain engaged with the situation in Zimbabwe”.

The facilitation team undertook a number of trips to Zimbabwe to meet with the leaders of the political formations. The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) played an active role in providing the technical support for the interventions by the presidency and the facilitation team. According to ICG (2011), in 2011 Zuma presented a report which indicated that the region and international community were losing patience with Mugabe who was seen as the major obstacle to the implementation of the GPA and smooth functioning of the Unity Government. It became crystal clear that Zuma’s mediation style at first was different from that of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma together with his team wanted to bring about reform in Zimbabwe.

According to ICG (2011:2), “Jacob Zuma termed the Zimbabwean situation as insupportable and urged Africa to send a mission to the country”. Furthermore, on Zuma’s presidential trip to London, he joined with Gordon Brown in a call for an end to the deadlock, a move that would have been unthinkable coming from Mbeki, who had strongly resisted western pressure to take a tougher stance. It is against this background that the researcher observed that Zuma saw the need of western influence in bringing about change in Zimbabwe although it was against the notion of having African solutions to African problems. More so, the ICG (2012:22), affirms that in 2011
SADC held a meeting in Livingstone, and President Jacob Zuma, presented a report that accused President Robert Mugabe and his ruling party of holding back reforms. He was openly criticizing President Mugabe and the ruling ZANU- PF party and this angered the ZANU-PF party and President Mugabe.

According to Tinhu (2013), in comparison between Thabo Mbeki’s mediation approach vis a vis Jacob Zuma’s approach, he articulates that Thabo Mbeki’s approach faced international criticism because he was soft on the president of Zimbabwe compared to Zuma’s tough approach against President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party. Tinhu (2013:1) argues that, “when Zuma took over the presidency, South Africa became one of Zimbabwe’s most active critics". This tough stance drew support from the opposition and human rights groups in Zimbabwe, and the new South African President was considered a savior. The international community endorsed the view that Zuma was doing a good job to take a tough position in dealing with Mugabe. Tinhu (2013), however states that the actions of Jacob Zuma were based on a miscalculation that Mugabe and his party could be pushed around easily. President Mugabe and ZANU-PF in reaction to Zuma’s efforts of undermining his rule, they intentionally ignored diplomatic respect as part of their ‘strategy’ to undermine Zuma and his mediation team (Tinhu, 2013).

In addition, President Mugabe reacted to Zuma’s tough approach by threatening to pull out of SADC. This was his strategy to undermine Jacob Zuma’s mediation process since Jacob Zuma had different views from those of the ZANU PF party and was in line with the opposition parties. This posed as a threat to the ZANU PF led government as Jacob Zuma was determined to bring about change in Zimbabwe hence they resorted undermining the dignitaries of Jacob Zuma and his team (Tinhu, 2013). In trying to make Jacob Zuma back off from his intentions of bringing about reform in Zimbabwe, President Mugabe provided monetary and ideological support to Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party who happened to be Jacob Zuma’s opponent. This was the president’s strategy of damaging Zuma’s chances to be re-elected into office and in September 2011. The South African National Congress (ANC) Secretary General accused ZANU-PF of influencing the thinking and actions of Julius Malema. In 2012, Julius Malema personally admitted that he had acquired his motivation from Mugabe, and added that South Africa should learn from Zimbabwe when it comes to issues such as Land Reform” (Tinhu, 2013:2). Although Jacob Zuma initially had an honest intention to push for
reforms in Zimbabwe, he was overcame by Mugabe to an extent which threatened his re-election prospects, and accordingly, he withdrew from his tough standpoint in dealing with Mugabe.

3.9 Conclusion

In a nutshell, the SADC mediation process in Zimbabwe faced was weak, flawed and ineffective as faced international criticism due to its failure to address political violence and the abuses of human rights. Thabo Mbeki used the quiet diplomacy as mediation strategy which ignored factors that would jeopardize the implementation of the GPA and focused on the power sharing between the conflicting parties and thus it provided a short term solution. When Jacob Zuma took over from Thabo Mbeki he had intentions of bringing about reform in Zimbabwe but was however intimidated by the ZANU-PF and President Mugabe as they openly supported his opponent Julius Malema and hence he had to withdraw from being tough on President Robert Mugabe. The GPA had inherent problems which affected its efficacy in bringing about stability in the country. The main inherent problem was its failure to address the security sector. Conflicting parties had to monitor themselves through the JOMIC without SADC supervision and this undermined the effectiveness of the GPA. It became sensible to say that the mediation process of SADC although it led to the creation of the GNU, it had inherent problems which affected its efficacy. The study recommends the use of transformative mediation on the grounds that it has the potential to substantively transform crisis in a country into lasting peace and stability. There are essential elements that characterize transformative mediation which can change SADC’s role in mediating a long-term solution on member states. These elements include, giving control of the mediation process to all parties in the dispute, supporting parties’ expression, exploration of differences and proactively supporting parties’ shifts towards empowerment and recognition.
CHAPTER 4 THE ZIMBABWE CRISIS AFTER THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the crisis in Zimbabwe after the GNU in 2009. The researcher assesses the performance of the GNU politically, economically and socially from the period of 2009 up to 2013. The chapter also assess the conduction of the 2013 elections as well as the performance of the newly elected government in bid to ascertain whether it managed to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. In order to achieve this the researcher assesses the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe from 2013 up to the period of 2016. The chapter also explores the attitude of the SADC at the aftermath of the GNU.

4.2 Political Crisis

The GNU managed to bring about stability in the politics in Zimbabwe. Although the political parties had consensus problems in making decisions. The terms of the GPA guided the political parties in Zimbabwe and they were able to put their differences aside as they worked together in bringing about development in Zimbabwe. The GNU led to the conduction of the 2013 elections which according to SADC Observer Mission (2013), were free and peaceful. SADC Observer Mission (2013), further states that, the elections of 2013 indicated a paradigm shift in the politics of Zimbabwe. That is, there was great change in the manner in which these elections were conducted.

