THE POST-COLONIAL CHALLENGES OF NATION-BUILDING THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM 1980 TO 2016
APPROVAL FORM

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The Post-Colonial Challenges of Nation-Building Through International Engagement: An Analysis of Zimbabwe’s International Relations from 1980 to 2016

Submitted by Wenceslaus Mudyanadzo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Politics and Public Management.

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First Supervisor Date

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DECLARATION

I, Wenceslaus Mudyanadzo, hereby declare that The Post-Colonial Challenges of Nation-Building Through International Engagement: An Analysis of Zimbabwe’s International Relations from 1980 to 2016 is my own work and has never been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other university. I declare that all sources that I used or quoted which were not mine were acknowledged and well referenced in my thesis.

Signature ................................................................

Date ..............................................................
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to thank the Almighty God for taking me this far. Glory be unto God! Secondly, special thanks to my supervisors, Prof Ami Carpenter of the University of Santiego, Unites States of America and Dr Terence Mashingaidze of the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe, for their patience and expertise as they guided me throughout the supervision process. My gratitude to them is eternal. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Lilian, my wife and children-Catherine, Jacqueline, Michael, Anotidaish, Anoshamisashe and Hannah; friends and colleagues at Midlands State University for their support, encouragement and advice during the preparation of this thesis. Any errors of fact or judgement in this thesis remain my responsibility.
Zimbabwe inherited a strong, sophisticated and integrated economy on achieving independence in 1980 despite the existence of mandatory United Nations sanctions on the then Rhodesian Government. After independence, Zimbabwe went on to establish an international network of bilateral and multilateral relations with the global community which the previous racist regime of Rhodesia could not achieve. Zimbabwe was also embraced by both western and eastern bloc countries who mobilised international financial resources in the form of grants and soft loans to support post-war recovery programmes, land resettlement and redistribution, rural development, the training of the human resource base of the new nation and the provision of critical infrastructure. As a result of the international goodwill towards Zimbabwe, the country achieved modest Growth Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth rates of between 7.5% in 1980 to 2.1% in 1998. Thereafter, especially between 2000 and 2008, the country experienced unprecedented negative economic growth rates averaging -7% per annum leading to the collapse of the economy, and the general incapacity of political and social sectors of the country to support the nation. The study therefore sought to unravel the cause of the unprecedented decline of the state in economic, political and social terms between 1980 and 2016 despite the existence of multiple bilateral and multilateral relationships with the global community. Such networks were expected to boost the economy and political and social institutions through foreign direct investment, trade, tourism and development assistance initiatives but instead the state continued to decline from 1997 to 2016 except for the period during the Government of National Unity (2009-2013).

The research utilised in-depth interviews and unstructured questionnaires to collect data from policy makers, foreign policy and public policy experts and civil society groups which specialise in international relations and public policy issues. The primary sources of data collected were also supplemented by secondary sources of data. The combined theories of realism, liberalism, cognitivism, constructivism, marxism and regionalism reflected in one way or the other the behaviour pattern of Zimbabwe in the international system. The theories of realism, liberalism and regionalism were more dominant in the study. The study concluded that Zimbabwe’s international relations practices which emanated from the country’s public policies and other governance practices were largely to blame for the country’s decline from a strong state to a weak state between 1980 and 2016. The study concluded by pointing out how Zimbabwe could rebuild its international relations profile through re-engagement and policy reform.
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>Africa Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AIPPA</td>
<td>Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Arab League</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIPPRA</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
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<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CZI</td>
<td>Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>Economic Community for West African States</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLMSA</td>
<td>Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa</td>
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</table>
FLS  Frontline States
FOCAC  Forum on China-Africa Co-operation
FRELIMO  Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GISP  Governance and Institutional Strengthening Project
GNU  Government of National Unity
GOZ  Government of Zimbabwe
GPA  Global Political Agreement
G20  Group of 20 countries
G77  Group of 77 countries
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDCZ  Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe
IEEA  Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act
IFI  International Financial Institutions
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ISDSC  Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
LGBTI  Lesbians, Gays, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MERP  Millennium Economic Recovery Programme
MFIs  Multilateral Financial Institutions
MFN  Most Favoured Nation
MNC  Multinational Corporations
MPLA  Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA  National Constitutional Assembly
NEDP  National Economic Development Plan
NERP  National Economic Recovery Plan
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NPC  National People’s Congress
OAU  Organization for African Unity
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-African Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF-ZAPU</td>
<td>Patriotic Front- Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
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<td>POSA</td>
<td>Public Order and Security Act</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area</td>
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<td>RBZ</td>
<td>Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RIDMP</td>
<td>Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPA</td>
<td>South African Press Association</td>
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<td>SEOM</td>
<td>SADC Electoral Observer Mission</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</td>
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<td>SSF</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force</td>
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<td>STERP</td>
<td>Short Term Economic Recovery Program</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Transnational Corporations</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UNWTO</td>
<td>United Nations World Tourism Organisation</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>ZDERA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
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<td>ZIA</td>
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<td>ZIMCORD</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ZIMPREST</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Programme of Economic and Social Transformation</td>
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<td>ZIMREF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund</td>
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<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZMDC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZTA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Tourism Authority</td>
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Chapter 1

Zimbabwe’s International Relations: An Overview of the Study

1.0 Introduction

The study sought to explore why Zimbabwe’s international relations practices appeared to remain ‘stuck’ in specific ways that run counter to its domestic, regional and international interests. The international relations practices adopted by Zimbabwe especially after 2000 have failed to promote political and economic renewal within the country and have remained isolationist and confrontational with key western countries such as Britain, United States of America and the European Union. As shall be highlighted in Chapter 2 and other chapters of this thesis, Britain and other western powers dominated Zimbabwe’s diplomatic space and all channels of diplomatic interaction at bilateral and multilateral levels. An intricate web of dependence on the western hemisphere dominated Zimbabwe’s post-colonial patterns of international engagements. Attempts at breaking the dependency pattern through the stand-off with the west after 2000 and the redirection of the country’s diplomatic orientation through the Look East Policy in 2003 resulted in the unprecedented economic, political and social decline of the country since independence. The western powers fought Zimbabwe through economic sanctions, arms embargoes, travel restrictions and other restrictive measures which paralysed Zimbabwe’s nation building efforts during the period under review.

Chapter 4 of this thesis also analysed some of the international relations practices which militated against national renewal and regional and international co-operation which included an aggressive, confrontational, scornful and insultive language towards western powers and their governments, the use of the “race card” to fight the west and to mobilise domestic and regional support, the use of the “sanctions mantra” to deflect criticism of incompetence and corruption and the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist ideology which was not in sync with the capitalist economic base which was operational in the country. Many leaders in the ruling party appeared not to understand or appreciate what Marxist-Leninist ideology was all about. In addition to these was the hegemonic and commandist approach to foreign policy and public policy processes which contributed to the weaknesses of the country’s foreign policy framework and implementation processes. The ruling party- Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU PF)- remained stuck in the values of the liberation struggle and failed to transform itself to a ruling party in government. The
argument advanced in this thesis is that Zimbabwe’s international relations practices are largely to blame for its decline from a strong state to a weak state between 1980 and 2016. The study sought to analyse the relationship between Zimbabwe’s international relations practices and the resultant drastic changes in the social, economic and political environment.

The management of a country’s international relations is regulated by a country’s foreign policy framework. Foreign policy is defined by Chandra (2006) as a systematic statement of deliberately selected national interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe (2012) website defined foreign policy “as a set of goals that seek to outline how a country will interface at an official level with other countries of the world and, to a lesser extent, with non-state actors in pursuit of its national economic, political, social and cultural interests”. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy statement issued in 2012, “the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is primarily based on the country’s desire to foster and protect its national interests, national security, independence, sovereignty, ideological goals and economic prosperity”. These strategic priorities making up Zimbabwe’s foreign policy are further analysed in this thesis.

A synthesis of economic, social and political indicators from various sources including Zimbabwe National Statistical Office (Zimstat), World Bank, International Monetary Fund and United Nations Agencies demonstrated that Zimbabwe as a state had experienced unprecedented economic, political and social decline as a result of controversial public policies which contradicted the country’s purported foreign policy objectives of protecting its national interests, national security, political, economic and social prosperity. Zimbabwe’s prosperity was hamstrung by a series of public policy measures which violated property rights, the rule of law and in general caused government ineffectiveness and an increase in government corruption. The country also remained subdued by sanctions imposed by western powers, declining per capita income, hyper-inflation, high unemployment, shortages of food, fuel, and foreign currency; perennial drought and a decline in life expectancy as a result of low rate of investment in the economy and lack of investor confidence which marked the period and a poor governance record among other factors. Collapsing of the health and education sectors during the period under study and the lack of access to public services delivery in the area of water, sanitation, urban and rural areas service provision, massive migration of Zimbabweans into the region and the struggle by the government to pay its
workers on a regular basis, among other factors, were a clear manifestation of a state in decline.

Zimbabwe was expected to activate its bilateral and multilateral relationships with the region and the world community to solve these challenges, but it remained struck in economic, political and social decline mode contrary to its purported international relations objectives.

According to Chandra (2006), the management of a country’s international relations, in many cases, is dictated by economic and strategic interests of nation-states which are key actors in the international system. In addition to nation-states, there are also non-state actors who include regional and international organisations, transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations which must be managed through international relations practices. The widening agenda of critical issues to be addressed, most of which lack a purely national solution, like terrorism, transnational threats, environmental degradation, drugs and migration among others, led to the creation of new actors that transcended political boundaries. It is precisely for this reason that international relations practices must be developed continuously to take into account the wide agenda involving state and non-state actors who have a role to play in advancing national interests.

As the study will elucidate in the impending chapters, Zimbabwe’s international relations practices with some key actors within the international community, especially western countries, appeared to be rigid, static and uncompromising. One explanatory factor is that Zimbabwe’s international relations practices continued to be framed by an outdated Marxist-Leninist liberation struggle ideology. However, the study argued that the Zimbabwe government’s key failure lay in its inability to activate its network of bilateral and multilateral international relations networks within the sub-region, the African continent and internationally to reverse its declining fortunes politically, economically and socially, and to break sanctions imposed on it by western countries. Parallels can be drawn with the Zimbabwean state’s predecessor, white ruled Rhodesia, which survived the mandatory United Nations sanctions between 1965 and 1979. Rhodesia then had apartheid-ruled South Africa and Portugal as its main partners who participated in sanctions busting on its behalf.
Post 1980 Zimbabwe on the other hand had cordial and diplomatic relations with Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries, the African Union (AU) countries, most of the United Nations (UN) countries, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, and most Asian nations, notably China, Russia, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Iran, among other countries who could have rescued Zimbabwe through bilateral and multilateral networks. A good international relations framework must achieve cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels by increasing market access for products through intra and extra-regional exports, promotion of cross border investment and foreign direct investment, promotion of tourism linkages and attracting international aid to assist key social sectors like health and education, but Zimbabwe’s international relations practices failed to achieve this major thrust especially between 2000 and 2008. According to Hansohm et al (2003), the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which occurred especially between 2000 and 2008, continues to delay processes of regional integration whilst also discouraging foreign direct investment into the region as a whole, thereby limiting growth.

It is imperative that international relations practices of any country must develop in response to its national capacity and to the dynamic changes taking place internationally, regionally and locally because these changes have a bearing on the viability of the state. A good example was given by Chandra (2008 p.3) while citing the changes in British, Russian and the United States of America foreign policy positions at different historic epochs. The British foreign policy reconciled with its medium power status after the Second World War, while the US foreign policy post-1945 could be explained in terms of its superpower status resulting from the First World War. After 1985, the Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, abandoned its superpower role as a recognition of its declining national capacity. International relations practices adopted by Zimbabwe had failed to reconcile with national capacity and to promote political and economic renewal within the country as the basis for reaching out to the region and the international community and as a strategy of accelerating global partnerships for sustainable development.

Furthermore, Zimbabwe had alienated itself gradually from the international community through domestic policies such as the expropriation of land without compensation which is against the rule of the global capitalist order, the holding of violent and disputed elections in
2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 which were not in line with SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (1992). Specifically, Zimbabwe failed to follow SADC guidelines with respect to full participation of citizens in the political process, freedom of association, political tolerance, and equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media during elections.

The culture of holding violent and disputed elections diminished Zimbabwe’s democratic credentials nationally, regionally and internationally. Zimbabwe also suffered from restrictive legislation on political mobilisation and participation in the political process as evidenced by the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the restrictions and closure of private media houses by the government through legislation such as Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war from 1998-2002 at a time it was looking for donor funding for the land reform programme did not find favours with some international partners. This contributed to a negative perception of Zimbabwe’s international relations record leading to the imposition of sanctions and international isolation. Zimbabwe was forced to adopt the “Look East Policy” in 2003 following the imposition of a de facto and a de jure sanctions regime by the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA) and some Western countries, notably Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which contributed to the economic meltdown of the Zimbabwean economy by 2008.

According to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (2010), the ‘Look East Policy’ was an attempt by the country to break western countries’ economic stranglehold on Zimbabwe by refocusing the country’s trade, investment and tourism linkages with Asian countries like China, Iran, Indonesia, India, Malaysia and Singapore as a way of circumventing the restrictions of the western imposed sanctions on the country, but this foreign policy strategy did not work as subsequent chapters will illustrate.

Whilst many countries the world over have made it their business to maintain good relationships with key countries in all the strategic regions of the world despite ideological differences, Zimbabwe remained hostage to its Marxist- Leninist ideology which alienated the country from the global capitalist world. This ideology was not in sync with the inherited capitalist infrastructure and the leadership’s obsession with interacting internationally with western countries, western financial institutions, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations. As a result of the Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation of the country, the policies and strategies that were adopted by the country, through the leadership of ZANU-PF, tended to reflect the pursuit of unrealist ideological goals which were divorced from the concrete reality obtaining domestically and internationally. As shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 6, obsession with Marxist-Leninist political structures like Politburo, Central Committee, President and First Secretary and the centralisation of power and decision making in the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF under the concept of the “one centre of power” had narrowed the locus of decision making in the party and government. The party was responsible for making policies and strategies that were used to run the country’s international relations.

Another area that weakened the country was the fact that Zimbabwe lacked a coherent strategy of engaging the international community since independence as Chapter 2 shall illustrate. Five distinct phases clearly come out in Zimbabwe’s national building efforts through international co-operation. The first phase was state interventionism phase from 1980 to 1990 when western financial institutions, western countries and western capital were used to correct historical injustices in all sectors and to promote a new equitable order in the country. A key feature of this phase was the marginalisation of eastern bloc countries of China and Russia in Zimbabwe’s initial nation building efforts although they had supported the liberation struggle. Zimbabwe had limited its options by being ring-fenced by the world capitalist system as part of the Lancaster House independence formula. The post-colonial international relations of Zimbabwe were therefore dictated by the United Kingdom and its western allies who were crucial in ensuring that adequate funding for war reconstruction and national development were available when required.

During the first phase of this national development strategy through this type of international engagement, Zimbabwe performed exceptional well in its nation building agenda as reflected in chapter 2. In contrast, when relations soured with Britain and the west after 2000 following Zimbabwe’s sovereign decision to compulsorily acquire white-owned land without compensation for resettling blacks who were marginalised by the colonial policies of segregation, relations plummeted to the lowest ebb resulting in the meltdown of the economy as a result of western sanctions. The colonial linkages were crucial in sustaining Zimbabwe’s international relations strategy in the first decade of independence and where these patterns
were disrupted as was the case between 2000 and 2008, the country was made to pay a high price in political and economic terms as reflected in this thesis.

The second phase was the *structural adjustment phase* from 1991 to 1996 when Zimbabwe was forced to adopt the ‘Washington Consensus’ brand of free market economic management as a condition for western funding. Zimbabwe remained in the western sphere of influence under this phase to ensure balance of payment support and support of social development programmes like health, education and the protection of poor and vulnerable groups who were expected to experience hardships during the transition. Again during this phase, the international relations of Zimbabwe emphasised the engagement of western powers, western financial institutions, international organisations and non-governational organisations without seriously exploring the potential role of eastern bloc countries to support Zimbabwe’s nation building efforts.

The third phase was the *reactive management phase* from 1997 to 2008 when Zimbabwe reacted angrily and emotionally to the negative effects of the western sponsored economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) and adopted its own home-grown economic reform programme in 1998, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). This programme resulted in Zimbabwe’s isolation from the international community. The home-grown programme was not successful because of the country’s decision to join the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s civil war in 1998 which drained Treasury an estimate of USD 3 million per month according to a UN Report (2009)\(^1\). Zimbabwe’s DRC war was also estimated to have cost USD 27 million per month by The Economist (1998)\(^2\) and the British Broadcasting Corporation in 2000 put the estimate at USD 25 million per month. The war weakened Zimbabwe’s development efforts since money which could have been used for national development was diverted to this war. Zimbabwe’s national interest in this war was difficult to identify. The DRC war was followed by the fast track land reform programme in 2000 which significantly weakened productivity on farms and in industry which depended on farm inputs.

The fourth phase was the launch of the *Look East Policy* in 2003 when Zimbabwe sought to reorient the country’s trade, investment, tourism and development assistance to eastern bloc countries of China, Russia, India, Malaysia and other Asian nations as a counter to the

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\(^1\) UN Report The Exploitation of Natural Resources and Conflict in the Congo (December 2009), New York, UN Security Council

isolation by western countries which imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe due to its poor governance record, its implementation of the fast track land reform programme and its involvement in the DRC war. The Look East Policy strategy failed to realise the anticipated “great leap forward” due to the challenges which Zimbabwe was having with western powers as Chapter 7 shall demonstrate. Some of the challenges which Zimbabwe was having with western countries like the failure to service its debts also caught up with China and other eastern bloc countries during their engagement with Zimbabwe.

The fifth phase was the re-engagement policy which Zimbabwe adopted during the Government of National Unity (GNU) from 2009 to 2013 and was continued with the ZANU-PF government that came to power after the general election of June 2013. Chapter 6 shall elaborate on the re-engagement policy by Zimbabwe. The re-engagement agenda was being frustrated by government policies which lacked clarity, consistency, predictability and non-discrimination in their application. The British and American governments had given conditions that re-engagement would only succeed if Zimbabwe demonstrated a clear commitment to political and economic reform and this is a condition that the country was either unwilling to embrace or at best, was painstakingly trying to implement. The new condition was similar to the condition given to Zimbabwe during the ESAP phase before relations broke down with western countries and financial institutions in 1998.

Zimbabwe was therefore pursuing an unstructured, unfocused and an unbalanced international relations strategy in its nation building strategy which weakened its national interests as defined by its foreign policy objectives.

1.1 Background and rationale of the study

In any country, international relations practices exist to support the domestic policies of a country and if that strategic alignment is not established, then the international relations practices will be deemed inappropriate to the overall national interest. This view is supported by the Realism and the Liberalism/Idealism perspectives of international relations. These perspectives view the national interests as the raison detre of conducting international relations. National interests, in this case, translate to the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and the promotion of its own political, economic, military, diplomatic and cultural interests through a state’s public policies and the promotion, harmonisation or defence of those domestic interests with other international actors (Morgentau, 1978; Holsti, 1985). The study sought to explore the systemic failure of
Zimbabwe’s international relations practices to realise their domestic political and economic agenda by the year 2016 despite the existence of a network of co-operation at bilateral, regional and international levels.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe’s website (2011), Zimbabwe put the full weight of its foreign policy towards forging cordial political, economic, military and cultural cooperation with Zimbabwe’s neighbours in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), in pursuit of win-win regional and sub-regional development initiatives and in the process protecting its national interests, security, sovereignty and independence.

Zimbabwe had also been an active player continentally within the framework of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) - now the African Union (AU), and within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 15 Countries, the Group of 77 Countries and within the United Nations (UN) system. In addition to its engagement with these regional and international organizations, Zimbabwe also operated a network of diplomatic embassies in every region of the world. The country’s worldwide diplomatic visibility raises serious questions as to why this could not assist the country, through bilateral and multilateral networks, to solve the myriad of economic and political challenges facing the country by the end of 2016.

Zimbabwe had failed to activate its network of bilateral and multilateral international relations networks within the SADC sub-region, the African continent and internationally in order to solve a deepening social, economic and political crisis affecting the country especially between 2000 and 2008. Efficient and effective international relations management is a crucial strategy in sustaining a country’s domestic economy and a bad international relations strategy will trigger negative consequences on the domestic economy.

When Zimbabwe achieved independence on 18 April 1980, it established cordial and flourishing bilateral and multilateral relations with virtually most state and non-state actors in the world regardless of ideological positions of those actors and despite its adopted Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation. According to Stoneman (1981), Zimbabwe inherited a strong, sophisticated and integrated economy with vibrant agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors. The economy was also supported by large scale foreign direct investments and international development assistance following the achievement of independence.
The country’s trade links with the rest of the world expanded remarkably, buoyed by the end of the liberation struggle, the lifting of mandatory United Nations sanctions and an increase in foreign aid which was targeted at reconstructing the economy. According to Davies (1981), Zimbabwe inherited an official foreign debt of $353 million from Rhodesia which represented 13.7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and required 5% of export earnings to service. By the end of December 2010, Zimbabwe’s foreign debt stood at USD 6.9 billion or 103% of the GDP of which USD 4.8 billion or 72% of GDP represented accumulated arrears due to Zimbabwe’s inability to service its debts following the souring of relations with international financial institutions and other development partners who could have assisted in clearing the arrears, including closing the financing gap (Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Finance Policy Statement, 2012). According to IMF Policy document on Zimbabwe, the Bretton Woods institutions withdrew balance of payment support to Zimbabwe in 2002 following policy disagreements with the Government of Zimbabwe, and thereafter the economy took a sharp downturn. World Bank (2008) statistics indicated that Zimbabwe’s GDP grew on average by about 4.5% between 1980 and 1990 and thereafter, especially after 2000, its economy experienced unprecedented decline in GDP annual growth rates.

As the diagram below reflects, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita and GDP annual growth rate continued to progressively decline between the periods indicated. The subdued and unstable economic growth rates were spurred by a number of factors which included dwindling international financing in response to inappropriate public policies which were considered hostile to foreign direct investment. Industries were generally failing to perform due to their lack of competitiveness as a result of antiquated machinery and lack of access to credit, among other challenges. This also led to a collapsing tax base and the closure of many industries due to declining productivity in firms and farms (CZI Report, 2015). The declining productivity on farms as a result of the land reform programme also significantly contributed to industrial decline because of the linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors. This decline in productivity negatively affected the economy leading to a significant decline in GDP per capita, GDP annual growth rate and also resulted in high unemployment of over 90% according to the Ministry of Finance’s 2016 mid-term fiscal

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**Table 1.1 Indicators of national economic decline during the period 1980 to 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP per Capita $</th>
<th>GDP Annual Growth Rate %</th>
<th>Inflation Rate %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>916.24</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1058.10</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1084.46</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>947.51</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>744.83</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>636.07</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>675.90</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>706.95</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>792.03</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>813.58</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>897.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>810.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>648</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>608</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>618.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>620.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>735.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>762.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>899.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>876.5</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$846.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>55.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>835.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>112.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>799.0</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>208.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$704.1</td>
<td>-16.6</td>
<td>622.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Per Capita GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>693.5</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>132.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>585.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>1281.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>66212.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (July)</td>
<td>$491</td>
<td>-17.1</td>
<td>231000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (December)</td>
<td></td>
<td>500 000 000 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2008, Zimbabwe issued its record-breaking one hundred trillion dollar note before the Zimbabwe dollar was abandoned in 2009 in favour of a basket of foreign currencies; that is, the United States dollar, South African Rand, Euro, British Pound, Botswana Pula, Australian dollar, and Chinese Yuan.

The adoption of some “imperialist” currencies was a painful decision for the government given Zimbabwe’s diplomatic condemnation of those countries. On attaining independence in 1980, Z$1 equaled US$1.45, but this strong Zimbabwean currency had become worthless 28 years down the line. The extent of the economic collapse was illustrated by the fact that hospitals, clinics, schools and public institutions remained closed for the greater part of 2008 as workers battled to overcome the ravaging effects of hyperinflation. By 2008, unemployment had reached alarming levels of above 80% (UNDP, 2012) and by 2016, it was over 90% according to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Finance mid-term fiscal policy review. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries Report (2011) showed that companies operated at capacity utilisation of 18.9% in 2006, 10% in 2008, 32.3% in 2009, 43.7% in 2010 and 57.2% in 2011. These statistics compared with capacity utilizations of 83% (1980-1989), and 70% to 76% between1990 to 1999 (Ruzivo Trust, 2016). Zimbabwean companies, according to CZI Report (2012), were constrained by three factors; which were national challenges, regional challenges and global challenges. At national level the companies were struggling to recover from the after-effects of the economic meltdown which climaxed in 2008 with the abandonment of the local Zimbabwean dollar when inflation spiralled out of control. Other challenges related to lack of clarity on indigenisation policy which was a deterrent to attracting potential investors, contradictory policy statement by cabinet ministers which

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6 Ruzivo Trust;www.ruzivo.co.zw/publications/factsheets.html?download=10...PIP3 accessed Nov.16, 2016
resulted in low business confidence by potential investors, liquidity challenges, corruption, the high cost of doing business which reflected in many licensing/fees requirements and many infrastructure deficits which were not conducive to investment.

At regional level, Zimbabwe was struggling to comply with SADC and COMESA Trade Protocols and to compete effectively with its regional partners given that its economic base had been weakened by the economic meltdown, sanctions and inefficient and corrupt governance. Globally, Zimbabwean companies were affected by a decline in global commodity prices of the country’s mineral exports of gold, platinum and diamonds. In addition to the declining commodity prices on the global market, Zimbabwean companies were also affected by the volatile and fragile global financial market and the subdued levels of FDI coming into the country compared to its peers in the region.

Meaningful revival of the economy only started after the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), from 2009 to 2013, as a result of the re-engagement policy with the international community which was supported by international funding. Real GDP growth was 5.7% in 2009, 10.6% in 2012, 4.5% in 2013 and 3.8% in 2014 (RBZ, 2016).

Economic decline intensified following the end of the tenure of the GNU in 2013 and the return to power of the ZANU-PF government. Zimbabwe’s macro-economic environment became increasingly unstable, unpredictable and insecure as cabinet ministers sent conflicting signals to the international investors community. Some cabinet ministers like the Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa were working hard to lure back foreign investors into the country while others like Patrick Zhuwao, Minister for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, campaigned against Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in preference for domestic funding solutions. As a result of this confusion and lack of co-ordinated strategy to engage the international investor community, market confidence sharply declined leading to the shortage of money in the banking system and political instability which was marked by public protests.

Zimbabwe, during this period, was also hampered by institutional and operational capacity in the public sector due to political isolation as a result of western imposed sanctions. Political distress at home by citizens compounded an already deteriorating international relations environment. Citizens’ anger towards government intensified as a result of the negative spin-offs from the crisis like unemployment, continuous closure of companies due to low capacity utilisation and the inability to import new equipment and lack of access to basic water,
sanitation, education and health facilities. More importantly, shortages of food, fuel and foreign currency inflamed the political environment. The World Bank Multi Indicator Cluster Survey of 2014 and the *indexmundi statistical indicators* (2016) showed that Zimbabwe’s life expectancy at birth declined from 63.09 years (1983), 50.68 years (1995), 41.19 years (2000), before rising to 47.95 years in 2009, 54.69 years (2012) and 60.67 years (2015).

As Zimbabwe’s economy was contracting as illustrated in this thesis, the country found itself relying heavily on international donor agencies, mainly western, to fund social sectors like education, health and social welfare. This was despite the fact that these agencies were, from time to time, labelled as “western agents of regime change” by the government. Zimbabwe’s international relations posture was hostile towards western powers and, from time to time, at public fora, western aid was dismissed as “filthy” and a facilitator of “regime change.” For a country which was failing to sustain itself and its citizens and was highly dependent on western donors, this was a strange foreign policy logic.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

The study sought to establish the institutional weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s international relations framework which resulted in the imposition of sanctions, international isolation and general economic weakness by 2016. The study also interrogates why Zimbabwe’s worldwide diplomatic visibility, through its embassies and membership of organisations like SADC, AU, NAM, Group of 15, Group of 77 and the UN could not help the country to solve the political, economic and social challenges which resulted in political, economic and social decline and the eventual weakening of the state’s capacity to deliver its mandate.

1.3 Research Objectives

a. To establish why Zimbabwe’s international relations practices failed to sustain Zimbabwe’s domestic economy through bilateral and multilateral networks;

b. To apply a multi-level analysis to explain Zimbabwe’s international relations decisions between 1980 and 2016;

c. To analyse the relationship between Zimbabwe’s international relations objectives and the country’s public policy objectives between 1980 and 2016;

d. To establish the institutional weakness of Zimbabwe’s international relations framework that resulted in the imposition of sanctions, international isolation and a general economic decline by 2016 and,
To establish the values that should inform Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with the international community.

1.4 Research Questions
a. Why did Zimbabwe’s international relations practices fail to sustain the nation’s economy through bilateral and multilateral networks?

b. What factors influenced Zimbabwean policy makers in developing and implementing an international relations agenda?

c. Was there coherence between Zimbabwe’s international relations objectives and the country’s public policy objectives between 1980 and 2016?

d. What institutional weakness are in Zimbabwe’s international relations framework which resulted in the imposition of sanctions, international isolation and a general economic decline by 2016?

e. What values should inform Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with the international community?

1.5 Justification of the Study
The study would be useful to future policy makers in re-designing Zimbabwe’s international relations framework in response to the challenges identified in the research and in order to achieve Zimbabwe’s nation building objectives. The results of the study would also facilitate Zimbabwe’s re-engagement process with key regional and international partners in light of the experiences highlighted by the study. The overall aim of the research was to offer a pathway to reorient Zimbabwe’s international relations framework, through changes in foreign policy and domestic policies, in line with the demands of constructive and fruitful engagement in the 21st century, without compromising the national interest.

1.6 Research Methodology
The research used the qualitative methodology. Qualitative approach as defined by Creswell (2009, p 4) is a means of exploring and understanding the meanings individuals and groups ascribe to a social or human problem. It is an approach which involves collecting, analysing and interpreting research data by observing what people do and say and understanding processes, events and relationships in the context of social, cultural and political situations. The rationale of using this approach is that it is useful for understanding, discovering and
describing social phenomena. The approach was also useful for probing underlying values, benefits, defects and assumptions of Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda and by implication how such aspects affected the strengths and weaknesses of the state. Sinaga (2014) argued that qualitative approach was useful in gaining an understanding of the underlying reasons, opinions and motivations. According to Corbin and Strauss (2008), qualitative research approach facilitates the desire to step beyond the known and enter into the world of participants to see the world from their perspective and in doing so make discoveries that will contribute towards the development of empirical knowledge. Qualitative approach, therefore, facilitates assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours in order to understand better the phenomena being studied and to reach appropriate conclusions.

1.6.1 Research design

The study took the form of a case study of the Republic of Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to understand the relationship between international relations management and the political, economic and social development of the country. According to Yin (2009), a case study tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions on why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what results. Yin (2009; p.8) further defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” The advantage of a case study is that it is generally more penetrative, more detailed and it draws examples from what is happening in reality. The idea of using such an approach is to be able to identify the weaknesses of the current approach and to be able to recommend an appropriate framework in line with international best practices and the ever changing political, economic and social environment.

1.6.2 Methods of data collection

The research utilised in-depth interviews and unstructured questionnaires to obtain primary sources of data from foreign policy experts, public policy experts and civil society groups which specialise in international relations and public policy issues. According to Boyce and Neale (2006, p3) in-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intense individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, programme or situation. In-depth interviews are useful when you want detailed information about a person’s thoughts and behaviours. In the same vein, an online source [https://www.b2binternational.com/files](https://www.b2binternational.com/files) defines unstructured
questionnaires as questions that elicit free responses. These are guided conversations rather than structured interviews and would often be referred to as a topic guide. The primary sources were also supplemented by a review of secondary sources of data (review of historical accounts, public records, newspaper articles, and archival records from the National Archives of Zimbabwe), all focusing on the same set of research questions and aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon. Secondary sources in the form of statistical data from Government publications and other related sources were also analysed and used in trying to highlight the indicators of state decline in Zimbabwe’s international relations.

1.6.3 Target Population

A population refers to “all people or items with the characteristics that a researcher wishes to study” (Bhattacherjee, 2012 p.65). Polit and Hungler (1999) argued that a population is an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. The target population for this study were policy makers, policy related institutions, academic community and interest groups or civic society groups involved in international relations issues.

The researcher interviewed 15 respondents who served as key informants from the category of retired government officials, the academic community and civil society groups involved in foreign policy issues. Serving government officials declined to be interviewed due to fears of reprisals from official circles in line with their mandate under the Official Secrets Act (Chapter 11:09). Also a total of 44 self-administered unstructured questionnaires were completed and returned by the respondents from a total target population of 50 respondents.

1.6.4 Sampling procedure

Purposive sampling technique commonly known as judgemental sampling was used in this study because of its emphasis on concentrating on people with particular characteristics who are knowledgeable about certain issues by virtue of their professional role, power in society, access to networks, expertise and experience. A random sample may not achieve the desired results for the researcher due to the fact that the persons chosen randomly may not have an interest or knowledge on the issues being researched. It was therefore important to target only those groups and persons with a keen interest in public policy and international relations issues in order to obtain appropriate responses. For questionnaires, the research used simple random sampling to select respondents. Simple random sampling gives the respondents an equal known chance of being selected.
1.6.5 Delimitation of the study
The study focused on the period 1980 to 2016 to analyse the causes and/or factors contributing to the decline of Zimbabwe from a strong state to a weak state as a result of its international relations practices. The period, a three decade perspective, offers adequate information on Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern in its conduct of international relations. Emphasis was placed on the role of policy makers, institutions of government like cabinet, foreign ministry and other relevant government ministries, parliament and the ruling ZANU-PF party.

1.6.6 Limitations of study
The researcher encountered challenges in getting feedback from questionnaires distributed to the respondents due to the sensitive nature of the topic. However some respondents contributed after their anonymity was assured. Serving senior government officials were also reluctant to be interviewed for fear of breaching the Official Secrets Act (Chapter 11:09).

1.6.7 Analytical Framework

1.6.7.1 Theories of International Relations
The researcher explored theories of international relations which helped to explain the behaviour pattern of Zimbabwe’s international relations between 1980 and 2016. Emphasis was given to the Realism theory in analysing Zimbabwe’s behaviour and decision-making patterns. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy preoccupation during the period was the preservation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and that approach was in line with the realism theory. According to Holsti (1985), the overriding interest of each state is self-interest, survival and preservation of its national security and power. Other international relations theories like Idealism, Constructivism and Marxist theories were used in this thesis to reinforce the main arguments of Realism.

1.6.7.2 Levels of Analysis
The second analytical framework that was used to examine Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern which influenced the country’s international relations practices was the levels of analysis. According to Nau (2009), levels of analysis are the location from which causes and patterns of events originate. The following levels of analysis were used;

i) Systems level analysis: At this level, emphasis was on exploring the behaviour pattern of
Zimbabwe’s international relations practices in the context of the international system where the international system was the “cause” and Zimbabwe’s behaviour was the “effect” and vice-versa.

ii) State level analysis: Emphasis at this level was on exploring the behaviour pattern of Zimbabwe’s international relations practices in relation to its public policies, the state’s unique characteristics like historical legacy, political culture, social traditions, and the geographic and economic nature of Zimbabwe.

iii) Organisational level analysis: Emphasis at this level was on exploring how government departments and interest groups participate in the political process to influence international relations practices and public policy outcomes in Zimbabwe. Special attention was given to the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State agencies and more importantly the ruling ZANU-PF party which were the key drivers of Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda.

iv) Individual level analysis: Emphasis at this level was on identifying the role of key individuals in influencing international relations practices.

1.6.7.3 Decision Making Models

The researcher was also guided by three decision making models in unravelling how, why and to what effect Zimbabwe pursued particular courses of action and inaction in its international relations agenda. The models are rational model, incremental model and irrational model.

The rational model identifies a problem, organises and classifies values, goals and objectives relevant to the problem and list possible ways to solve problem and realise goals of the organization. The rational model also lists possible consequences for each policy alternative with probability of occurrence and compares consequences with previously formulated goals and objectives. The final stage of this model is the selection of the policy solution with consequences most closely aligned to goals and objectives and which provides the highest level of problem resolution. The selected policy solution should provide most benefits at least costs. Another model that falls under the rational model is called bounded rationality. The bounded rationality model stipulates that policy makers are limited in the information and policy alternatives they can possess. The model recognises that “individuals have cognitive limitations and therefore complete rationality cannot be assumed in policy making” (Simon, 1957).
The incremental model stipulates that decision making occurs step-by-step, piecemeal, through trial and error. The model aims to achieve results through a process of bargaining and compromise (Gartner, 1997). Incremental decisions are preferred because policy measures can be tested and adjusted as they are implemented. Gradual policy changes avoid disadvantages or problematic situations and stimulate policy learning, constant negotiation and adjustment processes.

The irrational model which is associated with the works of Hernandez (2014) and Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) among others, argues that decision making under this model is non-rational and non-incremental and that there is coincidental congruence between problems, solutions and choice opportunities. Knowledge is acquired through trial and error or is deduced from experiences and responses in crisis situations. Preferences and strategies are developed through action as opposed to a preferable scenario where action is guided by preferences or strategies. Hernandez (2014) argued that decisions under this model were made emotionally and poorly reflected the preferred goal and were generally counter logic.

The above cited analytical frameworks were useful in analysing and observing the behaviour pattern of Zimbabwe domestically and internationally and the consequences of such behaviour. The diagram below illustrates how the analytical frameworks were used to reinforce each other in coming up with explanatory factors influencing the behaviour pattern, decision making processes, inputs and outputs relating to Zimbabwe’s international relations management.
Diagram above illustrates the analytical framework constructed by the author to analyse and observe Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern domestically and internationally and its impact on International Relations practices.

1.6.7.4 Data analysis and interpretation

Miles and Huberman cited in Yin (2009) summarised the following methods of analysing case study evidence; putting information into different arrays, making a matrix of categories and placing the evidence within such categories, examining the complexity of such tabulations and their relationships by calculating second-order numbers such as means and variances, or putting information in chronological order or using some other temporal scheme.

Another method of data analysis and interpretation is to use the descriptive approach to “identify an embedded unit of analysis and an overall pattern of complexity that ultimately can be used in a causal sense to explain why implementation had failed” (Yin, 2009)
Another analytic technique that can be used is the pattern-matching logic by comparing an empirically based pattern with a predicted one and if the pattern coincides with the results that could help a case study to strengthen its internal validity (Yin, 2009).

These methods of data analysis and interpretation were used in this thesis as the guide.
Thesis chapter Outlines

Chapter 1 is an overview of the study. It explores the various issues and challenges that necessitated the study and the methodology used to collect and analyse data.

Chapter 2 is the literature review part which examined historically significant events which helped to contextualise the topic and to identify gaps in existing literature. The chapter also defined and contextualised international relations theories and practices and explored the context of strong and weak states which was relevant to the study and the various theories and models of decision making relevant to foreign policy and public policy decision making.

Chapter 3 analyses the evolution of post-colonial Zimbabwe’s international relations. The key feature of the first two decades of independence was the close relationship with Western powers, Western financial institutions and Western Non Governmental Organisations in post war reconstruction and development activities. Zimbabwe’s international relations did not pursue a balanced international relations strategy as it was more aligned to the West than the East due to the colonial legacy. When there was a fall out in diplomatic relations with the West, Zimbabwe pursued a Look East Policy with the aim of countering western sanctions and the redirection of the country’s trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and development assistance from the west to the east.

Chapter 4 analyses the character of Zimbabwe’s international relations. The character did not endear itself to the international community especially Western powers. Notable among these characteristics included an aggressive, confrontational diplomatic communication strategy against the west, the use of the sanctions mantra and racism to fight its detractors and justify lack of national progress, anti-gay mantra to turn attention away from the real issues, among others.

Chapter 5 outlines and analyses Zimbabwe’s Regional Relations in the context of the political and security agenda of Zimbabwe and the region. The chapter concludes that Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern contributed to both negative and positive aspects of development and growth at national and regional level. Zimbabwe exhibited aspects of domineering which was resisted by regional allies like South Africa.

Chapter 6 explored Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy in the context of the Regional Economic Relations. Focus was centered on how Zimbabwe’s foreign policy behaviour pattern affected national and regional development and growth trajectories. Patterns of trade, foreign direct
investment, tourism and development assistance were analysed in the context of regional economic relations.

**Chapter 7** analysed Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy and its impact on various bilateral and multilateral relationships following the souring of relations with the west after 2000. The chapter concludes that the bilateral and multilateral relationships developed under the Look East policy had both beneficial and exploitative aspects.

**Chapter 8** concluded the thesis by outlining the findings and providing possible policy options for the Zimbabwe government to reorient its foreign policy from a preoccupation with politics to commercial diplomacy as a national renewal strategy.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This Literature review is meant to examine historically significant events and helps to contextualise the research by exploring related literature and relevant secondary sources of data associated with the problem statement in order to identify shortcomings and to add on to information gaps in secondary sources.

This review covers Zimbabwe’s international relations practices and other regional and international practices in order to explain why, where and when certain events happened, comprehend the problems confronted by policy makers at particular historic epochs and the logic behind their actions or inactions. It encompasses major political variables of international relations, including power, force, coercion, authority and influence and how these have been used by or against Zimbabwe to achieve certain outcomes.