According to SADC (2013), the elections were free and peaceful. It states that, the elections of 2013 were conducted in a conducive and peaceful environment. It further points out that, the contesting parties accepted and respected the outcome of the elections and there was no violence nor intimidation of any of the parties. However the SADC never used the terms free and fair when they described the election situation in 2013. They rather used fair and peaceful. The fairness of the elections was not mentioned, and thus it became clear that the 2013 elections were free and peaceful but however the extent of the fairness of the elections was questionable.

The Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) approved of the elections as free and peaceful. According to SATUCC (2013:1), “the 2013 harmonized election were largely conducted in a calm and peaceful environment compared to the 2008 election.” However,
SATUCC (2013), accepts that there were cases of intimidation of voters by political parties especially in the rural Zimbabwe. SATUCC (2013), further argues that the credibility of the 2013 elections was compromised by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and the Office of the Registrar-General of Voters who failed to release the electronic and hard copies of the voters roll to the different contesting parties until the eve of the voting day. This caused a lot of suspicions to all the interested groups and individuals. This was also against the Zimbabwe Electoral Act which states that “the ZEC shall within a reasonable period provide the voters roll to political parties and any interested groups or individuals” (SATUCC, 2013:3).

According to CZC (2013:2), “the 2013 election broke some of the principles of SADC governing elections and hence SADC’s commendation of the election was not in line with its own principles”. SADC principles and guidelines state that all citizens should enjoy freedom of movement, assembly and expression as well as political tolerance. However in Zimbabwe this was not the case as the freedom to assembly and associate were hindered by the Public Order and Security Act which regularly banned political gatherings. The unfairness of this Act was that it only applied to the opposition parties as they were denied enough opportunity to conduct their political campaigns to the Zimbabwean masses yet the ZANU-PF party conducted political campaigns throughout the country. More so, the CZC (2013), further states that on freedom of speech, the Public Order and Security Act stifled the right of access to information. The government used these Acts to ban newspapers and prevent foreign journalists from reporting and observing the elections (CZC, 2013).

More so, SADC’s guidelines and principles governing democratic elections state that there should be full participation of the citizens in the political process. However this was not the case in the 2013 election as the voter registration exercise closed on the 9th of July 2013 leaving thousands of prospective first-time voters unregistered(CZC, 2013). The CZC (2013), further argues that there was significant discrimination between rural and urban voters with more registration centers having been deployed in rural areas than in urban areas. According to CZC (2013:4), “the analysis of the voters roll identified a significant disparity with registration in urban wards at 67.94% and those in rural wards at 99.97%”.

In light of the above, SATUCC (2013), argues that the readiness of ZEC to conduct free and fair elections was uncertain as reflected in the several shortcomings in the preparations for the polls
and during the polling day. This concern was also expressed by the AU as well as the SADC. SATUCC (2013:4) states that “the Extra Ordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government held in Maputo on 15 June 2013, while acknowledging the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe on the election date, agreed on the need for the government of Zimbabwe to engage the Constitutional Court to seek more time beyond 31 July 2013 deadline for holding the Zambian elections”. The Summit in Maputo “further urged the three parties of the GNU to undertake immediate measures to create a conducive environment for the holding of peaceful, credible, free and fair elections” (SATUCC, 2013:5). However, despite concerns articulated by the AU and the SADC, the election date remained unchanged as determined by the Constitutional Court. In light of the above, the researcher observed that the elections of 2013 were not free and fair but the ZANU-PF party won the elections.

Instead of focusing on reducing poverty and boasting economic growth in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF led government after the 2013 elections began to focus on power struggles within the party and this caused factions, distrust and disunity within the party. The Former Vice-President Joyce Mujuru created the opposition Zimbabwe People First Party (Dixon, 2016). More so, according to Dixon (2016), such actions worsened the crisis in Zimbabwe since the funds which were meant for development projects were diverted to party campaigns. These factions within the ZANU-PF party further also caused political instability in the country.

Putting into consideration the above factors, the researcher observed that after the 2013 elections, intra-party disputes also emerged in the opposition parties in Zimbabwe (Dixon, 2016). These intra-party disputes led to factionalism in the opposition parties leading to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M) and the Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube (MDC-N), led by secretary-general Welshman Ncube. Other parties that were formed through splits from MDC include MDC Renewal Team, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Renewal Democrats in Zimbabwe (Dixon, 2016). This reduced the strength and support base of the MDC party as a whole and people in Zimbabwe began to lose confidence in the Movement for Democratic change. Dixon (2016), points out that despite these factional parties there were also other minor opposition parties like the Freedom Party, Transform Zimbabwe (TZ), United Parties, and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). It became evident that Zimbabwe after the 2013
elections had a pool of opposition parties with different agendas and this caused the continuity of political instability in the country which undermined the development of Zimbabwe (Dixon, 2016).

Furthermore, in 2016 many political protests occurred such as the Beat the Pot protest which took place in Bulawayo and was led by women in partnership with non-governmental organizations such as Women of Zimbabwe Arise (Kadirire, 2016). These women were protesting because of the economic decline in Zimbabwe and how it had negatively impacted on them. Instead of addressing the women’s grievances the government set the riot police to dismiss them. Kadirire (2016), further states that there was also the Tajamuka campaign which was very active in social media which mobilized the youths against the ZANU PF led government. This was because in their 2013 campaign, the ZANU-PF had pledged that the government would create 2.2 million jobs. However the continually worsening outlook on employment led to this being a prominent factor in the mass protests. There was also the This Flag campaign which was also active on social media. This campaign was led by Pastor Mawarire who mobilized the youths against the ZANU-PF government because of the unfulfilled promises that the government had made in their 2013 political campaigns. In 2016 there were also protests at the Beit bridge boarder due to the import banes on certain commodities by the government (Kadirire, 2016). Instead of addressing these problems the Government responded by sending the police as well as the army dismiss people without addressing the problem. People began to be frustrated and angry and this led to violence as they were now fighting the police and the army. Teargases were also used during the process and many people were injured (Kadirire, 2016). As a result of all these protests it became clear that crisis in Zimbabwe worsened after the ZANU-PF party won the elections in 2013. The GNU only managed to stabilize the situation but the crisis however resurfaced after the 2013 elections.

4.3 Economic Crisis

To begin with, according to Noko (2011), the creation of the GNU restored the trust and confidence in the Zimbabwean economy. Political instability before the GNU in Zimbabwe had scared way investors and they had closed down their businesses. Investors moved to neighboring countries stating that the environment in Zimbabwe was risky for business. However when the political parties came together and formed the GNU in 2009, it restored and revived the trust and
confidence in the economy. This was achieved through the removal of poor policies centered on export surrender requirements, excessive protectionism and price controls. A more positive attitude towards wealth creation was portrayed and this in turn encouraged investments. Businesses that had shut down re-opened, struggling companies revived themselves, and production increased. The increase in capacity utilization from 4% to 60% between January and December 2009, as well as much higher tax compliance, largely reflected confidence in the government and the reforms undertaken (Karombo, 2016). However, through interviews that the researcher conducted at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in Bulawayo province, the researcher gathered that, the poor policies such as the Indigenization policy of the 49% vs 51% of ownership which was not removed affected the economic situation in the sense that many foreign countries became reluctant in investing in the Zimbabwean economy due to fear of having their companies nationalized.

More so, according to Noko (2011), the creation of GNU which he refers to as the “marriage of convenience” brought about change and stability in the economy of Zimbabwe. This was because after the creation of the GNU the country adopted the multi-currency system which formalized the use of the US dollar, the South African rand as well as the Pula as legal tender in Zimbabwe and this made it possible for the country to curb inflation. However the country experienced liquidity problems which resulted in cash crisis and this impacted negatively on the economy. According to Karombo (2016), the money which was in circulation in Zimbabwe was less and banks did not have enough money to give to people. The cash crisis affected savings and loans as banks were no longer able to issue out big loans to businesses. Banks could only lend money to small businesses, such as grocery stores, as opposed to needed loans for modernizing or reviving industries (Karombo, 2016). This affected the economic development of Zimbabwe as big companies could not borrow money for running their businesses. Furthermore, the multi-currency system had its flows since the US dollar did not have small denominations. This affected business as well as the ordinary people in the country. Prices of goods were raised as a way to avoid the change problems especially on retailers. This was the reason why the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe resorted to issuing bond coins in 2014 as a way to address the cash crisis in Zimbabwe. In 2016 the government also introduced the bond notes which were equivalent to the US dollar but only functioned within the Zimbabwean borders (Karombo, 2016).
More so, according to the Zimbabwe Corruption Report (2016), corruption, lack of transparency and accountability caused the continuity of the Zambian crisis after the creation of the GNU. The report further states that the mining sector which is the back bone of the economy was affected by corruption and suffered from a lack of transparency and proper regulation. The report further, states that Zimbabwe is a major producer of diamonds, largely through companies in which the state has a stake, yet no meaningful revenues were remitted to Treasury. The report further states that Zimbabwe needed to develop a sound mining policy to properly leverage its mineral resources (Zimbabwe Corruption Report, 2016). In light of the above, it came to light that the crisis in Zimbabwe continued because of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability in economic sectors like the mining sector which were supposed to play a pivotal role in reviving the economy of the country.

Mackenzie (2013), further states that when the political parties formed the GNU the country had external debt. This debt had made it difficult for the country to revive its economy. However, the GNU working closely with the Ministry of Finance crafted a new economic blueprint, the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) that was to be the roadmap, the plan that would set the direction of the new government in terms of economic development (Tinhu, 2013). When the researcher was at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce she was further referred to the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) where she gathered information that, through the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), the Prime Minister and other government officials setup meetings with the western countries and financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the African Development bank for financial assistance and due to the sound and progressive newly established economic policies the World Bank and IMF revised their decision of banning the lending of money to the Zambian government.

It is against this background that the researcher observed that, although the GNU stabilized the economic situation in Zimbabwe, corruption, lack of transparency, lack of accountability and liquidity problems led to the continuation of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe.

4.4 Social Crisis

Tinhu (2013), argues that the GNU government managed to boast the social service delivery in Zimbabwe as it managed to revive the health sector which had been greatly affected by the Zambian crisis. The GNU also managed to normalize the vaccination ratios for children.
which had declined during the crisis. The GNU also managed to lower maternity and infant mortality rates in Zimbabwe and by 2012, the Ministry of Health was able to scrap maternal fees in public hospitals. More so, by 2012 the government had managed to increase access to both medical and education services (Kadirire, 2016).

Furthermore, Masunungure (2010), also articulates that before the Government of National Unity, hospital buildings were crumbling and there were devastating shortages of drugs. However in 2010, the government included the Health Infrastructure Financing (HIF) in the national budget and the money was aimed at reviving hospitals. The government could not revive all the hospitals at once and hence they resorted to injecting money in one hospital at a time starting with the Harare hospital, followed by Mpilo hospital in Bulawayo. The government successfully used this targeted approach to public sector investment (Masunungure, 2010). After the 2013 elections when the ZANU-PF was voted into power, the social services sector started to deteriorate. Funds which were supposed to be injected in these social services such as health and education were diverted for political campaigns.