2.1 Definitions and context of International Relations

International relations refer to relations between states, nations or peoples, cultures and international institutions (Salmon and Imber, 2008). According to Chandra (1994), all states are involved in international relations and this involvement is systematic and based on certain principles. The conduct of international relations by any country is regulated by a foreign policy framework which outlines a country’s objectives in its interaction with other countries. Chandra (1994) argued that the objectives of a country’s international relations can be grouped into three categories which are core values and interests, middle range objectives and universal long range objectives. Core values and interests relate to the existence of a state and for which people are prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice. Such values and interests are concerned with preservation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, defence of strategically vital political, economic, social and cultural institutions, and beliefs and values of the nation-state. Middle range objectives relate to foreign trade, sources of supplies and foreign markets, foreign direct investment and foreign aid and access to communication facilities. Such objectives are necessary for increasing social welfare of the population and enhancing a state’s prestige by increasing its sphere of influence or ideological self-extension. Universal long range objectives are those plans, dreams, visions and grand designs concerning the ultimate political or ideological organisation of the international system.
Zimbabwe at independence had core, middle range and long range objectives. On its core objectives, Zimbabwe wanted to protect its hard won sovereignty and territorial integrity. Zimbabwe took up arms against the Smith regime in the Second Chimurenga (Second War of Liberation) to secure its nationhood and freedom. Political leaders framed the struggle in the context of past colonial injustices, and used it as the basis of engaging the international community. Therefore one of the core objectives of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was the defence of its sovereignty and independence. Zimbabwe also valued its vital support base - the people who fought the liberation struggle and were instrumental in voting the government into power in 1980. It is this support base which the government sought to appease by undertaking the fast-track land reform programme which triggered a series of political and economic instabilities during the period 2000-2008. As far as the Zimbabwe government was concerned, the land was a key resource for empowering the people and for pursuing many other strategic national objectives and therefore it had to be entrusted to the indigenous black people of the country as the custodians. (Mugabe speeches at the UNGA, September 26, 2013; September 25, 2008; September 26, 2007).

In the middle range objectives, Zimbabwe, just like any other county, wanted to extend its influence within the international system. After independence, Zimbabwe engaged in cordial bilateral and multilateral relations with western countries, multilateral financial institutions and donors in order to access financial aid, to obtain foreign direct investment and trading partners. The objective of this strategy was to create a stable economy in Zimbabwe through post-war reconstruction and the betterment of living standards of the people. Alignment to western countries was achieved through a policy of national reconciliation which allowed Zimbabwe to consolidate its independence by building bridges with the former coloniser, the United Kingdom, her allies and more importantly, her kith and kin in Rhodesia who were appendages of the colonial system.

Zimbabwe’s long range objectives were in line with the vision of a United States of Africa, a development which was expected to enhance the prestige and economic well-being of African countries within the international community. Zimbabwe’s long range objectives were also in line with the reform of the United Nations Security Council to make it more representative of the various regions of the world. The country was of the view that a reformed UNSC would counter the influence of big powers which trampled on weak states like Zimbabwe because of their military and economic superiority. Zimbabwe advocated for the UNSC that recognised the equality of all sovereign states and peoples, whether big or
small, which were expected to observe, respect and abide by the provisions of the UN Charter.

2.2 Concept of Strong and weak states

States are in principle sovereign, but they are not equal and they do not possess the same influence in international affairs. According to Blair and Curtis (2009), states are considered strong due to military and political power, technological advancement, access to strategic raw materials such as oil, gas, diamonds and iron ore among others, and large populations.

Some states have significant influential voices in the international system because of their military strength which may enable them to play a dominant role in the regional and/or global context. The military strength of one country can be a security dilemma for other countries as they also seek self-defence by arming themselves adequately in order to match or surpass the commensurate standards of others, thereby leading to an arms race. Other states have significant political power derived from well-functioning democratic systems at home which promote political, economic and social progress. (Blair & Curtis, 2009) Some developing countries lack such internal coherence due to conflicts, power struggles, political repression and corruption being a dominant part of political activity. Technological innovation and access to critical strategic raw materials have given some states a competitive edge over others who are not equally endowed. Some states like India, China, Russia and USA have abundant resources and huge populations and this had helped them to have huge influence that is in line with these resources. Some countries in Africa like Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan have equally huge strategic resources and big populations but they have not been able to command significant influence globally, partly due to factors which include the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few political and military elites, unrepresentative political systems, unrest within the political systems and high levels of corruption among other reasons.

Some states in the developing world are considered weak due to a number of factors which include weak and corrupt political leadership, high levels of corruption, underdeveloped state infrastructure, poor levels of education and health provision and natural problems of famine and drought. The colonial legacy added to the underdevelopment of many countries because the countries were not prepared for the transfer of power since they had no tradition of democracy and good governance in their governmental systems. Power, as a result, was concentrated in a small group of political and military elites who enriched themselves at the
expense of the people, with corruption becoming institutionalised in the political process.

Scholars like Raftopoulos (2003), Ndlovu-Gatheni (2003), Mashingaidze (2006), Moyo (2007) and Mandaza (2011) had come up with various explanatory variables to explain Zimbabwe’s weakness in the international system. According to Raftopoulos (2003), Zimbabwe was weakened by the adoption of the ‘politics of regime survival’ following the imposition of sanctions by the west and the loss of a significant number of co-operating partners. Regime survival therefore became the pre-occupation of the government in all domestic and external dimensions of statecraft. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) put it, there was a shift from human security to regime security. Raftopolos (2007) also argued that the crisis in Zimbabwe which manifested in 2000 was largely caused by the emergence of a revived nationalism delivered in a virulent form, with race as a key trope within the discourse and a selective rendition of the liberation history. The Zimbabwe government officially responded to the crisis by blaming the British, the white minority race and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) who were labelled “fronts” or “puppets” of western interests.

Mashingaidze (2006) also contributed to the debate of the weakening of the state when he pointed to the ZANU-PF survival strategy of exclusionary mode of liberation war politics where citizens, groups of any nature and countries were categorised as friends or enemies, patriots or traitors, western stooges and anti-imperialists. Mashingaidze (2006) highlighted that the failure to harness political plurality and diversity for national development had weakened Zimbabwe’s development trajectory.

Moyo (2007) and Mandaza (2016) argued that independence had bequeathed a neo-colonial state in Zimbabwe and the moment Zimbabwe tried to free itself of its linkages with the former colony, the resistance was intense leading to rupture of relations and the weakening of the state.

2.3 Zimbabwe in the context of the Brookings Institute’s typology of weak states

Rice and Patrick (2008) of the US-based Brookings Institute ranked 141 developing countries against four key criteria of being a state, namely: the provision of security, the maintenance of legitimate political structures, the capacity to develop economic growth, and the ability to meet the basic needs of their population. The 2008 survey established that the majority of the thirty weakest states in the world are located in Africa with Zimbabwe being ranked at number eight (8).
Zimbabwe was rated number 8 out of 30 weakest states in the world by Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, senior research fellows at the Brookings Institute in 2008 based on a number of criteria which are relevant to this study. First, is the maintenance of legitimate political structures. The study established that the legitimacy of state structures were weakened by corruption, lack of participation in political processes due to fear, lack of transparency in electoral practices and general governance issues, power struggles and poor democratic practices which manifested in disputed electoral outcomes and violence during the campaign. The violation of people’s human rights before and during elections and the general breakdown of the rule of law weakened the legitimacy of political structures.

The second criteria was the ability to meet the basic needs of the people. Zimbabwe failed to meet this criteria due to the fact that the state was bankrupt and was failing to meet the basic human security needs of health, education, shelter, water, electricity and sanitation services which resulted in the outbreak of water borne diseases like cholera and typhoid in 2007 and 2008. The Brookings Institute’s study also observed that more people left Zimbabwe between 2005 and 2010 than those entering the country in search of food, shelter and employment.

The third criteria was the capacity for economic growth. On this criteria Zimbabwe was also classified as a weak state due to world record hyperinflation levels of 32% in 1998, 1193.5% in 2006 and 89.7 trillion % in 2008 (Hanke, 2009). Unemployment level was over 80% (CZI, 2009) and there was a huge brain drain in the critical sectors of education and health, coupled with a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection rate which made the task of national economic growth almost impossible. The fourth criteria was the provision of security. Zimbabwe remained relatively stable due to the fact that the military establishment remained strong despite the poor funding challenges. The security of the state was not contested but the only insecurity which contributed to the weakness of the state related to human security. People lacked the basic needs for their sustenance like food, health and education services, shelter and water among other requirements for daily survival.

2.4 Features of the international relations system

The key features of the international relations system that have dominated the conduct of relations among states in developed and developing countries include the following; the coordination and direction of foreign policy through the Ministry of Foreign/External Affairs.

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the existence of centralised Head of State/Government systems, public participation or lack of it in foreign policy processes, the management of internal and external security of the state, the use of public diplomacy/public relations to project the image of the country and the use of either bilateral or multilateral diplomacy to conduct their foreign affairs. These features are important to this research because they help to explain why Zimbabwe had conducted its international relations the way it did.

The coordination and direction of foreign policy of individual member states through the foreign ministry along with diplomatic missions abroad is a key feature of the international relations system. The foreign ministry coordinates the internal functions of a state’s international relations which include political, economic, protocol, legal and administrative functions. In addition to that, the foreign ministry coordinates the work of other government departments whose portfolios have a bearing on the international relations agenda like industry and trade, tourism, environment, immigration, defence and internal security. Barston (2006) argued that development issues are generally at the forefront of foreign policies of many states in order to secure international finance, solve problems arising from the scheduling of loans and restrictions on key exports, and the promotion of regional cooperation and relations with international organisations, transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations.

Another feature of the international relations system in developing countries, according to Barston (2006) is the prevalence of centralised Heads of State and/or Government systems, that is, strong central executive, a relatively weak bureaucracy and a narrow basis of foreign policy formulation. The style of conducting international relations under such a system places emphasis on direct negotiations by the Head of State and the use of Presidential emissaries (not necessarily career diplomats) to conduct sensitive assignments. The Head of State and/or Government is the nerve centre of policy formulation, implementation and evaluation processes with a minimal role, if any, for public participation in foreign policy making. The assumption of this approach, according to Headley (2012), is that foreign policy, including the security and survival of the state, was too important for the ignorant public to be allowed a significant role in its formulation and execution and that only trained and knowledgeable diplomats and other experts could negotiate the nuances of a country’s relations with other states.

Of course, the assumption fails to appreciate that it is the presumed ignorant public who
sacrifice their lives in the event of war and therefore they should be allowed to decide whether such a sacrifice should be made and when such a sacrifice should be made. Headley (2012) further argued that recent developments such as the “war on terror” have placed greater focus on public input in world affairs to the extent of engaging in public campaigns to educate the people on government policies. For example, the Zimbabwe government used the print and electronic state media to explain to the people the rationale of its land reform and indigenisation policies which were impacting negatively on foreign relations with external states and non-state actors.

Public participation in foreign policy processes is desirable and can be achieved through public official consultations through a variety of channels and institutions and through informal, unofficial or non-governmental voices and civil society actors. Public participation can also be achieved by consulting interest groups or think tanks with a keen interest on foreign policy development and these groups’ focus is mainly on transparency and interest representation. Furthermore, public participation in foreign policy is appropriate since valuable insight may be derived from the consultations. It is also fair on the part of the citizens since a mishap in foreign policy may translate into the suffering of the whole nation. For example in Zimbabwe, most citizens experienced economic hardships after the government, without consultation, embarked on the fast-track-land reform programme leading to the souring of relations with western powers and the imposition of sanctions. However, public participation does not always influence foreign policy because foreign policy is practically mainly reserved for the Executive and these have the final say on the selection of a policy path to follow. Therefore, in some instances, the public may be consulted and parliament given the opportunity to debate and vote on a certain issue but the executive will have the final say on a policy to follow.

Many developing countries like Zimbabwe have their international relations dominated by the executive branch of government, with their emphasis on liberation struggle narratives of the foreign policy environment and in the process leaving the public at the periphery of the foreign policy making process. Although Parliament can play a crucial role through its Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs to influence the foreign policy making process, its role is constrained by the fact that it deals more with domestic policy agendas than foreign policy issues. Parliament, however, can still demand that the country’s foreign engagements lead to the development of the nation and its citizens by ensuring that the executive abide by the constitution in all its international relations agenda. A key challenge of representative
elitism associated with the executive arm of government is that leaders may use their positions for selfish political, economic and electoral advantages at the expense of the public.

Another feature of the international relations system is the management of internal and external security of the state as a way of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the country. Management of a country’s security can be addressed from three perspectives, that is, the international system, nation-state and the individual (Barston, 2006). At the international system level, emphasis is based on the concept of collective security where states act in concert to control or limit force or to promote their national interests. Member states therefore sought security through a system of bilateral and multilateral alliances to safeguard their interests. A good example had been the formation of SADC as a sub-regional group where Zimbabwe belongs. The group had been drawn together as a security community based on the shared history of co-operation in liberating countries under colonial rule in Southern Africa. After independence the co-operation was restructured to focus on security, economic and political co-operation as a way of safeguarding the security, sovereignty and independence of the states (Africa & Molomo, 2013).

Zimbabwe is also a member of COMESA, AU, NAM and UN which also act as the guarantors of its security and independence through security co-operation. At national level, security is concerned with the ability to provide law and order, deterring external aggressors, seeking international support for the use of force where necessary, regime maintenance, ethnic stability, anti-terrorism and access to strategic national resources. Security at individual level is concerned with the human security agenda of “freedom from fear and want”. Emphasis of security at this level is the provision of services to citizens by the state that eliminates ‘deprivation, powerlessness, vulnerability and loss of dignity’ (Africa and Molomo, 2013). Adequate provision of food, shelter, education, health, water and electricity services, and crop and livestock production facilities becomes a critical ingredient of addressing intra-state instability and the security of the individual.

A further key feature of the international relations system is the use of public diplomacy or public relations to put across the correct and sometimes appropriate image of the country, its people and preoccupation in order to create confidence in a country and its products and to correct press distortions in another country. Through public diplomacy, states cultivate the public opinion in other countries and facilitates understanding between nations, peoples and
communities. This type of diplomacy has been a powerful weapon in the US’s international relations framework which strengthens its position as a superpower.

Most states prefer to conduct their international relations using either bilateral diplomacy or multilateral diplomacy, or both. Bilateral diplomacy are relations conducted between two states whereas multilateral diplomacy are relations conducted through global institutions, permanent conferences, and a variety of regional and pan-regional institutions (Barston, 2006). The use of bilateral relations reflects factors such as historical links, resource possession, territorial boundaries and alliance interests. Bilateral relations may take different forms like special political-military relations between USA and Britain, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status between two sovereign states where one country offers the other country reduced tariffs and removal of trade barriers on a reciprocal basis as a framework of trade policy. They may also take the form of an asymmetrical alliance, for example an alliance of major-minor powers like a military alliance between USA and South Korea, or cultural cooperation in the area of education, for example France and its former colonial territories have such a framework on a state-to-state basis. Bilateral diplomacy provides a sense of control, it is a selective rather than dependent relationship and parties are able to target or develop links with their counterparts for political, economic, technical and strategic reasons. Parties can also exit bilateral relationships as and when such relationships cease to serve their national interests. According to Barston (2006) multilateral international institutions provide a global arena for states and other actors in which participation demonstrates their sovereign equality, masking but not removing disparities of economic and other powers, which enables the state to project its views and receive diplomatic recognition of its identity.

Multilateralism enables states to display independence and to be able to operate within large group fora. Factors which may drive a state to go for multilateralism may include the fact that bilateralism may not be appropriate given the range of political, economic, technical, military and cultural issues at stake which can only be tackled through collective action. Multilateralism may be preferred where general rule making, containment of conflict and conflict resolution are the main goals. Barston (2006) advances the view that multilateralism may be favoured by those states that seek to depoliticise their foreign policy and assume an anodyne role in international relations. Examples given are Japan and Germany who channel their humanitarian assistance largely through UN agencies such as United Nations Children’ Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to reduce
political exposure by multilateralising their aid. For example some western countries who had differed politically with Zimbabwe found a way of helping the people of Zimbabwe through multilateral aid programmes in the areas of health and education without channelling such aid through government to government aid programmes.

This study was dominated by the realist perspective which regards the international system in general as a jungle in nature, where everyone strives for his/ her survival and only the fittest were at an advantage. Key variables central to this realist perspective and which are crucial in resolving disagreements about values include power, force, coercion and authority or influence. Developed and developing countries often argue, without agreeing, on the most efficient and effective way of dealing with global warming although they all agree that it is a challenge threatening the future survival of humanity. In many cases, the choice of priority for one country or region will have repercussions on another country or region. States or regions usually have disagreements on what should be done, how it should be done, when it should be done and in some cases who is going to pay. Sometimes the tussle is between achieving one group’s ends against other groups. States and regional groupings, depending on their military capacity and economic endowment, are sometimes forced to use power, force, coercion, authority or influence to achieve their objectives. Before embarking on drastic actions involving the use of force, states and regional groupings will always try and explore non-violent options to resolve their differences despite the fact that some states and regions are more powerful than others. In analysing international relations, what clearly comes out is that states, regional groups, international organisations, multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations do not always have the same loyalties and they disagree on what constitutes justice, legitimate action and order. Conflict is therefore a key feature of international relations as states and other international actors fail to find common ground over values to be pursued and why.

Considerable attention in international relations has been focused on the use of either ‘hard power’ or ‘soft power’ in achieving national objectives. ‘Hard power’ focuses on achieving direct results through military and economic might whereas ‘soft power’ focuses on achieving indirect results through culture and ideology. ‘Hard power’ is generally used by political leaders and nation-states, through inducements and threats, to get desirable outcomes, and typical examples of ‘hard power’ is the use of military force and economic sanctions on other nation-states. ‘Soft power’ is generally used with nation-states as the main players but Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Multinational Corporations
(MNCs) also have ‘soft power’ which is exercised through their wealth and their strong arguments and opinions which hold sway across state boundaries. ‘Soft power’ attempts to co-opt rather than coerce other nation-states to accept the ideas, culture and national values of powerful nation-states as their preferences. Examples of ‘soft power’ include development assistance which comes with foreign ideological values, public diplomacy, foreign media and culture.

A further key feature of the international relations system is the division of the world between rich and poor nations, also known as the North-South division. A key issue of concern to scholars is the fact that the division in wealth between rich and poor countries continues to increase. Scholars are keen to establish the factors accounting for that division and how the gap can be bridged. While some scholars have pointed at corrupt leadership and the inherited colonial legacy of underdevelopment as the main cause of poverty in the South, others have pointed at the structural economic relations of the global economy, for example the fact that the most powerful global institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are controlled and influenced by the interests of the rich global North. This was the major argument of the Marxists/Critical transformative approach which regards this structure as the root cause of the underdevelopment of Third World/developing countries.

A key element of interest to scholars is how the division between North and South countries affect the way development assistance and debts are managed. Related to the eschewed economic structural relations is also the political monopoly power of the United Nations Security Council which is dominated by the five permanent members of Britain, the United States of America, France, Russia and China plus Germany (P5 plus 1) who have veto power to stop any decisions they do not like or they think are not in their national interest. Many developing nations including Zimbabwe have been advocating for the reform of the UN Security Council to ensure that it is democratic, representative of all regions including the global South, is accountable for its decisions and is development oriented. Zimbabwe advocated for a United Nations that recognises the equality of sovereign nations and peoples, whether big or small, rich or poor.

International relations is also increasingly being viewed through the lenses of an interconnected world phenomenon called globalisation. According to Blair and Curtis (2009, p 147 ), globalisation “is an all-encompassing term that can be used to describe a whole range of developments, such as the retreat of the state, the end of distinct national cultures and the
manifestation of an information-based society.” In practice, this means that the world has become a small and interconnected place; capital is electronically exchanged between countries, products are sourced from all the corners of the globe, time and distance have been overcome by the advent of jet air travel, messages can be send to another country as quickly and easily as they can to an adjacent room, companies are increasingly focusing on global rather than national markets and nation-states are following developments taking place in distant countries. Globalisation phenomenon suggests that individual national differences are being blended together in a way which erases distinct economic, political and cultural activity. People’s lives are being shaped by events and decisions over which nation-states have little control as technology plays an important role in bringing cultures and countries together. Globalisation has resulted in the dominance of large companies on world markets and the corresponding collapse of small companies in some nation-states. An important point to note is that some issues transcend borders like global warming which affects all nations, whether rich or poor. Such issues, to the extent that they cause global ecological disasters like famine and rising sea levels which will lead to the submerging of some islands and coastal cities, require a global response.

As a result of globalisation, states have been compromised in terms of control of all their internal affairs. (Steger, 2009) The authority of states was now being challenged by international organisations, non-governmental organisations, regional organisations, multinational corporations and individuals who may have loyalties that go beyond traditional concepts of state sovereignty. Globalisation has created a network of states, companies and individuals that spreads across traditional state boundaries. Although globalisation implies an interconnected world, in reality some countries will be affected more than others. Globalisation implies that some actors in the international system will lose while others will win as a result of global competition. Nation-states should take into account that globalisation is a process driven by Western values and the fact that it is not an equal and fair process. A country’s international relations practices must therefore take into account the phenomenon of globalisation and implement an appropriate response framework if it is to remain relevant.

Analysing international relations helps in understanding the behaviour pattern of a state, region and the world, and the factors that give rise to a particular outcome and the nature of the consequences. International relations analysis therefore helps to obtain a deeper appreciation of some of the challenges that policy-makers confront on a daily basis and the reasoning behind their decisions. It also gives valuable insight on the way forward in
enhancing more viable international relations and their practises. Through an in-depth analysis of international relations, states and other influential actors have an understanding of the nature and character of the other actors they are dealing with and how to confront and relate with them on an international platform so as to achieve their national interests.

2.5 Theories of International Relations

In trying to understand why Zimbabwe in particular behaved the way it did in the international system between 1980 and 2016, and states in general, the study was guided by theories of international relations, also known as theories of state behaviour. The theories are realism, idealism, cognitivism, constructivism and marxism theories. Realism dominated this study. Salmon and Imber (2008) argued that each of these theories or perspectives constitute a frame or a lens through which global interactions or world politics are viewed. International relations theories are also concerned with the regulation of interstate relations and the achievement of justice, peace and order in the international system. Theories of international relations provide a structure of analysing relations between states and non-state actors in order to provide explanations of events and to proffer future predictions of similar patterns of events.

2.5.1 Realism theory

According to Holsti (1985), realism is a state level theory that advances the view that all states seek power and they also seek to increase that power and to decrease the power of their enemies. Such states see other powerful states as rivals who threaten their existence. Realism views states, just like people, as greedy, insecure and aggressive. Realism posits the view that world politics is driven by competitive self-interest and priority is given to national interest and security over ideology, moral concerns and social reconstructions. Realists uphold the assumptions that the overriding national interest of each state is its national security and survival and therefore states are obsessed with pursuing their own national interests. Realists believe that relations between states are determined by their power base deriving from their military and economic capabilities.

Realists are also of the view that the injection of morality and values into international relations causes reckless commitments, diplomatic rigidity and the escalation of conflict. Sovereign states, according to realists, are the principal actors in the international system and authority should be granted to great powers since they have the most influence on the international stage and that durable peace is achieved through a balance of power. Realists
believe that ‘structural anarchy’ or absence of central authority to settle disputes gives rise to ‘security dilemmas’ (Holsti, 1985). Zimbabwe’s international relations follow the realism theory as enshrined in the mission statement of its Foreign Affairs Ministry (2013);

The mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to promote the political and economic interests, image and influence of the Republic of Zimbabwe in the international community and to protect the interests and safety of Zimbabwean nationals abroad...

The statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes the national self-interest elements of national security deriving from military, economic and political capability as the bedrock of nation-building, defence and national sustenance.

2.5.2 Liberalism or idealism theory

Liberalism or idealism is another state level theory/perspective of international relations which advances the view that there is more of cooperation rather than rivalry in the world (Holsti, 1985). According to this perspective, states do not just compete or worry about power but they try to build a more just world order because they believe that cooperation rather than conflict is a viable strategy for humanity. States are seen as progressive social forces for social justice. Liberalism and its offshoot, neo-liberalism focus on how institutions can influence the behaviour of states by championing values or creating rule-based behaviour which will help to shape the behaviour pattern of states in the international system. In a way, Zimbabwe’s international relations followed the liberal theory deriving from the fact that Zimbabwe had placed a lot of emphasis on sub-regional (SADC and COMESA), regional (AU) and international (UN, NAM, G77) co-operation initiatives as a way of promoting world peace, security, order and economic growth and development which was essential to the survival of the sovereignty and independence of nation-states and that of Zimbabwe in particular. Zimbabwe, therefore, blended realism and liberalism perspectives of international relations to promote its national interests.

2.5.3 Cognitive theory

Cognitive theory of international relations examines the role of psychological processes; that is perception, misperception and belief systems in relationship to a state’s behaviour on the international stage. Cognitive theories focus on the psychological dynamics of a state’s decision makers and the shared belief system of a nation (Jervis, 1997). In a way,
Zimbabwe’s international relations practises can be said to be guided by the cognitive theory. This argument is centred on the fact that Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern in the international system was conditioned by the British colonial experiences of humiliation, manipulation and exploitation of the Zimbabwean people and the subsequent war of national liberation which freed the black people from colonial bondage. The experiences encountered in the processes of colonisation and national liberation struggles had the effect of radicalising Zimbabwe’s foreign policy approach with respect to former colonial masters immediately after the fallout with the west in 1998. More importantly, the experiences conditioned Zimbabwe to select its diplomatic partners based on past experiences and co-operation in the fight against colonialism as a way of defending its sovereignty and independence.

2.5.4 Constructivism theory

Constructivism theory of international relations examines state behaviour taking into account a state’s unique characteristics which include political, economic, social, cultural and religious influences that shape its international relations practices. Proponents of constructivism argue that concepts like power, anarchy, national interest, security dilemmas, allies or enemies are seen as socially constructed by human beings rather than structurally determined (Scott, 1967). According to Blair and Curtis (2009), constructivism counters the realist argument that the dynamics of international relations are shaped by the structures of the international system by advancing the view that the structures themselves are determined by social practices and changing social practices can lead to fundamental change of international structures. Constructivism theory did not dominate Zimbabwe’s approach to international relations as did the other previously discussed theories. However, Zimbabwe was concerned by the pursuit of unilateralism and national interest consideration by the permanent members of the UN Security Council at the expense of universal values, peace and world harmony. Zimbabwe had advocated for the reform of the UN so that it could serve as a custodian of multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism in line with the aims of the UN Charter. Changing the UN political practices which are not in line with the UN Charter was viewed by Zimbabwe as pivotal to the maintenance of international law enshrined in the UN Charter and the system of collective peace and security.

2.5.5 Marxism theory

Marxism theory’s approach to international relations emphasises on materialism. The Marxist approach is based on the works of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895).
It argues that any analysis of intra-and inter-state/nation conflict should not focus on war and peace but should zero on different issues like uneven development, poverty and exploitation within and between nations which arise from the dynamic modes of production and exchange. The Marxist approach focuses on the exploitation of poor states by the rich global capitalist system and states, and the fact that the exploitative system of neo-colonialism after independence continued to constrain the developing countries’ capacity to make material progress. The Marxian approach advocates for a structural and collective reform of the global capitalist system as a way of removing the inequality between the rich global North and the poor global South. The Marxist approach to international relations also explains Zimbabwe’s behaviour in the international system. After gaining independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean economy remained entrenched in the world capitalist system with the former colonial power, Britain, controlling most economic activities in Zimbabwe to do with trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and development assistance. In response to this economic stranglehold after independence, Zimbabwe had been campaigning for a new world order which gives a fair deal to developing countries. This approach is in line with the Marxian approach for a structural and collective reform of the global capitalist system in order to remove inequality between the rich global North and the poor global South. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was now emphasising South-South co-operation as a way of countering frustrations arising from North-South co-operation. Zimbabwe also adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology as its official guiding philosophy in running the affairs of the state since independence and its acrimonious relationship with western powers in international relations can also be explained by the fact that Zimbabwe and the west belonged to two different ideological camps.

Theories of regional integration were also explored with a view to identifying gaps in literature and how they had influenced Zimbabwe’s international relations framework.

2.5.6 Neo-functionalism theory

Haas (2001) propounded the neo-functionalism theory which is based on the importance of loyalty and trust in managing regional relations. According to neo-functionalism theory, political challenges would be overcome through a process of loyalty transference from the nation-state to the high authority or authorities (Haas, 2001). The basic import of this theory is that loyalty and trust among member countries are viewed as the fundamental building blocks in achieving regional integration. It should also be noted that in defining
regional integration in the context of neo-functionalism theory, Haas (2001) was using the European integration process and therefore this theory must be taken with caution. Neo-functionalism had been criticized for its European specificity and therefore the theory could be understood more as a European historically descriptive approach rather than as a regional integration theory with a world dimension per se. In the context of Zimbabwe’s regional relations, loyalty and trust to the region had been stunted by national interest consideration which prevented organisations like SADC and COMESA from assuming more supra-national roles which were critical for the achievement of regional integration. Other member states like South Africa also behaved in self-interested ways as the study shall demonstrate later. However, Zimbabwe placed a lot of trust and loyalty to SADC and the AU as the key guarantors of its security and independence.

2.5.7 Inter-governmentalism theory

Inter-governmentalism is another theory of regional relations which emerged as a reaction to neo-functionalism. The theory was rooted in two theoretical currents; neorealism whose core ideas were that the distribution of capabilities between member states induces differences of power, and neoliberal institutionalism, which stipulates that institutions serve as mediators to inter-state problems. Neorealism postulates that the international system was anarchical with states fighting for their survival as a prerequisite to pursuing other goals. It focuses on the interaction of states’ interests.

On the other hand, the most referred vision of inter-governmentalism nowadays is influenced by the work of neoliberal institutionalism. Since countries were now interconnected, international institutions like the WTO, UN and IMF among others served as arbiters who maintain fair rules for all (Grieco, et al 2003).

2.5.8 Interdependency theory

Interdependency theory which was propounded by Nye and Keohane in the 1970s was aimed at explaining international relations as characterized by an increasing interconnection between domestic and international affairs. The theory stipulates that there are rewards and costs which are associated with any relationship and that people try to minimise costs and maximise rewards. It further argues that closeness is the key to all relationships.
2.5.9 Regionalism

Regionalism was an extension of the interdependency theory. Haas (2001, p 25) described regionalism as;

The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.

A good example of organizations around the globe which have pursued or are still pursuing regional integration are the European Union (EU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Arab League (AL), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) among others.

There are many arguments associated with regionalism and they encompass various cross-cutting issues like political, economic, social and environmental issues among others. The arguments advocated for regional integration according to SADC are expressed in its objectives stated in article 5 of the SADC treaty of August 17 1992. These include

(a) to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of peoples of Southern Africa and to support the socially disadvantaged;
(b) to evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
(c) to promote and defend peace and security;
(d) to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the inter-dependence of member states;
(e) to achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
(f) to promote and maximise the productive employment and utilisation of the resources of the region;
(g) to achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources of the region and effective promotion of the environment and
(h) to strengthen and consolidate the longstanding historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.
SADC objectives were therefore used as the basis to tackle development, deprivation and backwardness among member states.

The other argument for regional integration worldwide is to have an internationally competitive region with the overarching objective of poverty reduction (*Southern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper, 2015.*) This point becomes valid if one takes a look at other regional integration initiatives such as the European Union (EU) which had been successful in reducing poverty among some of its backward members. In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) seeks to achieve deeper regional integration by establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) leading to the Customs Union, Monetary Union, and finally the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC). A Free Trade Area (FTA) guarantees the free movement of goods and services produced within the region and the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers. A Customs Union allows goods and services imported from outside the region to attract an agreed single tariff whilst a Monetary Union facilitates the establishment of Clearing House with a common currency. Regional arrangements also facilitate the free movement of capital and investment through the adoption of common investment policies and practices in order to create a favourable regional climate for investment and trade and the adoption of a common visa arrangement leading to free movement of persons in that region.

According to Sitati (2015) regionalism ensures that producers get a large market size which encourages mass production of goods and services and because of the large market created this lowers the cost of production by taking advantage of economies of scale. Market size, in turn, is an important factor facilitating innovation, the fixed costs of which can be spread across a larger customer base. Customers will in turn benefit from a wider choice of goods and lower prices due to increased productivity.

Regional integration increases co-ordination and bargaining power according to Bond et al (2007). Co-ordinating positions and bargaining can be easier and effective as a group than as individual countries especially when dealing with developed countries. The collective bargaining power argument is especially relevant for poor countries within the region. This can also help at international fora such as the World Trade Organisation and when regional

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groups deal with important institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB).

Polachek (1992) argued that regional integration has security benefits in terms of economics. Regional integration can increase trade within the region and attract the much needed foreign direct investment. In the end this creates trust among member states which eventually reduces the chances of conflict or war in the region. In Southern Africa, many countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi are struggling to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) due to poor governance, dysfunctional policies and huge amounts of external and domestic debts. A region is, therefore, better placed to attract investors than a single country.

In terms of politics regional integration has played an important role by making sure that peace always prevails in different regions in the world. In Southern Africa, SADC established the Southern African Regional Peacekeeping and Training Centre and other important institutions such as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in pursuit of peace, security and regional stability.

The primary objective of SADC in promoting political integration is to strengthen democracy as well as peace in the region and beyond as outlined by the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (www.sadc.int)\(^9\). This point becomes valid if one takes a look at various initiatives made by SADC to promote democracy through peaceful elections. SADC has established what it calls the SADC Electoral Observer Mission (SEOM) with a view to ensuring that free, fair and peaceful elections are held in the region in line with SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections.

Another important argument for political integration is that the region will be a force to reckon with internationally and regionally especially when mediating on conflict situations since their voice will be heard as a block, unlike a situation where weak individual member states try to bargain for some concessions with powerful blocks and developed states.

Regional integration also has a social dimension which aims to incorporate the ordinary citizens into the integration process. ECOWAS for example has an institution called the Human Resources, Information, Social and Cultural Affairs Commission (HR Commission) which is responsible for training and employment, the exchange of skilled human resources between member states and the harmonization of labour laws and social security

\(^9\) [http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/.../organ-politics-defense-and-security/]
legislation as a way of meeting the needs of citizens. While this can be a benefit to the region in so far as the exchange of human resources is concerned, in some cases it created conflicts in the form of xenophobic attacks due to pressure on social services and economic opportunities for the host countries. For example in SADC, South Africans complained that foreigners were taking up their jobs and other economic benefits and this led to xenophobic attacks in 2008, 2010 and 2015.

SADC had created a special institution to cater for social integration as a way of contributing towards poverty eradication and development of the citizenry. The overall goal of the Social and Human Development and Special Programmes Directorate of the SADC Secretariat is to contribute to the reduction of poverty and improve the availability of efficient and effective human resources for the promotion of the region’s economic growth, deeper integration and its competitiveness in the global economy (SADC Secretariat, 2015). Social integration plays a crucial role in uniting various people of different backgrounds in the region (www.sadc.int). SADC has key responsibilities in the area of education and skills development, employment and labour, science and technology, among others.

There are, however, many challenges associated with regional integration which may hinder national and regional development. Regional integration may be detrimental to national and regional development due to the issue of multiple memberships. According to Chingono and Nakana (2008), there were many challenges relating to the overlapping of memberships by states among the various Regional Economic Communities (REC) and the lack of political will by member states to belong to one organisation. Multiple membership causes confusion and problems in the long run if another block decides to have a customs union as these countries belong to more than one regional organization with the same objectives. According to Ahmed and Ghani (2006), the existence of multiple RECs can negatively affect regional integration. This can be seen from the example of SADC and SACU where countries such as South Africa had gone out of their regional organizations to look for economic initiatives elsewhere, such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) initiative. This is against the spirit of regional integration as it promotes the interests of individual countries at the expense of the regional thrust. The BRICS initiative may have its own membership requirements which may contradict with the requirements of SADC.

Regional integration also causes polarization especially in Southern Africa and elsewhere due to the different levels of development in member states. A good example is the position of
South Africa within SADC. South Africa is a dominant force in the region and most countries are just an extension of South Africa’s economy, for example Lesotho and Swaziland which belong to the South African dominated SACU regional grouping. Most countries in SADC, like Zimbabwe, depend on South Africa for their imports and exports. Other factors such as migration to strong economies in search of jobs and political stability are some of the major hindrances to regional integration in Southern Africa and Europe because such challenges have the effect of destabilising stable and strong economies. The major migration destination for SADC member states is South Africa and this factor has polarised the region due to its destabilisation effect on the recipient country. Regional integration premised on such unbalanced foundation would certainly not facilitate the letter and spirit of regional integration. The dilemma hinges on creating equal state opportunities which nations with a comparative advantage will always resist in pursuit of national interests.

Nye (1968) argued that regional political integration also affects the sovereignty of member states. A good example of this is when Madagascar was suspended from SADC in 2009 for what SADC called an “unconstitutional change of government” (SADC Secretariat,2009). Madagascar was readmitted back into SADC in 2014 after an Extra-Ordinary summit of Heads of State and Government. Zimbabwe also lost its sovereign right to form a government following general elections in 2008 which failed to meet SADC, AU and UN endorsement as free and fair elections. Zimbabwe had to go for 11 months without forming a government until it had met SADC and AU’s endorsement of a negotiated political settlement leading to the Global Political Agreement and the formation of a SADC and AU backed Government of National Unity in February 2009.

Another negative effect of regional integration is that it creates pressure on other countries to assist weaker member countries and in the end it affects the country’s economic structures. A good example of this can be drawn from the European Union. The United Kingdom (UK) felt that it was being forced to bail out countries such as Greece from their economic crisis using its taxpayer’s money. The EU regional integration was therefore a divisive agenda in European politics because it negatively affected the economic and social status of strong economies like those of UK and Germany leading to the UK’s vote to exit on June 24, 2016 through a referendum. However, regional integration theory argues that the setback of strong economies is temporary as such strong economies are likely to be stronger with full integration due to their competitiveness.
Grugel and Hout (1999) noted that regional integration allows domestic production to be substituted by intra-regional imports which in turn encourages specialization. However, this has the negative effect of creating more competition between and among states. For example the competition between South Africa and Zimbabwe has left Zimbabwe on the brink of de-industrialization due to cheap imports of finished goods from South Africa. Zimbabwe has been going through two decades of economic meltdown since 2000 which meant that companies could not recapitalise their operations during that period in preparation for competition. The result of that competition had negative impact on the ideals and goals of economic integration in the region.

In summary, elements of each theoretical framework described above have explanatory power with regards to Zimbabwe’s nation building aspirations and the consolidation and defence of statehood.

2.5.10 The arguments for and limitations of globalisation

Globalization is the diminution or elimination of state-enforced restrictions on exchanges across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result (Palmeur, 2002). The International Monetary Fund defined globalization as the “growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology” (IMF, 2008). Globalization is a term that came into popular use in the 1980s to describe the increased movement of people, knowledge and ideas, and goods and money across national borders, a dispensation that has led to increased interconnectedness among the world's populations economically, politically, socially and culturally. This section articulates the arguments for and against the concept of globalization as well as explaining other issues surrounding globalization.

Keohane and Nye (2000) summarise globalisation as the accelerated growth of economic activities across national and regional political boundaries. It finds expression in the increased movement of tangible and intangible goods and services, including ownership rights through trade and investment and often people though migration. It can and often is facilitated by a lowering of government impediments to that movement, and/or by technological progress, notably in transportation and communications. The action of
individual economic actors, firms, banks and people drive it, usually in the pursuit of profit, often spurred by the pressures of competition.

According to McGrew (1992) globalization refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies that make up the present world system. It describes the process by which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Globalization has two distinct phenomena: scope (or stretching) and intensity (or deepening). On the one hand, it defines a set of processes which embrace most of the globe or which operate world-wide; the concept therefore has a spatial connotation. It also implies an intensification of the levels of interaction, interconnectedness or interdependence between the states and societies which constitute the world community. Accordingly, alongside the stretching goes a deepening of global processes.

Hoogvelt (1998) argued that globalization has rearranged the architecture of world order. Economic, social and power relations have been recast to resemble not a pyramid but a three tier structure of concentric circles. All three circles cut across national and regional boundaries. In the core circle we find the elites of all continents and nations, although in different proportions in relation to their respective geographic surroundings. We may count in this core some 20 percent of the world population who are 'bankable'. They are encircled by a fluid, larger social layer of between 20 and 30 percent of the world population (workers and their families) who labour in insecure forms of employment, thrown into merciless competition in the global market. The third and largest concentric circle comprises those who are already effectively excluded from the global system, performing neither a productive function, nor presenting a potential consumer market in the present stage of high-tech information-driven capitalism.

Globalization, therefore, has become associated with the fast integration and interdependence of various nations which shapes world affairs on a global level. Globalization has affected the products people consume, the environment, culture, security and exchange of ideas between different countries. There are many factors that led to speedy globalization trends which include an increase in free-trade activities, emerging technologies, or the worldwide acceptance of markets. Globalization has affected cultures and economies on matters dealing with environmental destruction and availability of the already limited resources. It has had diverse implications on environmental issues such as pollution, climate change, deforestation,
water resources and biodiversity loss. Environmental degradation problems have become the subject of international efforts because the effects are felt globally.

There are many arguments and limitations associated with globalisation. Globalization is said to have changed the image of the world economy by increasing cross-border trade, exchange of currencies, free flow of capital, movement of people and flow of information. The concept has introduced the notion of border-less and integrated world economy. It has given a new dimension to businesses worldwide. Target market for businesses were not only their home land but the whole world (Intriligator, 2003).

According to Hill (2009) the expansion of global markets liberalize the economic activities of exchange of goods and funds. Removal of cross-border trade barriers has enabled and boosted global markets. However, it is not all countries that are benefiting from this exercise, and this brings out a question of whether policies associated with globalization were fair in addressing the needs of weak and underdeveloped economies like that of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the Zimbabwe government should come up with policies which ensure that the country benefits from this world phenomenon, rather than remaining ‘stuck’ in rigid protectionist policies like Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act which were not favourable to foreign direct investment.

Some forces in the world are in favour of a government that governs the entire world. Examples are institutions like the United Nations Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and World Bank which are regulating the relationship between different countries and governing issues of Justice, Human relations or political factors (IMF Centre, 2005)\(^\text{10}\). The primary purpose of the World Trade Organization was to unite the world trading system and according to Till (2005), 148 countries were members of the World Trade Organization. The primary purpose of IMF is to regulate the world monetary system while the United Nation Organization’s primary purpose is to bring peace and security all over the world. These institutions that regulate the relationship between countries have benefited most countries, for example, the IMF has helped many countries through lending them money. However, developing countries view these institutions as instruments of oppression and exploitation which are used by big powers like USA, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China to ensure that they control the world and promote their

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interests. Zimbabwe has been sending mixed signals on the usefulness of these institutions. On one hand the country has applauded the crucial role played by these institutions as instruments of world peace, security and development while also criticising their perceived role as instruments of oppression and exploitation. The foreign policy posturing of Zimbabwe tended to vascillate between these two diametrically opposed views.

Poverty rate has decreased in some regions where investment and trade is expanding. Examples of countries used were India where FDI was increasing rapidly and poverty rate was declining. Mexico has overcome its macro-economics crisis better than its neighbours as a result of globalisation. Similarly Zambia, Colombia and Poland have gained a lot by the falling of prices (Harrison, 2006).

Some analysts like Intriligator (2003), Attali (1991) and Cox (1987) among others view economic globalization as having a positive impact since it increases economic transactions across national borders and in the process increase world GDP and opportunities for economic growth and development. Still, the process is not without its critics, who consider that many of the economies of the industrial North (i.e., North America, Europe, East Asia) have benefited from globalization, while in the past two decades many semi- and non-industrial countries of the geo-political South (i.e., Africa, parts of Asia, and Central and South America) have faced economic downturns rather than the growth promised by economic integration. Critics like Ake (1995), Holm, Hans-Hendrik and Sorensen (1995), Huntington (1993) and MacEwan (1994) assert that these conditions are to a significant extent the consequence of global restructuring which has benefited Northern economies while disadvantaging Southern economies. Others voice concern that globalization adversely affects workers and the environment in many countries around the world (Castells, 1993; Fukuyana, 1992).

According to Horowitz (2004), globalization is weakening nation-states and global institutions would gradually take over the functions and powers of nation-states. Other social scientists believe that while increased global inter-connectivity will result in dramatic changes in world politics, particularly in the way states relate to each other, the nation-state will however remain at the centre of international political activity.

Frankel (2000) argued that multilateral organizations, and in particular the United Nations (UN), have changed their focus from maintaining the balance of power between the East and West to a more global approach to peacekeeping/peace-building, development,
environmental protection, protection of human rights, and the maintenance of the rule of law internationally. The creation of legal institutions like the international criminal tribunals that have sprung up in the past decade, as well as the proliferation of major international conferences aiming to address global problems through international cooperation, have been referred to as proof of political globalization. Still, since all of these institutions rely on the participation of nation-states and respect the fundamental principle of national sovereignty, the extent to which these institutions exhibit true political globalization continues to be debated.

The pressure globalization asserts on cultural norms is a major source of opposition to it. Many people view globalization, particularly in its economic form, as synonymous with Americanization (Schlesinger, 1997). To them globalization represents replacing traditional cultures with a materialistic American-centred culture. For example, many French people feel McDonald's is replacing French cuisine. Jose Bove, the French farmer who destroyed a French McDonald's under construction, has become a prominent anti-globalization figure in France. That McDonald's restaurants in France are locally owned and use predominately locally produced items does not matter in this context. These French people feel Americans are attempting to create an American hegemony by forcing American culture on them via movies, books, superstores and foods.

Through the development of Globalization, the world is getting into an identical culture that is understood by every nation which may be called the intermixing of cultures. People from different nations are getting less conscious about their national cultures and they have started evolving into a world culture. It may also be argued that the intermixing of cultures has resulted in community conflicts due to the clash of cultural practices. An example is that of some conservative societies who do not agree with homosexual rights which Americans consider to be universal. Some scholars argue that indeed it is a way of Americanizing the whole world.

Conservative scholars argue that it is important to maintain cultural diversity and cultural identity. They argue that fast-paced globalization destroys individual cultures and replaces them with a monolithic culture based on consumption, for example based on the American model. Those who welcome globalization suggest that it allows the rapid spread of the best a culture has to offer. They contend that modern communication technologies have the power to preserve cultural diversity.
Climate change which calls for truly global action, global co-ordination and sharing of knowledge as a way of tackling the challenges was by far the most difficult aspect associated with globalisation. Strategies to protect the quality of life through conservation, preservation, rehabilitation and reduction of landscape degradation through pollution, effluent or bad husbandry may require regional and global strategies to solve instead of isolated national strategies. Unlike many supposed failures and fears associated with increased global integration, in the case of the environment, globalization has a big role to play in responding to environmental degradation and climate change through international co-operation.

2.6 Factors determining national power in International Relations.

There are several factors that determine the power of a nation-state vis-à-vis other nation–states. These factors are critical in determining what a country can do and what it cannot do in terms of its international relations practices. The factors determine how a country conducts its international relations and how it defends its national interests.

Historical factors are important to many countries. It is a fact that many countries have a unique historical past and the inheritance of the past bears heavily on the present and future (Mudyanadzo, 2011). Zimbabwe’s history of struggle for freedom and independence acts as the point of reference and rallying point of the nation’s aspirations and a tool which is frequently used by political actors to whip national emotions and to mobilise people to achieve national objectives and to a certain extent selfish ends. An example is Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle history which was used after independence to craft special relationships with those liberation war allies who had supported the liberation struggle. The special relationships crafted during the liberation struggle manifested in political, economic, and military alliances after independence for mutual benefit. The historical co-operation helped to define Zimbabwe’s friends and enemies in its nation-building efforts. Historical perspectives also help international relations practitioners to confront present challenges and exploit future opportunities.

Geography is another key factor which is a source of national power. A country with a sea coast like South Africa or Mozambique has a strategic advantage compared to a landlocked country like Zimbabwe. Such a country can defend itself better in economic and military terms and has access to maritime resources. Morgenthau, Thompson and Clinton (2006) argued that the position of the continental territory of the United States of America which is separated from the continents of Europe and Asia by water which is three thousand miles
wide to the east and more than six thousand miles wide to the west gives the USA a permanent strategic advantage that determines its strategic capability in the world. Geographical location is also crucial if a country wants to secure its sovereignty and territorial integrity by making political, economic and security calculations based on bilateral and multilateral relationships with neighbours as the basis for achieving permanent peace on one’s door step. Zimbabwe’s central geographic location in Southern Africa is a key source of power in the region. Its central location is critical in facilitating trade by road and rail through the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western corridors of Southern African states. Plans to interlink electricity grids in the region depend on Zimbabwe in addition to the existing major trans-regional transmission lines that already pass through Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe’s geographical position is also crucial to the country and the region due to the presence of vast mineral deposits which are a necessary condition for national and regional growth and development. Zimbabwe’s Great Dyke which spreads 480km from North to South contains platinum, asbestos, chromium, gold, nickel and silver (Jurgens & Bahr, 2002). There are alluvial diamond deposits in the Eastern highlands of the country while the Hwange and Zambezi valley are rich in coal. Therefore the geographic location of Zimbabwe gives it huge political clout in regional and international relations as a result of these natural resource endowments.

Natural resources exert an important influence upon the power of a nation with respect to other nations (Morgenthau, 2006). A country which is self-sufficient in food is stronger than a country with a permanent scarcity of food which relies on other nations. Similarly, a country with strategic raw materials which are crucial for industrial production and for fighting a war, like oil and iron ore, is stronger than a country which lacks these resources. Nations with abundant natural resources, a high degree of industrialisation, and high standards of living will usually have a high standard of military preparedness backed by high quantity and quality of armed personnel.

Technological advancement especially relating to warfare technology ensures that those nations who do not have the same technological advancement are weaker in the international system. For example nations that possess nuclear weapons and the means to effectively use such weapons have a technological advantage over their competitors.

National leadership exerts a decisive influence upon national power. Great national leaders employ strategic and tactical innovations to war leadership and national leadership. Such
leaders rally the nation behind them and provide a vision for success in all national endeavours. A leader like Winston Churchill was able to successfully to rally the nation behind him in the fight against Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

2.7 Principles guiding Zimbabwe’s International Relations Practices

While there are factors that determine national power in international engagements as outlined above, these operate alongside principles that guide state behaviour in international relations. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe [2012], the country’s foreign policy objectives are grounded in protecting its national interests, national security, independence, sovereignty, ideological goals and economic prosperity. In pursuing these objectives, Zimbabwe had been guided by the following principles in its international relations practices:

(a) The promotion and protection of the national interests of Zimbabwe
(b) Respect for international law
(c) Peaceful co-existence with other nations
(d) Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means
(e) Promotion of regional and pan-African cultural, economic and political co-operation and integration… for the well-being and progress of the region, the continent and humanity.


These principles had been articulated and reinforced by Zimbabwe in its various policy statements since 1980. However, these principles were also violated by Zimbabwe as shall be demonstrated in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

The implementation of Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (2012), was driven by a number of considerations which included: forging regional, political, economic and cultural cooperation with Zimbabwe’s neighbours as well as SADC and COMESA regions; promoting African unity and solidarity through the African Union; pursuing development through regional and sub-regional initiatives; promoting solidarity among developing countries through South-South Cooperation; promoting international peace and security; and adherence to the principle of national sovereignty.
2.8 Domestic policy as foreign policy in the context of Zimbabwe

In international relations discourse, domestic policy also assumes the dimensions of foreign policy. According to South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs’ strategic plan, 2006 – 2009, its foreign policy is informed by domestic policy and the two are mutually reinforcing. The Department states that its foreign policy is guided by the vision of a ‘better South Africa in a better Africa and a better world’. The South African government further reiterated in 2008 that ‘foreign policy is an integrated part of government policy aimed at promoting security and the quality of life of all South Africans’ (Jo-Ansie van Wyk, 2012, p 80). In this context, it can be argued that international relations analysis is also a study of public policies of a country and how these affect bilateral and multilateral relationships.

Zimbabwe’s Land Reform and Resettlement policy and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment policy can be singled out as two such domestic policies, among others, which affected bilateral and multilateral relationships with western countries, multilateral agencies, international organisations and international non-governmental organisations which responded by imposing sanctions, cutting development assistance programmes and suspending balance of payments support and debt relief. Zimbabwe’s land reform programme featured prominently at regional and international fora where government officials articulated Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. The Zimbabwe government argued that land redistribution was a social justice issue which needed to be attended to as a matter of urgency because of its potential to cause instability in the country and the region through conflict between whites who expropriated land by force from blacks during the colonial era and blacks who fought the liberation struggle in order to repossess the land.

The government of Zimbabwe emphasized domestic policy priorities as the cornerstone of its foreign policy and sometimes public policies were articulated as foreign policy, a point which reinforces the view that public policies are an extension of a country’s foreign policy. According to Headley (2012), globalisation is breaking down the barriers between foreign and domestic matters such that they can no longer be separated in policy-making terms. Examples which can be cited are trade agreements between states which affect people’s jobs within a country while climate change problems may require action at the domestic and international levels. Foreign policy, according to Kent-Brown et al (2003), may claim the status of public policy because it comprises a series of decisions taken and choices made,
within a public institution, for and on behalf of the perceived public good or community, or national interest.

Zimbabwe viewed all its domestic problems and policy failures, especially between 1997 and 2016, as a creation of western countries and their imperialist allies because of the country’s history of colonial dispossession, deprivation and exploitation of the blacks by the whites and for that reason, domestic policy issues featured prominently in foreign policy pronouncement.

According to Adolfo (2009), Zimbabwe had been a pressing issue for SADC and the developments in the country have exposed divisions amongst member states and kept SADC’s eyes closely focused on Zimbabwe at a time it should have focused on other things especially the regional integration agenda. As a result, Zimbabwe’s situation had damaged SADC’s international reputation and the credibility of some of its leading politicians.

2.9 Conclusion
This chapter articulated the various theoretical perspectives which helped to contextualise and illuminate on aspects relating to Zimbabwe’s international relations practices. Emphasis was placed on issues like definition and context of international relations, the concept of the weak and strong states in the context of the Brookings Institute’s typology of weak and strong states, factors determining national power in international relations and the principles guiding Zimbabwe’s international relations. The chapter also looked at how domestic public policies had assumed the status of foreign policy in the context of Zimbabwe’s international relations and these issues were critical to the successful completion of this thesis.
Chapter 3

The Evolution of Post-Colonial Zimbabwe’s International Relations

3.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe achieved independence on 18 April 1980 following a protracted liberation struggle which raged from 1966 to 1979. The liberation struggle was fought to liberate the country from all forms of British colonial and imperialist designs. The war of liberation was in line with Zimbabwean nationalists’ aspirations of dismantling all colonial and imperialist systems of humiliation, oppression, manipulation and exploitation and their replacement with a democratic society based on values of equality, justice, fairness, non-discrimination and the dignity of all persons without regard to race, ethnicity, gender and religion as the bedrock of the new nation-state. Zimbabwe, with the support of both Western and Eastern bloc countries, moved rapidly to establish diplomatic contacts with the international community after fifteen years of United Nations mandatory economic sanctions and diplomatic ostracisation of the predecessor Rhodesian regime.

Zimbabwe became the forty-third member of the Commonwealth of Nations on 18 April 1980 (Griffith, 1998), and also assumed membership of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on the same date. When SADCC was transformed into Southern African Development Community on 17 August 1992 through a SADC Declaration and Treaty, Zimbabwe also became its active member (SADC Secretariat, 1992). Zimbabwe also became a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1980, the United Nations on 25 August 1980, and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) in 1981. At independence, Zimbabwe also joined economic and financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), among others. Many nations opened diplomatic missions in Zimbabwe and the country reciprocated by opening a number of strategic diplomatic missions abroad to manage its international relations agenda. Zimbabwe also entered into several bilateral joint commission agreements with developed and developing countries which were meant to foster greater economic, scientific and cultural co-operation in various fields. Zimbabwe was, therefore, warmly received by the international community when it achieved independence.

Although Zimbabwe proclaimed that it was led by a Marxist-Leninist ideology, there was a realisation by the new government that it had inherited a capitalist economy which was
anchored on the world capitalist system. The country was therefore forced to adopt strategies of pragmatism and moderation to achieve socialist transformation over time without upsetting the status quo. Local and international stakeholders warmly welcomed this strategy.

3.1 The Political, Economic and Social Context of Zimbabwe’s International Relations Agenda

A key feature of Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda on achieving independence was the involvement of both Western and Eastern bloc countries in the development of the country and its people, although a closer look at the country’s political, economic and social environment shows closer diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Western countries because of the British colonial legacy. A total of about US$300 million was pledged by mainly western donors in the first six months after independence to enable Zimbabwe to resettle refugees rapidly, repair war damages, and to enable the new government to adjust the iniquitous aspects of the economy inherited from Rhodesia (Davies, 1981). The new government also organised a donor’s conference, the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), held in Harare from 23 – 27 March 1981. The purpose of the conference was to secure pledges totalling Z$1.25 billion to help finance a three year programme of rural development and post-war reconstruction.11 The emphasis of ZIMCORD was on mobilising international financial resources, through grants and soft loans, in order to implement three major priority areas for development, that is, firstly post-war recovery programmes; secondly land settlement, redistribution and rural development and thirdly training and technical assistance (GOZ, 1986).

ZIMCORD’s philosophy was one of “moderation and reconciliation”, with the Zimbabwe government hoping to achieve a smooth, gradualist transformation to a socialist state using inflows of external capital from mainly western institutions. ZIMCORD was attended by representatives of forty-five countries, fifteen UN agencies and ten international bodies (Nelson, 1982). The largest donors at ZIMCORD were the World Bank, Britain, the United States of America, the European Union and other Western sources. The Soviet Union and China did not have official representation at the conference. ZIMCORD was an extension of the Lancaster House Agreement which was tailor-made to ensure that Zimbabwe remained within the western sphere of influence. The conference was essentially a regrouping of the

Anglo-Saxon alliance and their aim was to ring-fence the new nation-state from Sino/Soviet influence.

The conference was a major diplomatic achievement for the new republic because generous commitments to the tune of Z$1.29 billion were pledged compared to Z$1.25 billion which had been sought by the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ, 1986). Zimbabwe sought international financial assistance because of the land issue which Britain, at the Lancaster House Conference, had given undertaking to assist financially, and to mobilize international financial resources for the purposes of solving the problem, and that undertaking had been a major factor contributing to the success of the conference. According to Nelson (1982) Britain pledged Z$270 million for buying underutilised land to resettle peasants. The US government, through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) pledged Z$225 million towards the training of teachers and the setting up of teachers’ training colleges, while UN agencies like UNICEF supported primary school teacher training, early childhood education and care, and support for adult education. The German Foundation for International Development (DSE) provided instructors for vocational colleges and science and technical teachers for secondary education. Australia together with Mauritius provided teachers for secondary schools while the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) moved in swiftly to reconstruct war-damaged schools, and to build teachers’ houses in rural and disadvantaged areas.

In a clear demonstration of the relationship between domestic policies and international relations, many western aligned governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) viewed favourably the Zimbabwe government’s policies on free primary education and free primary health care given the country’s history of deprivation in these areas and they responded favourably through generous funding. Zimbabwe also sought the involvement of foreign governments, NGOs and international agencies in the reconstruction of physical infrastructure like schools, clinics, roads, bridges, dams and dip tanks damaged by the war because it could not do it single-handedly. The pledges reinforced a widely held view that the realization of the Zimbabwean government’s political, economic and social goals was pivotal to the success and stability of the new nation-state and the success and stability of the Southern African region in general. Through ZIMCORD, western countries were strategically repositioning themselves to control Zimbabwe’s destiny and their long term strategic interests.
Britain, through the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) was entrusted with the task of building the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) by integrating and retraining the Rhodesian army, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU). The British were acceptable to both armies because of the colonial history of the country.

Zimbabwe became firmly entrenched in the world capitalist system when it signed the Lome Convention in November 1980, becoming the sixtieth African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country to associate itself with the then European Economic Community (EEC), now known as the European Community (EU). The Convention guaranteed free access, on a non-reciprocal basis, of most ACP exports to the EEC except for goods covered by the common agricultural policy. Zimbabwe was given export quotas of beef (8 100 tonnes) and sugar (25 000 tonnes), allocated under Lome II, which enabled it to obtain foreign currency to service its external debt and to fund its import bills. The Convention also facilitated trade promotion between EEC and ACP countries and access to soft loans, grants and capital finance. The EEC-ACP agreement that Zimbabwe signed required the government to enter into consultations with the EEC if modifications of its customs tariff and its preferential arrangements with a developed country were contemplated. Furthermore, the rules of origin that are applied to determine whether goods were produced in Zimbabwe ensured that manufactured inputs from EEC rather than other countries were used. The pattern of development that followed was tied with the EEC and in a way this curtailed Zimbabwe’s ability to pursue independent economic policies as Zimbabwe’s economy had been anchored on the world capitalist system.

3.2 The Mugabe government’s contradictory “talk left” and “acting right” as the foundation of the eventual rupture of relations between Zimbabwe and the West

Although Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s Government which assumed power on 18 April 1980 adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology as the basis of organising and running the new state, the reality on the ground was a capitalist mode of production and exchange which was linked to the inherited world capitalist system. This capitalist system was a key determiner of the internal and external policies adopted by the government of Zimbabwe. The “talk-left” rhetoric of the government with its emphasis on Marxist-Leninist ideology was neutralised by
the “acting-right”. The Mugabe government’s “acting-right” was observed, for example, in his close collaboration with white tycoons like Roland Walter “Tiny” Rowland, Nicky Oppenheimer, Algy Cluff, John Bredenkamp and Billy Rautenbach, among others (Bond and Manyanya, 2003).

Tiny Rowland, a British businessman, was the Chief Executive Officer of the Lonrho conglomerate which was built with fortunes from the gold mines of African countries and Zimbabwe in particular. Rowland remained close to African presidents where his business interests were located and he would always be accorded a courtesy call on Prime Minister and later on President Mugabe each time he visited Zimbabwe, an honour which was normally accorded to visiting Heads of State and Government. Rowland’s other imperialist adventurer and counterpart on the African continent, Algy Cluff, described Rowland as a “smiling assassin” and a “very ungenerous man in many respects” (Patel, 2015). According to Cluff (2015), Rowland thanked Mugabe for “preaching reconciliation long before Nelson Mandela did, protected white farmers, notwithstanding the fact that he won the war. I thought he behaved, for the first 15 years, really rather well.” Later on Rowland was to find Mugabe the “most egregious” African president when he sought to dismantle his business empire in Zimbabwe. Lonrho Zimbabwe Limited and Rowland’s close association with Mugabe was difficult to understand given the fact that Lonrho and its Chief Executive Officer were associated with the face of British imperialism and capitalism which Mugabe had fought against for most of his political career.

“Acting right” was also observed when Mugabe struck a special relationship with Nicky Oppenheimer, one of the most influential individuals in global diamond trade, and also a former Chairman of Anglo-American Corporation, De Beers Diamond and Anglo Gold. Oppenheimer family operated six ranches in Zimbabwe totalling 45330 hectares which was occupied in 1935 (Zimbabwe Situation, November 7, 2014). Given the demand for land for resettlement immediately after independence, this was an ‘unholly alliance’. Furthermore, De Beers, which was controlled by Oppenheimer, was granted a prospecting licence for diamonds in Marange by the government and the prospecting licence kept on being renewed for 15 years amidst allegations that top government officials were benefitting from the diamonds during the exploration period. De Beers’ prospecting licence was then cancelled by the government. In a sign of the close relationship between the President and the Oppenheimer family, President Mugabe told Nicky Oppenheimer on November 6, 2014 that
he had met Nicky’s father immediately after independence and he was told that Zimbabwe had diamond deposits which had no commercial value (Zimbabwe Situation, November 7, 2014).

Businessmen who had operated closely with Mugabe’s government since independence include Billy Rautenbach, a mining and transport tycoon with a business empire based in Zimbabwe and spreading to a dozen African countries. Rautenbach was granted the exclusive right by the ZANU-PF government to construct a Greenfuel plant in Chisumbanje and to solely supply green fuel in the country. The other was John Bredenkamp, an arms dealer and mining business tycoon who was rated the UK’s 33rd richest citizen in 2003 (Zimbabwe Independent April 21, 2016). The two businessmen were well known funders of ZANU-PF and they were accused by the Panama law firm, Mossack Fonseca, of having helped politicians and business people from Zimbabwe to launder money through illicit financial flows and offshore companies. The two businessmen were put on UN and EU sanctions for allegedly operating as fronts for Mugabe’s business interests. Rautenbach had sanctions lifted by EU in February 2012 while the US lifted the sanctions in April 2014. Bredenkamp remained blacklisted (The Guardian April 6, 2014).

3.3 Realpolitik as the key determiner of international relations after independence

The eastern bloc countries of Russia and China remained peripheral to Zimbabwe’s nation building efforts especially during the first two decades after independence although they remained Zimbabwe’s so-called “all weather friends”. This was caused by the “shortcomings of socialism which had become apparent and capitalism seemed unavoidable in countries that wanted sustainable development” (Zhang Chun, 2014 p.7). The Eurocentric nature of Zimbabwe’s nation-building programme and the resultant international relations preoccupation with western countries is a clear manifestation of its failure to disengage from the world capitalist system as a result of the country’s colonial legacy. Zimbabwe chose to follow the capitalist route because that was in line with the Lancaster House Agreement which offered to support the country subject to certain conditions being met. These conditions included accessing cheap loans and grants from BrettonWoods institutions, international organisations and western countries in general. For example Western aid to Zimbabwe in the 1980s included USD 417million from the World Bank, USD 204million from the US and USD 156million from the European Economic Community (Zhung Chan, 2014). Zimbabwe only explored improved relations with China, Russia and other Eastern
block nations following its economic crisis as a result of its dispute with western powers over the land reform programme and the imposition of sanctions.

Achievement of domestic priorities were central to the Mugabe government’s international relations agenda after independence, given the colonial history of expropriation of land by force from the majority blacks by an occupying minority white race, followed by primitive settler accumulation and uneven development in the 90 years of formal settler-colonial capitalism in Zimbabwe. The history of Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda after independence demonstrates the Mugabe government’s commitment to equity and development policies as a way of dismantling the inherited system of racial segregation and under-development which characterised the colonial legacy. Achievement of such an agenda required the active participation of the international community who facilitated trade development, foreign direct investment, tourism development, development assistance and debt relief for the new nation-state. It is therefore not surprising that Zimbabwe inherited an official foreign debt of Z$353 million from Rhodesia which represented 13.7% of the GDP (Stoneman, 1981).

The new government of Zimbabwe did not repudiate this debt for pragmatic reasons in order to ensure that it was allowed to borrow from the same financial institutions in future. There was, however, a strong moral case for repudiating the debt given that it was raised by the Smith government to finance the war in contravention of mandatory UN sanctions. Mugabe’s government failed to stand-up to the global capitalist system on this important social justice issue which would have ensured that Zimbabwe started afresh as a new nation without a debt overhang. The promises from IMF and the World Bank of more loans, debt rescheduling, and policy advice were made to Zimbabwe in return for new foreign direct investment, new flows of financial capital, better interest rates and borrowing terms, greater power and respect within international economic fora and a return to economic growth, among other promises (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). Such promises compromised Zimbabwe’s resolve to repudiate Rhodesian era foreign debts. According to Bond and Manyanya (2003), the Third World debt crisis broke out in August 1982 when Mexico was forced into a near default leading to a wave of radical nationalist discourses on the debt issue, but surprisingly, Mugabe’s government decided to inherit the Rhodesian era debt and to access more loans from Washington.
The constraints facing the Zimbabwe government at independence explains why Prime Minister Mugabe behaved the way he did in terms of policy making and implementation. First, the inherited ownership structure of productive resources was concentrated in the hands of a few local white agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists, and therefore any radical changes to the economic structure would have caused extensive disruption of economic activity leading to political, economic and social instability. Zimbabwe opted for a gradualist approach to socialist transformation which was not going to upset its international and domestic partners who were critical to the success of the new nation-state by accepting the existing economic system. There was, however, the possibility of entrenching the existing system, over time, thereby making it difficult to effect the desired socialist changes and this appears to have been the strategic thinking of the original framers of the Lancaster House Agreement.

Secondly, the Lancaster House Agreement prescribed a formula for moderation and reconciliation as the basis of rebuilding the new nation. Entrenched constitutional provisions guaranteed property rights of the white minority race and also ensured their 20% representation in parliament for the first 10 years. Respect for the Lancaster House Agreement was therefore critical to ensure that inflows of external capital were not interrupted since Zimbabwe heavily depended on such capital for its socialist transformation agenda. Thirdly, the government lacked adequate specifics on the economy since the outgoing Rhodesian regime had not availed critical information which was needed for planning, and this problem translated into systemic challenges with regards to policy formulation and implementation (Bond & Manyanya, 2003). Zimbabwe, therefore, missed the opportunity to resist the power of international finance despite Mugabe’s militant anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist rhetoric. Realpolitik was at play.

3.4 Zimbabwe’s Post-Independence International Relations Strategies
Zimbabwe’s national development trajectory was marked by five distinct phases which were not clearly supported by a coherent, focused and balanced international relations strategy. The first was the State Interventionism phase (1980-1990) when western countries, western international organisations and non governmental organisations were entrusted by the new government with the daunting task of funding post war reconstruction and the correction of colonially induced distortions in the political, economic and social sectors of the new country. Eastern block countries who had successfully supported the decolonisation of Zimbabwe through financing the liberation struggle, remained peripheral to the country’s
reconstruction programme. This international relations strategy lacked focus and balance in that it lost many opportunities as a result of its excessive pursuit of western sponsored development programmes to the exclusion of eastern block countries. The philosophy of “moderation and reconciliation” which was implemented to appease western powers during this phase weakened the country because it did not allow the country to cast its net wide in search of nation building opportunities.

The second phase was the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) from 1991 to 1997. This national development strategy was meant to correct the mistakes of the state interventionism phase through the introduction of western sponsored economic reform programmes as a condition of continued western funding. Again the country’s international relations strategy lacked balance by putting all its eggs in one basket - western powers.

The third phase was the Reactive Management or “Splendid Isolation” period (1998 to around 2003). During this period Zimbabwe abandoned western sponsored development programmes in preference for its own home grown economic development programmes after failing to meet western conditions for continued funding. Zimbabwe adopted a “splendid isolation” international relations strategy which seriously weakened the country’s economic and social sectors in the absence of sources of domestic funding. There was no attempt to engage the Eastern block countries at this stage to improve the country’s development trajectory.

The fourth stage was the adoption of the Look East Policy by Zimbabwe between 2003 and 2008 in response to western sanctions in an effort to redirect the country’s trade, investment, tourism and development assistance linkages from the West to the Eastern block countries. The strategy placed little faith and commitment to re-engagement with the west. The strategy did not achieve the anticipated goal of reorienting the country’s economy toward the east as chapter 5 shall demonstrate.

The fifth strategy was the Re-engagement Policy (2009 to 2016 – it is still running) and the strategy was aimed at rehabilitating Zimbabwe’s relations with western countries and international financial institutions (IMF, WB & AfDB) as a way of unlocking lines of credit and other development assistance funding as elaborated in Chapter 6. Zimbabwe was backtracking to the international relations strategy adopted by the country in the 1980s and 1990s as a way of re-building the country. These phases clearly demonstrate an international relations strategy which was inconsistent, unfocused and unbalanced in terms of pursuing the
national interest and the development trajectory of the country. The following phases of the country's development strategy and the attendant foreign policy strategy shall be explained to illustrate how the strategies weakened the state through the pursuit of inconsistent, unfocused and unbalanced international relations strategies.

3.4.1 State interventionism phase (1980-1990)

Zimbabwe faced many challenges on achieving independence which required a proactive state intervention strategy. A huge agenda of post-war reconstruction awaited the new government. In addition to the reconstruction agenda, the government also needed to correct colonially induced distortions in society in the areas of political and civil service governance, social services provision, access to land, urban and rural segmentation of the economy and the co-existence of a regulated formal sector alongside a loosely regulated non-formal sector. Addressing these issues required the option of going it alone or seeking the assistance of international co-operating partners. Zimbabwe chose to co-operate with mostly western international partners in its nation-building efforts. The eastern block partners remained peripheral to this initial national development strategy.

After independence, Zimbabwe inherited and preserved a diversified import substituting economy that withstood 15 years of United Nations mandatory economic sanctions and the economy then was characterised by state intervention in markets and in the manufacturing, agriculture, mining and distribution sectors (Stoneman, 1981). Zimbabwe adopted state interventionism in the economy to correct historical injustices and to promote the new social order brought by independence. Education and health sectors were targeted as the main engines of social, economic and political transformation. Zimbabwe inherited a two-tier education system that catered for white and black races differently. Education was used by the colonial settler state to protect, defend and reproduce white privilege (Chimhowu, et al 2010). The government intervened and introduced equal quality education at all levels and also legislated to make primary education compulsory.

According to the Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture (2007)\textsuperscript{12}, Zimbabwe had successfully achieved free primary education for all and 65% secondary education for the majority by the end of 1989. This was a record achievement given that at independence, only a third of Zimbabwe’s children had access to primary education and only 4% attended

secondary education (Chimhowu, et al 2010). Massive investment in education increased literacy rates to 98% for the 15-24 years age group, and for the adult population it rose to 85% by 1990. In 2010, Zimbabwe overtook Tunisia with the highest literacy rate in Africa at 92% (Chimhowu, et al 2010). According to the Report of the Secretary of Education and Culture, 1980 – 1990 presented to the Parliament of Zimbabwe, the education budget varied from 20.9% to 26.1% of the state budget.

The massive budget allocation to education was made possible due to the active support of western donors and when funding was reduced or withdrawn following the introduction of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) between 1991 and 1997, and the souring of political relations with western governments over the land reform programme and various governance issues especially after 2000, funding towards the education budget was drastically reduced.

Another key intervention that was implemented by the government of Zimbabwe after independence was related to the health sector. The country had inherited a public health service system which provided mainly for the white community and a few urban blacks who could afford the costs. Rural areas were largely underserved and they relied mainly on missionary clinics and hospitals. In keeping with its socialist ideological orientation, the Zimbabwe government embarked on an ambitious programme under the theme “health for all by the year 2000” which revolved around preventative and primary health care provision and the rolling out of a massive health infrastructure linked to service delivery target of at least a health facility within an 8 kilometres walking distance for all people including those in the rural areas.

The government also embarked on a massive human resource development strategy in line with this expansion. Zimbabwe also made welfare improvements in the area of health by providing free health care to workers earning less than Z$150 per month and their families. Health spending, in real terms, grew from 2% as a share of the GDP in 1980 to a peak of 3% in 1990 (UNDP, 1997) before the health budget began to shrink following the introduction of a World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and the withdrawal of funding by western governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

The withdrawal of mainly western funded donors who had played a crucial role in bolstering the country’s health care system over policy differences with the government contributed in a
big way to the collapse of the public health system which manifested in a cholera epidemic, worsening HIV and AIDS pandemic, increase in tuberculosis, maternal mortality, morbidity, and malnutrition. For example, according to the 2013 UN Report on maternal mortality in Zimbabwe, no progress was made since 1990 in addressing maternal mortality due to lack of obstetric care since about a third of Zimbabwean women delivered babies at home due to poverty. Maternal mortality rose by 28% between 1990 and 2010 to over 960 deaths per 100 000, and each year during the period, about 3000 women died in Zimbabwe during childbirth. The 2013 UN Report further stipulates that about 1.23% of GDP was lost annually due to maternal complications. The withdrawal of donor funds reversed the remarkable achievements in the health sector which brought health care for about 85% of the population in the first decade of independence (UN 2013 Report).

During the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe also faced a huge agenda of social assistance to redress economic conditions and welfare gaps caused by 90 years of colonial rule and underdevelopment of the majority who remained alien in their land of birth. The government intervened in critical social security programmes. The government sought to improve the welfare of unskilled and semi-skilled workers such as domestic workers, agricultural workers, industrial workers and mine workers by introducing minimum wage policy in order to correct colonially induced distortions and exploitations. In addition to prescribing minimum wages for the various sectors, the government prohibited workers from striking for better conditions of service. Employers were also prohibited from dismissing workers from employment without the approval of government.

The government also introduced price control measures in order to keep the price of basic food commodities like maize meal, bread, cooking oil, flour etc relatively low by subsidising producers. Interest rates were artificially kept low. Zimbabwe also responded to food deprivation due to droughts (1982-1983; 1987-1988) by adopting a drought relief programme which involved large scale distribution of take home food rations to the adult population during the 1982 – 1983 period and free food distribution for households that did not have able bodied adults, while households with able-bodied adults obtained food rations through the food-for-work programme during the 1987-1988 period. Social protection programmes implemented by the government were meant to protect the poor people from vulnerability,
exclusion, hunger and poverty. International donors, mainly western, played a crucial role in sustaining the social protection programmes and other social programmes of government (Chimhowu, et al 2010)

One of the key interventions that were introduced by the Government of Zimbabwe in 1980 was the transformation of public services in order to meet the expectations of its citizens. The country had inherited a settler colonial administration with socio-economic delivery in favour of a white minority settler community and urban areas (Chimhowu, et al 2010). Emphasis of the colonial administration was on maintaining law and order. The social re-engineering programme that was required then needed massive funding from the international community and western countries fully supported the thrust financially. The Head of Government, Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe, issued a Directive in 1981 which had the effect of Africanising the public service in order to accelerate national development and to meet the expectations of the majority. The Africanisation of the public service also served to project internationally an image of an independent African state. The public service was tasked with making the government vision and agenda of a socialist transformation of society operational, as articulated in the ‘Growth with Equity’ policy document, supplemented by the Three Year Transitional Development Plan (Chimhowu, et al 2010).

Public services offered by the government were in line with the new political, economic, and social environment, but the Directive did not transform rules and regulations governing public administration and its efficiency and effectiveness. Public spending increased sharply in the area of public service employment. Many western nations supported financially the skills development programmes that came with the Prime Minister’s Directive because this was viewed as the panacea to the development agenda of the new nation-state.

State interventionism was dropped as government policy agenda by the end of 1989 when budget deficits began to grow as a result of massive expansion in public service provision and the rapid decline in the economy which was failing to generate 500 000 jobs per annum needed to absorb school leavers who were being churned out by an improved education system. The economy was under stress because social welfare policies were draining the fiscus in an unsustainable way and the foreign debt was mounting leading to debt servicing problems (Chimhowu, et al 2010).

The interventionism phase of Zimbabwe’s policy agenda was, therefore, based on the implementation of socialist, egalitarian and democratic principles which were backed by
western aid and capital as a key feature of Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda. The Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation of the ZANU- PF government was not an issue to countries like Britain, USA, Australia, Canada, and the European Union because they continued to determine Zimbabwe’s destiny through trade, investment and development aid activities. African countries played a peripheral role in the reconstruction agenda of Zimbabwe after independence except for Nigeria which provided funding for decolonising the public press which was controlled by the Argus group of apartheid- ruled South Africa.

The decade of state interventionism had its own achievements and draw backs. For example, between 1980 and 1989 Zimbabwe made considerable achievements in the areas of education, health and small holder agriculture production. In the area of education, primary enrolment rose from 1.2 million children in 1980 to 2.2 million in 1989 and secondary enrolment rose from 74 000 to 671 000 in the same period (GOZ,1991). Notable achievements were also recorded in the areas of health and population services. According to the Government of Zimbabwe (1991), the percentage of children fully immunised tripled from 25% to 86%, infant mortality declined from 86 to 61 per 1000 births, life expectancy increased from 55 to 59 years while the population growth rate fell to about 2.8% per annum in 1989. In terms of small holder agriculture, farmers’ share of marketed maize rose from zero in 1980 to more than 70% in 1989 due to a redirection of credit, extension and marketing services, in addition to the maintenance of appropriate producer prices.

Despite these remarkable achievements, there were many impediments to economic growth which prompted a rethink of Zimbabwe’s development strategy. According to Chimhowu, et al (2010), growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the period 1980 to 1989 was 2.7% behind the population growth rate of 2.8% per annum. Moreover, a disproportionate share of this modest growth was in the provision of social services and public administration. Overall export growth increased by a disappointing 3.4% in real terms between 1980 and 1989, and, coupled with debt service payments which peaked at 34% of export earnings in 1987, this had the effect of constraining the growth of imports which affected existing capacity utilization in addition to affecting investment in new productive capacity.

Unemployment reached 26% in 1989 due to the fact that a total of about 200 000 school leavers were being churned out by the education system annually and yet only about 20 000 to 30 000 new jobs were being created in the formal sector and the bulk of these jobs were created in the governmental sector, especially in education, health and public administration.
Government therefore wanted to focus attention on promoting employment in the formal productive sectors and the informal sector as a way of redressing the anomaly.

The government’s fiscal deficit also prompted a rethink of policy direction. The fiscal deficit was in excess of 10% of the GDP during the period 1980-1989 and this caused government debt to reach 71% of GDP by 1989, 36% of which was external debt (Ministry of Finance Policy Statement, 2012). The large component of Zimbabwe’s debt which was external debt had the effect of causing internal interference in the domestic affairs of the country by lending countries and institutions that happened to be mainly western countries and institutions. The lenders wanted to ensure that they get their money back together with interest and hence the interference in Zimbabwe’s domestic policy agendas. Western countries and institutions were also keen to maintain their hegemony on Zimbabwe to ensure they continued to benefit from its vast natural resources.

3.4.2 The Structural Adjustment Programme Phase (1991-1997)

Zimbabwe was forced to adopt the ‘Washington Consensus’ brand of free-market economics in 1990, a hegemonic ideology which shaped Zimbabwe’s macro-economic policy agenda and its relations with the global capitalist system (Bond and Manyanya,2003). The policy framework adopted by Zimbabwe was called Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) - a neoliberal policy framework whose main thrust was:

- Fiscal austerity especially through cuts in social spending, full cost-recovery and unaffordable user fees on even essential social services, liberalisation of trade and financial markets, high real interest rates, restructuring the economy to emphasise export-orientation, mindless and often corrupt privatization and deregulation (Bond and Manyanya, 2003 p 32).

Zimbabwe was forced to adopt ESAP as a condition for continued receipt of donor funds by the IMF, World Bank and western nations. Again, eastern block countries remained peripheral to this international relations strategy. By adopting ESAP, Zimbabwe had fully embraced capitalism, though reluctantly, and any talk of socialism was mere rhetoric. According to Jenkins (1997), there were many push factors that explain this radical policy shift. The first is the rightward movement in ideology that culminated in the triumph of global capitalism with the collapse of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe which marked the whole of the 1980s. Zimbabwe found itself with no socialist ideological partners to lean on.

Secondly, external financial institutions who became economic advisors to government since 1980; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – together with local pressure groups who included strong, white dominated lobby groups, viewed privatisation as a key economic and fiscal recovery strategy to the economy whose budget was increasingly becoming unsustainable (Bond & Manyanya, 2003).

Thirdly, technocrats prevailed over ideologues in Mugabe’s cabinet. According to Bond and Manyanya (2003), ESAP was introduced by Finance Minister, Bernard Chidzero, with the support of technocrats in cabinet, the ruling party and the bureaucracy. Technocratic considerations replaced political considerations within the ruling party ZANU-PF and government structures. The technocrats were joined by the World Bank and IMF to constitute a pro-adjustment coalition which eclipsed any resistance that the Mugabe cabinet could mount.

Fourthly, the economy was under stress due to the social welfare policies which were draining the fiscus in a big way and the socialist-oriented development strategy was not delivering jobs at a time when there was growing unemployment. Fifthly, the serious debt servicing problem by 1990 caused government to reconsider its policy. The external debt service ratio in the mid-1980s was in the range of 20-40% of the GDP. Chidzero and the World Bank had promised that ESAP would deliver the following benefits;

- Economy would grow by 5% annually, the overall budget deficit would shrink to 5% of GDP, repaying the debt would become easier and the debt service ratio would drop from 24% in 1990 to 18.9% by 1995, private sector investment would double government investment from levels of the late 1980s, total investment, which averaged less than 20% of GDP from 1985-1990, would reach 25% by 1993 and remain there; inflation, running at 20% in early 1991, would be down to 10% by 1994, exports would grow by about one third from late 1980s levels, Zimbabwe would have better terms of trade in its dealings with the world economy and new direct foreign investment would flood in at a rate of US $30 million a year from 1992-1995.

(Bond and Manyanya, 2003 p.32)

ESAP marked a decisive phase when Zimbabwe was transformed from a strong state to a weak state. ESAP wiped out all the remarkable achievements in political, economic and
social sectors that had been gained in the first decade of independence (1980-1990). ESAP failed dismally to achieve its objectives outlined above. According to Jenkins (1997), during the implementation of ESAP, GDP growth only reached 5% during one year (1994) and averaged about 1.2% from 1991 to 1995. Inflation averaged more than 30% during the ESAP period and was nowhere near the 10% target. The budget deficit was more than 10% of GDP and never achieved the target of 5%. Zimbabwe’s foreign debt was 75% of the GDP by 1994 before falling to about 67% of the GDP in 1995. During the 1992-1993 fiscal year, interest payments on both foreign and domestic debt increased 15% more than projected due to the interest and exchange rate volatility (World Bank, 1995). Per capita income contracted by -1.9% to Z$1992 compared to Z$2998 just before ESAP (Chimhowu, et al 2010). Interest rates trebled between 1991-1996 (Moore, 2003). Zimbabwe experienced deindustrialisation under ESAP, for example the textile industry contracted by 61% between 1990 and 1995 (Camody, 1998) and manufacturing output in general fell by more than 20% between 1991 and 2000 (Ismi, 2004).