Moreover, according to McKenzie (2013:1), “after the GNU the country continued to face severe humanitarian crisis as the citizens of Zimbabwe’s major cities did not have enough clean water”. The responses that the researcher got from the Ministry of health and Child Welfare further revealed that the shortage of clean water resulted in outbreaks of typhoid, diarrhea, and other illnesses. The researcher also gathered that residents of Bulawayo and the rest of the country continued not to have reliable running clean water for years. The Bulawayo city required 1.6 million cubic meters of water every day, but only half was being treated. Moreover, the city’s raw sewage was pumped into the same dams and rivers that supplied water and created a dangerous and dirty loop. As a way to cope under such circumstances, the people of Bulawayo resorted to drilling boreholes and this resulted in lowering the water tables.

More so, according to Tinhu (2013), on infrastructural development, the GNU was financially assisted by the Development Bank of Southern Africa which provided US$262 million to rehabilitate the 500km stretch of the road from Plumtree border Post to Forbes border post, linking six of Zimbabwe’s biggest cities including Harare and Bulawayo. Rural district councils were supplied with equipment to maintain the gravel roads that make up 85% of the country’s 88,000km of roads. Work on the dualisation of a 73km stretch of road linking Harare to
Marondera was financed through the government budget (Tinhu, 2013). The runway at Harare’s international airport was repaved and old projects started years earlier by the previous government, including the Joshua Nkomo Airport in Bulawayo, were completed. However after the 2013 elections such development seized and this was due to corruption within the government. According to Karombo (2016), by 2015 most roads were filled with potholes and these potholes caused road accidents that killed many people.

In light of the above, it became very clear that the crisis in Zimbabwe did not end after the GNU. It can only be stated that the GNU stabilized the situation from the period of its creation in 2009 up to 2013 but however after the 2013 elections the situation slowly but surely went back to what it was before the creation of the GNU.

4.5 The Attitude of SADC to the Zimbabwean Crisis in the Aftermath of the Government of National Unity.

According to Tinhu (2013), the SADC after the implementation of the GNU wanted to see Zimbabwe transform into a peaceful state. This is because SADC continued to monitor events in Zimbabwe as the mediator Jacob Zuma continued to visit the country to check if there is progress. This is supported by the fact that the political parties in Zimbabwe were able to draft a constitution which was accepted by the political parties although there disagreements in certain parts of the constitution. Tinhu (2013), further states that the SADC continued to guide the signatories of the GNU into creating an environment that is peaceful and conducive for conducting free and fair elections in Zimbabwe. Through such positive attitude by the SADC Zimbabwe was able to conduct elections in 2013 which were free and fair.

After the 2013 elections the SADC officially announced that it had done its part as it had managed to guide the Zimbabwean political parties into conducting free and fair elections. The SADC monitoring team endorsed the elections of 2013 as they declared that they were free and fair. According to SATUCC (2013), SADC observer mission stated that the elections in Zimbabwe had shown a paradigm shift from what had been happening in the past years. This shows that SADC through the elections of 2013 rested its case in Zimbabwe.

However, Karombo (2016), argues that the SADC ignored the violations of human rights on the aftermath of the GNU in Zimbabwe. This is because SADC has protected the image of the
president of the ruling party at the expense of the Zimbabwean masses. People in Zimbabwe were denied the rights to protest against the unfulfilled promises of the ruling party ZANU- PF as the ruling party sent the army and the police to attack and dismiss people. The people of Zimbabwe have been denied freedom of expression. The SADC ignored these unjust actions by the ruling party in Zimbabwe. Hence it shows that the attitude of the SADC toward Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the GNU was negative as the economic decline regional body ignored suffering of the Zimbabwean masses (Karombo, 2016).

4.6 Conclusion

In a nutshell, it can be noted that the crisis in Zimbabwe did not end after the creation of the GNU. The situation was stabilized during the period of 2009 and 2013 as the country seemed to be progressing from a crisis situation. However after the 2013 elections when the ZANU-PF party won, conditions slowly started to deteriorate from where they were. Subsequently, the crisis continued despite the restoration of the political and economic confidence by GNU. The SADC as the regional body endorsed the 2013 elections as free and peaceful despite being conducted against its principles and guidelines hence this worsened the situation of a country in a crisis. Consequently, the researcher has concluded that SADC was not effective in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. The delay and lack of consensus affected the efficacy of the regional body in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. The study concludes that even though there are many factors that affected the effectiveness of the regional body, the brotherhood approach that was used by Thabo Mbeki toward Mugabe was the major obstacle towards bringing about peace and security in Zimbabwe. At the aftermath of the GNU the SADC ignored the violations of human rights which continued to exist in Zimbabwe as people were denied to protest about the government’s unfulfilled promises.
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APPENDICIES

The Global Political Agreement Document of 2008


AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION-PATRIOTIC FRONT (ZANU-PF) AND THE TWO MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) FORMATIONS, ON RESOLVING THE CHALLENGES FACING ZIMBABWE

PREAMBLE

We, the Parties to this Agreement;

CONCERNED about the recent challenges that we have faced as a country and the multiple threats to the well-being of our people and, therefore, determined to resolve these permanently.

CONSIDERING our shared determination to uphold, defend and sustain Zimbabwe's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity, as a respected member of the international community, a nation where all citizens respect and, therefore, enjoy equal protection of the law and have equal opportunity to compete and prosper in all spheres of life.

ACKNOWLEDGING the sacrifices made by thousands of Zimbabwe's gallant sons and daughters in the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination and determined to accept, cherish and recognise the significance of the Liberation Struggle as the foundation of our sovereign independence, freedoms and human rights.

DEDICATING ourselves to putting an end to the polarisation, divisions, conflict and intolerance that has characterised Zimbabwean politics and society in recent times.

COMMITTING ourselves to putting our people and our country first by arresting the fall in living standards and reversing the decline of our economy.

EMPHASISING our shared commitment to re-orient our attitudes towards respect for the Constitution and all national laws, the rule of law, observance of Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols and national events.

RESPECTING the rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events freely without let or hindrance.

RECOGNISING, accepting and acknowledging that the values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all persons without regard to race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, place of origin or birth are the bedrock of our democracy and good governance.

DETERMINED to build a society free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality.

RECOGNISING and accepting that the Land Question has been at the core of the contestation in Zimbabwe and acknowledging the centrality of issues relating to the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and governance.

COMMITTED to act in a manner that demonstrates loyalty to Zimbabwe, patriotism and commitment to Zimbabwe's national purpose, core values, interests and aspirations.

DETERMINED to act in a manner that demonstrates respect for the democratic values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, respect of all persons and human rights.
SUBMITTING ourselves to the mandate of the Extraordinary Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 29th March 2007 and endorsed in Lusaka on 12th April 2008 and in the AU Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt from 30th June to 1 July 2008.

RECOGNISING the centrality and importance of African institutions in dealing with African problems, we agreed to seek solutions to our differences, challenges and problems through dialogue.

ACKNOWLEDGING that pursuant to the Dar-es-Salaam SADC resolution, the Parties negotiated and agreed on a draft Constitution, initialed by the Parties on 30 September 2007, and further agreed and cosponsored the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 18 Act, amendments to the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services Act.

APPRECIATING the historical obligation and need to reach a solution that will allow us to put Zimbabwe first and give the people a genuine chance of rebuilding and reconstructing their livelihoods.

PURSUANT to the common desire of working together, the Parties agreed to and executed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 July 2008, attached hereto as Annexure "A".

NOW THEREFORE AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
1. Definitions

The "Agreement" shall mean this written Agreement signed by the representatives of ZANU-PF and the MDC, in its two formations ("the Parties") in fulfillment of the material mandate handed down by the SADC Extraordinary Summit on 29th March 2007 and endorsed by SADC in Lusaka, Zambia and adopted by the African Union Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. The "Parties" shall mean ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively. The "Government" or "New Government" means the new Government to be set up in terms of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT
2. Declaration of Commitment

The Parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country.

ARTICLE III
RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH
3. Economic recovery

3.1 The Parties agree:

(a) To give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the process of developing and implementing an economic recovery strategy and plan. To that end, the parties are
committed to working together on a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy, which will urgently address the issues of production, food security, poverty and unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.

(b) To create conditions that would ensure that the 2008/2009 agricultural season is productive.

(c) To establish a National Economic Council, composed of representatives of the Parties and of the following sectors:

(i) Manufacturing
(ii) Agriculture
(iii) Mining
(iv) Tourism
(v) Commerce
(vi) Financial
(vii) Labour
(viii) Academia; and
(ix) Other relevant sectors

(d) That the terms of reference of the Council shall include giving advice to Government, formulating economic plans and programmes for approval by government and such other functions as are assigned to the Council by the Government.

(e) To endorse the SADC resolution on the economy.

ARTICLE IV
SANCTIONS AND MEASURES

4. Sanctions and Measures

4.1 Recognising and acknowledging that some sections of the international community have since 2000 imposed various sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe, which have included targeted sanctions.

4.2 The Parties note the present economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other sections of the International Community over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme.

4.3 Noting and acknowledging the following sanctions and measures imposed on Zimbabwe:-

(a) Enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by the United States of America Congress which outlaws Zimbabwe's right to access credit from International Financial Institutions in which the United States Government is represented or has a stake;

(b) Suspension of Zimbabwe's voting and related rights, suspension of balance of payment support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund resources and suspension of technical assistance to Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund;

(c) Suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to Zimbabwe by The World Bank; and
(d) Imposition of targeted travel bans against current Government and some business leaders.

4.4 Noting that this international isolation has over the years created a negative international perception of Zimbabwe and thereby resulting in the further isolation of the country by the non-availing of lines of credit to Zimbabwe by some sections of the international community.

4.5 Recognizing the consequent contribution of this isolation to the further decline of the economy.

4.6 Desirous and committed to bringing to an end the fall in the standards of living of our people, the Parties hereby agree:

(a) to endorse the SADC resolution on sanctions concerning Zimbabwe;

(b) that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe; and

(c) commit themselves to working together in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country's international isolation.

ARTICLE V

LAND QUESTION

5. Land Question

5.1 Recognising that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during the colonial conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post independence period were not only unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity and justice.

5.2 Noting that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to win one man one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need for the re-distribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was at the core of the liberation struggle.

5.3 Accepting the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme in Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and injustices in order to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice.

5.4 While differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the parties acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has taken place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000.

5.5 Accepting the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution.

5.6 Noting that in the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and further in the Draft Constitution agreed to by the parties the primary obligation of compensating former land owners for land acquired rests on the former colonial power.

5.7 Further recognising the need to ensure that all land is used productively in the interests of all the people of Zimbabwe.

5.8 Recognising the need for women's access and control over land in their own right as equal citizens.

5.9 The Parties hereby agree to:

(a) conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during the tenure of the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships.

(b) ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and who apply for it shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation;
(c) ensure security of tenure to all land holders.

(d) call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former land owners for resettlement;

(e) work together to secure international support and finance for the land reform programme in terms of compensation for the former land owners and support for new farmers; and

(f) work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land.

ARTICLE VI

CONSTITUTION

6. Constitution

Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves;

Aware that the process of making this constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and democratic;

Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe;

Acknowledging the draft Constitution that the Parties signed and agreed to in Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, annexed hereto as Annexure "B";

Determined to create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves; and

Mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women.