As a result of ESAP, Zimbabwe experienced unprecedented economic decline and poverty levels scaled alarming heights as price and wage controls were removed and the Zimbabwe dollar was devalued by 40%. Unemployment reached 50% by 1997 and the percentage of people living below the poverty datum line rose from 50% to 75% (Chimhowu, et al 2010). Real wages fell sharply due to cost recovery policies for education, health and other social services. In response to the social costs brought by ESAP, there were spontaneous public riots known as ‘IMF riots’ which included public workers strike in 1996 and other strikes in 1997 and IMF food riots in 1998. The riots were called ‘IMF riots’ because IMF and the World Bank’s prescriptive policies on Zimbabwe were believed to have caused the economic hardships which triggered the strikes and the riots.

Zimbabwe’s economy was dependent on international finance from western countries and institutions for balance of payment support before and during ESAP and estimates suggest that by the time of the land invasions in 2000, up to 18% of recurrent expenditure budget was financed that way (Chimhowu, et al 2010). Western donors also supported the various social development programmes of government especially the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme which was meant to protect the poor and vulnerable groups from transitional hardships during ESAP. According to the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ, 1991), potential negative effects of structural adjustment on the poor and vulnerable groups fell into three general categories; that is, firstly those affected by unemployment due to redundancy as a
result of rationalisation of the public service and parastatals, the expected collapse of inefficient private sector companies which could not withstand competition and employees who were expected to be retrenched in all sectors.

Secondly, poor and vulnerable groups were expected to be affected by inflation and relative price increases whilst a third category of the poor and vulnerable groups were expected to experience negative effects of structural adjustment due to social service cut-backs and increased cost recovery. Aid volumes had been declining since 1994 and declined drastically following the Fast Track Land Reform programme of the government. Zimbabwe should have reassessed its international relations agenda after the experiences of ESAP to lessen the “soft power” exposure of western countries who used their financial power, economic and technical skills, and influence deriving from the colonial legacy to force the adoption of an economic blueprint which threatened the existence of Zimbabwe as a nation state and the survival of its people. Zimbabwe did not know what it really wanted when it engaged western countries, NGOs and international organisations before the implementation of ESAP, otherwise it would have avoided taking all the prescriptions without assessing their relevance to Zimbabwe’s economic malaise.

Zimbabwe also lacked negotiating skills which would have defended its national interests and as a result, the “soft power” of western nations and institutions prevailed in imposing ideological values and policy options which were backed by their wealth. When ESAP came to an end, a review of Zimbabwe’s international relations should have been conducted in order to cast wide its relationship to include potential financiers from the East, but sadly, this did not happen. A Look East Policy could have been explored at this stage. Broadening Zimbabwe’s network of financial assistance would have given the country many strategic options at any given time. Zimbabwe continued to hope that a way forward with western countries would be found whilst at the same time retreating to reactive management in its international relations agenda. Mugabe intensified his verbal confrontation towards western countries, international institutions and NGOs affiliated to the West.

3.4.3 Reactive Management Phase (1997-2008)

The failure of the IMF and World Bank supported Economic Structural Adjustment Programme triggered internal instability in Zimbabwe which was caused by, among other things, the decline in investor confidence, increase in unemployment and inflation, ballooning of both foreign and domestic debt, poor export performance leading to serious
foreign currency shortages, reduction in social spending by the government which affected basic social services on offer leading to a high cost of living, and the withdrawal of aid by western nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations who were funding a critical component of Zimbabwe’s budget. ESAP wiped out all the remarkable achievements of the Zimbabwe government during the first decade of independence (1980-1990).

As people’s resistance mounted as a result of ESAP and the resultant macro-economic policy failure, the Zimbabwe government resorted to reactive management. The government adopted an authoritarian style of management in order to suppress dissent and to hold on to power at any cost. In typical realism fashion, national security and survival was considered the ‘irreducible minimum’ of Zimbabwe’s national interest. As hardships continued to mount because of ESAP, Zimbabwe’s 50 000 plus war veterans demanded Z$50 000 one-off payments, an increase in their pensions benefits to Z$2000 per month, access to a significant percentage of all land acquired by the government for resettlement and the government obliged because it feared losing this critical pillar of its support base. The expenditure had not been budgeted for and it drastically increased government expenditure which undermined confidence in Zimbabwe’s fiscal policy and on November 14, 1997 (also called “Black Friday”), the Zimbabwe dollar lost 71.5% of its value against the US dollar and the stock market crashed, wiping off 46% from the value of shares as external investors lost confidence in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar. The failure of ESAP and economic mismanagement were also contributory factors to the crash of the Zimbabwe dollar as investors who adopted a “wait and see attitude” were generally losing confidence in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe adopted its own home-grown economic blueprint in 1998, after abandoning ESAP, and the programme was called Zimbabwe Programme of Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), which adopted a domestic reform agenda whilst recognising the need for policy reversals in many areas to consolidate its political hold on power. The measures adopted included the introduction of selected price controls, increased tariffs, import licensing on some goods, pegging of the exchange rate, suspension of foreign currency accounts, introduction of new export incentives and the imposition of levies on tobacco and consumer goods.

Before assessing the success of ZIMPREST in realising its objectives, the Zimbabwe government launched a new economic policy programme called Millennium Economic
Recovery Programme (MERP) in August 2001 as a short term 18-month recovery programme whose main thrust was to address underlying macroeconomic fundamentals with the support of civil society. The economic programme was abandoned unceremoniously immediately after adoption as it failed to provide direction to the economy. After MERP, the Zimbabwe government adopted another policy programme called Macro Economic Policy Framework from 2005-2006 in which economic programmes were either implemented piecemeal or abandoned half way or remained paper reforms.

In 2006, the state introduced the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) and in 2007 the National Economic Development Plan (NEDP) which purported to create ‘a conducive environment for investment’. This was happening at a time when the government was introducing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment regulations which contradicted NEDP. Most of these economic development plans were rendered useless when the international donor community and international financial institutions withdrew their financial support. Government’s reaction to ESAP was, therefore, incoherent, unpredictable, confusing and directionless following its abandonment by the western nations and International Financial Institutions as reflected by the adoption of a plethora of economic development plans without funding and the abandonment of some of the plans before implementation.

Zimbabwe’s international isolation intensified following the extra-parliamentary deployment of Zimbabwean troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by the Head of State and Government, President Mugabe, in support of the Kabila Government which was under siege from rebel forces. The military deployment took place during the period 1998 to 2002. The DRC war drained Zimbabwe’s Treasury an estimated US$1 million every day at a time the country was struggling to finance its development programs.

In addition to the DRC war, the failure of the Zimbabwe International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement to raise the money from international donors to fund the land reform and resettlement in 1998, the failure to reform the constitution through a referendum in 2000, which triggered the fast-track land reform programme, a deteriorating economy, a vibrant opposition and militant civil society and the real prospects of losing power all contributed to a violent reaction by the government leading to more international isolation. The deterioration of Zimbabwe from a strong state to a weak state can therefore be explained by the failure of macro-economic policies which aimed at addressing long term structural
problems in the economy which were linked to the deterioration in political governance and the fall-out with western nations, international financial institutions and non-state actors, as a result of such problems. Western nations and international financial institutions provided critical financial support which was crucial to the viability of the government.

Attempts by the government to go it alone after 2000 was an international relations disaster as the political, economic and social patterns reflected a country going through unprecedented decline. For example, Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) carried by the Government of Zimbabwe showed that the number of households living below the food poverty line was 25.8% in 1991, 34.9% in 1995, 63% in 2003 and 72% in 2006, and estimates suggested that by November 2008, the peak of the crisis, up to 80% of the population survived on less than US$2 per day (Chimhowu, et al 2010). Zimbabwe was clearly a weak state due to food insecurity and the rapidly declining economy. The result of Zimbabwe’s decline in political, economic and social sectors and its abandonment by western financiers meant that Zimbabwe was compromised in her capacity to engage the international community.

3.4.4 Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy (2003-2008)
Zimbabwe adopted the Look East Policy after the imposition of western sanctions on the country as a way of dealing with the political and economic crises at home and to re-orient its trade, investment, tourism and development assistance opportunities from the west to the eastern block countries as Chapter 5 and 6 shall illustrate in greater detail. The strategy improved the economic and political situation in the country but it failed to disengage Zimbabwe from its traditional western linkages.

3.4.5 The Re-engagement Policy (2009 to 2016)
The re-engagement policy was the last international relations strategy which was used by Zimbabwe in its nation building efforts during the Government of National Unity (2009 to 2013) and was continued by the ZANU-PF government which came to power after general elections in 2013. The re-engagement strategy and the challenges and opportunities associated with that strategy were discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

3.5 The Centrality of the Land Reform Programme to Zimbabwe’s International Relations.
The repossession of land forcibly acquired from blacks by the colonial settler regime in 1890 was the raison d’etre of the liberation struggle and after independence, the land issue
remained central to Zimbabwe’s internal crisis and the major cause of the country’s diplomatic confrontation with Britain, the former colonial power, and other Western powers sympathetic to Britain. The land issue defined the political, economic, social and cultural relations between Zimbabwe, on one hand, and Western nations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations on the other.

The British colonial history of violent land appropriations and dispossession of Zimbabweans and the resistance to such land deprivations through the first war of resistance (First Chimurenga, 1893-1896) and the second war of resistance and liberation (Second Chimurenga, 1966 -1979) ensured that the land issue remained a central feature of Zimbabwe’s domestic and international relations agenda. The Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe succeeded in 1979 because Britain and its allies, notably the United States, had given guarantees that they will fund the land reform programme, using the willing seller – willing buyer formula and the compensation was to be based on market rates. A moratorium on constitutional reforms was also included in the Lancaster House Agreement which ensured that land reform could only be carried out for the first ten years using the formula agreed at Lancaster.

The land issue was a race and class issue at the same time. Before independence, colonial policies regarding racial settlement affected the pattern of agricultural production and were, for the most part, responsible for the gross inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. Land settlement was guided by the Land Apportionment Act (1930), Land Husbandry Act (1951) and the Land Tenure Act (1969). The purpose of these pieces of legislation was to allocate land along racial lines by dividing the country into European and African areas. The occupying European race, which comprised 4% of the total population, allocated themselves about 50% of the whole national land which was the most fertile land suitable for intensive farming in regions i, ii and iii. In contrast, the Africans who constituted 96% of the population and who owned the land prior to colonisation, were allocated the other 50% of the national land which was barren, arid and semi-arid and located in regions iv and v. The area allocated to Africans was relatively small and population pressure mounted on those communal areas due to population growth. The situation in African communal areas was worsened by poor agricultural support services leading to bad traditional farming practices.
and discrimination in the provision of infrastructure which restricted production in African areas while stimulating production in European areas.  

On achieving independence in 1980, 6000 white large-scale commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares of Zimbabwe’s best fertile land, while 8 500 African small-scale commercial farmers owned 1.4 million hectares and an estimated 700 000 indigenous communal area households survived on 16.4 million hectares, 75% of which was in the driest and least fertile agro-ecological zones (Hammer, et al 2003). By 1998, the eschewed racial ownership of land did not change much with 4000 white large scale commercial farmers retaining 11.2 million hectares of land (28%), over 1 million communal households occupying 16.3 million hectares(42%) while 70 000 households had been resettled on 2 million hectares (9%). The white large-scale commercial farmers constituted the agrarian bourgeois, who together with their counterparts in manufacturing and mining, had a controlling stake in the economy while Africans constituted the dominant force in terms of workers and the peasant classes but remained marginalised in the mainstream economy.

As impatience and tension grew because of the slow pace of the land reform programme and priorities of the government’s resettlement programme which had shifted significantly to benefit the bureaucratic elites and the creation of a new class of black large scale commercial farmers, spontaneous land invasions by mainly war veterans and peasants began on white commercial farms. Government’s reaction to the invasions was to evict or arrest the occupiers although the evicted occupiers continued to return to previously occupied farms, sometimes with the tacit approval of ZANU-PF which made political mileage out of the invasions. It was under the political climate of land invasions that the International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement was held in Harare, from 9-11 September 1998.

The conference was convened by Zimbabwe to inform donors on the status of land reform and resettlement since independence. By convening an international donor’s conference, Zimbabwe’s strategy was to internationalise the land reform and resettlement issue since the origin of the issue was the Lancaster House Agreement which was brokered in 1979 with the active support of Anglo-Saxon nations who had pledged financial support for the land reform and resettlement. Representatives of the following countries and international organisations attended; Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France,

Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America, African Development Bank, Economic Commission for Africa, European Union delegation, Internationa Fund for Agricultural Development, International Monetary Fund, International Organisation for Migration and United Nations Environment Programme. Local delegates who attended included the Commercial Farmers Union, Zimbabwe Farmers Union, Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union, Zimbabwe Tourism Authority, Women and land lobby groups. From the list of delegates, it can be extrapolated that mainly western nations, backed by western aligned financial institutions and international organisations, remained ceased with the land issue in Zimbabwe. Two notable exceptions from the communist bloc, China and Cuba, attended but they did not make any meaningful contribution to the outcome of the conference.

This conference was an extension of the western brokered Lancaster House Agreement and therefore communist countries like China and Cuba could only observe developments. This clearly demonstrates that Zimbabwe’s domestic and international relations agenda was, up to that point, largely influenced by western nations and western aligned international financial institutions and international organisations. Donors unanimously endorsed the necessity for land reform and resettlement in Zimbabwe as a critical national strategy for poverty reduction, economic growth and political stability. The conference recommended that the land reform and resettlement programme be integrated into the macro-economic policy reform process and that the programme should target the poor and focus also on equal access to land and ownership by men and women. The conference did not result in any money pledges on the table but it committed itself to supporting the Inception Phase which was to be implemented over 24 months with a focus on the establishment of an “efficient and rational structure of farming, achievement of optimal utilisation of land and natural resources and equitable access to land by all Zimbabweans irrespective of colour, gender or creed” (Communique of the International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement, September 11, 1998).

A task force was established to co-ordinate the mobilisation of funds from willing donors to support the inception phase. The inception phase was, however, never implemented when Britain refused to join a team of major donors to prepare documents for a two year phase suggested by the conference. Britain killed the inception phase by insisting that a consultant be appointed to do an economic returns analysis of the programme to date to assess how it had alleviated poverty among the chronic poor in Zimbabwe. The British position was viewed
by the Zimbabwe government, restless war veterans and peasants as a delaying tactic and dishonest broking by Britain and her allies who were protecting the entrenched privileges of the minority white race who controlled most of the land. Land invasions overtook the inception phase. The Zimbabwe government resisted intrusive demands by donors for transparency, accountability and the rule of law in the new land reform process. Zimbabwe also resisted pressure to withdraw Zimbabwean troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo since these two issues were viewed as national sovereignty issues which were not negotiable. The Mugabe government used national sovereignty as the centre piece of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialist rhetoric to counter critics of the revived land revolution and the new brand of authoritarian nationalism (Worby, 2003).

As the fallout from the outcome of the donors conference intensified, the ZANU-PF National Congress resolved in December 1999 that Britain should pay compensation for agricultural land acquired under the land reform programme and the Zimbabwe government would pay for improvements on the land. ZANU-PF argued that this was a moral obligation for Britain as the former colonial power. The ZANU-PF resolution was incorporated in the constitutional proposals of 2000 and was later given constitutional effect.

The land issue took a dramatic turn in February 2000 when the Zimbabwe government lost a constitutional referendum, which it had promoted, to an alliance of opposition and civic society leaders. ZANU-PF had inserted a clause in the draft constitution committing Britain to pay for land acquired by the state and it is this clause which it had banked on to win votes in the February 2000 referendum and the June 2000 Parliamentary elections. Besides the land issue, voters were voting on other contentious issues like economic meltdown, governance issues and the curbing of excessive presidential powers in the proposed new constitution. The victory of the ‘NO’ vote was a slap in the face for the government since it resonated with the ‘regime change agenda’ sentiments which had been promoted by some countries at the International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in 1998.

The ZANU-PF government sought to consolidate its hold on power in the wake of the referendum defeat and the land issue remained its trump card. Invasion of white commercial farms led by war veterans and peasants intensified shortly after the referendum defeat and engulfed the whole country in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of June 2000 with tacit approval of ZANU-PF and the government. President Mugabe warned anyone who interfered with land occupiers that they would face the full wrath of the state. War veterans
blamed white farmers, the West, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the civil society group, National Constitutional Authority (NCA) for the ‘NO’ vote and portrayed the vote as primarily about blocking land redistribution (Alexander, 2003). President Mugabe urged his party supporters to “strike fear in the heart of the white man, they must tremble” (Raftopoulos, 2003). The stage had been set for a major confrontation with white farmers, opposition parties and civil society groups within the country who were specified as ‘enemies of the state’ who wanted to give back the country to the British, and western countries and international financial institutions who had opposed this method of land reform as it was deemed to violate the rule of law and property rights. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proposed to the government of Zimbabwe in 2000 to slow down the land reform programme in line with Zimbabwe’s implementation capacity, and to promote national dialogue and possible resumption of UNDP technical assistance, but the suggestion was ignored because it had already been overtaken by the ‘fast-track land reform’ programme which was underway on the ground.

When the June 2000 parliamentary elections were held, the land issue featured prominently and the opposition and civic society groups who opposed the land invasions under the fast-track land reform programme were labelled “sell outs” and “enemies of the state” during the election campaign. The elections were held in an environment of violence and intimidation against opposition and civic society leaders and supporters. Despite high levels of intimidation, violence, political intolerance of the opposition and lack of access to the public media by opposition and civic groups, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change won 57 seats against ZANU-PF’s 62 seats in parliament. The election results clearly demonstrated that the balance of power had markedly shifted in favour of the opposition movement which included civic society groups and ZANU-PF adopted ruthless political strategies to contain the swing to the opposition in preparation for the 2002 Presidential election.

Sub-regional, regional and trans-continental campaigns were launched by the Mugabe government at that stage to win support for the fast-track land reform programme drawing on the liberation struggles of black people on the African continent and the African-American struggles in the US. Prominent African American civil rights campaigner, Andrew Young, was enlisted by the Mugabe government to win sympathy in Washington for the land reform programme but the campaign failed because the Republican Administration at the White House introduced tough sanctions against Zimbabwe through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) in December 2001. SADC which had observed the 2000
Parliamentary elections, through the SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission, politely failed to endorse the elections as a true reflection of the desire of the electorate citing incidences of “violence in all the provinces of the country”, the “disruption of opposition campaign meetings” by ZANU-PF functionaries, “lack of free flow of communication to the electorate- a necessary condition for democracy to prevail”, and “lack of access to the public media” by the opposition. Although ZANU-PF had used unorthodox means to win the election as a way of defending the land reform programme, SADC member states did not buy the strategy since this was contrary to the common political value system that SADC was building through SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission recommended that SADC leaders should engage the Zimbabwe leadership to facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition.

International diplomatic efforts were launched in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001 by Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in order to resolve the land crisis in Zimbabwe. The Abuja meeting agreed in its communiqué that:

Land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from other issues of concern to the Commonwealth such as rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and the economy. A programme of land reform is therefore crucial to the resolution of the problem. Such a programme of land reform must be implemented in a fair, just and sustainable manner, in the interest of all the people in Zimbabwe, within the law and constitution of Zimbabwe (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001).

At the Abuja meeting, the Zimbabwe government undertook to prevent further occupation of farms, restore the rule of law, take firm action against violence and intimidation, and respect freedom of expression, but farm invasions, violence, intimidation and suppression of freedom of expression intensified immediately after the meeting. The Zimbabwe government, in clear violation of the letter and spirit of the Abuja resolution, went on to amend the Land Acquisition Act in 2001 to allow it to allocate land without giving the owners the right to contest the acquisition. The actions taken by Zimbabwe had the effect of denting Zimbabwe’s international relations image with the Commonwealth, the European Union and the United States. Interest in Zimbabwe by international donors and investors evaporated rapidly due to the perception of lawlessness which had gripped the country as a result of the land invasions.
As the Commonwealth’s interest in Zimbabwe took centre stage because of the land issue and related governance issues, the Commonwealth despatched an Election Observer Group to monitor the 2002 Presidential election. The Commonwealth Observer Group (2002) observed that the Presidential election was tarnished by high levels of politically motivated violence and that “the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for a free expression of the will by the electors”. The observer group urged the Commonwealth to take appropriate response in the wake of the findings. Zimbabwe was then suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth for one year and this position was to be reviewed after a year based on progress in Zimbabwe in terms of implementing provisions of the 1991 Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles.

When Zimbabwe’s suspension was further renewed after a year, Mugabe reacted angrily to the suspension and withdrew from the Commonwealth on December 7, 2003, in the midst of intensified farm invasions in line with the fast-track-land reform programme. Although Zimbabwe expected solidarity from SADC and the African Union (AU), lobby groups within the Commonwealth at the Abuja Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting (CHOGM), African delegations stood by the Commonwealth principles as Zimbabwe was withdrawing. Zimbabwe’s diplomatic strategy was to split the Commonwealth along racial lines or at least to get African delegations withdrawing from the Commonwealth in solidarity, but this did not happen.

The Abuja summit, however, ended with deep feelings from African delegations over Zimbabwe’s treatment by the Commonwealth, but no substantive action was taken. The failure of Pan-Africanism to defend Zimbabwe’s land issue at the Abuja CHOGM meeting was a huge setback for Zimbabwe’s international relations strategy which was based on projecting the land issue as a racial issue because it involved white farmers with Anglo-Saxon ancestry. The land issue had also been projected as a bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and Britain, and Anglo-Saxon nations within and outside the Commonwealth rejected these positions preferring instead to link it to the violation of the rule of law, a cardinal principle which is considered to be sacrosanct by the Commonwealth.

As Zimbabwe was withdrawing from the Commonwealth in 2003 as a result of the land issue primarily, its strong SADC ally, Mozambique, was establishing its roots in the Commonwealth having joined in 1995. Mozambique, together with five other members who included Jamaica, Nigeria, India, Australia, Canada minus South Africa which
opposed the motion, voted for Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth in 2003. Rwanda joined the Commonwealth in 2009 after Zimbabwe’s withdrawal in 2003, reinforcing the view that the Commonwealth was a credible organisation since it was being joined by countries with no historic links to Britain dating back to the colonial era, that is, Mozambique (a former Portuguese colony) and Rwanda (a former French colony).

Zimbabwe’s strategy of internationalising the land issue had few takers in SADC and the AU due to national interest considerations. The position taken earlier by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka in July 2001 also supports this view. The communiqué of the Summit called on “Britain to honour its colonial obligations to fund the land resettlement programme in Zimbabwe in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement”. Pursuant to that resolution, Foreign Ministers of the OAU set up a committee chaired by Nigeria and comprising Algeria, South Africa, Cameroon, Kenya and Zambia to “co-ordinate with Zimbabwe at all fora wherever the land issue is raised” (OAU Communiqué, 2001). Whatever co-ordination that may have been done by African delegations at future summits, like the Abuja CHOGM summit, appear to have been minimal and ineffective because African delegations were pursuing national interests in such fora. For example, the SADC group within the Commonwealth, supported by Uganda, could only issue a solidarity message with Zimbabwe after the suspension by the Commonwealth, by referring to the “dismissive, intolerant and rigid attitude” shown by some Commonwealth member states towards Zimbabwe.

The African group within the Commonwealth was divided over the land issue in Zimbabwe. According to Chan (2007), Zimbabwe’s argument on the land issue, in particular the argument that the land issue was a racial issue was damaging the international relations of Africa as a whole and some African countries preferred to steer clear of controversies arising from such a policy for fear of the contagion effect. It partly explains why Zimbabwe withdrew into a “laager mentality” and pursued a “splendid isolation” policy with respect to Western nations especially after withdrawing from the Commonwealth. African solidarity was getting thin on the ground and was not translating to meaningful strategies to reinforce Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. The behaviour of African states, at that point, can best be described by the theory of political realism which stipulates that world politics is driven by “competitive self- interest” and that the “overriding national interest of each state is its survival, security, power and relative
capabilities” (Holsti, 1985). Examples will be cited here to show that although SADC member states appeared to be in solidarity with Zimbabwe over the land issue, individual member states were, in fact, pursuing individual national interest considerations. The African National Congress (ANC) Secretary General, Gwede Mantashe, made remarks to the effect that Zimbabwe’s style of land reform is no go area for South Africa while addressing a rally in the Free State. He argued that;

> Look at Zimbabwe. It used to be the breadbasket of Africa. Today it imports almost everything. The Zimbabwe dollar has disappeared. This economy will disappear if that is the example we want to follow…We will not expropriate land without compensation because it would be disastrous. We are not going to grab your farms. If your land is sold, it will be for compensation. (Southern Eye, August 14, 2014).

Mantashe’s position is reinforced by previous SADC member states’ pronouncement on the matter. For example in August 2001, the Blantyre summit of SADC Heads of State and Government expressed their concern at the effect of the economic situation in Zimbabwe on the entire region especially with respect to the fast-track reform programme. This was followed by a statement made by President Thabo Mbeki, with the apparent support of Botswana, in November 2001, that the blame for Zimbabwe’s problems was as a result of the policies pursued by the ruling party (SAPA, December 3, 2001). Malawi’s Foreign Minister, Lilian Patel, weighed in and stated that; “We reiterate that the bottom line for Zimbabwe is a just and equitable land redistribution which, however, must be done in a legally sound and violence-free manner” (SAPA, January 13, 2002).

Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, was more emphatic when he commented about Zimbabwe’s land reform after leaving office;

> The way the land reform was done offended other players in the world. I told them (Mugabe and ZANU -PF), they could not listen; they did what they wanted with their country. They set a bad example which we don’t want any country in Africa to follow. So they must pay a price (Newsday, August 28, 2013).

SADC summits communiqués articulated a tough line in support of Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme urging Britain to honour its colonial obligations but, behind closed doors, various concerns were raised about the style of the land reform programme, and SADC member states negotiated with international players with the interests of their
countries as the guide to their international relations. SADC, therefore, took an inconsistent line on Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. What comes out clearly in this analytical expose is that Zimbabwe could not trust SADC and AU member states to defend its land policy because these countries did not want to jeopardise their bilateral and multilateral relationships with other states and non-state actors who were affected by Zimbabwe’s fast-track-land-reform programme. Therefore, the land policy of Zimbabwe affected the international relations of SADC and AU member states that were sometimes forced to defend Zimbabwe although this was contrary to their national interests.

Zimbabwe’s land policy is a good example of a domestic policy which was articulated and implemented as a central pillar of the country’s international relations agenda. Although the modus operandi of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme was being resisted in SADC and AU member states with a similar historical background like that of Zimbabwe, it is however finding favour with radical nationalist parties in Africa who view such a method as the only avenue to access that critical resource in the absence of financial resources to buy land. History may find it difficult to ignore Mugabe’s formula for social justice with respect to land reform and the empowerment of marginalised communities. In justifying the method he used to redistribute land he argued; “If standing for my people’s aspirations makes me a Hitler, let me be a Hitler a thousand times” (The Guardian, August 2, 2013). Mugabe implemented the land reform programme in an assertive and defiant manner and ignored the huge impact of such a policy on the country, the region and the international community. The strategy was to normalise relations with the international community when the land was firmly in the hands of the indigenous people.

Zimbabwe, therefore, experienced an unprecedented decline from a strong to a weak state between 1980 and 2016 as a result of macro-economic policy failure especially between 1990 and 2008 which triggered balance of payments problems, which in turn led to the failure to service foreign debts and the souring of relations with bilateral and multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and many western countries who provided critical balance of payment support. When Zimbabwe failed to secure funding from western donors at the International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in 1998, it embarked on a violent fast-track-land reform programme which entailed expropriation of land by force without compensation even with respect to land protected by Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs).
The method of land reform, together with the violent conduct of its general elections in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008, had the effect of portraying Zimbabwe as a lawless country and this affected inflows of foreign direct investment and trade, tourism and development assistance programmes. The overall effect was the isolation of the country politically, economically and socially by most countries and institutions who were involved in providing bilateral and multilateral assistance.

3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated four key aspects of Zimbabwe’s post-colonial international relations which ruined and weakened Zimbabwe as a state. First, the Zimbabwe government pursued closer, warm and cordial ties with western countries in the first decade of independence (1980-1990) as a way of achieving her domestic priorities of nation building. Mugabe’s socialist, egalitarian policies were backed by western aid and capital as a strategy of dismantling the inherited system of racial segregation and inequality. This strategy weakened the state because the country did not make use of Eastern bloc countries as well to grow her economy. The country only ‘looked to the East’ after 2000 when relations with western powers had practically broken down. Zimbabwe should have focused on both the Eastern and Western bloc countries at independence as a viable nation-building strategy.

Secondly, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (1991-1996) was implemented with half-hearted commitment, policy discord and division within the government with respect to its usefulness. This prompted western governments and international financial institutions to stop supporting the Zimbabwe government at a time the government was heavily dependent on western institutions for aid, capital and balance of payment support, further weakening the state which was least prepared for this development.

Thirdly, Zimbabwe’s land reform programme, which was central to its international relations, did not get the support of AU and SADC as had been anticipated by the government. Despite the fact that official communiqués of AU and SADC Summits supported the programme, at government and party levels, leaders expressed reservations about Zimbabwe’s land policy as articulated in this chapter. Some countries in SADC, notably Mozambique and Zambia, key allies of Zimbabwe, embraced immediately the white farmers who were booted out of farms in Zimbabwe and gave them prime farms in their countries. Zambia went on to supply Zimbabwe with maize through the productive
efforts of white farmers who had been booted out of farms in Zimbabwe. In 2003, Mozambique joined Nigeria, Jamaica, India, Australia and Canada in voting for Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth. Therefore AU and SADC solidarity with Zimbabwe’s land reform were hollow and meaningless.

Fourthly, Mugabe’s confrontational stance towards the west, his use of racism to fight his western detractors and the holding of violent and disputed elections in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 further weakened the state’s image with international co-operating partners who responded by withdrawing their support to the country in response to his diplomatic style which contributed in a big way to the decline of the state.

In a nutshell, Zimbabwe pursued international relations strategies which were inconsistent, incoherent, isolationist and unbalanced in its nation building trajectory and this seriously affected its capacity to deliver its national interest goals. The country placed a lot of faith in western countries and western international financial institutions to deliver its development agenda while eastern bloc countries remained peripheral to that strategy. This international relations strategy weakened the country’s achievements in its nation building goals both in the short, medium and long-term. When western powers and financial institutions abandoned Zimbabwe in 1997 following disagreements over conditions for continued funding, the country’s international relations strategy assumed dimensions of isolationism, incoherence, unpredictability, confusion, directionlessness, desperation and anger. Zimbabwe continued to insult western powers and financial institutions’ policies on the country whilst at the same time depending heavily on those countries and institutions for critical support in social sectors like health, education, social security and food security. The colonial patterns of dependence and domination were intensified and consolidated at independence, through the Lancaster House Agreement, and attempts by Zimbabwe to resist the inherited colonial international relations framework of the country were met with the disciplining forces of international capitalism.
Chapter 4

The Character of Zimbabwe’s International Relations

4.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe’s international relations agenda between the period 1980 to 2016 was characterised by the nationalistic and liberation struggle ideologies which stood against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, all forms of foreign aggression, domination, occupation and interference in its internal affairs. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state was not negotiable. The political, economic and social orientation of Zimbabwe’s international relations was reinforced by the nationalistic and assertive leadership of President Robert Gabriel Mugabe who did not mince his words when criticising former colonial powers and their sympathizers in defence of self-determination and independence. However, according to Mandaza (2014), Mugabe’s assertive leadership in international affairs was influenced more by the determination to stay in power at all cost rather than the defence of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity per se.

Zimbabwe’s international relations was also influenced by ZANU-PF’s foreign and domestic policy agenda with its emphasis on defending the gains of independence and consolidating historical and solidarity networks achieved during and after the liberation struggle. These networks, which were achieved during the struggle for independence between ZANU-PF and other liberation movements on one side and African states and other international states on the other, manifested in political, military and economic solidarity. There was also an emphasis on centralisation of power and policy making in ZANU-PF and in the President, through a centralised Head of State international relations system, as a way of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and to guard it against perceived enemies. Therefore in terms of international relations theory, I would argue that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives between 1980 and 2016 were nationalistic in nature with a focus on maintaining state power and state interests and by extension the power and interests of the ZANU-PF ruling elite as the centre-piece of its international relations agenda. This chapter is devoted to identifying and analysing these and other characteristics of Zimbabwe’s international relations and how the characteristics affected or influenced Zimbabwe’s diplomatic engagement with state and non-state actors, both regionally and internationally.
4.1 Centralisation of International Relations Power in the Head of State and Government and Head of ZANU-PF

A key characteristic of Zimbabwe’s international relations during the period was the centralisation of power in the person of the Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF who influenced foreign policy agenda setting, formulation, legitimation, implementation and evaluation processes. Mugabe served as both President of Zimbabwe, President and First Secretary of three key decision making organs of ZANU-PF; that is Congress, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau (Politburo). According to the ZANU-PF constitution amended in 2005, Congress is the supreme policy-making organ of the party and is presided over by the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF. Congress’ role is to formulate, pronounce and declare all policies of the party and to supervise their implementation. The Central Committee of ZANU-PF is a principal organ of Congress and it consist of 245 members. Its role is to implement all policies, resolutions, directives and programmes enunciated by Congress and to direct, supervise and superintend all the functions of Central Government in respect of programmes enunciated by Congress. This key organ is again presided over by the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF. Mugabe also presided over the Politburo, a secretariat of the Central Committee, consisting of 49 members, whose role is to implement all decisions, directives, rules and regulations of the Central Committee.

The Politburo is the most powerful body in ZANU-PF which supervises the work of government. Major foreign policy decisions were debated in these key organs of the party and once positions were adopted, they were then recommended to Cabinet for adoption as government policy by the Politburo. In his capacity as The President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF, Mugabe chaired these party organs and his views in most cases prevailed. He also appointed the Politburo and the Cabinet and these powers of appointment ensured that he was surrounded by personnel whose loyalty and support for his policies were unquestionable. The authoritarian nature of Zimbabwe’s international relations system, therefore, manifested in one centre of power at government and party level- that is, Robert G. Mugabe, as President of the Zimbabwe Government and President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF’s key organs of Congress, Central Committee and Politburo.

Since Mugabe filled both roles, he was also responsible for the legitimation of policies through political speeches and public press statements, parliamentary processes and
presidential assent to bills which would have been passed by parliament and the implementation of government policies through the cabinet.

While the President set the parameters of foreign policy processes to be followed, the bureaucracy, through ministries like Foreign Affairs, Defence, Industry and Trade and other technical ministries, facilitated in moulding and giving direction to the parameters set by the President. Parliament, for its part, contributed through parliamentary debates of foreign policy positions outlined by the President in his State of the Nation Address and the ratification of international treaties in consultation with the Office of the President and Cabinet. ZANU-PF’s dominance in parliament and its effective use of the party whipping system ensured that the President’s directives and interests were followed. The system had the effect of creating a strong central executive around the Presidency and the weakening of the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy which is removed from interactive foreign policy decision-making.

The Head of State and Government in Zimbabwe, therefore, was the centre of gravity in the processes of agenda setting, formulation, legitimation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy due to the centralised system of international relations management at party and government level. Centralisation of international relations power in the Head of State and Government and President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF had been found to be desirable to co-ordinate party and government policies since Zimbabwe implemented government policies which emanated from the party. The logic of creating a one centre of power according to ZANU-PF was to do away with factional leadership and to achieve unity of purpose between the ruling party and the government (Sunday Mail, February 21, 2016). There is some evidence that centralized governance is functional for developing countries. Barston (2006, p.17) argued that the prevalence of centralised Heads-of-State system was necessary in developing countries to improve co-ordination and direction of foreign policy in order to enhance central political control and overcome political and economic instability. Reed (1970) also argued that since foreign policy had a significant effect on the domestic policy front of a state, the risk of policy failures was too great to most African countries hence the reluctance to have public opinion dictate agenda setting. The centralized control of foreign policy and other international relations activities is seen as a response to fragmentation or independent action associated with advanced industrial states.
Still, the ‘hegemonic and commandist approach’ to foreign policy processes disqualifies participation by academia, civic groups and political parties in most foreign policy processes. The process promotes the dictum that ‘what was good for ZANU-PF was also good for the country’, which may be patently false in some situations. My argument is that ZANU-PF preferred a centralised foreign policy making structure to guard against its perceived enemies and to promote its interests.

The President, as Head of State and Government and commander-in-chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, had overwhelming powers over other branches of government when it came to influencing the international relations agenda of the country. According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe No.20 of 2013, executive authority was vested in the Office of the President who exercised it through Cabinet. As both Head of State and Government, Mugabe had wide ranging constitutional powers which include the following:

To assent to and signing Bills into law, referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for an opinion or advice on its constitutionality, summoning the National Assembly, the Senate or Parliament to an extraordinary sitting to conduct special business, making appointments which the constitution requires the President to make, calling elections in terms of the constitution, calling a referendum on any matter in accordance with the law, to declare war and make peace, conferring honours and awards to locals and foreigners, appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and diplomatic and consular representatives, receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives and concluding or executing conventions, treaties, and agreements with foreign states, governments and international organisations.

(Section 110[1-4] of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No.20 2013 ACT)

The President and Head of State also had the power to declare war and make peace (Section 111(1)-(3); grant a pardon to any person, whether foreign or local, convicted of any offence in Zimbabwe (Section 112(1)-(3) and to declare a state of emergency in the whole or any part of Zimbabwe and such a declaration may require the co-operation of foreign governments to effectively tackle the problem (Section 113(1)-(3).

It is clear from these powers that President Mugabe played a central role in the conduct of the country’s international relations by virtue of the wide powers which had a bearing on international relations that were bestowed on him by the constitution. The power to ‘declare war and make peace’ had the effect of locking away procedure, in certain circumstances, and they bestowed unfettered power on the President. The President of Zimbabwe was, during
this period, central to the conduct of bilateral and multilateral negotiations and individual negotiations involving multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations and international organisations depending on the issue/issues at stake which may have required his leadership. The President also participated in state visits which were meant to improve diplomatic space, to address substantive issues relating to improvement in trade, foreign direct investment, tourism, development assistance and to enhance the country’s credibility and reputation and to propose institutional reforms of key institutions such as the United Nations.

The effect of such wide powers at the disposal of the President in domestic and international relations led to personalisation and the concentration of foreign policy decision making in the offices of the Head of State and Government. The result of this concentration of power in one individual had been to slow decision-making and to create bottlenecks in terms of the implementation of major projects and international agreements which had a bearing on the development of the country. As a result, the projection of the country’s interests abroad tended to reflect more on the personality and position of the Head of State and Government than external objectives of the country. A good example is Zimbabwe’s military involvement in Mozambique (1982-1992), Democratic Republic of Congo (1998-2002) and Angola (1995-1996). In all the cases, these were decisions taken by the Presidency. In 2000, the MDC questioned in Parliament what they considered an unconstitutional decision by the Presidency to commit Zimbabwe troops abroad without the acquiescence of Parliament (Adar et al, 2002). This approach to decision making in foreign policy which was centred around the Presidency, weakened Zimbabwe as a state since alternative processes to foreign policy formulation, implementation and evaluation were not explored prior to their adoption through a public participation process. President Mugabe was considered to be the de-facto foreign minister of Zimbabwe because he occupied most diplomatic space which could have been occupied by the foreign minister under liberal, pluralist systems.

4.2 Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation of Foreign Policy

At independence, Zimbabwe sought to establish a socialist society guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, an ideology which had played a crucial role in liberating the country. The ruling ZANU-PF party had adopted communist structures of political organisation like politburo, central committee, women’s league, youth league, provincial, district, branch and cell organs as a way of supervising the party and government under an envisaged one-party-
state. On December 30, 1987, following the Unity Agreement between ZANU-PF and (PF) ZAPU and the election of Robert Gabriel Mugabe by the Electoral College of Parliament as the First Executive President of Zimbabwe, Mugabe indicated during the inauguration that the direction of policies to be followed by his government would be derived from the party’s Marxist-Leninist ideology (Patsanza, 1988).

Marxism-Leninism was also buttressed by the Pan-African liberation ideology which was against domination of blacks by whites. Zimbabwe’s domestic and foreign policy orientation was structured around the values of pan-African solidarity with Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FLMSA), an association of six liberation political parties of Southern Africa whose roots was the Frontline States. The parties were African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) of Tanzania, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) of Angola, South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) of Zimbabwe.

The ideology of pan-Africanism was also used by Zimbabwe and President Mugabe to structure solidarity networks with former liberation movements on the African continent, independent African states and other like-minded states internationally. Zimbabwe structured cordial international relations around these countries which helped the country through solidarity networks when the country was going through a difficult period like sanctions imposed by the West after 2000. A good example is the fact that despite western countries exerting strong pressure on SADC countries to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008, all SADC countries refused to accede to such demands based on pan-African solidarity. Mugabe is considered a dictator in the west but he is revered on the African continent as a statesman because of his liberation struggle credentials and his crusade for African countries to take control of their countries and their resources, a thrust which strikes a chord with many Africans. A German journalist Andrea Jeska (2014) asked former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano why as a democrat he remained friendly to Robert Mugabe and he angrily responded that “one doesn’t desert a friend just because he has fallen on difficult times.”

Another example of pan-African solidarity occurred when the EU isolated Zimbabwe from attending the 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon and the EU-Africa Summit in 2014 in
Brussels. The African Union as a block spoke with one voice in solidarity with Zimbabwe and in defence of African interests by arguing that if Zimbabwe was not invited, African member states would not attend. The AU solidarity worked in Zimbabwe’s diplomatic interest but it embarrassed the Europeans who wanted to maintain the travel sanctions on Mugabe and his inner circle during such AU official visits. The invitations to Mugabe took place due to pan-African solidarity.