6.1 The Parties hereby agree:

(a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of the Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows:

(i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to assist the Select Committee in performing its mandate herein;

(ii) to hold such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the process of public consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe;

(iii) to convene an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their representation in the subcommittees referred to above and such related matters as may assist the committee in its work;

(iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference; and

(v) to report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New Constitution for Zimbabwe

(b) that the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be submitted to a referendum;

(c) that, in implementing the above, the following time frames shall apply:
(i) the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception of a new government;

(ii) the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 months of the date of the appointment of the Select Committee;

(iii) the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 4 months of the date of the first All Stakeholders Conference;

(iv) the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the public consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference;

(v) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference;

(vi) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and the debate concluded within one month;

(vii) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of a referendum;

(viii) a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the conclusion of the debate;

(ix) in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall be gazetted within 1 month of the date of the referendum; and

(x) the draft Constitution shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month after the expiration of the period of 30 days from the date of its gazetting.

ARTICLE VII

PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY

7. Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity

7.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government:

a) will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all;

b) will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions;

c) shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post independence political conflicts; and

d) will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation.

e) will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel.

ARTICLE VIII

RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EVENTS

8. Respect for National Institutions and Events
8.1 In the interests of forging a common vision for our country, the Parties hereby agree:

(a) on the necessity of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion to respect and observe Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols, national programmes and events; and

(b) that all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion have the right to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events without let or hindrance.

ARTICLE IX
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

9. External Interference

9.1 The Parties reaffirm the principle of the United Nations Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries.

9.2 The Parties hereby agree:

(a) that the responsibility of effecting change of government in Zimbabwe vests exclusively on and is the sole prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe through peaceful, democratic and constitutional means;

(b) to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of changing governments; and

(c) that no outsiders have a right to call or campaign for regime change in Zimbabwe.

ARTICLE X
FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

10. Free political activity

Recognising that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the cornerstone of any multiparty democratic system, the Parties have agreed that there should be free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political parties are able to propagate their views and canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation.

ARTICLE XI
RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS

11. Rule of law, respect for the Constitution and other laws

11.1 The Parties hereby agree that it is the duty of all political parties and individuals to:

(a) respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land;

(b) adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law.

ARTICLE XII
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

12. Freedoms of Assembly and Association

12.1 Recognising the importance of the freedoms of assembly and association in a multi-party democracy and noting that public meetings have to be conducted in a free, peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the law, the Parties have agreed:
(a) to work together in a manner which guarantees the full implementation and realisation of the right to freedom of association and assembly; and

(b) that the Government shall undertake training programmes, workshops and meetings for the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the appreciation of the right of freedom of assembly and association and the proper interpretation, understanding and application of the provisions of security legislation.

ARTICLE XIII

STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS

13. State organs and institutions

13.1 State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties.

13.2 For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform their duties ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and requirements of a multi-party democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the Parties have agreed that the following steps be taken:-

(a) that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system;

(b) ensuring that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles of the Rule of Law and remain non-partisan and impartial;

(c) laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or favour; and

(d) recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures that no political or other form of favouritism is practised.

ARTICLE XIV

TRADITIONAL LEADERS

14. Traditional Leaders

14.1 Recognising and acknowledging that traditional leaders are community leaders with equal responsibilities and obligations to all members of their communities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and political affiliation, the Parties hereby agree to:-

(a) commit themselves to ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders; and

(b) call upon traditional leaders not to engage in partisan political activities at national level as well as in their communities.

ARTICLE XV

NATIONAL YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME

15. National Youth Training Programme

Recognising the desirability of a national youth training programme which inculcates the values of patriotism, discipline, tolerance, non-violence, openness, democracy, equality, justice and respect.
Determined to ensure that the National Youth Training Programme raises awareness of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, engenders a spirit of community service, skills development and a commitment to the development of Zimbabwe

15.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

(a) all youths regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and political affiliation are eligible to participate in national youth training programmes;

(b) the National Youth Training Programme must be run in a non-partisan manner and shall not include partisan political material advancing the cause of any political party; and

(c) while recognising that youths undergoing training at national youth training centres have a right to hold political opinions, they shall not, during the period of their training, collectively and as part of a scheme of the training centre be used or deployed for partisan political work.

ARTICLE XVI

HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE

16. Humanitarian and food assistance

16.1 In times of need, every Zimbabwean regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion is entitled to request and receive humanitarian and food assistance from the State.

16.2 It is the primary responsibility of the State to ensure that every Zimbabwean who needs humanitarian and food assistance receives it.

16.3 Non-Governmental Organisations involved in giving humanitarian and food assistance shall do so without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion and in doing so, shall not promote or advance the interests of any political party or cause.

16.4 In this regard the Parties hereby agree:

(a) that in the fulfillment of its obligations above, the Government and all State Institutions and quasi State Institutions shall render humanitarian and food assistance without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation or religion;

(b) that humanitarian interventions rendered by Non-Governmental Organisations, shall be provided without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion.

(c) that all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food assistance to enable them to return and settle in their original homes and that social welfare organisations shall be allowed to render such assistance as might be required.

(d) that all NGO’s rendering humanitarian and food assistance must operate within the confines of the laws of Zimbabwe.

ARTICLE XVII

LEGISLATIVE AGENDA PRIORITIES

17. Legislative agenda

17.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

(a) the legislative agenda will be prioritized in order to reflect the letter and spirit of this agreement;
(b) the Government will discuss and agree on further legislative measures which may become necessary to implement the Government's agreed policies and in particular, with a view to entrenching democratic values and practices.

ARTICLE XVIII

SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

18. Security of persons and prevention of violence

18.1 Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends.