Marxist-Leninist ideology was adopted by Zimbabwe because the ideology had successfully guided the liberation movements of ZANU-PF and ZANLA, and PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA. Socialism had appeal in Zimbabwe because it was viewed by ZANU-PF as a unifying force because of its anti-individualistic approach and its non-recognition of ethnic divisions. Its exclusive focus on class divisions suggested that socialism could suppress, conquer or prevent social injustice or fragmentation. Socialism also had appeal in Zimbabwe because of its emphasis on public ownership of the means of production, that is, land, capital or property which would be administered in the public interest. The ruling party preferred socialism because it provided sufficient justification for the nationalisation of foreign-owned and locally-owned businesses given the colonial history of the country where blacks were marginalised from the mainstream economy through a system of racial segregation, dispossession and deprivation (Mudyanadzo, 2011, p.8).

The Government of Zimbabwe in 1980 identified the imbalance in the economy as a result of the ownership structure of productive resources, primarily land and capital, which were owned by a local white bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists backed by an institutional structure which was built to support the system. Zimbabwe had a choice to follow a radical socialist transformation of the economy which would have meant violating the Lancaster House Constitutional provisions leading to massive cuts in post-war reconstruction and development assistance, or to accept the existing system and introduce socialist transformation over time. Thus the philosophy of ‘moderation and reconciliation’ was adopted as a strategy to achieve gradualist transformation to the desired socialist state during the period 1980 to about 1999. This philosophy resulted in Zimbabwe practising neo-liberal ideology as a way of accessing western funding although rhetorically Zimbabwe continued to be guided by socialist ideology contrary to the economic base which dictated a capitalist mode of production, distribution and exchange.
Zimbabwe proclaimed socialism as the guiding ideology backed by the ruling party, ZANU-PF’s, communist organisation structures but in reality it remained a neo-liberal state anchored on the world capitalist system. Zimbabwe used the ideology of socialism to achieve national support towards its defined nation-building goals and to rally international support among like-minded nations to preserve its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and to obtain solidarity in its struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony. Socialism appears to have served the state’s needs for self-preservation than national development per se. For example within the international fora (SADC, AU, NAM, and UN), nations with the same ideological orientation like Zimbabwe tended to support each other based on ideological consideration.

However, stark economic realities at home led to the emergence of a rift between government and workers representatives, especially the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The rift climaxed in 1999 with the formation of the workers party-Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)-as the effects of the IMF and World Bank imposed structural adjustment programmes started affecting the welfare and interests of workers. The envisioned dictatorship of the proletariat under a socialist system had been replaced by the dictatorship of Bretton Woods’s institutions with government support.

The failure by government to draw the working class behind it extinguished ZANU-PF’s self-proclaimed ‘vanguard’ role under a socialist system. After 2000, as ZANU-PF sought accommodation from eastern bloc powers following the economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation by western powers, the ruling elite became more entrenched as bourgeoisie nationalist elites with support from countries like China and Russia. In return, China and other eastern bloc countries received favourable access to mining concessions and other lucrative contracts and were protected by the government when they violated the country’s labour laws which protected the working class. Zimbabwe did not allow western investors in the country to violate labour laws because of the colonial history of the country which was linked to the exploitation and oppression of black people by white people. The sharing of the same ideological orientation backed by support during the liberation struggle should not have constituted sufficient justification by the government to support exploitation and oppression by countries like China. While the socialist ideological orientation was useful in mobilising international support for Zimbabwe especially during crisis situations, its nation-building value was minimal because the country operated for the greater part under the guidance of a
neo-liberal ideology due to the ‘disciplining forces’ of local and international capitalism which dominated the economic base.

4.3 Mugabe’s assertive nationalistic leadership

Mugabe’s assertive personality dominated the character of Zimbabwe’s international relations. Assertiveness came from his role as hero of the liberation struggle, founding father of the nation and elder statesman in the SADC region and the African continent. Mugabe had spent eleven years in political detention in Rhodesia (1964-1974) before going to Mozambique in 1975 to lead the armed struggle until 1979 when a peace settlement which led to independence in 1980 was negotiated at Lancaster House. Based on these illustrious liberation struggle credentials, Mugabe assumed huge influence and moral and political authority at home, on the African continent and internationally because he had dedicated a greater part of his life to fighting for the liberation of his country and the African continent.

Political opponents at home were labelled ‘puppets of the West’, ‘surrogates of imperialism’, ‘counter-revolutionaries’, or ‘sell-outs’ who were bent on effecting a ‘regime change agenda’. Using this strategy, Mugabe called upon Zimbabweans to shun external interference, at all cost, in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. For example, in an address to mourners at the Heroes Acre in Harare on April 13, 2011 President Mugabe challenged Zimbabweans to be vigilant in the face of perceived aggression by western powers. He argued that “as we assemble here, there are countries that assemble in Europe to discuss Zimbabwe. To them Zimbabwe is not free, it is not independent, to them in their imagination, Zimbabwe is still a colony” (The Herald, April 14, 2014). President Mugabe went further to point out that “we had an EU parliament passing a resolution on Zimbabwe, how the GPA should operate, how elections should be held and even how our diamonds should be sold” (The Herald, April 14, 2014). The President then advised his audience to remain wary, vigilant and to be ready to defend the country and to sacrifice their lives as did those who fought during the liberation struggle. This message resonated with the ordinary people who had experienced the liberation struggle.

President Mugabe argued that Zimbabwe’s destiny should be designed by Zimbabweans themselves and this message resonated well with the country’s domestic constituency and regional and international audiences due to Mugabe’s iconic liberation struggle credentials. George Chisoko (2015), in an article on President Mugabe in the eyes of African Journalists, cited the following reasons why Mugabe’s messages resonate well with journalists and
Africans in general. Mugabe had articulated a bold, anti-colonialist stance which he had used to stand up to the west. Mugabe had also articulated a pan-Africanist message in which he emphasised that Africa’s destiny should be decided and shaped by Africans themselves without western interference and this resonated well with Africans on the continent and Africans in the diaspora. Another strong attribute of Mugabe’s leadership was his capacity to take bold decisions and to stand by those decisions. For example, his anti-gay stance and his populist land reform programme were viciously denounced and resisted by western powers and the result was the reduction in development aid to Zimbabwe but this did not deter Mugabe from standing by his decisions. This character was made possible by the intense use of propaganda by the state electronic and print media, and the use of party and government propaganda functionaries who made political capital out of deification of Mugabe’s domestic and foreign leadership of the country.

One of Mugabe’s key strategies was to blame government’s poor performance record on adversaries, especially former colonial powers who had imposed sanctions on the country, whilst absolving government of any shortcomings. Shortages of food, fuel, electricity, medicines, machinery and spare parts among others, and ZANU-PF’s electoral defeat by the MDC in the 2000 Referendum and the March 2008 General Elections, were all blamed on western powers who were accused of intending to impose a ‘regime change’ in Zimbabwe through ‘illegal sanctions’. Mugabe was able to use a wide range of methods including appealing to the liberation struggle ethos of national sacrifice, the churning out of patriotic messages in the public media, warnings of possible invasion by ‘greedy imperialist vampires’ and the use of racial hatred against the whites as a method to ruthlessly implement his fast-track-reform program and to solidify his votes among the rural poor people. President Mugabe, was therefore able to consolidate his power base in the process by creating an image of himself as an infallible and irreplaceable leader whose mission was to roll back neo-colonial and imperialist designs on Zimbabwe.

4.4 An aggressive, confrontational diplomatic character

Since independence, and particularly between 2000 and 2008, Zimbabwe adopted an aggressive, confrontational diplomatic character towards Western countries who were frequently described as the root cause of its problems. Government rhetoric was laden with scornful tones and contained insults about key western leaders, their systems of government and their association with the history of colonialism and enslavement. For example in 2001,
Mugabe accused the “white Commonwealth of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada of ganging up on developing black nations such as Zimbabwe” (Associated Press, November 1, 2001).

The confrontational diplomatic character towards western countries who had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe had the effect of making the Zimbabwean leader, Robert G. Mugabe, an international hero of developing countries who were facing the same effects of western countries’ policies on their countries. While most of these developing countries could not stand up to big powers like Britain, USA and the European Union, Zimbabwe provided the protest voice on their behalf. Mugabe, as a result, received thunderous applause at regional and international fora while facing bankruptcy at home due to the retaliatory actions of those big powers which took the form of tightening of sanctions and the closure of Zimbabwe’s diplomatic space in the international system. Mugabe’s confrontational diplomatic rhetoric angered western countries who responded also by isolating him at a time Zimbabwe needed the co-operation of all economic powers to support its economy.

A notable diplomatic confrontation took place at the World Earth Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg on September 2, 2002. In defence of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme and the country’s sovereignty, President Mugabe argued that “sustainable development was not possible without agrarian reforms that acknowledge that land comes first before all else and that all else grows from and off the land” (The Herald, September 3, 2002). He also argued that “land empowers the poor from where the mandate to rule comes from” (The Herald, September 3, 2002). In a carefully structured diplomatic argument, Mugabe blamed the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the British Government for Zimbabwe’s problems. He argued that:

We say this as Zimbabweans; we have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are, we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood in sustenance and maintenance and protection of that independence. We do not mind having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe; we are not Europeans; we have not asked for a square inch of that territory. So, Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.

(The Herald, September 3, 2002).

Mugabe’s statement divided the Summit between developing countries who gave him a standing ovation in support of his land reform programme and developed countries who condemned the land reform in the strongest possible terms for undermining the rule of law.
property rights and racial partnerships. Mugabe left his seat as Blair walked into the summit venue and reappeared later when Blair was winding up his statement. Mugabe’s diplomatic strategy was to use such summits to put across, in a forceful way, his dispute with western powers for the benefit of sympathetic developing countries. The strategy served to wade off Western powers’ pressures on him and his country and to buttress his power base at home, regionally and internationally. However, the benefits of such a diplomatic strategy to the well being of Zimbabwe appeared questionable since it had the effect of inviting more sanctions on the country and in the process weakening the country’s economic base. The Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, admitted the folly of this belligerence towards the West by arguing that Zimbabwe was “too small to pursue a policy of confrontation” (Zimbabwe Investor, May 6, 2014).

Mugabe also confronted British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George Bush Jnr, at the UN Summit in Rome in 2005. The Food and Agricultural Organisation [FAO] summit was convened to celebrate the 60th anniversary of FAO and to explore ways of enhancing food security in the world. Mugabe used the summit to attack Blair and Bush. President Mugabe exploded in a confrontational manner and said;

Must we allow these men, the two unholy men of our millennium, who in the same way as Hitler and Mussolini formed an unholy alliance, form an alliance to attack an innocent country?

(Irish Times, June 3, 2008).

Mugabe’s speech was referring to US- British military invasion of Iraq under the pretext that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction which were later on not found to exist. The Zimbabwean leader was also arguing, by extension, that it was the same leaders who were fighting an unholy war against Zimbabwe’s land reform programme which had benefitted the black people at the expense of the minority white race of British and American ancestry. Western countries were angry that Mugabe had decided to politicise an event that was meant to enhance food security in the world. The diplomatic posturing by Zimbabwe was viewed by FAO and western countries as inappropriate given that Zimbabwe was, at that time, importing 37000 tons of maize to feed about 3.8 million people mainly based in the rural areas. Again this was another diplomatic strategy whose usefulness to the well-being of Zimbabwe was questionable. Mugabe’s belligerent diplomatic outburst made the task of re-engagement difficult to accomplish. Diplomatic attitudes were hardened by this approach and
this had the effect of further widening the gap for constructive engagement. It can, therefore, be observed that the belligerent diplomatic posturing against Western powers was influenced more by the survival of the leadership and party in power (ZANU-PF) and in this particular case, the interests of the ruling elites which were at stake and were being projected as the national interest. The Zimbabwean President had used an adversarial approach towards the West at the expense of mending bridges. The use of war rhetoric and insults against western countries whilst at the same time playing victims of sanctions by the same countries did not help Zimbabwe to grow its economy.

4.5 The use of “the race card” as a tool to fight detractors and mobilise domestic and international support

The unresolved issues of race in post-independent Zimbabwe manifested in racial inequality in terms of land ownership and utilisation in favour of the white minority race and the whites’ domination of the commanding heights of the economy. In addition to these issues, the white minority race maintained a white settler colonial culture of segregation which manifested in low integration with blacks in residential suburbs, sporting facilities and in schools and entertainment facilities (Mandaza, 1986). Zimbabwe’s political problems were therefore reduced to settler colonial racism whose solution could only be found by addressing issues of post-independence racial domination and inequalities; what I refer to in this section as “the race card”.

President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government used the race card skilfully, effectively and opportunistically to fight western powers and their surrogates and to build support domestically, regionally and internationally. In the context of Zimbabwe’s nation building efforts, Mugabe and his government believed that all the problems of the country had to do with the minority white race given the country’s colonial history where the white race controlled the key sectors in the economy which include agriculture, mining, manufacturing and tourism.

Although the Zimbabwe government had extended a hand of reconciliation to the white community at independence, this policy of racial reconciliation broke down when the British Labour government of Tony Blair refused to honour commitments to fund the land reform programme made at Lancaster House in 1979. Blair’s government categorically refused in 1997 to be bound by the commitment made by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher. Mugabe’s government viewed this British policy shift as racist and meant to protect
their kith and kin in post-independent Zimbabwe. At that point, race became central to Zimbabwe’s international relations. The British colonial experience created the context in which Mugabe played the race card. Muzondidya (2010) argued that Britain’s denial of colonial responsibility of the injustices in Zimbabwe and the subsequent imposition of targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe by Britain, USA, Australia, Canada and the EU coupled with open support for the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) had the effect of exacerbating the race card as a tool for fighting the West by Mugabe. The ZANU-PF government cast the Zimbabwe crisis as a racial problem caused by imperialist western forces aimed at reversing the sovereignty and independence of Zimbabwe.

Mugabe argued that his government was a victim of western onslaught following the compulsory acquisition of land after 2000 when racial politics took centre stage in Zimbabwe. According to Muzondidya (2010), ZANU-PF used the issues of race and land to redirect citizens’ anger from government towards the “native-settler question”, that is, questions of belonging, citizenship and economic rights. Nativism discourse had the effect of connecting the ZANU-PF government to the older generation of Zimbabweans who had fought in the war and were familiar with the oppression of colonialism whilst the younger generation were attracted by the prospects of being empowered by the government as the white race was being displaced on the land and in other key sectors where blacks were historically marginalised. At home, Mugabe argued that he was defending Zimbabwe’s god-given resources against imperialist western countries and white commercial farmers while the opposition MDC party were cast as stooges of western powers.

According to ZANU-PF propaganda, the MDC’s political agenda was to return the country back to the whites. Although it appeared to be a simplistic political propaganda, it had a huge impact on unsophisticated local audiences, especially those who lived in overpopulated rural areas and those living close to white owned farms who did not want to miss the opportunity of the land being returned to ‘its rightful owners’. The race card also had an appeal to urban workers who had lost their jobs as a result of the economic crisis and were looking to ZANU-PF for economic empowerment. The anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist messages resonated well with the African continent and other parts of the developing world given their own experience of white racial domination, exploitation and prejudice. Some Zimbabweans in the Diaspora also supported the race card in view of their own encounter with racism as African migrants in the West. As Muzondidya (2010) put it, racism was used by Zimbabwe as defensive nationalism and a coping strategy.
Mugabe used the race card to opportunistically seek electoral support, taking advantage of his liberation war credentials. For example on June 17, 2008, he told voters that “you can vote for Tsvangirayi, but if he brings back the whites we will go to war” (Zimeye, 2009 p.1). Mugabe also told his supporters that “the only white man you can trust is a dead white man” (The Telegraph, June 5, 2008). He also urged his ZANU-PF supporters to “continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our real enemy” (The Irish Times, December 15, 2000). He further justified this position by arguing that “the white man is not indigenous to Africa, Africa is for Africans and Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans” (The Irish Times, December 15, 2000). Mugabe further argued that “They think because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. Never again” (The Irish Times, December 15, 2000). The race card in this scenario was used as an element of national power. It was used to maintain power by the ruling elite and to confront the nation’s detractors who were associated with the history of colonialism and imperialism in Zimbabwe.

Race had remained a key issue in Zimbabwe’s international relations because it remained embedded in the social, economic and political structures of the country following the end of colonial rule. The white community’s visible affluence and their continued social isolation provided a catalyst for anti-white sentiments which ZANU-PF capitalised on. The failure by western countries, especially Britain, the EU and the USA to deal sensitively with the issues of racial inequality and domination after independence had the effect of internationalising Zimbabwe’s argument in favour of the ZANU-PF government. Racism was used as an element of national power to defend the agenda of the poor by ensuring that Zimbabwe did not pander to foreign interests or answer to foreign imperatives that are alien to the national interests. The race card was also used as an instrument to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zimbabwe at local, regional and international fora.

It was therefore difficult for western countries to pin down Zimbabwe on racism because of the direct linkage between racial inequality and domination by whites after independence and the marginalisation of the black population as a result of colonialism. Although the race card was an effective arsenal in Mugabe’s diplomatic strategy, it had the effect of hardening the attitudes of western powers who responded by increasing the targeted sanctions that were in place, thereby further weakening the economy of Zimbabwe.
4.6 Mugabe’s anti-gay mantra

The Mugabe government’s anti-gay mantra attracted heated debate at home and abroad, and this had the effect of diverting attention from key issues of bilateral and multilateral engagement between Zimbabwe and western powers. Mugabe, at regional and international fora, missed several opportunities to attract global leaders to partner his country’s nation building efforts by attacking homosexuals whom he described as ‘worse than dogs and pigs’. Western leaders were described as ‘gay gangsters’ for supporting gay rights. Mugabe regarded gay rights as “unnatural” and “filthy”.

Zimbabwe, as a conservative country, believed that the sexual orientation of lesbians, gays, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBT) individuals do not conform to the country’s values, norms, traditions and beliefs. Many western countries including the UN regard LGBT rights as human rights standards which must be upheld. Mugabe had rejected such standards or ‘new rights’ which were contrary to the values, norms, traditions and beliefs of the country. Mugabe’s position on gays and lesbians ran contrary to the UN’s work which seeks to tackle homophobia and transphobia in the world. The UN’s position, according to UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Kin-moon’s press statement of May15, 2015, was that member states must respect international human rights standards including gay rights. He encouraged members to repeal and to establish a moratorium on the application of laws that criminalise same-sex conduct between consenting adults. The UNSG reiterated that “LGBT rights are human rights”.

Mugabe criticised western powers for assuming the role of ‘global prefects’ on gay rights. Mugabe’s anti-gay mantra was viewed as fuelling public prejudice against LGBT people, setting him on a collision course with western countries and international organisations who have linked observance of gay rights to the granting of development aid. Mugabe’s belligerent, inflammatory speeches against gays had the effect of making the task of re-engagement much difficult. Zimbabwe had the option to disagree with these countries on gay rights without necessarily making it a key issue in its international relations agenda. As Madanhire (2013) put it, ‘homosexuality is a non-issue in Zimbabwe, those who practise it do so in the privacy of their bedrooms’. The anti-gay mantra was a clear strategy by Mugabe to win electoral support at home taking advantage of the conservative nature of Zimbabwean society while internationally he used the anti-gay mantra to fight western countries which he called ‘gay gangsters’. It was also a strategy that was used by the Zimbabwe government to
deflect western criticism of the government’s performance record and to divert national attention from the real issues affecting the country.

4.7 The use of the “sanctions mantra” to justify lack of national progress since 2000

President Mugabe used the sanctions imposed by the west after 2000 as a strategy to justify his government’s poor performance and lack of delivery of basic services which any state is entitled to do. All problems, challenges, shortages, loss of state revenue, poverty in society, negative economic growth rates, hyperinflation, de-industrialisation and capital flight were viewed through the lenses of sanctions imposed by the west. The ZANU-PF government never acknowledged the disastrous failures of the “Third Chimurenga” policies which were meant to empower the previously marginalised blacks but ended up driving the country backwards. Mugabe did not proffer solutions on what measures his government was putting in place to bust those sanctions or to blunt their effects.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 15, 2005, Mugabe said;

“Our efforts have been seriously affected by recurring droughts and floods, HIV and AIDS and of course unilateral sanctions imposed on us by countries that do not wish us well.”

President Mugabe also linked sanctions to the poverty in the country by arguing that

We believe these illegal sanctions are not only unjustified and cruel but they have also contributed deeply to the suffering and the poverty-induced polarisation of the people of Zimbabwe. Our condemnation, our isolation is because my government took the necessary measures to create conditions for equal opportunities, for decolonisation, for creating conditions in which our people could regain their lost resources.

(Zimbabwe Daily, February 3, 2009)

Mugabe also linked the sanctions to the loss of state revenue by arguing at the High-Level Thematic Debate on Achieving Sustainable Development Goals at the United Nations on April 22, 2016 that the West’s illegal economic sanctions had cost Zimbabwe over US$42 billion in potential revenue since the turn of the century and he claimed this had detracted the country’s efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Mugabe did not provide tangible evidence to back this argument.

However, the US and EU governments had been consistent in denying that the sanctions were “illegal and racist” and a hinderance to Zimbabwe’s economic development. According to a
press statement issued by the US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Bruce Wharton, at SAPES Trust on February 13, 2014, he outlined his government’s position that Zimbabwe’s economy was in the hands of Zimbabweans. Ambassador Wharton argued that the idea that targeted US sanctions had caused Zimbabwe’s economic woes simply did not hold up to critical analysis. He further argued that Zimbabwe’s sovereign policy decisions were the primary drivers of its economic performance. Wharton gave examples of sovereign policy decisions which ruined the economy which did not have anything to do with Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) or targeted sanctions. These included; the decision to send Zimbabwe Defence Forces into the Democratic Republic of Congo at an estimated cost of USD 1million per day; Zimbabwe’s decision to stop payments on its loans from the International Money Fund and the subsequent loss of new lending and debt relief facilities; the decision in 2000 to pursue the “fast track” land reform programme which led to reduced agricultural production, reduced GDP, increased need to import food and damaged confidence in the application of the rule of law and finally decisions which were made between 2003 and 2008 to print money without backing the currency with income or assets.

The US Ambassador also argued that targeted sanctions only apply to only 113 individuals and 70 entities against a population of 13.1million according to the 2012 census. Wharton also pointed to a health balance of trade between Zimbabwe and USA by citing 2012 trade figures when Zimbabwe imported USD 53million worth of goods from the US and exported USD 52million worth of goods. The US Ambassador further argued that the US wanted Zimbabwe to prosper through the strengthening of its democratic institutions, respecting the rule of law and human rights as the surest way to a strong, democratic and sanctions-free Zimbabwe.

The facts being advanced by western nations are not being acknowledged by Zimbabwe. Emphasis of its international relations strategy was to view sanctions as the root cause of all its problems. The reality was that capital, whether from the east or the west, was timid to get involved in a country like Zimbabwe where there was policy inconsistency, unpredictability and where the government was failing to service its external debts. Failure to get lines of credit from the international community was not a result of sanctions but the country’s lack of creditworthiness. The country was indebted to almost all the major economies of the world by 1999. The west was not the only major economic bloc in the world on which Zimbabwe could rely on. There were other other blocks like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the oil rich Arab countries which were growing at a rapid pace and had
many trade, investment, tourism and development assistance opportunities. Zimbabwe failed to tap into these huge economic blocs which had not imposed sanctions on the country. The country was simply weakened by the absence of international relations strategies to actively engage the international community for mutual benefit.

The argument that the sanctions were “illegal and racist” did not hold water. The sanctions were illegal because the Zimbabwe government argued that they were not imposed by the UN. But any country has the sovereign right to engage or disengage with any country according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or in line with its national interests which demand whether such engagement should exit. The EU or USA do not owe Zimbabwe a living and therefore they were entitled to disengage with Zimbabwe if their national interest demanded that.

Therefore, as the Zimbabwe government’s political and economic problems mounted due to maladministration, poor policies and corruption, Mugabe activated the sanctions mantra to defend his record at home, in the region and at international fora. Government failure was pathetically claimed to be associated with externally induced sanctions without acknowledging governance weaknesses, failure to adopt to changing circumstances and the general failure to meet the expectations of the citizens. Obsession with fighting regime change and the protection of the ruling elite was evidently the real reason for the use of the sanctions mantra as a coping and survival strategy in international relations. The sanctions mantra was also a strategy of mobilisation for use among like-minded states who believed that their liberation struggle legacy was being threatened by colonial and neo-colonial forces.

However, the real sanctions was the inappropriate public policies, maladministration and the primitive looting of public resources like the USD 15 billion which went missing at Chiadzwa diamond mine as reported by President Mugabe on March 3, 2016 (The Herald March 4, 2016). When a country like Zimbabwe has little appetite to deal with corruption, it becomes complicity in imposing sanctions on itself. A country which manages its economy efficiently and effectively is capable of busting any sanctions that may be imposed on it like what Rhodesia did during the mandatory UN sanctions between 1965 and 1979.

4.8 Discord between foreign policy objectives and public policy objectives

The foreign policy of a country seeks to project to the international community the public policy objectives of the country. Essentially, foreign policy involves translating the public
policy agenda of government into statements or principles of selected national interests which are then projected internationally to further its strategic national interests. (Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 2012). In this context, foreign policy becomes an extension of domestic or public policy agenda of the government.

A key characteristic feature of Zimbabwe’s international relations which weakened the state was the discord between some foreign policy objectives and public policy objectives. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe website (2010), Zimbabwe’s diplomacy sought to achieve the broad objective of promoting and attracting trade, investment, tourism linkages and development co-operation with the international community. For this objective to be realised, it was imperative that public policies relating to investment attraction provided transparency, clarity, consistency and predictability as a way of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade, but this was contradicted by what was happening with respect to public policy formulation and implementation.

The land reform programme which was implemented through a compulsory acquisition process without compensation created a high risk profile for the country because of perceptions of lack of transparency, lack of respect for property rights and the general perception of the breakdown of the rule of law. In addition to the land reform policy, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment policy which was signed into law by President Mugabe in 2008, was another contentious piece of legislation which was resisted by potential investors from USA, Britain, the European Union, Zimbabwe’s political allies Russia and China, and some African countries like South Africa who had expressed anxiety over the policy. The indigenisation and economic empowerment policy compels all foreign-owned companies to relinquish 51% shares to indigenous Zimbabweans and remain with 49% equity, a policy which had been vigorously resisted by potential investors.

The policy also discriminated people according to their nationality and whether they participated in the colonisation and therefore disempowerment of Zimbabweans. This policy resulted in western countries getting no concessions in terms of the thresholds for indigenisation whilst eastern bloc countries like China and Russia were exempted and in some cases the thresholds negotiated downwards. Government sought to introduce flexibility in the application of the policy by giving line ministers power to approve indigenisation plans for sectors under their purview with the Indigenisation minister issuing compliance certificates. However, the policy review opened the door for corruption by ministers
(Zimbabwe Independent, July 3, 2015). The indigenisation and economic empowerment policy, therefore, promoted discretionary application of law and this did not create an enabling environment for attracting FDI.

The policy was further damaged by lack of transparency and clear implementation legislation, contradictory statements from cabinet ministers and senior public officials at various domestic, regional and international fora. Zimbabwean diplomats, as part of their key result area, were expected to attract and market investment opportunities in Zimbabwe but they were faced with the difficult task of marketing a public policy which was not saleable to potential investors because of its lack of clarity, consistency and predictability. The policies especially on land reform and indigenisation and economic empowerment were structured in a manner that frustrated investors and capital inflows and created challenges in terms of nation branding as a strategy to promote the development of investment, trade and tourism.

Failure to protect property rights, civil rights and respect for the rule of law as evidenced through various public policies exposed the discord between domestic policy objectives and foreign policy objectives. Trade, investment and tourism initiatives by Zimbabwean diplomats failed to produce the desired results since such activities were also influenced by the Zimbabwe government’s failure to protect property rights, civil rights and respect for the rule of law. The ZANU-PF ruling party failed to appreciate that, in acting the way it was doing locally through public policies, it also had to think about the global implications of its public policies given the integration of the country with the global economy. Therefore Zimbabwe failed to reposition itself in regional and global value chains as a result of inappropriate public policies.

The other situation where there was discord between foreign policy objectives and public policy objectives related to the implementation of international treaty agreements which Zimbabwe had ratified. Zimbabwe ratified a number of international agreements and treaties, like Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs) as a way of promoting an investor friendly business environment and as a vehicle to mobilise financial and material resources from other countries. These BIPPAs also contained legal provisions which protected investments of foreign companies in Zimbabwe by requiring that any properties covered by such agreements could only be acquired by the government after full and fair compensation. This foreign policy objective of attracting investment through such international agreements ensured that many BIPPA agreements were signed by many EU
countries and other countries like South Africa and New Zealand, among others. However, the implementation of such agreements were problematic due to the failure by the government to pay full and fair compensation where public policies demanded that such acquisitions take place.

The Zimbabwe government, according to Finance Minister Herbert Murerwa (2006) and Patrick Chinamasa (2014), argued that it did not pay compensation due to ‘resource constraints’. Zimbabwe was expected to be legally bound by the terms of the BIPPAs and other treaties which it ratified and to refrain from acts that undermined the terms and objectives of the treaties or conventions. This apparent discord between foreign policy objectives underlined in treaties/conventions that Zimbabwe signed and the implementation of public policies which undermined these foreign policy objectives served to diminish Zimbabwe’s economic revival efforts and the political re-engagement with the international community. It is evident from this situation that due attention was not accorded to coordinating foreign policy objectives as instruments of marketing Zimbabwe’s domestic policy agenda to the regional and international community and domestic policies as tools for harnessing and balancing competing interests, values and management of conflict in Zimbabwe. Some of Zimbabwe’s public policies, especially the land and indigenisation and economic empowerment policies, failed to take into account external demands relating to foreign direct investment, trade, tourism and development aid as explained in greater detail in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. These factors were critical to the revival and sustainability of the economy and the deficit in these areas explains the weakening of the state during the period 2000 to 2016.

4.9 The application of double standards in implementing foreign policy principles

Another characteristic feature of Zimbabwe’s international relations during the period 1980-2008 and thereafter was the use of double standards in the implementation of foreign policy principles. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (2010), Zimbabwe was guided by the following foreign policy principles before the adoption of new principles in the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) ACT of 2013, which have been briefly outlined in chapter 1.

- The sovereign equality of all member states
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and its inalienable right to independent existence
- Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration
- Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of all African dependent territories leading to self-determination, through the support of liberation movements which were still dependent
- Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs
- Promotion of African unity and solidarity within Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU)
- Belief in non-discrimination, whether based on colour, creed, religion or other forms
- Promotion of solidarity and cohesion among developing countries through south-south co-operation.

Zimbabwe used double standards in the application of some of these principles, especially on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member and its inalienable right to independent existence and the principle of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. Contradictory behaviours in the application of foreign policy principles by Zimbabwe was evident when the country condemned, in the strongest diplomatic terms, the US invasion of Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and Haiti (1994). Zimbabwe accused the US of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries which was against the rule of international law as defined in the UN Charter. Zimbabwe also condemned the unilateral action of big powers, US and UK, who led the invasion of Iraq in 1993 without a UN mandate, under the pretext that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction which later on proved to be inaccurate. Zimbabwe also condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 leading to the annexation of Kuwait as the 19th province of Iraq. The invasions had clearly breached the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. Zimbabwe defended the invaded countries because the aggressors had breached the principles that guided Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, Non Aligned Movement (NAM) principles and United Nations (UN) Charter principles.

On the other hand, Zimbabwe remained silent when Russia invaded Georgia (2008) following the openly expressed intention by the country to seek NATO membership. Zimbabwe also remained silent when Russia sponsored separatist movements in Georgia and
Ukraine leading to the military invasion of Ukraine (2014-2015), and the annexation of Crimea under the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that the invasion of Ukrainian territory was in violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Zimbabwe did not protest this violation of a cardinal principle of its foreign policy. Zimbabwe had also remained silent when China, for many years, denied Tibet and its people self-determination and independence despite its spiritual leader, Dalai Lama, campaigning for independence for many years.

Double standards by Zimbabwe were also demonstrated in the Libyan invasion by NATO forces led by Britain and France and supported by the US in 2011. The Libyan invasion was sanctioned by UNSC resolution 1973, based on the doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) as a way of preventing the Libyan leader from massacring civilians in Benghazi. The resolution authorised the creation of a no-fly zone and other measures to protect civilians. However, NATO nations went beyond their mandate by engaging in military operations in Libya leading to the ouster and death of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. Mugabe condemned the action of western powers in Libya accusing them of being “vampires” who were interested in controlling Libyan oil resources. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, failed to condemn Russia’s imperialist designs in Syria which were linked to the massacre of civilians under the guise of supporting the government of Syria against perceived terrorists. Syria was accused of using biological weapons against its opponents which is illegal under international law but Zimbabwe never questioned this practice due to Syria’s special relationship with Russia.

It is evident that Zimbabwe compromised its foreign policy principles if these principles were violated by its ideological and liberation war allies of Russia and China. Zimbabwe relied on China and Russia for protection at the United Nations Security Council as was the case on July 11, 2008 when China and Russia vetoed a Security Council Resolution that would have imposed targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe applied these principles vigorously in debates at regional and international fora if these principles were violated by western powers, the Zimbabwe government’s ideological enemies. The approach taken by Zimbabwe in the application of these principles did not reflect a truly non-aligned country but a country aligned more to the Eastern bloc countries of China and Russia. Double standards could be explained by Zimbabwe’s pursuit of self-interests based on historical, commercial and security ties and interests dating back to the Cold-War era and the struggle for independence which was backed mainly by the Eastern bloc countries.
However, the pursuit of double standards in the application of foreign policy principles and values is not new to Zimbabwe only. Many countries behave in self-interested ways contrary to their principles and values. My argument, however, is that such an approach disadvantages the concerned countries in the international diplomatic system because allies may fail to trust them or co-operate with them. A good example is the US policy on torture during the George Bush era which was against US values and international law. The Bush Administration ignored international and domestic statutory provisions that apply to the treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees by arguing that the “war on terrorism” was a “new kind of war” that placed a “high premium” on the “ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists” (Fontas, 2010). The policy caused a lot of problems at home and negatively affected the US’s relations with other countries who opposed the secretive and brutal interrogation techniques of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defence Department.

4.10 Conclusion

Zimbabwe’s international relations were determined by a number of characteristics which affected or influenced its engagement with state and non-state actors at regional and international level. A major characteristic of Zimbabwe’s international relations system was the centralisation of power in the Head of State and Head of Government and the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF who happened to be one individual. This centralisation of power was influenced by the ZANU-PF regime’s determination to stay in power at all cost, to guard against its perceived enemies and to promote its interests rather than the defence of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity per se.

The other characteristics that featured in Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern in the international diplomatic system was the Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation of foreign policy, Mugabe’s assertive nationalistic leadership, an aggressive confrontational diplomatic character towards its perceived western enemies, the use of “the race card” as a coping mechanism to fight detractors and mobilise domestic and international support, the use of the sanctions mantra as an excuse to justify the government’s failure to deliver, Mugabe’s anti-gay mantra, discord between foreign policy objectives and public policy objective and the application of double standards in implementing foreign policy principles. Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern in the international diplomatic system during the period was characterised more by reactive and defensive coping mechanisms rather than proactive approaches to
international engagement. Zimbabwe behaved like a state under siege. This approach to Zimbabwe’s conduct of foreign relations had the effect of weakening the state in political and economic terms as other chapters to follow shall demonstrate.
Chapter 5

Zimbabwe’s Regional Relations in the context of the Political and Security Agenda

5.0 Introduction

There were two distinct phases of Zimbabwe’s regional relations. The first phase, from 1980 to about 1999, was marked by cordial relations between Zimbabwe and its regional and international state and non-state partners. During that time Zimbabwe pursued successful bilateral and multilateral relations with its counterparts in the African region and sub-regional groups like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). This was due to the distinguished role played by Zimbabwe in fighting racism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism on the African continent in general and in Southern Africa in particular. Zimbabwe provided material and moral support to the liberation movements of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) of South Africa and South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia and this role solidified its liberation struggle credentials in the region. Zimbabwe was also favourably viewed as a positive force in the region by the western world following its adoption of the policy of racial reconciliation on achieving independence in 1980.

The second phase of Zimbabwe’s regional relations, from 2000 onwards, was domestically coined the “Third Chimurenga”, which simply means the “Third Liberation Struggle” against oppressors. The First Chimurenga took place between 1896 to 1897 when the colonialists under the British South Africa Company (BSAC) fought the indigenous Shona and Ndebele communities leading to their conquest and colonisation. The Second Chimurenga took place from the 1960s to 1979 when Africans took up arms to fight the white settler colonial regime in Rhodesia leading to the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 which ended the war and granted independence to Zimbabwe. The Third Chimurenga phase, emphasised on compulsory acquisition and distribution of land from the minority white race to the indigenous black people through a government programme called the ‘fast-track-land-reform’ as a way of addressing the legacy of colonial land expropriation. The “Third Chimurenga” phase of Zimbabwe’s regional relations also focused on economic empowerment of the blacks through the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment laws to redress the marginalisation of indigenous Zimbabweans as a result of
colonialism. This chapter focuses on this controversial approach to Zimbabwe’s domestic policy-making and implementation and its negative impact on regional relations.

The approach taken by Zimbabwe through the “Third Chimurenga” strategy weakened its national interest pursuits in the region as defined in its foreign policy objectives. Some of the policies adopted by Zimbabwe had undermined the international image of the country. Examples are the Land Reform Programme (from 2000 onwards), the Public Order and Security Act (Chapter 11:17) of 2002, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Chapter 10:27) of 2002, Section 33 (2) (b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (Chapter 9:23) of 2004 which was used routinely to punish those who dared to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, and the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33) of 2008. The manner in which issues of democracy and governance were handled and the confrontational diplomatic posturing of the government towards the western world had the effect of compromising Zimbabwe’s image regionally and internationally. Zimbabwe placed a lot of trust in the region to cushion it from political and economic challenges in line with the solidarity culture established during the liberation struggle and the letter and spirit of the regional integration agenda. However, the trust was misplaced because national interest considerations took precedence over regional interests.

5.1 Background to Zimbabwe’s Regional Relations

Before analysing Zimbabwe’s regional relations in the context of the “Third Chimurenga”, it may be imperative to give background information on factors that shaped Zimbabwe’s regional relations and the broad aims of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within subregional groups of SADC, COMESA and the AU region as these had largely informed and influenced the conduct of Zimbabwe’s regional relations.

5.1.1 Factors that shaped Zimbabwe’s regional relations

There were many factors that shaped Zimbabwe’s regional relations. First, historical factors had largely influenced Zimbabwe’s regional relations. Zimbabwe’s historical past, particularly the struggle for freedom and independence, bears strongly on the structure of present and future regional relations. The country fought a protracted liberation struggle between 1966 up to 1979, supported by the African continent, through the OAU’s Liberation Committee, who provided military assistance, logistical support, and political and moral support to the struggle for independence.
The Frontline States (FLS) of Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Angola provided the frontline rear-bases for guerillas and nationalists from where the liberation struggle was fought from. Zimbabwe regarded the Frontline States as the first line of defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity after independence. In recognition of the distinguished role played by the FLS in the successful liberation of the country, they were accorded special diplomatic status with Mozambique being the first country to have its diplomatic mission accredited to Zimbabwe after independence. President Samora Machel of Mozambique was also the first Head of State to visit Zimbabwe after independence. These diplomatic moves were in recognition of the distinguished role played by Mozambique which provided rear bases for ZANU-PF guerillas and nationalists during the struggle for independence. Zimbabwe also established excellent bilateral relations with the rest of the FLS of Tanzania, Angola, Zambia and Botswana, as the states were considered pivotal to the survival and well-being of the new state.

After Zimbabwe’s independence, as the second dominant economy after apartheid ruled South Africa, the country was expected to play a dominant political role in the liberation of Southern Africa. The logic was that since Zimbabwe was assisted by most African countries to wage its liberation struggle, it was expected to be conscious of its indebtedness for that support and to play a crucial reciprocal role in the struggle against racism and colonialism in apartheid ruled South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia). Zimbabwe hosted liberation movements of ANC and PAC of South Africa and SWAPO of South West Africa (Namibia) as its contribution to the liberation of those countries. The independence of Zimbabwe was, therefore, pivotal to the disbandment of Pretoria’s idea of a Constellation of Southern African States in line with the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)’s principal political and economic objectives of reducing member states’ dependence on apartheid South Africa and isolating South Africa politically and economically. The isolation of South Africa from the international community was meant to accelerate the demise of apartheid.

The history of the struggle for freedom and independence on the African continent, which was backed by African countries, ensured that strong bonds of solidarity and brotherhood were established after independence. On the basis of that solidarity and brotherhood, new bonds of bilateral and multilateral relations were established. As Africa and Molomo (2013, p26) argued, the ‘historical unity of Southern Africa against white minority rule…remains the
driving force of a cohesive identity of the region as a security community’ and an economic community. The shared nationalism against white domination and oppression created what Hammerstad (2005, p 69) described as a ‘great sense of regional identity, co-operation and collaboration’

The second factor is the geographical location of Zimbabwe which is also linked to political, economic and security factors. The country is situated on the African continent and in the Southern African region. On achieving independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was expected by the African continent and by SADCC to assume the role of helping her neighbours to attain their independence and be free from the vestiges of apartheid racism. Several logics drove this expectation. First, the strategic geographical location of Zimbabwe within the sub-region was expected to play a pivotal role in facilitating the logistical requirements of the liberation movements of South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia). There was a strong belief among Frontline States that the independence of Zimbabwe was meaningless without the independence of countries it shared borders with because the country was likely to be held hostage by apartheid South Africa and to continue to experience destabilisation activities from that country.

The second logic was that Zimbabwe had emerged as the largest economy in the sub-region after apartheid South Africa and therefore it was largely perceived as the leader of both the SADCC and the then Frontline States (Adar et al, 2002). The expected leadership role of Zimbabwe came with responsibilities to lead the struggle for the independence of the remaining colonised countries in Southern Africa. Although Zimbabwe assumed this leadership role, it was a landlocked country and its economy was heavily dependent on apartheid South Africa which meant that it had to balance both roles of supporting the liberation struggle whilst at the same time maintaining economic relations with apartheid South Africa in order to secure access to the sea. Pragmatism required that Zimbabwe establish close bilateral cooperation with South Africa even though it disagreed with the apartheid system in South Africa. Zimbabwe could not survive economically without apartheid South Africa because its economy was historically inextricably linked to the apartheid economy.

More importantly, the central geographic location of Zimbabwe was instrumental in the establishment of a regional architecture of co-operation in political, economic, social and military matters which would enhance the political, economic and security strength of the
Southern African region and ultimately the African continent. The African continent and the sub-region (SADC) were viewed by Zimbabwe as the ultimate guarantee of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence in line with the AU’s Constitutive Act (2001) mandate of “ensuring and maintaining continental unity, peace and prosperity”.

The third factor was that the disbandment of apartheid offered Zimbabwe and other SADCC states the opportunity for a ‘new start’ which would facilitate the rehabilitation of regional states’ economies which had been affected by the Rhodesian war. Zimbabwe, therefore, saw opportunities that would derive from regional co-operation leading to abundant opportunities in trade, foreign direct investment, tourism development and development aid flowing into regional countries.

Zimbabwe made its national interests calculations based on Southern Africa’s geopolitical and economic strategic importance as a gateway for potential trade, investment and tourism opportunities with Europe, Americas and Asia. Africa and Molomo (2013) observed that the Southern Africa region has a long coastal belt characterized by the strategic intersection of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the deep natural ports along the Indian and Atlantic Oceans that make the region ideal for global trade. This heritage was a defining factor in pushing Southern African states towards co-operation for mutual benefit. The economic factor was also a compelling reason for the promotion of political and economic stability as the basis for tackling uneven development, poverty, unemployment, and the provision of regional infrastructure to improve regional connectivity and integration.

African culture is another crucial factor which shaped Zimbabwe’s regional relations. Zimbabwe is an African state situated in the Southern African region and its approach to international relations was first and foremost influenced by its African identity, African culture and African aspirations which it shares with other AU member states. Zimbabwe therefore considers the African continent as an extension of its own territory in line with the vision of a United States of Africa. However, African culture which drives the history of Southern African people does not appear to be as defining a factor as sovereign statehood and national identity born out of the defective colonial architecture of states. The interests of state regimes and elites had tended to selfishly control decision making structures and resources and responses to many non-state actors in defence of sovereign statehood. Given that the region has diverse African cultures and peoples, it is inevitable that individual states and
peoples have competing interests, aspirations and visions which they prioritise ahead of regional interests.

5.1.2 Broad aims of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the African Union Region

In pursuing its foreign policy objectives within the African Union, Zimbabwe sought to achieve the following goals according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (2010):

To mobilize diplomatic and moral support for Zimbabwe through African Union institutions; to monitor political, economic, social and security developments on the African continent with a view to assessing their implications on bilateral, regional and international developments that affect the well-being of Zimbabwe; to promote trade, investment and tourism linkages between Zimbabwe and AU member states; to ensure Africa’s ownership of AU institutions and processes, free from outside interference; to promote African unity and solidarity through the AU framework; to promote African consensus on Africa’s representation in the Security Council of the United Nations and to promote continentally, peace, security and co-operation through African Union structures by peaceful and diplomatic negotiations and through collective peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations by AU member states.

Zimbabwe achieved most of its foreign policy objectives within the African Union, especially the ones on mobilizing diplomatic and moral support for Zimbabwe through African Union institutions, promoting African unity and solidarity through the AU framework, promotion of peace and security through the AU framework and the promotion of African consensus on Africa’s representation in the Security Council of the United Nations. Basically Zimbabwe and the AU have spoken with one voice on these issues. The AU stood solidly behind Zimbabwe in relation to the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by western nations and called for their unconditional removal at all their summits since 2001. The African union also stood by Zimbabwe in support of the conduct and validity of the country’s general elections in 2000, 2002 and 2005 and proclaimed the elections “free and fair” despite widespread protests and allegations of intimidation, violence and vote rigging by opposition parties and civic society groups. For example, the March 31 2007 SADC Dar-es-Salaam communiqué on Zimbabwe, the 2007 Accra AU Conference, and the 27th SADC Summit in Lusaka had all stood by Zimbabwe and waded off western condemnation of Zimbabwe’s human rights record. However in 2008, the AU dismissed Zimbabwe’s Presidential election re-run as not free and fair and called for a Government of National Unity as a way of establishing reconciliation, peace and a harmonious working environment among the contesting parties.
One of the major foreign policy objectives which Zimbabwe had not been able to achieve within the AU structures was to ensure Africa’s ownership of AU institutions and processes, free from outside interference. The AU continues to be funded by donors or what are called partners to the tune of 70% of its budget, with the World Bank, EU and China being the biggest funders (Mataboge, 2016; Mail and Guardian June 19, 2015). Many member states have not managed to pay their subscriptions as required by the AU Constitutive Act. This lack of financial capacity on the part of AU member states had given former colonial powers sufficient leeway to meddle in AU’s institutions and processes through budget support and technical assistance. There is increasing pressure on African countries which were better off like South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Angola to increase their contribution as a way of lessening dependence on partners.

The second foreign policy objective which Zimbabwe had not been able to fulfil effectively with AU member states has been the promotion of trade, investment and tourism linkages. There is very little evidence to show any level of activity in trade, investment and tourism linkages with AU member states outside the regional economic communities like SADC and COMESA. Historically, countries from these regional economic communities had so much in common including a shared colonial legacy, trade relationships and cultural linkages and affinities. Notable exceptional African countries which came to the assistance of Zimbabwe include Nigeria which helped to decolonize Zimbabwe’s mass media by giving a grant of USD5million which enabled the country to decolonize its mass media from the South African Argus group of newspapers (Ronning and Kupe, 1999). When Zimbabwe was in a fuel crisis between 2006 and 2008, the Libyan government of Col Gaddafi proposed to give oil to Zimbabwe in exchange for tracts of Zimbabwean land. The deal was abandoned because it was considered unviable. There is therefore insignificant or negligible trade, tourism or investment coming from the AU member states because many member states are also actively trying to attract these from developed countries.

The AU can best be described as a political institution for achieving mainly political objectives but not economic objectives which have largely been decentralized to regional economic communities. According to Raine (2009, p 9), Africa is a continent of 53 countries hosting more than 2000 languages, with a diversity of ethnicities, cultures, different styles of leadership, different resource endowments and markets. Because of that reason, it is difficult to come up with structured economic relationships outside the framework of regional economic communities.
5.1.3 Broad aims of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the Southern African Development Community Sub-Region

Since Zimbabwe was one of the founding members of SADC, its foreign policy was crafted in line with the SADC objectives, vision and mission, with an emphasis on protecting its national interests, security, sovereignty and independence. According to the policy statement by Foreign Minister Mumbengegwi (2009), Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within SADC was guided by the need to “forge political, economic, security and cultural co-operation with its neighbours in the Southern African region and to promote development through regional and sub-regional initiatives”.

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy also sought to achieve SADC solidarity and support in its nation-building efforts. The promotion of peace and security in SADC, through inter and intra-state conflict resolution, was also a crucial pillar of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy orientation. In working towards that foreign policy objective, Zimbabwe had been active in the creation of SADC institutions and mechanisms for achieving peace and security through the creation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, the SADC Brigade which operates under the Organ and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact which operates on the principle of collective security and promotes the ‘injure one, injure all’ concept. The SADC Standby Force, which operates under the African Standby Force, is meant to contribute to peace not only in the sub-region but also in the African region as a whole. However, the SADC Standby Force is hardly operational and is yet to deploy in a conflict situation in SADC. The security architecture of Zimbabwe is therefore built around the security of SADC and the African continent who are the ultimate guarantor of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

5.1.4 Broad aims of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Sub Region

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within COMESA had been structured around the objectives of COMESA and include the development of a regional economic bloc which will offer many trade, investment, tourism opportunities and other benefits to Zimbabwe and the region. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within COMESA aims at overcoming the challenges of a landlocked country since her goods will have free circulation rights when moving to such countries because all formalities will have taken place at the port of entry. Zimbabwe’s
foreign policy, therefore, sought to achieve socio-economic prosperity within a prosperous economic community.

5.2 Zimbabwe and the Regional Integration agenda

Zimbabwe’s relations with the region will be analysed in the context of the objectives of SADC and to a lesser extent COMESA and the AU. This section will explore the state of political and security relations between Zimbabwe and the region with a close focus on the political objectives of both SADC and Zimbabwe.

5.2.1 The State of Political and Security Relations between Zimbabwe and SADC

Political relations in SADC were characterized more by competition than co-operation among the member states. Although SADC member states maintain cordial relations at official bilateral level, they are struggling to evolve common political values, systems and institutions at sub-regional level in line with one of SADC’s key policy objectives outlined in the SADC Treaty of 1992. The other challenge affecting political relations at regional level was that the political leadership of SADC countries were committed to regional integration at the rhetoric level but in practice some of the governments were more preoccupied with the maintenance of power at any cost, in addition to promoting their sovereignty, national interests, political and economic stability, legitimacy and the security of their states. There were also elements of suspicion among member states based on the historical backgrounds of the states and their ideological orientation. The picture that emerges when one analyses SADC’s objectives and the practical results obtaining on the ground is that SADC’s expectations from the regional integration process were too high. The collective vision of regional integration was being stunted by individual states’ preoccupation with national interest considerations. As Cilliers (2012) noted, regional integration is a complex and protracted process which requires visionary leadership, adherence to solid common principles, and active championship. The study will analyse the key political objectives of SADC and how Zimbabwe and other SADC countries had succeeded or failed to meet such objectives.

5.2.2 The promotion of common political values, systems and institutions

One of the key political objectives of SADC is the promotion of common political values, systems and institutions as a prerequisite to regional integration. However, the challenge is how to achieve that objective given that there are various regimes which range from democratic governments to dictatorships. Friedman (2014) classifies five countries in SADC...
as ‘free’ in line with the classification of Freedom House; that is, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and Lesotho. However, the frequent involvement of the military in destabilizing elected governments in Lesotho disqualifies this country from this categorization. The rest of the SADC countries are considered to suffer from too many deficits in democracy and are in the process of evolving democratic practices in their countries while others are maintaining their autocratic, monarchical regimes like Swaziland. While this classification may prove to be polemic, it is however borrowed from SADC principles and values which are derived from institutions which are democratic, rule-based, legitimate and effective. Dictatorship arises from weak democratic systems and values, poor governance as defined by the lack of transparency and accountability in their bureaucratic systems in addition to lack of observation of human rights and the rule of law. As Mansfield and Milner (2012) argued, democratic leaders are more favourable to competition and the rule of law than autocratic leaders, and violating an international agreement does not carry the same costs for an autocratic leader than it does for a democratic leader.

Within SADC, manifestations of competition between democratic and autocratic leaders is evident with those countries who have democratic systems attracting more trade, investment, tourism and development assistance compared to autocratic regimes. Zimbabwe had been affected by negative stereotypes relating to lack of good governance and the general perception that it was not a law abiding country following the fast-track-land reform programme between 2000 and 2008 when white farmers had their farms confiscated by government without compensation. Zimbabwe also refused to follow the rule of international law when it acquired land which was covered by Bilateral Investment and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs) without compensation as required by law. The Zimbabwe government’s Finance Minister, Chinamasa, in 2014 argued that the fact that Zimbabwe could not pay full and fair compensation for the properties could not preclude it from compulsorily acquiring the land concerned. Chinamasa cited lack of funds as the reason for the Zimbabwe government’s action and promised to pay in future without giving a time frame.

In some instances farmers losing their land were asked to apply for compensation from Britain, the former colonial power which had promised to fund the programme as part of the Lancaster House Agreement but later on reneged on its promise. Even South Africa lost large tracts of its own nationals’ land which was covered by BIPPAs. The compulsory acquisition of land without compensation was contrary to the obligations which the country had pledged
to honour when it ratified the agreements. South Africa, Botswana and Malawi strongly objected to the approach taken by Zimbabwe in acquiring the land as it was viewed to be contrary to the rule of law enshrined in SADC standards on democratic governance.

As far as Zimbabwe was concerned, its national interest considerations took precedence over these SADC standards on governance. It can be observed that different political systems within SADC member states affected the pursuit of common value systems which are outlined in the SADC Treaty. For example some member states like Madagascar, Lesotho, DRC, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had been struggling to meet the SADC standards of holding credible, democratic elections which are prescribed in SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. A good example was the failure of Zimbabwe to meet the SADC standards in June 2008 when it held a disputed presidential election run-off which led to SADC intervention and the facilitation of a Global Political Agreement between the contesting parties-ZANU-PF and MDC formations. This SADC initiated formula, which was backed by the African Union, resulted in the formation of a Government of National Unity in February 2009. The SADC negotiated formula gave legitimacy to the Zimbabwe government following a 10 months stalemate without a government. The crisis in Zimbabwe needed the active attention of the region because it was affecting the supra-national objectives of the sub-region as thousands of Zimbabwean refugees poured into neighbouring countries of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique in pursuit of food, jobs, and peace. Zimbabwe’s problems then ceased to be not only a foreign policy issue for those countries receiving refugees but it also became a domestic security issue for those countries who were failing to cope with the influx of refugees. SADC was therefore able to effectively use its leverage on Zimbabwe to solve the internal crisis which was having a spill-over effect on neighbouring countries.

Zimbabwe co-operated with SADC because it was in line with its major national objective of defending its ‘national interest’ which translated to holding on to power at all cost. Surrendering power to the opposition was viewed as succumbing to the ‘regime change agenda’ which was being advocated by western powers. The opposition did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the ZANU-PF ruling elite since it was regarded as ‘stooges’ of the west. The South African mediator on Zimbabwe’s crisis, President Thabo Mbeki, seemed to lend credence to this view of ZANU-PF by appearing jovial and comfortable in public appearances with President Mugabe. President Mbeki had also molly-coddled the Zimbabwe regime during the mediation process and appeared to promote a policy of appeasement and
brotherhood towards the ZANU-PF ruling elite based on the shared liberation struggle brotherhood and comradeship.

When President Zuma took over Mbeki’s mediation role on Zimbabwe, he also appeared to warm up to the ZANU-PF ruling elite and was quick to endorse the ZANU-PF victory in the 2013 harmonized general election although there were apparent loopholes in the implementation of SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections. Therefore, South Africa’s policy of appeasement and comradeship, based on the shared history of the liberation struggle, continued to dominate the country’s approach to Zimbabwe and this had the effect of undermining SADC’s own adopted standards on democracy, good governance, the rule of law and electoral practices. A military coup d’état in Madagascar (2009) also destabilized SADC’s democratic evolutionary processes in its pursuit of common political values, systems and institutions.

The overall picture emerging from an analysis of the political composition of SADC, therefore, is that of a regional grouping with different political systems which range from democratic to autocratic regimes. The regimes were led by different ideologies ranging from Marxist-Leninism (for example Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) to those guided by neo-liberal ideologies (for example South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, DRC, Lesotho, Seychelles and Madagascar). Swaziland is the only country in the region with a Head of State and Government who is a King in a monarchical system of government which does not subject itself to elections. SADC’s membership includes Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone states, island states of Seychelles and Mauritius and states such as DRC and Tanzania which are traditionally viewed as Central and East African states respectively (Adar et al, 2002; p.287).

The different colonial legacies of these countries meant that they were affected and influenced by different patterns of post-colonial relations in the form of trade, investment and development assistance. In addition to this albatross around their necks, SADC is a creation of its Northern donors on which it relies heavily for funding. Therefore, a North-South dependency syndrome exist in terms of development aid. As Adar et al (2002) observed, donors have a say in terms of ‘what is given and who gets what’. Therefore, the policy making context involving SADC would appear to consist of large numbers of Northern actors who will naturally have their own demands and expectations. This situation had the effect of undermining the decision-making processes of SADC member states and the relevance of
such decisions to member states and their people. SADC member states’ independence is also constrained by the parameters set by the troika of world financial institutions—International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organisation (WTO)—who define the meaning of good governance in fiscal, development and trade policy. SADC is also constrained by policies and expectations of donor fora such as the EU-SADC ministerial conference and the SADC-USA donor forum among others.

SADC is also being compelled to respond to the dictates of globalization as the region is being increasingly incorporated in the world economy. Given the diverse political and economic backgrounds of this grouping and the various exogenous and endogenous factors that impact on their nation building efforts as outlined, it was, under such circumstances, inevitable that evolving, common political values, systems and institutions was going to be a difficult hurdle. The only major aspects that held this group together was the shared nature, culture, a sense of community and the long history of political and economic co-operation especially in the emancipation of the region.

5.2.3 Achievement of complementarity between national and regional strategies

The major challenge facing SADC was the thrust of achieving complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes as one of its political and economic objectives. Member states were clear in their vision that underdevelopment, deprivation and backwardness could only be overcome through co-operation and integration. The challenge facing the sub-region, therefore, was how to operationalize this vision through the complementation of national and regional strategies and programmes.

Complimenting national and regional strategies was constrained by a number of factors. First, despite rhetoric commitment to regional integration, member states preoccupied themselves with sovereignty, legitimacy, economic and political stability issues. Leaders were keen to stay in power at all cost and therefore domestic factor considerations (like land acquisition in the case of Zimbabwe) took precedence over regional integration agenda and values. SADC leaders lacked the political will and commitment that was required to propel regional integration given domestic factors considerations which took priority most of the time.

Secondly, co-ordination of national and regional strategies was stunted by the region’s unequal power relations with some economic and military dominant countries like South
Africa and Zimbabwe tending to bulldoze their way due to their political, military and economic clout.

Thirdly, there was also a tendency by foreign countries to select trade, investment, tourism and development assistance partners on a bilateral basis without regard to the regional integration agenda and this had the effect of distorting and in some cases derailing regional strategies. The sovereign space of SADC was not respected by some western nations who preferred to impose their own strategies on SADC member states which were not in line with regional strategies and the general aspirations of the peoples of the region. In such situations, member states were driven by national interest and sovereignty consideration which took precedence over regional strategies.

Fourthly, implementation of national and regional strategies was also constrained by ‘opposition to sharing sovereignty’ among member states (de Lombaerde & Langenhove, 2007). As Van Nieuwkerk (2012) noted, there is little evidence of a collective effort to develop a shared foreign policy approach due to the problem of defining ‘interests’ and specification of ‘targets’ of foreign policy. The SADC secretariat was disempowered to make, authorize, implement and enforce rules among member states. Agreements, protocols and memoranda signed by SADC member states were supposed to be rule-based and not discretionary as was the case with most viable regional integration schemes. In support of this viewpoint, Lunogelo (2012) argued that there is no supra-national regime in SADC which had an effective rule-based system to implement, monitor and enforce the SADC Treaty and its various agreements, protocols and memoranda. Lunogelo (2012) concludes that as a result, discretion dominates rather than binding commitments.

Given a regional institutional framework which promotes discretion rather than a rule based system, it becomes difficult for member states to co-ordinate and compliment national and regional strategies and programmes. In line with the ‘realist’ school of international relations, SADC member states were preoccupied with state power and state interests as the dominant factor of regional co-operation and such an approach stunted the synchronization of national and regional strategies. A good example was Zimbabwe’s foreign policy approach which sought to consolidate SADC solidarity and mutual support as a way of protecting its national interests, security, independence and sovereignty. Although Zimbabwe valued so much regional solidarity and mutual support, it was hostile to interference in its internal affairs by SADC member states. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy therefore appeared to place emphasis on
support from regional countries for its survival whilst at the same time placing its own interests ahead of the region. This behaviour pattern applied to almost every country in SADC and a foreign policy approach of that nature could not be relied upon to compliment national and regional strategies.

5.2.4 The promotion and defence of peace and security

Another key political objective of SADC was the ‘promotion and defence of peace and security’ in the region as the starting point in pursuit of sustainable development and the safeguarding of the security of SADC member states and the African continent in general. SADC recognized that the lack of peace and security in the region stifles development and democracy. Emphasis had been placed on building an effective security architecture, in line with the regional integration agenda, as the basis for securing and promoting peace, security, democracy and development of the region. Regional security management became, therefore, the means and part of the solution to regional development. As van Nieuwkerk (2012, p.6) put it, “The region can thus be the cause (the regional security complex), the means (regional security management), and the solution (regional development).

SADC’s evolution as a security architecture can be traced to the meeting of April 18, 1996 of SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security held in Gaborone, which recommended to the SADC Summit the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) with a mandate to flexibly and timeously respond, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive crisis situations. According to Adar et al (2002, p 296) its brief was to compliment, not replace, OAU (AU) mechanism for resolving security issues. The Organ was then launched in Botswana on June 28, 1996 at a Summit of Heads of State and Government of SADC member states. The Gaborone Summit adopted the following institutional guidelines for the Organ; firstly, the organ shall operate at the summit level and shall function independent of other SADC structures; secondly, the organ shall also operate at ministerial and technical levels; thirdly, the chairperson of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and troika basis; fourthly, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee shall be one of the institutions of the Organ; and lastly, the Organ may establish other structures as the need arises.

In January 2002, the SADC Summit gave OPDSC the mandate to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (van Nieuwkerk, 2012). SIPO’s core
The objective was the creation of a peaceful and security environment which enabled SADC to realize its social, political and economic objectives. According to van Nieuwkerk (2012, p 9), SIPO was designed to achieve three objectives; provide guidelines for action (strategies and activities), shape the institutional framework for the day-to-day activities of the Organ (including the operationalization of the Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact), and to align SADC’s peace and security agenda with that of the AU’s African Standby Force and aspects of good governance. The Organ is managed by a troika of elected member states who include the serving chairperson, the incoming chairperson and the outgoing chairperson. The Organ is supported by committees which include the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) comprising ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security of each member state. All political and security decisions taken by the Organ are referred to the SADC Summit for discussion and approval and such decisions by the Organ and the Summit are made by consensus.

5.2.4.1 Challenges to the objective of the promotion and defence of peace and security in SADC

There were many problems which stood in the way of the promotion and defence of peace and security from the time SADC was established in 1992. First, the origins of OPDS demonstrated competition and conflict for leadership between President Mugabe who was the inaugural chairperson of OPDS and President Mandela who was the chairperson of SADC. Zimbabwe and South Africa and their respective supporters differed in interpreting whether the OPDS was subordinate to the Summit of Heads of State and Government (South African view) or whether it enjoyed its own policy-making autonomy (Zimbabwean view). While Zimbabwe had argued that the OPDS had its own policy-making autonomy and should be separated from the rest of SADC institutions as a way of ‘excluding SADC donors from discussing security issues’ (Financial Gazette, September 25, 1997), South Africa had argued that the Summit could never have intended to enable such a “Frankenstein monster” not to be under its control (Adar, et al 2002; p.296). According to Gocalves (1997), Mugabe interpreted the Organ as having “sweeping powers to intervene in domestic disputes” whilst Mandela, with the support of Botswana, insisted that the Organ “remain a consultative body assisting member states in dealing with their internal disputes through political means”. It was, however, resolved at the 1999 Mbabane Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting that the Organ was subordinate to the Summit.
Secondly, there were also differences in terms of which security regime was to be adopted for the region. The main protagonists were Zimbabwe and South Africa. Zimbabwe led the “militarist camp” which advocated for ‘a mutual defence pact which prioritized defence co-operation and military responses to conflict’ and it was supported by its allies Angola and Namibia (Africa & Molomo 2013, p30). South Africa led the “pacifist camp” which advocated for a ‘common security’ regime whose primary purpose for co-operation was political. South Africa was backed by its allies who included Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Swaziland and Tanzania. As Nathan (2011) observed, the DRC made no contribution to the debate, while Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia contributed erratically without conforming to any discernible security pattern. A compromise was, however, reached which sought to appease both factions. It was also agreed that the chairperson of the Organ would rotate so that no single state would dominate this regional security body. The lack of initial consensus on the structure of the security regime which was to be put in place created suspicion between Zimbabwe and other states who had a different interpretation of the security situation in SADC.

Thirdly, Zimbabwe and South Africa also differed in their diagnosis of the DRC crisis (1998-2002) and the possible solution to the military conflict. Zimbabwe together with Angola, Namibia and the DRC adopted a realist approach to the crisis and advocated for a military solution to the crisis as a way of defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of DRC from rebel forces. South Africa on the other hand adopted a pluralist approach which sought to craft an all-inclusive political process leading to an inclusive political dispensation in the DRC. The ‘hawks’ won the argument following their military intervention in the DRC in 1998 without a SADC Summit mandate. The tensions which arose in the region as a result of these different approaches to regional security did not augur well in developing mutual trust which is critical in any security architecture. Many member states at the early formative stages of SADC institutions could not trust South Africa’s intentions due to the fact that it had just emerged from apartheid rule while others were wary of hawkish states like Zimbabwe who could not be relied upon to solve inter and intra-states disputes without the use of force.

Fourthly, since the region’s establishment, it was ‘wracked by high levels of violent conflict’ including a civil war in Mozambique (1982-1992) between the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO rebels who were sponsored by apartheid South Africa, a civil war in Angola (1975-2002) and another civil war in DRC (1998 to 2002) which led to the
military intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in support of the DRC government’s sovereignty and territorial integrity which was being threatened by rebels from Burundi and Rwanda. The conflict in the DRC remains unresolved to date. The military involvement of Zimbabwe in the DRC conflict, which cost an average of USD 1 million per day at the height of the war according to UN estimates, seriously and irreparably damaged Zimbabwe’s economy. Zimbabwe never recovered economically from its military involvement in the DRC war and it was difficult to establish the national interest considerations associated with the military decision. The EU and other western co-operating partners imposed an arms embargo and other sanctions on Zimbabwe in response to the country’s military involvement in the DRC.

Fifthly, there were also violent conflicts in several SADC countries, notably election violence in Zimbabwe in 2000, 2002 and 2008, leading to disputed results; mutiny by the army in Lesotho in 1998 leading to external military intervention by South Africa and Botswana, while Madagascar experienced a violent and unconstitutional change of government in 2009. These events negatively affected peace and security in the region.

Sixthly, there were many tensions between member states which SADC, as a regional security community, managed to pacify successfully. According to Africa and Molomo (2012), Angola in 1998 threatened to invade neighbouring Zambia in order to halt supplies to National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels and two years later Zambia accused Angola of conducting military attacks on its territory. Another violent incident worthy noting is that in 2008 South African citizens carried xenophobic attacks on nationals of SADC member states who had migrated to South Africa in search of food, employment and a peaceful environment away from conflict. The killings, maiming and forced deportation of these SADC nationals which had recurred intermittently since then, demonstrated that a regional community or identity remains a long way to go.

The seventh aspect was the tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana, and also between Zimbabwe and Zambia in 2008. The tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana arose when Zimbabwe accused Botswana of providing military support to opposition insurgents leading to the mobilization of artillery and troops by Botswana along its common border with Zimbabwe. Alao (2012; p.135) argued that the source of another tension with Botswana emanated from Botswana President Khama’s statement that “land reform needed to be done in Zimbabwe, but it was a question of doing the right in a wrong way”. Khama further
argued that “the good things were overshadowed by acts of lawlessness”. Tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana also arose over the massive influx of economic refugees from Zimbabwe into Botswana and the construction of a Botswana security fence along the border with Zimbabwe as a way of containing the movement of refugees into Botswana. Relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana also soured when Botswana accused Zimbabwe state media of waging a hostile campaign against the country. The relations reached frosty levels when President Khama boycotted the August 16-17, 2008 SADC Summit in protest at the outcome of the June 2008 Presidential election in Zimbabwe which Botswana regarded as illegitimate. The summit was attended instead by the Botswana foreign minister, a downgrade in diplomatic representation which was meant to send a message to Zimbabwe and other SADC countries about Botswana’s diplomatic stance. The Botswana foreign minister, Phandu Skelemani, further inflamed the situation when, in November 2008, he urged all countries bordering Zimbabwe to close their borders with Zimbabwe in order “to bring down Robert Mugabe’s government” (International Herald Tribune, November 26, 2008).

There was also tension between Zimbabwe and Zambia when the late President of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, called Mugabe a “regional embarrassment” following the disputed 2008 presidential election run-off which was characterized by violence, intimidation, abuse of human rights and ill-treatment of the opposition (Alao, 2012 p.131). Zambia also complained about the influx of Zimbabwean refugees into Zambia in 2008, the second such event, after helping the country to liberate itself during the liberation struggle by providing shelter for refugees and military and material support systems for the Zimbabwe guerrillas in the 1970s. Zambia believed then that such a development betrayed the good role Zambia played in liberating Zimbabwe. Zambia felt that it was unfair to host Zimbabwean refugees again after their country had achieved independence. However, the region’s security diplomacy managed to pacify the conflicts, not only for the good of the peoples and individual states concerned but more importantly for the good of the region as a whole. The region managed to reach compromises among competing nation-state elements in order to move forward.

The eighth aspect was the failure to operationalize the SADC Standby Force which had been a huge let down for the region. Despite conflicts occurring in member states like Madagascar which may have necessitated the deployment of the SADC Brigade, this had not happened. The SADC Standby Force was meant to provide solutions to SADC conflicts in line with the AU Doctrine of “African solutions for African problems” through a SADC Brigade which was to intervene, where necessary, in conflict situations.
A number of challenges stood in the way of SADC’s objective of securing peace, security and development. There has been a tendency to over rely on diplomacy even where dialogue could prove inadequate in resolving conflict. There was also the challenge of a common operational doctrine given the diverse historical military and colonial backgrounds of member states. Training of the SADC Standby Force (SSF) according to Article 13 of the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the force was to be the responsibility of each state party although standardisation of training was to be developed by the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in line with standards of the African Union and the United Nations. Despite the fact that the SADC Standby Force had embarked on joint peacekeeping exercises including Blue Hungwe (in Zimbabwe), Blue Crane (South Africa), Tanzanite (Tanzania), Thokgamo (Botswana) and Golfinho (South Africa) the SSF had not been able to collectively participate in peacekeeping operations due to logistical challenges like lack of adequate funding. Some SADC member states are lagging behind in meeting their financial obligations towards the Endowment Fund to enable collective participation by the region in peacekeeping operations. Participation in peacekeeping operations is being done by individual member states based on their individual capabilities.

The ninth aspect involved states like DRC who do not exercise real security control over their territories or the movement of people and goods along their porous borders. Such states could not be relied upon to contribute effectively towards the peace and security agenda of the region since their preoccupation is the fending-off of military threats and national survival. The irony is that such states ‘which are self-conscious about their weaknesses and vulnerability as nation-states are often very concerned about the recognition of their sovereignty and the status accorded to their leaders’ (Adar, et al, 2002).

5.2.5 Factors accounting for the strengths of Zimbabwe’s regional relations in the area of politics, peace and security

The strength of Zimbabwe’s regional relations was anchored on the prominent role that Zimbabwe and its President, Robert Mugabe, played in the successful liberation of Southern Africa. Mugabe is considered a hero by many oppressed and marginalized peoples of Southern Africa and the world over who look up to him as an accomplished liberation struggle stalwart and elder statesman in the region. The emergence of Zimbabwe in 1980 as an independent state enabled the Frontline States (FLS) to set the foundation for the creation of SADC through a structured regional economic project called the Southern African
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which later on evolved into SADC in 1992. Therefore, it would not be possible to analyse the evolution of SADC as we know it today without mentioning the active involvement of Zimbabwe in the institutional design of its sophisticated political and security architecture. This view is supported by Nathan (2012) who argued that at the time of SADC’s formation in 1992, Zimbabwe was the most committed member to the process of defining the security agenda of SADC. Nathan (2012) contrasts this with South Africa, under Mandela’s Presidency (1994-1999), which was preoccupied with its post-apartheid policies while under Mbeki’s Presidency (1999-2008), a lot of emphasis was placed on the architecture of the African Union rather than the sub-region, SADC.

Zimbabwe embraced a foreign policy of partnering other member states in the region to create the structures because it fervently believed that SADC and the AU are the key guarantors of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and independence, national security and political and economic prosperity of the country. Since Zimbabwe regards African states as an extension of its own country, this is where it derives the trust to safeguard its national interests through African institutions. The liberation struggle was fought on African soil with the support mainly of African member states and therefore these were the only countries which could be trusted to safeguard Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and its prosperity.

Secondly, the strength of Zimbabwe’s regional relations in the area of politics, peace and security emanates from its anti-imperialist and anti-neo-colonialist stance in all matters to do with development co-operation. Zimbabwe had always advocated for ‘African solutions to African problems’ in various platforms at home, in the region and internationally. This approach is viewed as a sustainable basis of developing SADC member states using their own resources than to rely on foreigners. President Mugabe’s undiplomatic and belligerent style which he used at home against the West and in particular against Britain, the EU and the USA which resulted in Zimbabwe’s diplomatic isolation and the imposition of ‘targeted sanctions’ following the implementation of the fast-track-land reform programme from 2000 to 2008, was also used by the Zimbabwe government to fight western allies at the regional stage. Issues which dominated Mugabe’s attack on western powers centred on their interference in the internal affairs of regional states, gay rights and human rights which Mugabe claimed were being imposed on Africans whilst the west behaved as prefects, the use of racism as a trump card to fight the west at regional level because of the linkage of racism and colonization and subsequent expropriation of the blacks’ ancestral lands by the whites.
Mugabe also argued for a United Nations system which was representative, democratic, accountable and development oriented as a counter to the influence of big powers, especially western powers, who trampled on the rights of weak and small states. This diplomatic style which was used in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy processes also found expression in Zimbabwe’s regional pronouncement. For example when he took over the SADC Chairmanship on August 17, 2014, Mugabe advocated for SADC to wean itself from foreign donors, especially the west. Mugabe argued;

Our continued over reliance on the generosity and goodwill of our co-operating partners tend to compromise our ownership and sustainability of our SADC programmes. How can we proudly claim SADC to be our organization when close to 60% of our programmes are externally funded?

(Newsday, August 18, 2014)

Mugabe then urged SADC to cut on some of its programmes and pursue programmes it could fund. President Mugabe statement reflected the tension within SADC between Mugabe’s populism and other countries like South Africa who advocated for pragmatism. Mugabe statement was preceded by his traditional anti-western rhetoric that made him a hero with some people who were afraid of western dominance, but his views did not reflect the general consensus within the SADC leadership. According to the SADC Executive Secretary Stergomena Lawrence Tax’s Report for 2014, SADC member states contribute 21% to the SADC budget while co-operating partners contribute 79%. Therefore, if Mugabe’s advice was to be followed, it would mean SADC would completely shut operations or at best trim down major programmes and not many member states would support the move. President Mugabe had used the same approach in Zimbabwe with disastrous results in terms of attracting foreign direct investment and rehabilitation of the economy after the meltdown of the economy in 2008. Mugabe’s diplomatic approach at regional level was domineering and Zhangazha (2014) views it as quarrelsome and opinionated, which is not useful in building consensus over key decisions at Heads of State level. Mugabe also at one time threatened to pull Zimbabwe out of the region when a SADC decision, during the mediation process of President Zuma, went against his expectations. He later on withdrew his statement and apologized to the mediator.

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15 For details of SADC budgets and economic constrains refer to the 35th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government documents published by the SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.
Mugabe also threatened that AU member states would pull out of the UN if the UN Security Council was not reformed to include African representation to counter the abuse of veto powers by western powers and to ensure that AU member states are not reduced to “artificial members of the UN” (Mugabe’s speech at the 26th AU Summit in Addis Ababa). President Mugabe was therefore taking his country’s fights with Britain, USA and EU to the SADC and AU and many African countries who have excellent bilateral and multilateral relationship with western countries and institutions did not share his views which were considered to result in the diversion of resources from the region.

A huge component of some SADC countries’ national budgets were funded by donors and this made it difficult for them to determine their own destiny by adopting diplomatic postures such as that of Zimbabwe. There was understandable fear within SADC that Zimbabwe’s political and economic policies could have a contagion effect across the region due to the fact that some regional leaders do not have the spine to challenge Zimbabwe because Mugabe is a revered African statesman. Few African leaders would have the moral authority to challenge Mugabe because of his enormous contribution to the liberation of Southern African countries. However, Mugabe’s policies against imperialism and neo-colonialism had been consistent at home and in the region and he is widely acknowledged as a bulwark against western hegemony and exploitative forces.

Thirdly, Mugabe’s government had been a key strategic partner in coalescing all former liberation movements in SADC to build strong synergies and exchange ideas on how best to protect the legacy of the liberation movement, to safeguard their independence and to ensure that opposition parties who emerged from the post-liberation milieu were not used by western powers to roll back the frontiers of freedom. Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FLMSA) included ANC of South Africa, FRELIMO of Mozambique, MPLA of Angola, CCM of Tanzania, SWAPO of Namibia and ZANU-PF of Zimbabwe. FLMSA started holding their meetings on a regular basis since 2008 and they have been meeting annually thereafter either as meetings of Wings/Leagues, meetings of Secretary-Generals and as Summits of Heads of Former Liberation Movements in Southern Africa. Before major SADC Summits were held, the liberation movements would meet earlier to share notes and to strategize on the way forward. Zimbabwe was able to fully utilise this platform to seek unity, solidarity and support from SADC countries in response to perceived neo-colonial forces which threatened the peace and independence of regional countries.
The mediation of Thabo Mbeki in Zimbabwe’s political crisis in 2008 was viewed with suspicion by the opposition parties of the MDC formations because of the mediator’s close association and involvement in FLMSA activities. However, this obsession with the preservation of former Southern African liberation movements’ hold on power is a disingenuous strategy of managing regional relations because it does a disservice to the people who may be suffering from gross incompetence by their governments. As Sithole (2012) argued, the threats for these liberation movements may not be external but may emanate from the failure to meet the expectations of their citizens and adopting to changing circumstances at party and government levels. Liberation movements who are rolled out of power under these circumstances should not allege that these are western sponsored regime change agendas as they emanate from their own internal weaknesses of governance.

The fourth strength of Zimbabwe’s regional relations was its leadership role in the reconstitution of SADC organs like the SADC Tribunal which had its operations suspended in 2010 following protests by Zimbabwe that it was interfering in its internal affairs by usurping the functions and authority of national courts. The Tribunal had passed a judgement in favour of Zimbabwean white farmers led by Mike Campbell whose land had been compulsorily acquired by the Zimbabwe government for redistribution to the landless peasants. The Tribunal’s judges held that the Zimbabwean government’s land seizures violated the law and Zimbabwe protested that the judgement undermined its sovereignty.

The Tribunal was, thereafter reconstituted at the instigation of Zimbabwe in 2014 with the active support of all the other 14 members of SADC with a mandate to deal with inter-state disputes but without the mandate to deal with cases brought by individuals. While supporters of Zimbabwe argued that the disbandment was in the ‘interest of the region’ because it promoted the sovereignty of member states, there were also concerns raised by individuals and civil society groups that the disbandment was an attack on SADC’s commitment to legal order and the defence of human rights. SADC member states’ ruling elites co-operated with each other to secure the security of their states without any concern for the security of their people which is a key objective in the SADC Treaty of 1992. As Africa and Molomo (2012; p.34) argued, the ability of member states to address issues of human security, which are often transnational as in this case, are hampered by their fear of losing national sovereignty and the concomitant reluctance of leaders to rattle the cages of others. In promoting its national interest the way Zimbabwe did, it also provided leadership and direction to other SADC leaders on what direction to take on the SADC Tribunal.
5.2.6 Weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s regional relations in the area of politics, defence and security

There were, however, many weaknesses which were associated with the Mugabe government’s style of regional diplomatic engagement which weakened the state’s efforts in the region. First, Zimbabwe had competed with South Africa for regional political leadership in terms of institutional design, ideological orientation and how relations with the west were to be conducted. These were difficult issues to manoeuvre given the diverse ideological orientation of member states. For example, while Zimbabwe led the “hawkish” states in the region like Angola and Namibia which were known for their aggressive diplomatic posturing at home and in the region, South Africa, on the other hand, preferred diplomatic instruments like mediation, negotiation, and arbitration among others to be applied before resorting to military force as a last resort.

The competition that arose from these different approaches to “African solutions to African problems” within the region polarised regional positions and created suspicions and lack of trust among some member states. Foreign countries outside the region found the perfect opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of SADC member states by aligning themselves with some of the camps. Some SADC countries with cordial bilateral relations with western powers could not embrace Zimbabwe’s confrontational diplomatic style and this narrowed the range of areas of co-operation at bilateral and regional levels. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s “hawkish” and confrontational diplomatic style weakened the country’s foreign policy objectives in the region.

The second weakness is that Zimbabwe exhibited elements of intellectual arrogance and intellectual dishonesty in its re-engagement with the west and this was not helpful to SADC’s efforts of normalising Zimbabwe’s relations with the west. Zimbabwe’s Foreign Ministry had been advocating the view that it is the west which is supposed to re-engage with Zimbabwe and not vice-versa. In an address to the strategic planning workshop for the Foreign Ministry at the Great Zimbabwe Hotel, Minister Mumbengegwi argued:

It’s not Zimbabwe which should re-engage the west, but it is the west that should re-engage Zimbabwe. We are not going to re-engage them anymore because it is them who unilaterally imposed sanctions on us and they should first unilaterally lift them. What we are demanding first is the unconditional lifting of sanctions.

(The Herald, October 5, 2013).
SADC member states had put a lot of work in negotiating the normalisations of relations between Zimbabwe and the west and this kind of diplomatic posturing did not advance national and regional interests. There was a realisation by the EU, USA and some SADC countries that a strategy of re-engaging Zimbabwe outside the framework of sanctions may be the starting point since some of the sanctions may not be easy to remove on the statute books of some western countries. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was seeking sympathy, solidarity and a moral platform to pursue unjustified standards of democracy and good governance which were not in line with the SADC Declaration and the Treaty which seeks a “shared future in an environment of peace, security, stability, regional co-operation and integration based on equity, mutual benefit and solidarity” (www.sadc.int).

Zimbabwe’s ‘hawkish’ diplomatic character sought to create problems for the country and the region where a negotiated diplomatic outcome was a distinct option. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy did not want to acknowledge that the root cause of the problems facing the country were linked to deficits in democracy, good governance and lack of respect for the rule of law which were the major bone of contention with western powers. Even South Africa, a regional ally of Zimbabwe which was expected to be an advocate of Zimbabwe, had also suffered from the lawlessness and impunity of ZANU-PF militants who seized South African farms in Nyazura in 2011 in violation of a bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement signed between Pretoria and Harare in 2009. Zimbabwe was seeking the solidarity and sympathy of regional allies when the same allies were also victims of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy weakness arose from the failure to abide by standards established in the SADC Treaty, the AU Constitutive Act principles and principles of the United Nations Charter. More importantly, Zimbabwe could not argue that it is the west who must engage Zimbabwe and not the other way round because the country was crumbling politically and economically from the cumulative impact of western imposed sanctions which needed to be removed through engagement. This diplomatic posturing was a typical case of intellectual dishonesty which was unnecessary in any nation-building effort.