18.2 Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the election of March 29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence.

18.3 Recognising that violence dehumanises and engenders feelings of hatred and polarisation within the country.

18.4 Further recognising that violence undermines our collective independence as a people and our capacity to exercise our free will in making political choices.

18.5 The Parties hereby agree:

(a) to promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non-violence and dialogue as means of resolving political differences;

(b) to renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends;

(c) that the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book;

(d) that all political parties, other organisations and their leaders shall commit themselves to do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political violence, including by non-State actors and shall consistently appeal to their members to desist from violence;

(e) to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are not engaged in the perpetration of violence.

(f) that all civil society organisations of whatever description whether affiliated to a political party or not shall not promote or advocate for or use violence or any other form of intimidation or coercion to canvass or mobilise for or oppose any political party or to achieve any political end;

(g) to work together to ensure the security of all persons and property;

(h) to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons, their safe return home and their enjoyment of the full protection of the law.

(i) to refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or unfairly undermine each other.

(j) that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the principles of the rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the determination as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons accused of politically related offences arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 elections.
ARTICLE XIX

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION

19. Freedom of Expression and Communication

Recognising the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the role of the media in a multi-party democracy.

Noting that while the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act permit the issuance of licences, no licences other than to the public broadcaster have been issued.

Aware of the emergence of foreign based radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe, some of which are funded by foreign governments.

Concerned that the failure to issue licences under the Broadcasting Services Act to alternative broadcasters might have given rise to external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe.

Further concerned that foreign government funded external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe are not in Zimbabwe’s national interest.

Desirous of ensuring the opening up of the air waves and ensuring the operation of as many media houses as possible.

19.1 The Parties hereby agree:-

(a) that the government shall ensure the immediate processing by the appropriate authorities of all applications for registration and registration in terms of both the Broadcasting Services Act as well as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act;

(b) all Zimbabwean nationals including those currently working for or running external radio stations be encouraged to make applications for broadcasting licences, in Zimbabwe, in terms of the law;

(c) that in recognition of the open media environment anticipated by this Agreement, the Parties hereby:-

(i) call upon the governments that are hosting and/or funding external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting and funding; and

(ii) encourage the Zimbabweans running or working for external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe; and

(d) that steps be taken to ensure that the public media provides balanced and fair coverage to all political parties for their legitimate political activities.

(e) that the public and private media shall refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or that unfairly undermines political parties and other organisations. To this end, the inclusive government shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to achieve this objective.

ARTICLE XX

FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT

20. Framework for a new Government

Acknowledging that we have an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government;
Accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise;

Recognising that the formation of such a Government would demonstrate the respect of the Parties for the deeply-felt and immediate hopes and aspirations of the millions of our people.

Determined to carry out sustained work to create the conditions for returning our country to stability and prosperity;

Acknowledging the need for gender parity, particularly the need to appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts;

20.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

20.1.1 Executive Powers and Authority

The Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in this Constitution and legislation.

The President of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.

The Prime Minister of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.

The Cabinet of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.

In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have regard to the principles and spirit underlying the formation of the Inclusive Government and accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion both inside and outside government.

20.1.2 The Cabinet

(a) shall have the responsibility to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the consequential programmes;

(b) shall, subject to approval by Parliament, allocate the financial resources for the implementation of such policies and programmes;

(c) shall have the responsibility to prepare and present to Parliament, all such legislation and other instruments as may be necessary to implement the policies and programmes of the National Executive;

(d) shall, except where the Constitution requires ratification by Parliament, or action by the President, approve all international agreements;

(e) shall ensure that the state organs, including the Ministries and Departments, have sufficient financial and other resources and appropriate operational capacity to carry out their functions effectively; and

(f) shall take decisions by consensus, and take collective responsibility for all Cabinet decisions, including those originally initiated individually by any member of Cabinet.

(g) The President and the Prime Minister will agree on the allocation of Ministries between them for the purpose of day-to-day supervision.

20.1.3 The President

(a) chairs Cabinet;

(b) exercises executive authority;

(c) shall exercise his/her powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution;
(d) can, subject to the Constitution, declare war and make peace;

(e) can, subject to the Constitution, proclaim and terminate martial law;

(f) confers honours and precedence, on the advice of Cabinet;

(g) grants pardons, respites, substitutes less severe punishment and suspends or remits sentences, on the advice of Cabinet;

(h) chairs the National Security Council;

(i) formally appoints the Vice Presidents;

(j) shall, pursuant to this Agreement, appoint the Prime Minister pending the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the Parties;

(k) formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in accordance with this agreement;

(l) after consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers, allocates Ministerial portfolios in accordance with this Agreement;

(m) accredits, receives and recognizes diplomatic agents and consular officers;

(n) appoints independent Constitutional Commissions in terms of the Constitution;

(o) appoints service/executive Commissions in terms of the Constitution and in consultation with the Prime Minister;

(p) in consultation with the Prime Minister, makes key appointments the President is required to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament;

(q) may, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister, dissolve Parliament;

(r) must be kept fully informed by the Prime Minister on the general conduct of the government business and;

(s) shall be furnished with such information as he/she may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the government, and may advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet in this regard.

20.1.4 The Prime Minister

(a) chairs the Council of Ministers and is the Deputy Chairperson of Cabinet;

(b) exercises executive authority;

(c) shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet;

(d) shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of government;

(e) shall ensure that the Ministers develop appropriate implementation plans to give effect to the policies decided by Cabinet: in this regard, the Ministers will report to the Prime Minister on all issues relating to the implementation of such policies and plans;

(f) shall ensure that the legislation necessary to enable the government to carry out its functions is in place: in this regard, he/she shall have the responsibility to discharge the functions of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament;
(g) shall be a member of the National Security Council;

(h) may be assigned such additional functions as are necessary further to enhance the work of the Inclusive Government;

(i) shall, to ensure the effective execution of these tasks, be assisted by Deputy Prime Ministers; and

(j) shall report regularly to the President and Parliament.