Thirdly, Mugabe’s belligerent, confrontational diplomatic style towards western powers who are the main funders of SADC programmes had the effect of alienating the country from western countries who responded by isolating the country from constructive engagement at home and in the region. Mugabe’s regional diplomacy assumed that there were alternatives to
regional funding, in the short to medium term. The evidence on the ground did not support this as the Executive Secretary of SADC indicated in her 2014 Annual Report that SADC was funded by donors to the tune of more than three quarters of the budget (79% partners and 21% member states). This situation could not easily be substituted by member states funding. Some of the projects being funded by western nations, like infrastructure projects, were too critical to be disrupted without an alternative viable strategy. What was required therefore was a strategy for disengagement from the traditional sponsors, for the medium and long term, without necessarily upsetting the current funders who happened to be mainly western nations. While Mugabe’s view was correct that member states cannot claim to own and determine the destiny of SADC when funders meddle in its affairs through budgetary support and technical assistance, an effective strategy to disengage from this situation was required without necessarily dismantling the current arrangement in the absence of an alternative option. The policy of moderation, rather than confrontation, should therefore inform Zimbabwe’s approach to regional relations.

Fourthly, given that individual states and peoples in the region have different and competing interests, visions and aspirations, western nations have been able literally to ‘divide and rule’ them. Outspoken countries like Zimbabwe have been isolated and punished in the process through denial of access to Foreign Direct Investment, trade and development assistance. Some western countries view South Africa as the gateway into SADC, which meant that most regional investment and trade programmes found their way into South Africa at the expense of countries like Zimbabwe.

Fifthly, SADC solidarity and support to Zimbabwe was, ironically, a weakness of the country’s regional relations within the sub-region. The support, at times, reflected elements of dishonesty. For example, Zimbabwe sought SADC and AU support in its land reform programme which was granted at all summits of the region. However, what is interesting is that some countries like Mozambique, Zambia and Nigeria attracted immediately those white farmers who were displaced by Zimbabwe’s land reform programme and in turn the recipient countries went on to supply Zimbabwe with its staple food requirements as a result of those white farmers. Furthermore, some member states supported Zimbabwe’s domestic policies, like the land reform at regional level but disowned such policies in their policy pronouncement at home and in their engagement with bilateral and multilateral partners, especially from the west.
Zimbabwe learnt the hard way that the solidarity by the region on the land issue did not translate to meaningful solidarity in terms of cushioning it from the retaliatory actions of western powers. The country experienced an unprecedented collapse of the economy between 2000 and 2008, resulting in hyperinflation and the abandonment of the national currency by 2008 in favour of a basket of currencies which included ‘imperialist currencies’ of the US dollar, the British pound and the Euro. During the 2000 to 2008 political and economic crisis, the most significant help offered by SADC member states, especially South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Namibia, was the opening of their borders wide open to ensure Zimbabwean refugees’ access to temporary shelter and food. While it is correct to observe that SADC member states paid a high price for Zimbabwe’s controversial policies, it would also be pertinent to point out that regional solidarity demonstrated by these countries was, in some instances, dishonest, hollow and selfish as it served to protect their national interests and not the interests of Zimbabwe. Strong economies in the region like South Africa, Botswana and Namibia were beneficiaries of the critical skills which migrated from Zimbabwe. Regional economies also benefited from the collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy because they became the suppliers of most of the goods and services which Zimbabwe could not provide to its citizens.

5.3 Conclusion
Zimbabwe played a key role in the institutional design of regional political and security institutions before and after the formation of SADC. Such institutions became pivotal in providing the security and solidarity that was critical to the defence of the sovereignty and independence of member states. Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe was admired and revered as an elder statesman in the region having played a key role in liberating countries who were still under colonial rule. On the other hand, Mugabe was also disliked by other regional leaders for providing leadership on key issues where member states differed like the position of the Organ vis-à-vis the Summit of Heads of States and the reconstitution of the SADC Tribute at the request of Zimbabwe.
Chapter 6

Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy in the context of Regional Economic Relations.

6.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the Southern Africa Development Community and internationally was premised on achieving success in four key result areas of trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and development assistance. In the context of this study, the area of focus was SADC and how Zimbabwe had achieved or failed to achieve its development and economic growth objectives at national and regional level using the key result areas of its foreign policy targets.

In the context of this chapter, the following issues, among others, were identified as having weakened Zimbabwe as a state in terms of achieving its objectives through regional economic relations:

(1) The regional integration agenda was not a panacea for Zimbabwe as it was expected to be complemented by coherent national public policies in line with the regional integration agenda. As a result, there was a weak link between Zimbabwe’s national development strategies and regional development strategies.

(2) Within Zimbabwe, some key public policies were not consistent with trade and investment policies in general and with the foreign policy thrust of the country and this affected Zimbabwe’s potential to attract trade and investment opportunities regionally and internationally. Good trade and investment policies are key for productivity and growth within the country and in the region and they make it possible for Zimbabwe to benefit from regional and global value chains which is a key feature of the global economy.

(3) The failure by Zimbabwe to stabilize the macroeconomic environment since the start of the “Third Chimurenga” weakened Zimbabwe’s development and growth effort through the regional integration agenda as the country ceased to be competitive and efforts were placed on national survival strategies.

(4) The sanctions which were imposed by western nations weakened Zimbabwe’s development and growth efforts through restricting initiatives in trade, investment, tourism and development assistance. The sanctions also strained relations between Zimbabwe and its neighbours in SADC because it is estimated that over 2 million Zimbabweans migrated to
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and other countries as economic refugees in search of employment, or in search of security as asylum seeks (ZIMSTAT & IOM, 2009)

(5) Zimbabwe’s confrontational behaviour pattern towards key western nations, at home, in the region and at international fora, had the effect of drawing back regional efforts of attracting trade, investment, tourism and development assistance. Zimbabwe failed to appreciate that national and regional markets were dependent on international markets for inputs and outputs. These issues, among others, will be analysed as contributing to the weakening of the state in realising its national and regional objectives.

6.1 Trade as an instrument of promoting development and economic growth at national and regional level.

Trade development and integration among SADC member states and the sub-regions on the African continent is viewed as one such instrument of achieving SADC’s objective of development and economic growth of member states. Intra-regional trade between countries of the same region increases trade and commodity exchanges among themselves and reduces tariffs and non-tariff barriers associated with foreign markets and this measure leads to growing prosperity for the countries concerned. Central to the implementation of an economic integration agenda is a trade protocol. According to the SADC secretariat (1996) trade in goods and services constitute a major area of co-operation that supports SADC’s goals of economic development and poverty eradication. The Trade protocol is therefore a vehicle for realizing the trade objective of SADC through the process of liberalization of intra-regional trade, creation of mutually beneficial trade arrangements and the enhancement of productivity and competitiveness in the region. According to the AfDB Annual Report for 2014\(^\text{16}\), inter-Africa trade more than doubled from 2005 to 2012 from USD 62 billion to USD 147 billion and half of that trade took place in the SADC sub-region where South Africa trades with its neighbours.

South Africa is the epicentre of regional trade due to its relatively advanced infrastructure of roads, ports, railways and an efficient communication network which links landlocked countries in the region with the rest of the world. As the trade diagrams below demonstrate, very little inter-trade takes place among SADC members since most countries trade more with South Africa than they do with other member states. The trade pattern illustrated by the diagrams below show that, firstly, South Africa had trade surplus with all the SADC member

\(^{16}\) Details on inter-Africa trade are contained in the AfDB Annual Report for 2014
states combined. Secondly, South African exports to the region were almost five times more than its imports from the region. South Africa’s trade with the region is therefore unbalanced in favour of South Africa. It is also pertinent to point out that South Africa is the source of most products demanded by consumers in the SADC region. Thirdly, according to the Australian Government’s Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) trade performance review document of 2006, South African imports from the region are insignificant as they constitute only 2% of its global imports while total exports to SADC countries constitute 10% of South Africa’s global exports. Therefore, South Africa’s main trading partners were developed countries.

SADC economies are small compared to world markets and the goods they produce are small compared to the needs of South African markets. In addition to the problem of market size of SADC countries which are small, they also export the same basket of unprocessed commodities similar to South Africa like minerals, metals and agricultural products among others. South Africa has the added advantage that it exports some high value-added manufactured goods to SADC countries and the world. Zimbabwe is South Africa’s largest trading partner in the whole of SADC and by extension, South Africa has a lot of economic leverage on Zimbabwe. Because of the unequal economic relationship between the two countries, Zimbabwe’s regional diplomacy was, therefore, occupied by demands for “beneficiation and value addition” of its products before they are exported as a way of countering the South African monopoly in regional markets. However, the challenge for this strategy was for countries like Zimbabwe to be able to attract potential investors into these “beneficiation and value addition industries” given their own restrictive foreign direct investment policies at home which scared away rather than attract investors.

Zimbabwe had also been lobbying member states to ensure that they put pressure on South Africa to reduce the unsustainable trade imbalance between South Africa and SADC on one hand and between South Africa and each individual member state. From 2000 to 2004, Zimbabwe as the main trading partner of South Africa in the region, was at position 13 out of the list of top 15 destinations for South African exports in the world while no other SADC country featured on the list of the top 15 import partners for South Africa (TIPS, 2006).

SADC and Zimbabwean diplomacy were therefore concerned about addressing the apparent dearth in intra-SADC trade between South Africa and SADC. The frustration arising from the huge trade imbalance had raised tension in the region with countries like Zimbabwe telling
the South African government to do more to reduce the dependency of SADC member states on South Africa. As a counter strategy to South Africa’s economic hegemony, President Mugabe (2015) had called for beneficiation of SADC’s abundant resources in order to speed up the industrialization of the region and to create employment. President Mugabe argued that:

Our region is endowed with abundant and diverse natural resources, which, instead of being sold in raw form, at very low prices, must, instead, be exploited and beneficiated, in order to add value to our exports. Value addition and beneficiation is critical, because the process should assist us in our efforts to industrialise, and in turn, increase employment opportunities for our people.

(SADC Day Message; August 17, 2015)

The message President Mugabe was advancing was that SADC was capable of becoming a dominant force in global economic affairs if it added value to its vast natural resources before exporting them. The current arrangement where SADC resources were usually exported in raw form, with most of the value-addition and beneficiation taking place outside the region and thus benefitting other countries was detrimental to the pursuit of sustainable economic growth and development, and the achievement of prosperity and peace in the region. As Southern Africa Today (October 2014) noted, a key challenge for Southern Africa is that the region had relied on an “economic growth path built on consumption and commodity exports rather than one that places emphasis on industrialisation.” Therefore, the challenge facing Zimbabwe and other countries in SADC is to transform their economies from being raw resource dependent to those that enjoy beneficiated products and are technology driven, dynamic and diversified.

However, for that strategy to work, it requires the active support of South Africa which is already benefiting from the current eschewed arrangement. South Africa as the only African country in the G20 and BRICS groups of countries appears to exert more effort on those developed countries than SADC countries because that is where more trade opportunities are, not SADC.
Table 6.1 RSA Trade Balance with SADC (R Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Growth %</th>
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<tr>
<td>Exports to SADC</td>
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<td>23543</td>
<td>29734</td>
<td>25583</td>
<td>24911</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports from SADC</td>
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<td>4477</td>
<td>5568</td>
<td>5584</td>
<td>7554</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Balance with SADC</td>
<td>17946</td>
<td>19066</td>
<td>24166</td>
<td>19999</td>
<td>17357</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The above trade figures show that South Africa’s leadership role in trade among SADC countries is unassailable as it dominates all the combined countries in terms of performance. Although Zimbabwe remained the largest trading partner of South Africa in the whole of the SADC sub-region, the volume of Zimbabwe’s trade remained subdued due to a plethora of restrictive domestic policies and high risk profile of the country following the implementation of empowerment policies under the “Third Chimurenga”. The figures show that overall annual SADC trade figures were growing at an impressive rate in comparison to the national growth figures of countries like Zimbabwe which remained subdued.

6.1.1 Weaknesses of Trade as an instrument of promoting development and growth at national and regional levels

There are many factors which account for the apparent ineffectiveness of trade as an instrument of promoting development and growth at national and regional levels in line with the regional integration agenda. First, Zimbabwe and other countries in SADC continue to suffer from the economic stranglehold of South Africa which had its historic roots in apartheid South Africa and its dream of a “Constellation of Southern African States”. South Africa relies on its extensive experience of doing business in the region to structure trade
deals which benefits its national interests at the expense of the region. South Africa had taken advantage of SADC member states’ misdirected, short-sighted and at times dishonesty and unrealistic policy choices to push its own trade agenda. For example, when Zimbabwe was implementing its land reform programme and the indigenization and economic empowerment policies, many trading and investment partners deserted the country, and South Africa, using its historic links and experience of doing business with Zimbabwe, moved in to fill the gap (Besada, 2011).

Therefore while it may be pertinent to argue that South Africa’s trade agenda in SADC is economically self-interested, it is also important to point out that member states’ governance policies and their unwillingness to reform politically and economically had stood in the way of national and regional development and growth.

Secondly, all member states were pursuing national interests’ agendas at the expense of the regional agenda of promoting development and growth. Individual member states were pursuing bilateral trade relationships with South Africa which serve their national interests and there was no collective will and effort to dismantle the South African stranglehold in respect of regional trade. SADC member states took advantage of Zimbabwe’s economic challenges from 2000 to 2008 to supply more goods and services to the country since it could not service its citizens. This development contributed in a big way to the acceleration of de-industrialisation in Zimbabwe.

Thirdly, there were no institutional arrangements at regional level to fight the ‘targeted sanctions’ on Zimbabwe and the diplomatic isolation by western powers which affected trade outcomes. As western powers were divesting trade and investment opportunities from Zimbabwe, individual member states were openly embracing such opportunities at the expense of their colleague. The attitude of SADC member states on the ‘splendid isolation’ of Zimbabwe can be described as ‘real politik’. SADC member states were also having their own economic challenges, like the 2008 world recession from which they are yet to recover and this prevented them from focusing attention on Zimbabwe’s economic challenges.

Fourthly, trade growth and development was stymied by the challenge of conducting trade within three regional economic blocs with different trade protocols, that is, SADC, COMESA and the South African Customs Union (SACU). Therefore it becomes difficult for member states to implement the rules of origin in determining whether the goods being traded should benefit from the different trade policies of the different Regional Economic Communities
(REC). Rules of origin is an important tool for determining whether goods being traded should benefit from a region’s Free Trade Area. The rules of origin have been blamed as being insufficient to determine the origin of goods being traded and the fact that rules of origin in SADC, for example, had not responded to tariff reductions of countries in SACU. This is a key area which may require harmonization if trade development and growth is to be enhanced to ensure a clear political commitment to a particular country group or groups.

Fifthly, SADC member states should find a way of balancing supra-national and national interests which may appear to be in conflict in certain circumstances. For example, SADC supra-national objectives may require removal of tariff barriers among member states and the harmonization of trade barriers with third parties through a common external tariff (CET) while individual member states may produce a long list of ‘sensitive’ items for exemption from tariffs in response to competition challenges. Such a development undermines the Customs Union. However, some element of trade control is required to contain the risk of regional countries dumping their products on a country like Zimbabwe due to lack of competitiveness of local companies as a result of two decades of economic contraction and de-industrialization. Zimbabwe suffered for too long from “severe macro-economic disequilibrium, foreign debt service burdens, lack of trade finance, protective import substitution strategies adopted at independence which restricted trade, and a narrow tax base” (FAO, 2015). Mechanisms to provide compensation to disadvantaged economies like Zimbabwe were either absent or ineffective.

Sixthly, trade development through regional integration was also hampered by political opposition to sharing sovereignty among member states, failure by member states to meet their financial obligations, fights over ratification of agreements and domestic factors considerations which overrode regional integration agenda. Above all, Zimbabwe’s economy, like that of other weak economies in the region, needed reinforcement to achieve appropriate orientation that would be required to realize regional integration and the attainment of national and regional objectives.

The seventh challenges has to do with the need to reorient the development model of SADC member states which is driven by consumption and primary commodity exports. The vulnerability of this model was amply demonstrated during the global economic recession beginning 2008 when the region’s economic performance was severely jolted due to the poor prices of raw commodities on world markets.
The eighth challenge which affects the performance of trade development at national and regional levels is the weak economic infrastructure of member states. These include poor road, rail and air network connectivity and power shortages. Zimbabwe had been struggling to overcome these challenges following two decades of economic contraction and de-industrialisation which started in 2000 with the launch of the “Third Chimurenga”. Government has a key role to play in the provision of infrastructure which is critical in facilitating trade and other forms of development. The development by SADC of a Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP), which was approved in Maputo in 2012, will go a long way in meeting the infrastructural requirements of the region if effective financial mechanisms are put in place.

The ninth challenge that affected Zimbabwe and other SADC countries’ trade development related to trading across borders. The diagram below which was extracted from the World Bank Doing Business 2014 SADC Report demonstrates Zimbabwe’s poor record as a trading nation in SADC. The trading statistics show that;

(a) Zimbabwe had prohibitive high costs of exporting at US$3765 per container which is almost double the regional average of US$1904. SADC countries with the lowest export costs are Seychelles at US$705 and Mauritius at US$675.
(b) Zimbabwe also had high prohibitive costs of importing at US$5660 per container compared to the best regional performance of Seychelles at US$675.
(c) Zimbabwe was also the worst performer in SADC in terms of the period it takes to import goods. Zimbabwe takes 71 days to import goods while Mauritius takes 10 days and South Africa takes 16 days.
(d) Zimbabwe takes 53 days to export goods compared to the best regional performance of Mauritius which is 10 days.
Table 6.2 Facts and figures on trading across borders in SADC

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Worst Regional Performance</th>
<th>Best Regional Performance</th>
<th>Regional Average</th>
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<tr>
<td>Documents required to export (Number)</td>
<td>10 (Angola and Malawi)</td>
<td>4 (Mauritius)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents required to import (Number)</td>
<td>11 (Tanzania)</td>
<td>5 (Seychelles and Mauritius)</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time required to export (Days)</td>
<td>53 (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td>10 (Mauritius)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time required to import (Days)</td>
<td>71 (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td>10 (Mauritius)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost required to export (USD per container)</td>
<td>3765 (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td>675 (Mauritius)</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost required to import (USD per container)</td>
<td>5660 (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td>675 (Seychelles)</td>
<td>2428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The other challenge to trade development which was linked to border management was articulated by Mawethu Vilana, Deputy Director of South Africa’s Department of Transport, at the African Rennaisance Conference in Durban in May 2012. Vilana pointed out that by the time a trader passed from South Africa to Zimbabwe he would have completed 19 administration and other bureaucratic checks which include weighbridges on either side of the border and the weighbridges had further challenges relating to different axle-load standards between countries. Another challenge was that drivers rely on the computerised customs clearance system on the South African side, but the system usually reverted to manual on the Zimbabwean side causing considerable delays. Vilana also cited the fact that border posts in Southern Africa were designed to control the movement of people rather than to facilitate trade. There was therefore inadequate trade facilitation infrastructure at the
border posts. Southern African countries could explore the possibility of implementing three models of border management according to Villana (2012). The first, is the “one stop border post” model where clearance of goods is done at one facility like the pilot border design at Chirundu which managed to cut waiting time by 30%. The second model is the “common one country” facility where a single building is constructed in one of the two adjacent countries to facilitate clearance in both the two countries. The third model is the “juxtaposed facility” which comprise of shared facilities in the country of entry in each direction. Revenue sharing considerations would also need to be factored in when setting up such partnerships at border posts.

The trading across border challenges that Zimbabwe and other SADC countries are facing have hindered the growth and development of trade at national and regional levels. These challenges have to do with the internal governance systems in Zimbabwe and other countries in SADC which could be corrected if appropriate effort and focus was placed on these issues. However, the major challenge with Zimbabwe was that it was taking too long to reform its political and economic policies which are impacting negatively on its national and regional performance. Economic empowerment, under the banner of “Third Chimurenga” was being overemphasised at the expense of pragmatic, effective policies which have been proven to work within the region and internationally.

In general, road transport in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region is very expensive and it accounts for approximately 95% of the cargo volume. According to Trade Mark Southern Africa (2016) it costs US$5000 to US$8000 to ship a 20ft container from Durban to Lusaka compared to US$1500 from Japan to Durban. The bulk of the road costs in the region are linked to the number of days it takes for trucks to cross the border since a stationary truck costs between US$200 to US$400 per day which cost is passed on to the client and ultimately to the consumer. Zimbabwe and other SADC countries must, therefore, work on easing customs, immigration and other transit procedures as a way of facilitating trade and reducing time and costs in line with the SADC Protocol on Trade ratified in 2000. Zimbabwe had been working on rehabilitating its road, railway, and airports infrastructure to facilitate efficient, effective and uninterrupted movement of goods and services in the country and the region.

Finally, the other challenge that stood in the way of trade development at national level, in the case of Zimbabwe, had to do with lack of access to affordable trade finance following the souring of relations with Bretton Woods’s institutions, International Financial Institutions and
western nations who were the major providers of development assistance and trade finance. Zimbabwe should explore other funding opportunities presented under South-South co-operation or those available within the region to finance its trade development programmes.

6.2 Foreign direct investment as an instrument of promoting development and economic growth at national and regional levels

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) had been considered as one of the key instruments that SADC and national governments of member states used to propel economic growth and development. However, the major challenge confronting SADC and individual member states was the lack of an agreed framework which was critical in building investor confidence, trust and effective and efficient co-operation at national and regional levels. According to Adar et al (2002), two approaches dominated decision making in SADC; that of state-centred realism and that of nascent pluralism. The realist approach wanted to ensure that regionalism would add political and economic value to the resources available to each state and therefore decision making was about defining and projecting the national interest. Zimbabwe was the leading advocate for this approach. According to Adar et al (2002), the pluralist approach is about decision-making being part of an on-going process of policy consultation and policy integration between state and non-state actors at national and sub-regional levels. Emphasis at this level is the development of decisions at different political, economic and social levels of governance as the basis of regional integration. South Africa took a key role as an advocate of this approach. However, SADC’s structure favours a nation-based and realist view of decision-making (Adar, et al, 2002).

Differences in approach to issues like FDI arise from disparities in development among member states, the regime types, that is whether democratic or autocratic, and the personal leadership style of Heads of State and Government in the respective member states. FDI tended to favour individual investor-recipient relationships instead of the region. Investors’ tendency to cherry-pick individual member states arises from their pursuit of investor friendly environments which are backed by good governance, respect for bilateral and multilateral investment agreements ratified and respect for property rights and human rights.

Zimbabwe experienced many challenges in attracting FDI following the implementation of its land reform programme and the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) as the diagram on net FDI in SADC countries below shows. During the implementation of these two pieces of legislation, Zimbabwe was criticized by
western powers for its failure to observe property and human rights enshrined in the
constitution. Zimbabwe also fell out of favour with potential investors when it failed to abide
by its treaty obligations under international law due to its failure to honour Bilateral
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs) which it signed with countries
like South Africa, Netherland, Germany, Belgium and New Zealand, among others. The
Zimbabwe government acquired farms protected by these BIPPAs without paying
compensation as required under international law and it argued that the government did not
have the money to pay compensation but it was going to compensate subject to availability of
funds without giving a timeframe. Zimbabwe used municipal law, Constitution of Zimbabwe
Amendment Act (No.17) and its sovereignty to justify its policies and western powers
responded harshly by imposing sanctions which had the effect of restricting FDI in
Zimbabwe.

Since the inception of the land reform programme in 2000 and the enactment of the
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act in 2008, Zimbabwe became the least
preferred investment destination in SADC by western powers, multilateral financial
institutions and other investors as the diagram below demonstrates. The imposition of
sanctions by western nations as a result of the country’s policies destabilized Zimbabwe
leading to world-record hyperinflation, low capacity utilization of companies, de-
industrialization in most sectors of the economy, lack of access to lines of credit and the
decline of GDP by 50% in 2008 (Robertson, 2014).

Zimbabwe also earned itself a high-risk profile with investors when it failed to service its
foreign debts with IMF and the World Bank which stood at USD 1.3billion in 2002 and
about USD6 billion by 2009 (Kanyenze et al, 2011). External debt as a proportion of GDP
stood at 190% in 2008 (Kanyenze et al, 2011). As international development partners and
investors deserted Zimbabwe in response to the internal crisis which manifested in the form
uncertainty related to the government’s compulsory acquisition of land, breaches in property
rights, hyperinflation, among others, according to President Mugabe’s address at the
December 2013 ZANU-PF Conference, even Zimbabwe’s traditional partners like China
were demanding excessive quantities of Zimbabwe’s assets as security for Chinese loans.

Zimbabwe had been struggling to restore sanity to its political and economic environment
since 1998 as a spring board to attracting domestic, regional and international investment.
Net FDI inflows into Zimbabwe remained subdued more than any other country in SADC during the period 2000 to 2008. Small economies such as Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi and Swaziland managed to attract more investment than Zimbabwe as the diagram below on Net FDI shows. In 2009, the World Bank ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 175 countries in terms of ease of doing business. Therefore Zimbabwe’s decade of economic contraction between 1998 and 2008 coupled with economic challenges like infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, political instability, macro-economic disequilibrium, land reform and indigenization pressures, policy uncertainty and contradictions and a large external and domestic debt burden ensured that Zimbabwe was not an attractive investment partner for international and regional partners.

Zimbabwe’s suspension from technical assistance by the IMF Executive Board on June 13, 2002 meant that it could not borrow resources under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility because of its overdue obligation. The practical implication of this IMF ruling was that Zimbabwe could not access substantial funds from all international financial institutions without IMF and World Bank stamp of approval. Although Zimbabwe used regional relations as a tool to achieve investment initiatives at national and regional levels, this thrust was constrained by its high risk profile which emanated from its domestic policies and weak governance record.

South Africa had taken a dominant lead in investment initiatives in Zimbabwe and other countries in the region, taking advantage of its appreciation of the business culture of these countries. More importantly, South Africa had been used as a launch pad for foreign investment into the rest of Africa. According to Ramessur-Seenarain et al (2007), South Africa had 900 Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in 2002, with a further 2044 foreign affiliates based in South Africa and these dominated investment initiatives in the region. South Africa also partnered with AfDB and other international banks to develop regional infrastructure for improved regional connectivity and regional integration.

The strategy of South Africa was centered on developing trilateral partnerships with banks and SADC which would then be used to identify and package regional projects, especially those focusing on regional infrastructure like roads, ports, railways, telecommunications, energy and borders infrastructure among others. By using South Africa’s well developed public-private partnerships framework and its efficient and sophisticated financial services sector and public infrastructure, TNCs were able to penetrate and participate in cross-border
investments into SADC countries. In terms of FDI in the region, there is evidence of South African centred or led investment initiatives. Figures below also show that as Zimbabwe was struggling to attract foreign direct investment between 2000 and 2008, other countries in SADC were improving their FDI inflows and this could imply that FDI which could have gone into Zimbabwe found its way into neighbouring countries in response to Zimbabwe’s political and economic instability. The statistics also show that overall FDI figures for the SADC sub-region was increasing between 2000 and 2011 at a time Zimbabwe was struggling to attract investment into the country. Therefore, FDI as a strategy to promote development and growth at regional level worked but the same strategy did not work at national level in Zimbabwe due to the country’s high risk profile as a result of its domestic policies.

Table 6.3 Net FDI in SADC in millions US $ (2000 – 2011)

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</table>


However, South Africa played a key role in investing in Zimbabwe during the period when regional and international partners were divesting from the country due to its high risk profile. According to South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Mzwandile Masina, South Africa invested R20 billion in Zimbabwe between 2004 and 2015 in mining, agriculture, banking and retail sectors and was expected to invest about USD 600 million in 2016 alone (The Herald, March 23, 2016). South Africa had been able to activate its hegemonic regional role to buy assets at give-away prices and to invest in Zimbabwe at a time the economy was at its weakest. Zimbabwe did not have room to manoeuvre as most potential investors had abandoned the country. Although South Africa’s intervention was not sufficient to rescue Zimbabwe’s economy during the period, it was a positive effort in terms of regional co-operation. South Africa was pursuing its national interests of growing its economy through investments in Zimbabwe rather than advancing regional co-operation per se.

6.2.1 Weakness of FDI as an instrument for promoting development and growth at national and regional levels.

The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment recognises the importance of FDI in facilitating the development of the region and member states and it encourages member states to promote entrepreneurship in industries as the bedrock of industrialisation. There are, however, a number of factors which account for the weakness of foreign direct investment as an instrument for promoting development and growth at national and regional levels.

Firstly, there are many risks associated with the high cost of investment in the region and in member countries which is linked to inadequate transportation system (road, rail, air) and communication and energy infrastructure. The SADC Regional Infrastructure Development
Master Plan (2012)\textsuperscript{17} recognised the critical importance of infrastructure development as an enabler in achieving investment in various sectors of the economy and of promoting industrialisation, trade development and tourism development. The development of information technology in all its modern forms and energy sources of various types are also key enablers of the development of industry, trade and tourism. The weak domestic financial markets lack capacity to provide financial support for industrial development. Deposits mobilised and credit extended by financial institutions in most member states tend to be low except for South Africa and Mauritius. In addition to this shortcoming funding from the financial services sector tend to be short term while financing industrial development requires medium to long term financing.

Secondly, corruption and illicit financial flows from the region and member states had undermined prospects for investment initiatives. If member states and the region were to fully manage proceeds from natural resources and other endowments such as diamonds, gold, platinum and oil, the region and member states would be able to finance their development agenda. The SADC Today policy brief of April 2015 estimates that Africa had lost more than USD 1.8 trillion to illicit financial outflows between 1970 and 2008 and continues to lose resources valued at US 150 billion annually through illicit capital flight mainly through tax evasion, mispricing of goods, bulk cash movement outside the country and services by multinational companies and through other corrupt activities by nationals of member states.

The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) statistics show that between January to December 2015, a total of USD 684 million was externalised outside Zimbabwe by individuals and companies under the auspices of free funds for various dubious purposes including remittance of donations to oneself, offshore investments and account transfers. In addition to this, the RBZ (2016) in its monetary statement indicated that USD 1.2 billion worth of export sales proceeds were externalized by firms. The region and member states therefore need to invest heavily in data collection and knowledge management about its natural resources as the surest way of retaining development capital in the region and member states. Mechanisms should also be developed to coordinate strategies to avoid the ‘siphoning’ and the channelling of resources outside the region which are meant to develop the region and member states. In order to overcome these externalisation schemes, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe put in place

\textsuperscript{17} The SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan, also called Vision 2027, was adopted in Maputo on September 16, 2012. It was to be implemented over 5 year intervals; i.e., short term (2012-2017), medium term (2017-2022) and long term (2022-2027)
measures which included reporting of suspicious transactions by banks, promotion of plastic money and bank transfers, observance of strict customer due diligence to ensure that all local and cross border transactions are bonafide to the extent possible and practical and the monitoring of operations of offshore related companies. Measures have also been put in place to control cash leakages at borders.

Thirdly, lack of adequate investment at regional and member state level also arise from a weak agreed framework for attracting investment within the region and member states. Member states pursue self-interested agendas which promote their own interests at the expense of the region.

Fourthly, poor domestic policies by some member states, for example Zimbabwe’s policies on land and economic empowerment regulations, had scared away potential investors in the country that had in turn affected the attraction of investment by the region in general. When investors plan on investing in the region they don’t only focus on one country but they attempt to capture the overall picture prevailing in member states and its impact on investment. Therefore coordination of critical policies like empowerment policies by member states will go a long way in attracting investment to the region in view of the fact that SADC and member states are also competing for the same investment resources from other regions and countries. It is therefore imperative that SADC and its member states come up with a coherent framework of attracting investment resources at regional and national level.

Fifthly, member states are at different stages of economic development and the most developed countries like South Africa are attracting the greater share of investment while others like Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are reduced to a dependent relationship with South Africa. South Africa contributes about 70 percent of SADC’s GDP and about 60 percent of trade with the region (Mupuva, 2011). Zimbabwe for example had been experiencing economic meltdown and de-industrialisation since 2000 and this makes it difficult to attract new forms of investment. South Africa therefore had been able to engage development partners from the EU and BRICS countries as a way of attracting investment while smaller nations in SADC did not have the same political and economic leverage. Some countries in the SADC region like Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola have foreign debt burdens which militate against new capital injection.
6.3 Official development assistance as an instrument of promoting development and economic growth at national and regional levels

Official development assistance (ODA) is another key driver of economic growth and development because it positively impacts on a country’s balance of payment position. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy placed a lot of emphasis on leveraging development aid in its nation building efforts and in accomplishing some of the regional development initiatives. According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ, 2007), before the imposition of sanctions, Zimbabwe’s ODA was paid directly through the government, but after 2000, ODA funding for Zimbabwe was redirected to other countries, curtailed severely or channelled directly to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The dilemma that faced Zimbabwe was that its international relations with western powers had been strained following the imposition of sanctions on the country and it was the same western powers who funded most donor programmes and projects within the Zimbabwe NGO community. The Zimbabwe government could not convince NGOs to continue their programmes after the imposition of sanctions because NGOs needed to change their area of focus and their modus operandi in line with the demands of western nations if they were to remain in business. As a result of the strained relations between Zimbabwe and the west, many NGOs changed their area of focus to concentrate on humanitarian aid and social services in line with the direction of the funders, while other NGOs moved out of the country completely in line with the dictates of funders.

The imposition of sanctions, therefore, had far reaching implications on the growth and development of the economy. First, restrictions on ODA flows into Zimbabwe by Multilateral Financial Institutions of IMF, WB and AfDB had the effect of suspending balance of payment support, suspension of technical assistance and the voting and related rights of Zimbabwe by these MFIs. This followed Zimbabwe’s failure to service its debt obligations since 1999. According to RBZ (2007) balance of payment support unlocks a country’s capacity to finance export and import and it creates capacity for amortizing outstanding loans. Secondly, sanctions ensured that there was suspension on grants and infrastructure development funding, from the WB to the government and the private sector. Before the imposition of sanctions, the WB had approved loans and grants to Zimbabwe totalling USD 1.5 billion but after October 2, 2000, the WB ceased help to Zimbabwe. Sanctions of that nature scare away potential investors and they attract high-risk premiums on off-shore lines.
of credit, at prohibitive high interest rates, should government or the private sector decide to secure money on such money markets. The RBZ (2007) indicated that loans inflows increased on average from USD 134.3million to USD 480.3million per annum during the 1980s but declined to an average of USD 49.3million between 2000 and 2006 under the weight of sanctions.

Thirdly, sanctions by MFIs and western governments resulted in capital flight and foreign currency shortages which constrained the country’s capacity to meet foreign payment obligations and the financing of critical imports like drugs, grain, raw materials, electricity, and fuel among others (RBZ, 2007). Fourthly, sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe had the debilitating effects on vulnerable groups and civilians who were expected to be cushioned from the sanctions (RBZ, 2007). As the country could not access international lines of credit in addition to the fact that exporting industries were either not exporting or were operating at low capacity, this meant that the country’s revenue generating capacity was not sufficient to cater for the vulnerable groups in society.

It is pertinent to note that while Zimbabwe was excluded by the west from benefiting from balance of payment support, grants, loans, credit lines and infrastructure development support, most SADC countries continued to benefit from these especially after 2000 and this partly explains why Zimbabwe had been unable to strike the same cord with regional neighbours in development assistance matters. Zimbabwe’s bitterness in its regional pronouncement arises from its diplomatic isolation and the sanctions imposed on the country since 2000. For example, Zimbabwe had not benefited from the European Development Fund which compensates COMESA member states for revenue losses under the tariff phase down exercise under specific conditions which take into account macro-economic policies and governance issues. This discriminatory practice, according to the RBZ (2007), affects Zimbabwe’s tariff reduction process in line with other countries in COMESA and in the process undermine regional integration initiatives.

Zimbabwe had also not benefited from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which was enacted by the USA in 2000. AGOA offers tangible incentives to African countries to open their economies, build free markets and embrace pluralism. African countries in this AGOA category can export a wide range of goods to the US duty free. A total of 37 African countries had met the AGOA criteria and are enjoying the trade incentives which have eluded Zimbabwe because of sanctions.
The diagram below shows that all SADC member states received a significant amount of aid including Zimbabwe. While some member states receive aid in terms of balance of payment support, trade finance, loans, grants and humanitarian and social services aid, Zimbabwean donors are now only concentrating on HIV/AIDS, social sector expenditures, social service delivery mechanisms, human rights and analytical work with a focus on macro-economic policy stability (Gono, 2007). Aid in humanitarian and social issues is short term and therefore it cannot be relied upon to contribute to long term economic development and poverty reduction in Zimbabwe. Hillestad (2011) stipulated that Zimbabwe receives about USD 715million a year in humanitarian assistance- the 18th largest amount of assistance in 2011. What Zimbabwe needs most is development finance which is critical in funding infrastructure projects, commercial and trade finance, lines of credit to kick start the economy, grants and loans to meet foreign currency payment obligations and to finance critical imports.

The challenge is that most of the assistance that Zimbabwe requires is traditionally obtained from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries who are responsible for the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. Alternative development funding to Zimbabwe in SADC came from South Africa to the tune of USD 93million between 2005 to 2011 (Business Day, February 7, 2016). The assistance came from two South African Funds; the Africa Renaissance Fund and the International Cooperation Fund. South Africa spent USD 209 million in development cooperation in 2011 on African countries and Cuba, making it the 12th largest provider of government aid outside OECD countries (Business Day, February 7, 2016). South Africa also received USD1.5billion in development aid in 2011, making it the 22nd largest ODA recipient with 38% of the aid coming from the USA (Business Day, February 7, 2016). The other help from SADC was expected to come from the March 30, 2009 Mbabane SADC Special Economic Summit called to consider a “reconstruction package for Zimbabwe”. There were no offers from SADC member states, but they mandated President Kgalema Motlanthe, as chair of SADC, to request for USD 8 billion lifeline for Zimbabwe and the removal of travel and visa restrictions on President Mugabe and his officials at the G20 Summit in London on April 2, 2009. EU Foreign Ministers dismissed the request arguing that Zimbabwe must prove that it was democratic before aid can resume. South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma acknowledged that the G20 London Summit was more concerned about “salvaging their own economies” (Business Day, February 7, 2016).
However, the role of international development partners is critical in the management of Zimbabwe’s economy. The Zimbabwean Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, in his 2016 National Budget Statement, highlighted the following key contributions of international development partners, in the 2015/2016 financial year, which were mainly western institutions. The World Bank provided USD 1.6 million towards consultative legal workshops and development of the new State Procurement Board (SPB), the designing of institutional arrangements for SPB and procuring entities and preliminary work for E-procurement project. The African Development Bank (ADB) provided USD 1.3 million to facilitate national legal reforms, capacity development and acquisition of ICT equipment. The ADB further provided USD 2.9 million towards strengthening institutions of transparency and accountability with Parliament getting USD 1.47 million and the Auditor-General getting USD 0.87 million. ADB also contributed USD 1.2 million in 2015 and USD 1.5 million in support of the Governance Institutional Support Project which seeks to improve transparency and effectiveness in public finance and economic management. The World Bank contributed USD 36.1 million towards the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) which reinforces government’s efforts to strengthen public financial management, improve the doing business environment, enhance reforms of parastatals and enhancing the monitoring of Zim Asset Policy Implementation.

According to the Ministry of Finance’s National Budget Statement for 2016, development partner support for 2015 from bilateral and multilateral partners included: Euro 234 million from the European Union, USD 36.1 million from the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund Multi-donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank, USD 107.8 million for the Zimbabwe-ADB Country Addendum, and USD 15 million under the Zimbabwe-JICA Co-operation, among others. In addition to the above partner programmes, the Government of Zimbabwe had partnered with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to come up with a Country Programme of Cooperation for 2016 to 2020 and the estimated resource envelopes for the three country programmes are UNDP-USD 195.5 million, UNICEF-USD 600 million and UNFPA-98.5 million. In addition to the above donor contributions, EU contributed USD 18.8 towards the Health Development Fund in 2015 while Canada, DFID, Ireland, Norway and Sweden contributed USD 18.8 million. In 2016 the EU contributed USD 59.2 million towards the Health Development Fund while the other donors mentioned above contributed USD 16.6 million. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development availed a
grant for USD 1 million for the design and construction of two 140 bedded district hospitals in Harare. China also advanced a loan facility to Zimbabwe through China Exim Bank worth USD 100 million for the procurement of equipment for 5 Central hospitals, 7 Provincial hospitals, 44 District hospitals, 30 Mission hospitals, 3 Rural health centres and 2 Urban poly-centres according to the Ministry of Finance’ Budget Statement for 2016.

The amount of support coming from Zimbabwe’s development partners, as the above figures demonstrate, are too huge to be taken lightly especially in view of Zimbabwe’s serious budgetary constraints. The 2016 Zimbabwe National Budget Statement stipulates that 80% of recurrent expenditure is absorbed by employment costs which leaves only 20% for other expenses related to development and social service provision. The delivery of critical services would be next to impossible in the absence of supportive development partners. The development partners had effectively addressed Zimbabwe’s narrow fiscal space against huge operational and development requirements.

Mugabe’s foreign policy on development assistance appears to contradict itself. For example, Mugabe argues that over reliance on foreign aid threatens sustainable development in Africa and SADC and he fervently believes that the exploitation, value addition and beneficiation of the abundant natural resources at the disposal of member states is the key to self-reliance. However, considering that Zimbabwe relies heavily on humanitarian assistance to the tune of between USD 715 million to USD 1 billion per annum as reflected in the World Bank diagram below, it is difficult to understand how such a gap can be closed and from which sources especially in the short and medium term. Zimbabwe had been technically broke for over a decade considering that treasury figures had consistently shown government expenditures on salaries consuming over 80% of the budget which leaves little scope for development expenditure. The solution for Zimbabwe is to normalize its relations with the international community, especially the west where the bigger share of the aid comes from, so that it could have access to development assistance, in the short and medium term, while it builds capacity to exploit, value add and beneficiate its natural resources in the long term in preparation for self-reliance.
Table 6.4 Foreign Aid to SADC Countries 2013 – 2014 (USD millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>242.3</td>
<td>194.2</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>177.8</td>
<td>185.3</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>1067.1</td>
<td>1403.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1001.2</td>
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6.4 Tourism development as an instrument of promoting development and economic growth at national and regional level.