20.1.5 Council of Ministers

To ensure that the Prime Minister properly discharges his responsibility to oversee the implementation of the work of government, there shall be a Council of Ministers consisting of all the Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, whose functions shall be:

(a) to assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions;

(b) to assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the government;

(c) to enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet Committees;

(d) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet decisions;

(e) to receive and consider reports from the Committee responsible for the periodic review mechanism; and

(f) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters related to the periodic review mechanism.

20.1.6 Composition of the Executive

(1) There shall be a President, which Office shall continue to be occupied by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe.

(2) There shall be two (2) Vice Presidents, who will be nominated by the President and/or Zanu-PF.

(3) There shall be a Prime Minister, which Office shall be occupied by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai.

(4) There shall be two (2) Deputy Prime Ministers, one (1) from MDC-T and one (1) from the MDC-M.

(5) There shall be thirty-one (31) Ministers, with fifteen (15) nominated by ZANU PF, thirteen (13) by MDC-T and three (3) by MDC-M. Of the 31 Ministers, three (3) one each per Party, may be appointed from outside the members of Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so appointed shall become members of the House of Assembly and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote.

(6) There shall be fifteen (15) Deputy Ministers, with (eight) 8 nominated by ZANU PF, six (6) by MDC-T and one (1) by MDC-M.

(7) Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after consultation among the leaders of all the political parties participating in the Inclusive Government.

20.1.7 Senate

(a) The President shall, in his discretion, appoint five (5) persons to the existing positions of Presidential senatorial appointments.

(b) There shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, which shall be filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M.
20.1.8 Filling of vacancies

(a) In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 20.1.7(b) above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising.

ARTICLE XXI

ELECTORAL VACANCIES

21. Electoral Vacancies

Aware of the divisive and often times confrontational nature of elections and by elections;

Noting the need to allow this agreement to take root amongst the parties and people of Zimbabwe; and Cognisant of the need to give our people some breathing space and a healing period;

21.1 The Parties hereby agree that for a period of 12 months from the date of signing of this agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local authority or parliamentary seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall be entitled to nominate and field a candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying with the rules governing its internal democracy.

ARTICLE XXII

IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

22. Implementation mechanisms

22.1 To ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this Agreement, the Parties hereby constitute a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (“JOMIC”) to be composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and four senior members from each of the two MDC Formations. Gender consideration must be taken into account in relation to the composition of JOMIC.

22.2 The committee shall be co-chaired by persons from the Parties.

22.3 The committee shall have the following functions:-

(a) to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement;

(b) to assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of this Agreement in its entirety;

(c) to receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the implementation, enforcement and execution of this Agreement;

(d) to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the parties; and

(e) to promote continuing dialogue between the Parties.

22.4 JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC and to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary for the fulfillment of this Agreement.

22.5 The new Government shall ensure that steps are taken to make the security forces conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws of Zimbabwe including laws relating to public order and security.
22.6 The implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU.

22.7 The Parties and the new Government shall seek the support and assistance of SADC and the AU in mobilizing the international community to support the new Government's economic recovery plans and programmes together with the lifting of sanctions taken against Zimbabwe and some of its leaders.

22.8 The Parties agree that they shall cause Parliament to amend any legislation to the extent necessary to bring this agreement into full force.

ARTICLE XXIII

PERIODIC REVIEW MECHANISM

23. Periodic review mechanism

23.1 Having regard to the Objectives and Priorities of the New Government as set out in this Agreement, the Parties hereby agree that:

(a) they shall constitute a committee composed of 2 representatives each to review on an annual basis progress on the implementation and achievement of the priorities and objectives set out in this Agreement, namely: Economic (restoration of economic stability and growth, sanctions, land question) Political (new constitution, promotion of equality, national healing and cohesion and unity, external interference, free political activity, rule of law, state organs and institutions, legislative agenda and priorities) Security (security of persons and prevention of violence) and Communication (media and external radio stations); and

(b) the committee shall make recommendations to the Parties and the new government on any matters relating to this Agreement, more particularly on measures and programmes that may be necessary to take and make to realise full implementation of this Agreement.

(c) this Agreement and the relationship agreed to hereunder will be reviewed at the conclusion of the constitution-making process.

23.2 The Parties will continually review the effectiveness and any other matter relating to the functioning of the Inclusive Government established by the Constitution in consultation with the Guarantors.

ARTICLE XXIV

INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

24. Interim Constitutional amendments

The Parties hereby agree:

24.1 that the constitutional amendments which are necessary for the implementation of this agreement shall be passed by parliament and assented to by the President as Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 19. The Parties undertake to unconditionally support the enactment of the said Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No 19; 24.2 to include in Constitutional Amendment No19 the provisions contained in Chapters 4 and 13, and section 121 of the draft Constitution that the Parties executed at Kariba on 30 September 2007 (Kariba draft).

ARTICLE XXV

COMMENCEMENT

25. Commencement
This Agreement shall enter into force upon its signature by the Parties.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have signed this Agreement in the English language, in six identical copies, all texts being equally authentic:

DONE AT HARARE, ON THIS 15th DAY OF September 2008

ROBERT G MUGABE
PRESIDENT, ZANU-PF

MORGAN R TSVANGIRAI
PRESIDENT, MDC

ARTHUR G O MUTAMBARA
PRESIDENT, MDC

In WITNESS THEREOF the Facilitator:

THABO MBEKI
SADC FACILITATOR