Tourism had emerged as a major economic and social activity which is integral to development at national and regional level. According to the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (2015), the tourism sector has a “catalyst influence for widespread economic and social progress” and a means of promoting sustainable development based on
unique natural, cultural and historic resources including wildlife, wilderness area, natural wonders, pristine beaches, mountain ranges and round-the-year sunshine. Tourism products from natural, cultural and built products offer travellers the opportunity for game viewing, white water rafting, bungee jumping, river cruises, botany and wildlife viewing, fishing, beautiful scenery and striking sunset viewing among others. Tourism offers many jobs and livelihoods to individuals and companies at national and regional levels and contributes to the Gross Domestic Product and capital investment of national and regional economies.

SADC (2015) noted that tourism’s contribution to the regional economy of SADC rose from a total of USD 14.4 billion in 2000 to USD 58.8 billion in 2012. Tourism target markets and investment patterns have reinforced old colonial ties with former colonial powers as the primary source market for international tourism as a result of history, language, economic and political ties. For example Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, and Zambia had tended to attract English-speaking countries like United Kingdom as their major tourism generating markets while Angola and Mozambique tended to attract tourists from Portugal. On the other hand Tanzania and Namibia attracted more tourists from Germany and to a lesser extent the UK.

Tourists figures presented in the diagram below reflects the number of non-resident visitors to SADC by country between 1995 to 2009. A significant pattern of the tourist arrivals was that, cumulatively, the total number of SADC tourists were increasing between 1995 and 2009, at a time some member states were struggling to attract tourists due to various nation specific challenges.
Table 6.5 Arrivals of Non Resident SADC Tourists, Thousands, 1995-2009

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Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the region was therefore focused on promoting tourism as a way of achieving development and growth at national and regional levels.
6.4.1 Factors affecting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy strategy on tourism at national and regional levels.

There were many factors which negatively impacted on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy strategy on tourism at national and regional levels. Firstly, there was stiff competition for tourism receipts by SADC countries in line with their national interest considerations which dominated their approach to tourism business. Some of the tourist destinations like Victoria Falls were advertised by some member states like South Africa as their own destination package and this strategy prejudiced countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia who jointly own this destination and were therefore expected to benefit from it.

Secondly, many member states in SADC had adopted an “Open Skies Policy” to enhance international and intra-national air access. However, according to SADC (2016), few countries had implemented this policy to encourage more airlines to ply routes within member states and across SADC destinations by 2010 except for Botswana. Zimbabwe suffered from delays in opening up air services with a view to protecting its national airline, Air Zimbabwe, with disastrous consequences which had made travelling within the country and within the region very expensive for tourists.

Thirdly, internal factors such as political instability and economic disequilibria in Zimbabwe kept many tourists away in favour of regional destinations which were politically and economically stable. Tourists are generally sensitive to issues of personal safety and security. The issues that affected Zimbabwe’s capacity to attract FDI also contributed to the failure by Zimbabwe to realize meaningful growth from tourism especially during the period 2000 to 2008. Zimbabwe suffered from political and economic instability during the period. In addition to these problems, there were also challenges relating to election violence in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2008 and this painted a negative image of the country. Other problems that destroyed the tourism industry included severe shortages of foreign currency, drugs in hospitals, fuel, electricity, clean water, shortage of goods and services, outbreak of cholera and other water borne diseases. The negative publicity that arose from this crisis affected the traditional tourism markets of Australia, European Union, USA, Japan and Germany and the countries in turn withdrew their airlines citing security, safety and health challenges among others. The negative publicity was also buttressed by the exodus of thousands of Zimbabweans into the region and the diaspora as Zimbabweans desperately sought shelter, food and safety from politically motivated violence. Zimbabwe also lacked the capacity,
during the period 2000 to 2008 to invest in tourism infrastructure, like roads and airports, and to re-develop and facelift accommodation facilities in key resort areas due to economic and political challenges. As a result of these challenges, tourists to Zimbabwe declined from a record of 2.4 million in 2004 to 1.8 million in 2008 (UNWTO).

Fourthly, the other challenge which inhibited tourism development and growth in Zimbabwe and the region related to corruption and illicit flows of financial and natural resources. Cases of corruption relating to illegal wildlife hunting, illegal trade in ivory and animal products and tourism concessions in protected areas dominated in some countries in the region. Zimbabwe had several cases of elephants poisoned by poachers who were believed to be conniving with illegal traders. Uncontrolled or illegal hunting can also lead to the extinction of rare animal species as was the case with the killing of the iconic “Cecil the Lion” at Hwange National Park. According to the Chief Executive Officer of the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority, Karikoga Kaseke and the President of the Safari Operators Association of Zimbabwe, Emmanuel Fundira, the killing of the locally and globally known lion resulted in the reduction of tourist revenue since many tourists who were attracted to the park to view the image of a distinguished animal with the black mane cancelled their bookings after the news of the killing (USA Today, July 30, 2015). The Department of National Parks and Wildlife of Malawi and the Lilongwe Wildlife Trust reported in 2016 that more than 20 cases of illegal ivory trafficking were handled by the courts leading to heavy sentences to people who were conniving with illegal traders. Therefore illicit flows of financial and natural resources stood in the way of developing and growing the national and regional economies through tourism.

6.4.2 Zimbabwe’s response to the challenges of tourism as an instrument of growth and development at national and regional level.

Zimbabwe introduced some interventions to address some of the challenges encountered in using tourism as an instrument of achieving growth and development at national and regional level. The first strategy was to rebrand Zimbabwe’s tourism products from “Zimbabwe; Africa’s Paradise” to “A World of Wonders” (Chibaya, 2013). While this rebranding effort showed signs of achieving positive results following the installation of the Government of National Unity in 2009 which brought political and economic stability, some challenges relating to investor confidence, the ease of doing business, western imposed sanctions and liquidity challenges in the economy had constrained the achievement of government efforts.
Zimbabwe also launched its National Tourism Policy in July 2014. The policy made it clear that tourism was a government led, but private sector driven project. The policy treated the whole country as a tourism development zone with a focus on exploiting opportunities in the areas of religion, music, culture, agro-industry, township and mining tourism as a way of luring tourists and growing the economy. The policy also focused on regional marketing of tourist resorts. However, funding for such marketing remains a big challenge given the state of the economy. The policy considers each province as a tourist hub and promotes the awareness of liberation struggle battles and events during the pre-colonial and colonial period. The importance of historical times is also used in the policy to rebrand various ancient structures throughout the country into ancient cities. The policy is expected to boost tourism in Zimbabwe and in the region assuming that Zimbabwe fixes those political and economic challenges which are hindering its nation-building efforts.

The major achievement of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the region and internationally had been its capacity to negotiate the permission for Zimbabweans to travel to 84 countries without the need for a visa (Henley Visa Restrictions Index, 2012). Although Zimbabweans can now enter most SADC countries without the need to apply for a visa prior to the trip, most of the SADC visas have restrictive requirements which are meant to protect their labour markets from being flooded by foreign nationals. These restrictions are contrary to the regional integration agenda of increasing the free movement of people, labour, goods and capital across national borders. Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis worked against the country’s foreign policy objective of growing the national economy through tourism development and growth.

6.5 Conclusion

The basic import of this chapter is that South Africa dominates the region economically in all matters involving trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and development assistance and this makes South Africa an indispensable partner in the regional economic integration process. South Africa’s trade with its neighbors in SADC is heavily tilted in South Africa’s favour and this trade imbalance raised tensions in the region directed at South Africa. In addition to this aspect, South Africa also dominates in all other indicators of economic growth and development, that is, FDI, tourism and development assistance. The challenge is for South Africa to drive the regional economic integration process in a mutually beneficial manner given that the current arrangement benefits its national interests.
While pulling Zimbabwe out of the crisis through regional co-operation is a priority for South African foreign policy, this should not be done in a manner which shows South Africa’s hegemonic role. Zimbabwe would need to move away from its confrontational rhetoric towards the west as a way of building bridges with SADC member states who have cordial relations with western countries and are playing a key role in Zimbabwe’s nation building efforts. On its part, Zimbabwe must sort out its internal political and economic crisis and mend its relations with the west to ensure that its foreign policy objectives in the region are realized. There is evidence that most member states of SADC are trying to avoid the contagion effect of Zimbabwe’s crisis by steering clear from its controversial policies while at the same time structuring bilateral economic deals with western countries beneficial to their national interests at the expense of the region. For example, according to the Reserve Bank of South Africa, the source of most FDI into South Africa was from EU in 2010 with the UK accounting for 49% of FDI stock at the end of 2010 compared with 4% for China. The EU was also South Africa’s major trading partner in the same year. Such critical economic linkages made it expensive to associate with countries like Zimbabwe whose economic and political policies had repelled western nations. National interests came first before regional solidarity in such circumstances.

As Van Nieuwkerk (2012) observed, SADC’s regional economic integration programme is constrained by the region’s unequal power relations and the tendency by outsiders to select trade partners on a bilateral basis with little regard for local efforts to establish a regional free trade area leading to a customs union and common monetary area. SADC is a stable but inefficient institution used by members to behave in a disaggregated manner and is driven by overriding demands of national interest and sovereignty (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives can therefore not succeed in an environment such as this if it does not sort out its internal governance crisis. Another key factor which constrained SADC was that it was a state driven project, rather than a people driven project and therefore it was preoccupied with the protection of the ruling elites against criticism and pressure for political and economic reform. The situation of SADC was also compounded by the lack of evidence of a collective effort to develop a shared foreign policy due to the preoccupation with the pursuit of national interest considerations. SADC member states are also not ready to share democratic political values and norms, or harmonise their national decision-making structures and practices to enhance regional integration.
Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s Minister in charge of Planning, advised that for regional integration to succeed, the region must “establish uniform, rational, consistent and predictable policies across countries and this is the sine qua non of integration and co-operation” Trevor Manuel attributed the success of BRICS group of countries to increased harmonisation of policies in trade and investment, among others because “nobody could throw good money at bad policies or practices” (Newsday, November 26, 2012). Through its “Third Chimurenga” policies, Zimbabwe was doing the opposite of this advice. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy emphasised regional solidarity and yet it also did not brook interference in its internal affairs by SADC member states. Zimbabwe must realise that the centre of power and influence was shifting from individual nation-states to embrace regional and global value chains as a valuable, sustainable national development strategy.
Chapter 7

Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy

7.0 Introduction

This chapter interrogates the role of bilateralism and multilateralism in the context of the Look East Policy with a particular focus on China. The approach used sought to understand whether, and how, the policy influenced Zimbabwe’s economic and political situation particularly during the period 2003-2008 and thereafter. The chapter focused on seven channels of diplomatic interaction at bilateral and multilateral levels to assess the success or failure of the Look East Policy, viz; (1) bilateral political visits, (2) military co-operation, (3) trade relations, (4) foreign direct investment inflows, (5) tourism linkages, (6) development assistance and (7) co-operation in institutions of global governance. Specifically, the research focused on exploring why Zimbabwe’s economy declined significantly between 2000 and 2008 in spite of bilateral and multilateral relationships with Eastern bloc countries that could have off-set the sanctions imposed by the EU and US. Of all bilateral relationships with Eastern bloc countries, China’s trade and investment was by far the most impactful. This chapter thus focuses primarily on the Zimbabwe-China bilateral relations whilst analysing domestic political and environmental factors that influence bilateral and multilateral relations, and ultimately the level of returns under such circumstances. The study’s major argument in this chapter is that political leaders in Zimbabwe and China have been disingenuous in framing the policy as ‘win-win’ because China had exploited Zimbabwe during the implementation process.

7.1 Historical Background to Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy.

Zimbabwe officially adopted the Look East Policy in 2003 following the unprecedented meltdown of the Zimbabwean economy due to the imposition of a sanctions regime by the EU, US and other western nations against Zimbabwe. Relations soured with the western world (EU, US and other nations of European ancestral populations in the world) following a crisis triggered by the Constitutional referendum results of February 2000 in which the Zimbabwe government’s position was defeated by an alliance of opposition parties and civic society groups. The Zimbabwe government viewed the victory of opposition forces as a regime change agenda and it sought immediately to consolidate its tenure. Invasion of land owned by the white community began and intensified with tacit approval from the government. In the June 2000 Parliamentary elections which followed, ZANU-PF got 62
seats in parliament while the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) got 57 seats and this significant shift in power in favour of the opposition further infuriated the ZANU-PF government which responded by unleashing violence and intimidation on opponents in preparation for the 2002 Presidential election. The Zimbabwe government also launched the ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme’ between 2000-2002 and the programme was meant to redistribute land from the minority European race who possessed it through the colonial system of expropriation by force to the majority black people.

The EU, the USA and other members of the western world responded to what they viewed as serious departures from democratic processes, the rule of law and protection of human rights by enacting punitive sanctions on the Mugabe government. The EU Parliament responded by passing various resolutions on the situation in Zimbabwe on 13 April 2000, 5 May 2000, 6 July 2000, 15 March 2001, 6 September 2001, 13 December 2001, 14 March 2002, 15 May 2002 and 3 July 2002. In December 2001, the US Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA)\(^{18}\) prohibiting U.S. support for debt relief or new loans for Zimbabwe until such time when democratic processes, the rule of law and respect for human rights were restored. Furthermore, on March 6, 2003 the White House, through President George Bush, issued an Executive Order 13288 which had the effect of blocking the property of persons undermining democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe and establishing travel and financial restrictions on the Mugabe government and his close associates. The US issued a press statement in 2014 through its ambassador in Harare, Bruce Wharton, in which it was argued that the sanctions were targeted on only 113 individuals out of 13.1 million people in Zimbabwe and 70 entities.

However, opinion remained divided between western nations and Zimbabwe on the impact of sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy. The US and the EU argued that sovereign policy decisions were the major drivers of Zimbabwe’s economic decline and not external factors like sanctions. The US Ambassador in a press statement issued in Harare on February 13, 2014 cited, among other reasons, the decision by the Zimbabwe government in 1997 to give war veterans one-time payments and pensions, which were not budgeted for and resulted in the Zimbabwe dollar losing more than two thirds of its value in one day on “Black Friday”, November 14, 1997. The US Ambassador also cited the decision by Zimbabwe to intervene

\(^{18}\) US President George Bush signed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, on March 6, 2003 through Executive Order 13288 which had the effect of blocking persons or institutions in Zimbabwe which were alleged to be undermining democratic processes and also imposing travel and financial restrictions on President Mugabe and his inner circle.
in the Democratic Republic of Congo war which cost Zimbabwe about one million U.S. dollars per day for about two years, the decision to stop loan repayments to Bretton Woods institutions which led to loss of new lending and debt relief facilities, the implementation of the “fast track land reform programme” leading to reduction in agricultural production and increasing the need to import food and damaging confidence in the application of the rule of law. Another sovereign decision cited was the printing of the Zimbabwe dollar between 2003 and 2008 without backing the currency with income or assets.

The US disputed that sanctions were an issue during this period and cited trade figures between US and Zimbabwe which showed that Zimbabwe traded favourably well with the US as the US Census Bureau Foreign Trade figures (2016) below demonstrate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Zimbabwe Exports</th>
<th>US Imports</th>
<th>Trade balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>+60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>+59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>+53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>+14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>+28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>+48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>103.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>+55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>-32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>+19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>-63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>-46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>+16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>+30.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trade figures are in millions of USD

The Zimbabwe government on the other hand claimed that the sanctions were the root cause of her problems. For example some of the manifestations of US sanctions on Zimbabwe included the interception of money belonging to individuals and companies by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). According to the Herald of June 17 2016, in 2013 the
Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe (IDCZ) reportedly lost over USD 20 million to the OFAC while a Zimbabwean resident in Botswana had his USD 1000 frozen. The Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company, a subsidiary of IDCZ had USD 5 million frozen by the US due to the sanctions whilst the Mineral Marketing Cooperation of Zimbabwe lost over USD 30 million in revenue to OFAC. The Olivine Company, a subsidiary of IDCZ lost a USD 2 million loan facility secured from the PTA bank which was meant to capitalise its operations. In addition to these losses as a result of sanctions, the US Treasury Department fined Barclays Bank plc USD 2.5 million for violating sanctions targeted at IDCZ (The Herald, February 11, 2016). Barclays Bank plc had processed 159 banned transactions worth USD 3.4 million for Barclays Bank Zimbabwe customers who were directly or indirectly linked to IDCZ, a company on the US sanctions list. The Zimbabwe government estimated that total revenue of USD 42 billion was lost between 2003 and 2016 through sanctions imposed by the western world and this is estimated to have contributed towards the shrinking of the economy by over 40 percent, with disastrous effects on jobs and livelihoods.

Before the imposition of sanctions, most of Zimbabwe’s trade, investments, loans, tourism income and development assistance came from western countries. The country once considered ‘the darling of the west’ responded to this diplomatic and economic isolation through the ‘Look East Policy’. To quote Mugabe’s own words “as the West started being hostile to us (Zimbabwe), we deliberately declared a Look East Policy” (Zimbabwe Independent, May 2, 2014). Zimbabwe looked for assistance from her ‘all-weather friends’ in the East to unlock trade, investment, tourism and development assistance opportunities. According to Zhang Chun (2014;p.7), Zimbabwe and China who had remained ‘strange comrades’ during the period 1980-2000 despite their close political relations forged during the liberation struggle, opened a window for greater economic co-operation following the imposition of western sanctions. Zimbabwe was looking for trade, investment, tourism and development assistance partners to counter western sanctions whilst China was also looking for partners to fuel her economy through the re-engagement African policy. The turning point in their bilateral relations were triggered by Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis and western sanctions.

The Look East Policy was launched by the Zimbabwe government in order to increase cooperation with a number of countries in Asia and the Far East with a particular focus on China, Iran, Indonesia, India, Malaysia and Singapore with a view to break the West’s economic stranglehold on Zimbabwe (Mudyanadzo, 2011, p.147). According to Zhang Chun
(2014, p.11), although the Look East Policy was initially meant to engage Asian and other Pacific countries, its implementation saw the focus shifting to China. A number of reasons could be advanced for this development. First, China provided a platform that facilitated the two countries’ realisation of their national interests, through the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). Both countries were keen to withstand western hegemony by defending their national interests through increased co-operation. Secondly, the two countries shared the same ideological orientation which was crucial in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. China had supported the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU-PF, through training of guerrilla forces in the Maoist military strategy of mass mobilisation and ‘hit and run’ as opposed to the conventional warfare, and the provision of military weapons and logistical support during the liberation struggle from 1963 to 1979. Zimbabwe, in a way, was indebted to China for the support rendered during the liberation struggle. The two countries had a good track record of working together in the political sphere and it was easy to translate this into economic co-operation. Thirdly, the relationship between China and Zimbabwe were fully grounded in the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs.

In officially launching the Look East policy as the hallmark of twenty-first century Zimbabwe-China bilateral co-operation in 2003, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe declared that “We are turning to the days when our greatest friends were the Chinese. We look again to the East, where the sun rises, and no longer to the West, where it sets” [Alden, 2007; p.63]. President Mugabe officially launched the Look East policy on 6 December 2005 when he presented his State of the Nation Address to the Parliament of the Republic of Zimbabwe by declaring that “Zimbabwe is looking to the East and there is no looking back”(Mudyanadzo, 2011, p.147).

7.1.1 China’s African Policy

An appreciation of China’s Africa policy and her engagement with the continent in general is critical in illuminating Zimbabwe’s engagement with China. Zimbabwe’s engagement with China is not an isolated strategy but part of China’s grand strategy for the continent. According to Zhang Chun (2014; p.22), China lacks a clear national strategy towards Zimbabwe because Zimbabwe is not important enough to warrant a national strategy. China only has a broader Africa strategy. Zhang Chun (2014; p.22) also noted that a Zimbabwean strategy on China is absent due to the Zimbabwean government’s unwillingness to put all its
eggs in one basket. There is therefore lack of focus and co-ordination between Zimbabwe and China’s national strategies towards each other although their regional strategies tend to converge.

Chinese foreign policy towards Africa emphasises strategic partnerships, mutual benefit and the respect of the sovereignty of African states (Alden, 2007; Power & Mohan 2008). Chinese policy emphasises that the starting point is not ‘aid but development’ although the motives and outcomes may be totally different (Power & Mohan, 2008). According to Power and Mohan (2008), China’s Africa strategy of 2006 reaffirmed the old principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and the ‘One China ‘policy. It also emphasised trade, investment, economic co-operation and the deepening of political relations as the basis for engagement with Africa. Emphasis in that strategy is also given to access to African commodities, co-operation in the multilateral system and for Chinese support for the African Union and other regional initiatives and organisations. Alden (2007) observed that Beijing’s Africa policy is implemented through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic instruments, financial incentives in the form of investments and development assistance as well as limited peacekeeping and military co-operation.

China’s policy towards Africa is crafted around a network of personal relationships with individual African leaders solidified during state visits, backed by a web of bilateral agreements in trade, finances, development assistance and defence. A good example is the visit to six African states by the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin in 1996. During the visit Zemin signed twenty-three (23) economic and technical co-operation agreements with six states (Power and Mohan, 2008). President Zemin also outlined a five point proposal for long term Sino-Africa co-operation which included fostering sincere friendship, interactions based on equality, respect for sovereignty and non interference, common development on the basis of mutual benefit, enhanced consultation and co-operation in global affairs and the pursuit of a just and fair international order (Power and Mohan,2008).

According to Cheru and Obi (2010), Chinese cultural diplomacy on Africa is built around six programmes. The first programme relates to human resource training. China trains African professionals in various fields at Chinese universities, colleges and vocational training schools. At the Sino-Africa Summit held in 2006, a total of 4000 scholarships per year to African countries were announced. The highly elite focused nature of China’s scholarship programme and the lack of transparency on how such scholarships are awarded since they are
transmitted in secret government to government agreements ensures that only the children of the political and bureaucratic elites benefit. Once these students graduate from Chinese institutions they are sent to their home countries and used by Chinese as conduits for penetrating the African continent. China had also managed to attract fee paying students from Africa due to the competitive nature of their fees structure compared to some international universities.

The second aspect of Chinese cultural diplomacy or soft power is the elaborate establishment of African Confucius Institutes to promote the teaching of Chinese as a foreign language and also to promote cultural exchanges and co-operation in education, culture and economics. This Chinese national strategy is used to spread Chinese cultural influence and as a strategy of penetrating African and global markets in line with the Chinese commercial strategy of ‘going global’. According to Cheru and Obi (2010) Confucius Institutes in Africa are located in Egypt (two), Cameroon (one), South Africa (two), Zimbabwe (one), Nigeria (two), Kenya (two), Madagascar (one), and Rwanda (one).

The third programme of Chinese cultural diplomacy involves the organising of scholarly and policy dialogue symposiums and forums which are attended by African scholars, artists, officials and diplomats. Such symposiums like the China and Africa Shared Development (Beijing, 2006) and the Sino-Africa Human Rights (Beijing, 2014) were crucial in increasing people to people contacts.

The fourth programme relates to the National Volunteer Project. The programme is an equivalent of Peace Corps and is a medium of promoting Chinese culture in Africa. Volunteer Chinese youth participate in various professional activities like construction, agriculture and teaching. The fifth programme is the Municipal Foreign Policy and the Sister Cities programme. Under this programme, cities in Africa are twinned with cities in China with the objective of assisting each other in many areas.

The sixth programme of China’s cultural diplomacy is the African Cultural Visitor Programme which was initiated by China’s Ministry of Culture in 2006. The programme aims to enhance mutual cultural understanding and co-operation between China and Africa. The programme involves visits by Chinese and African cultural personalities in order to experience each other’s culture. This programme has the effect of enhancing China’s penetration of African markets through such cultural diplomacy.
Another key feature of China’s African policy relates to investment and development assistance which is tied to business deals relating to natural resources extraction rights. For example in 2008, China and the Democratic Republic of Congo negotiated a US$9 billion minerals for infrastructure deal (Men and Baton, 2011). Under the deal, Chinese companies pledged to build roads, railways, hospitals and universities in return for the right to a copper and cobalt mine (Men and Barton, 2011). In Zimbabwe, China pledged a US$5 billion loan to obtain 50% equity in a US$40 billion platinum concession (Guchu, 2009). The Zimbabwean loan raised serious allegations of Mugabe’s government mortgaging the country for future generations (Guchu, 2009; p.67). The ‘development aid for resources’ African policy had been criticised as exploitative and a source of corruption in African states due to the secretive government-to-government agreements related to such deals. Most of the aid is bilateral and is tied to the use of Chinese companies and Chinese sourced materials. China defends this African policy on grounds that transparency will come once the economic magic has worked. However, the major weakness of this policy is that most of the wealth China invests in Africa finds its way into the pockets of corrupt African government elites and Chinese companies and business people.

Beijing had also used ‘dollar diplomacy’ to spearhead its African policy. Such a strategy entailed the use of Beijing’s dollar power to champion the ‘One China’ policy by isolating Taipei on the African continent in order to gain diplomatic ground. African countries were given aid in return for supporting its foreign policy agenda which included the non-diplomatic recognition of Taipei especially in their bilateral relations and in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. China, therefore, used her aid to counter western interests on the African continent, a development which is criticised as a new form of neo-colonialism. The zero interest and concessional loans advanced by China to African countries had created fears of a new wave of African debt (Xinghui Zhang, 2011). European countries have also been concerned by China’s visible footprints across Africa, a continent traditionally considered by the Europeans as their ‘backyard’ due to the historical ties built during colonialism and after independence. Ideological battles are likely to play out on the African continent as China tries to demonstrate that its ‘developmental model’ is more appropriate than the ‘western democratic models’ which are claimed to be universal.
7.1.2 African nations’ response to China’s diplomatic penetration of the continent

Africa’s response to China’s aggressive diplomatic penetration of the continent had ranged from appreciation to criticism. African countries appreciated China’s ‘no political strings attached trade and investment policy’ and its policy of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of African states’ as a major departure from the culture of doing business with western countries. China does not attach political strings to its trade, investment and aid activities as opposed to western countries which use these to advance democracy. The principles guiding China’s trade, investment and aid activities with African countries are; mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. These principles resonate with African states’ foreign policy positions and as a result, the Chinese approach had found favour on the African continent. Chinese aid is a different kind of aid and it emphasises infrastructure projects, production, university scholarships, provision of credit lines at zero-interest or concessional loans in exchange for Africa’s strategic raw materials like oil, minerals, wood and agricultural produce in order to fuel her rapid industrialisation. Most of the deals between China and African states are done bilaterally and secretively. African political leaders prefer this highly elite character of China’s engagement as it offers opportunities for enrichment by a corrupt leadership.

China is also embraced in Africa as a development partner whose interest is driven by its economic needs and the development needs of the African continent. Africa is keen to learn from China’s development experience. China’s involvement in Africa’s development had been embraced by African leaders because it provides the much needed stimulus to grow the local economy. China’s engagement with the African continent offers African countries opportunities to diversity trade, investment, tourism and aid opportunities not from just one set of market or relationship which may not be in their national interest. Competition for Africa’s resources between Chinese companies and western companies had the effect of increasing the market value of such resources. Additionally, competition for infrastructure projects had the positive effect of reducing prices for construction projects. African leaders therefore view China as a source of competitive advantage.

China’s involvement in Africa is also appreciated by African leaders because of her avowed ‘all-weather friendship’ with most African states based on close historical ties linked to the struggles against colonialism and imperialism. China played a crucial role in supporting
African decolonisation struggles (Men and Barton, 2011, p.65). Furthermore, China did not have a history of colonisation, enslavement, financing coups against unfriendly regimes or deploying military forces in support of its foreign policy (Men and Barton, 2011; p.63). The good political track record of China endeared itself to the African continent.

The African leadership had also embraced China because it had helped to defend African states’ international relations agenda vis-à-vis western countries. African states faced problems with western countries due to their poor governance record especially in the areas of human rights abuses, democracy deficit and corruption. China’s laissez faire attitude towards these issues had raised questions about its moral and ethical commitment to Africa’s sustainable social, economic and political development. China had defended corrupt, ruthless, pariah African states at international fora based on the principle of ‘non interference in each other’s internal affairs’. Beijing had also crafted its African policy around a network of co-operation with individual African leaders reinforced by a web of bilateral agreements in trade, investment, development assistance, tourism and defence. Chinese multilateral diplomacy respects African sensibilities with its emphasis on anti-colonial discourse which had been adopted by Beijing and incorporated in official policy statements. The building of the new African Union building in Addis Ababa and the funding of Forum on China- Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) activities is clear testimony of China’s enduring commitment to Africa.

China, on the other hand, had been criticised by African leaders for the poor quality of infrastructure it is providing to African countries which has a short life span. China is also criticised for the poor quality of goods it is supplying African markets. African countries feel that such goods are being dumped in Africa much to the detriment of companies in these countries who cannot compete on equal footing with China. African development gains are therefore being undermined by Chinese competitiveness leading to the closure of some industries and the loss of significant jobs. Beijing had also been criticised for failure to observe African countries’ labour and environmental laws and it would argue its activities are covered by bilateral agreements which are confidential although no such agreements may exist in practice. Such arguments are used to justify China’s business malpractices on the African continent which ignores African local needs and concerns, whether they are developmental, environmental, labour disputes or respect for good governance and human rights issues. Some African countries are worried about Beijing’s social, political, economic and security activities on the African continent which may have the effect of changing the
western orientation of the continent with some arguing that this is a new form of colonisation under the rubric of South-South solidarity (Alden, 2007).

7.2 Zimbabwe-China Relations

Zimbabwe-China relations were cemented during the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe (1963-1979) when China supported ZANU-PF guerrilla forces militarily to counterbalance the Soviet Union’s support for ZAPU-PF guerrilla forces. This strategic political relationship was abandoned between 1980 and 1993 when Chinese economic attention was directed towards Japan, Asia and the USA while African countries were largely marginalised (Zhung Chun, 2014). Africa then was not considered strategic from the Chinese business point of view. Zimbabwe then was the ‘darling of western countries’ until the fall-out after 2000 when Zimbabwe was forced to ‘Look East’. As Alden (2007) has succinctly argued, the Look East policy had been used by the ZANU-PF government to get Zimbabwe out of isolation and to engineer the economic turnaround of the country in the wake of hostile internal and external forces. The study sought to establish whether the Look East policy was successful or not in realising its major objective of breaking the west’s sanctions on Zimbabwe by analysing seven channels of diplomatic interaction at bilateral and multilateral levels between Zimbabwe and China; that is, bilateral political visits, military co-operation, trade links, foreign direct investment inflows, tourism linkages, development assistance and co-operation in institutions of global governance.

7.3 Theoretical perspectives of Bilateral and Multilateral Levels of Influence

Bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements have a key influence in determining international relations outcomes among nation-states. Bilateralism refers to political, economic, military, scientific or cultural relations or agreements entered between two states to meet their interests. Identification of commonalities lies at the heart of bilateral relationship building (Rana, 2007). Barston (2006; p.37) argued that the use of bilateral relations reflect factors such as historical links, alliance interests, resource possession and territorial boundaries. Bilateral relations also focus on the development of joint ideas, the protection of shared interests, the establishment of commercial, political, military, cultural and technical arrangements for mutual benefit between two states. The liberalism perspective of bilateralism argues that if an influential state wants control over small states, it will build a series of bilateral agreements with the small states to increase its influence. Disparities in material resources, financial resources, military and industrial technology, educational and
cultural development are considered an advantage that could easily be exploited by the stronger states under bilateralism. Bilateralism is the indispensable building block for multilateral diplomacy (Rana, 2000).

Multilateralism, according to Keohane (1990), is a form of membership in an alliance or in international institutions which is necessary to bind great powers, to discourage unilateralism, and to give small states a voice and voting opportunity that they would otherwise not have. Multilateral relations are conducted through global institutions, permanent conferences and a variety of regional and pan-regional institutions (Barston, 2006; p.39). Barston (2006) supported Keohane’s (1990) view by arguing that multilateral institutions provide a framework or sense of solidarity within which states are able to display independence and operate within a larger group fora. Multilateral institutions are, in this context, regarded as the preferred route for articulating issues of international order, for making rules applicable to many states, for building a network of friends and co-operation partners with big, medium and small states and non-state actors as a way of insulating a state from uncertainty and potential insecurity (Rana, 2007). Furthermore, multilateralism ensures a certain level of participation by all states in the management of world affairs and it provides legitimacy in matters regarding the creation of universal values. According to Rana (2000), bilateral and multilateral relations are shaped by a number of influences which include (1) security objectives, (2) shared ideals like ideology or values, (3) historical relationships, (4) matching mutual interests, (5) shared culture like the post-colonial relationships between Britain and France and their former colonies.

7.3 Bilateral influences

7.3.1 Bilateral political visits

The diplomatic isolation of Zimbabwe intensified after 2001 when the European Union imposed travel bans and assets freeze on selected key officials of Mugabe’s government and the USA government followed with similar sanctions. The sanctions were retaliatory moves against the Mugabe government following the ‘fast track land reform programme’ of 2000 to 2002 which violated the cardinal principles of the world capitalist order by compulsorily acquiring white-owned land without compensation. Western countries were also against the violence by the ZANU-PF led government that targeted the opposition and civil society groups during the 2000 Parliamentary elections and the 2002 Presidential elections as these were viewed to be against the rule of law. The Bretton Woods institutions of International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank had ceased financial assistance to Zimbabwe in 1999 and in 2002, IMF took a further drastic step by closing its Harare Office and suspending Zimbabwe’s voting rights in 2003. Faced by sanctions and travel bans from western nations and financial institutions, Zimbabwe and China initiated bilateral political visits to explore areas of co-operation and to fight Zimbabwe’s international isolation and travel bans by the west. This was viewed by Zimbabwe as the only way to overcome its collapsing economy.

Bilateral visits between Zimbabwe and China were initiated mainly by Zimbabwean leaders to indicate a foreign policy reorientation or shift of cordial foreign relations away from the EU and the USA to the East with a focus on China. Such bilateral visits allowed Zimbabwean and Chinese leaders to renew contacts and to focus on areas of close co-operation for mutual benefit. More importantly, bilateral visits were used by Zimbabwe to improve her diplomatic space and freedom of action as a nation and to enhance her credibility and international reputation in the wake of the humiliating travel bans and sanctions by the West.

Table 7.1 Bilateral Visits by Senior Zimbabwean and Chinese Officials, 1980-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DELEGATION LEADER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>State Councillor and Defence Minister Chi Haotian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Vice Premier Zhu Rongji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>President Jiang Zemin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>State Councillor Chen Junsheng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress[NPC] Xu Jialu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Standing Member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, Wei Jianxing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference[CPPCC] Wan Guoquan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>State Councillor Chen Zhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Wu Bangguo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>He Luli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Wang Qishan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Zhou Tienong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Li Wuwei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Liu Yunsan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Yang Jiechi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Hui Liangyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Wang Yang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwean Delegations to China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2005  President Robert G.Mugabe
2008  President Robert G.Mugabe
2010  President Robert G. Mugabe
2011  President Robert G.Mugabe
2011  Vice President Joice Mujuru
2011  Deputy Prime Minister A.Mutambara
2012  Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai


The diagram above illustrates that bilateral visits at the highest level of engagement by China and Zimbabwe reflect excellent, cordial and constructive relationships which, if handled professionally, could result in ‘win-win’ situations for both countries. Reciprocal visits and exchanges between the two governments and ruling parties massaged bilateral relations at the highest level. China was, however, slow to come on board as she lost over a decade between 1980 and 1993 before showing a keen interest on Zimbabwe when in 1994 the State Councillor and Defence Minister, Chi Haotian, visited Zimbabwe, the first such a high profile bilateral visit by a Chinese senior official since independence in 1980. The Zimbabwe visit coincided with Chinese diplomatic forays and keen interest in Africa which led to the release in January 2006 of ‘China’s Africa policy’.

During the ‘lost decade’ of opportunities in Africa, China was preoccupied with Japan, Asia and the USA, but China’s foreign policy corrected the neglect following the Tiananmen incident of 1989. As Men and Barton (2011) argued, the incident motivated China to work closely with its Third World allies to resist western sanctions and also to secure natural and energy resources to sustain its phenomenal growth. Distinguished Chinese leaders who visited Zimbabwe included President Jiang Zemin (1995), Vice Premiers Zhu Rongji (1995), Wang Qishan (2011), Hui Liangyu (2012) and Wang Yang (2013), Foreign Ministers Tang Jiaxuan (2000) and Yang Jiechi (2011). Chinese senior officials’ last visit to Zimbabwe was in 2007 followed by a freeze of such high level diplomatic visits due to fierce international criticism about China’s potential to perpetuate the crisis in Zimbabwe by propping a government which was considered a ‘pariah state’ by western powers who had imposed
sanctions. Pressure from Zimbabwean opposition parties and civil society groups also weighed in heavily against Beijing’s continued engagement with the Zimbabwe government through visits, as this was likely to compromise internal negotiation processes and regional sponsored negotiations which were meant to resolve the Zimbabwe political and economic crisis. The tense political situation obtaining in Zimbabwe then largely explains why President Hu Jintao did not visit Zimbabwe during his February 2007 tour of Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa.

China was treading carefully on Zimbabwe as it feared endangering the security of Chinese investments and personnel in view of the unstable political and economic environment marked by hyperinflation, a collapsing economy, high unemployment levels of over 85% and high levels of social deprivation and destitution. China did not defy the cries of the Zimbabwean people, SADC recommendations not to endanger internal negotiations between ZANU-PF and MDC parties and western condemnation of China’s engagement with rogue regimes which violate human rights, the rule of law and tenets of good governance. According to Matahwa (2007), China was becoming increasingly concerned about how it appeared to the west during the period 2006-2008 because it also depended on western technology and markets. Beijing therefore waited for an opportune moment to re-engage Zimbabwe and the opportunity arose in 2009 when a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed with a key mandate to stabilise the political and economic environment. Official visits to Zimbabwe by Beijing began in 2010 and intensified in 2011 and 2012 as Beijing worked hard to close lost ground.

In contrast, Zimbabwe, through Prime Minister R.G. Mugabe (1980-1987) and thereafter President, demonstrated intense diplomatic commitment to the relationship since independence by visiting China in 1980, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2011, whilst Vice President Joyce Mujuru (2011), Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara (2011) and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (2012) also visited China on official business. Prime Minister and then President R.G.Mugabe visited China several times after independence to thank China for assisting the ZANU-PF party and its guerrilla forces, ZANLA, during the liberation struggle and to initiate a number of co-operation programmes. China did not respond forcefully to Zimbabwe’s strong diplomatic overtures as was expected because her priorities were elsewhere in the 1980s. As Zhang Chun (2014; p.7) put it, China and Zimbabwe remained ‘strange comrades’ in the period with their close political relations
not translating into greater economic co-operation. Zimbabwe nurtured a relationship which proved strategic in the long term when it had been abandoned by the west.

Zimbabwe was not affected by the lack of commitment to the bilateral relationship by Beijing during the 1980s because most of her diplomatic space was occupied by western countries who were contributing to the country’s reconstruction and development agenda. Beijing became the solution to Zimbabwe’s woes when the country began battling international diplomatic isolation by western countries and a collapsing economy, hence the adoption of the ‘Look East’ policy. However, China and Zimbabwe had demonstrated through high level bilateral visits to each other’s country that they are strategic partners at political and economic levels and that they are motivated to further develop the dynamic bilateral relationship.

7.3.2 Bilateral Military Co-operation
Zimbabwe and China intensified ‘weapons diplomacy’ following the imposition of an arms embargo on Zimbabwe by the EU in February 2002 (EU Common Position 2002/145/CFSP (2002), EU Common Position 2004/161/CFSP (2004), and EU Council Regulation 314/2004 (2004). The resolutions prohibited the ‘granting, selling, supplying or transferring of technical assistance related to military equipment’ based on the argument that such weapons would be used for internal repression in Zimbabwe. The US joined its EU counterparts and imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe in April 2003 over allegations of serious violations of human rights, freedom of opinion, freedom of association and freedom of peaceful assembly. The arms embargo by western countries created an opportunity for China to fill the gap by supplying arms to Zimbabwe in line with Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy which was launched in 2003. China defended the intensification of arms supply to Zimbabwe at a time Zimbabwe’s economy was rapidly declining by arguing that refusing to ‘engage in trade with a recognised government constitutes unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of the country’ (Hanauer et al, 2014).

Although military co-operation between China and Zimbabwe had divided Zimbabweans and the international community because of the perceived selfish economic interests of China and the perceived interests of the ruling Zimbabwean elite who wanted to remain in power at all costs, the co-operation was decisive in ensuring that Zimbabwe remained militarily strong during the period 2003-2008 despite the economic meltdown and the sanctions which could have brought down the government under normal circumstances.
The compromised position of China can be deduced from the fact that while it remained the largest supplier of arms to Zimbabwe during the country’s political and economic crisis, it was also instrumental in vetoing, together with Russia, a United Nations Security Council Resolution in July 2008 that was aimed at imposing an arms embargo and punitive sanctions on Zimbabwean leaders.


According to Zhang Chun (2014, p.13), the Chinese government became cautious of selling arms to Zimbabwe following the controversy of the 2008 An Yue Jiang military cargo ship which could not deliver its ammunition cargo to Zimbabwe due to the refusal of neighbouring countries to provide docking facilities as a result of world pressure and outcry. China was accused of inflaming the situation in Zimbabwe by providing military weapons to the government at a time the Zimbabwe government was being accused of widespread human rights abuses targeted at its opponents. The ‘ship of shame incident’ embarrassed China diplomatically and it decided to add Zimbabwe to ‘its list of limited level military trading’ where it was only removed at the end of 2013’ (Zhang Chun, 2014, p.13).

In 2007, China provided a loan of US$98 million for the construction of a ‘techno-spy and communication base’ known as the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence. Because of the secretive nature of the deal, it was not made clear how and when the money would be repaid by the Zimbabwe government. This was at a time Zimbabwe’s economy had contracted to US$3 billion in 2008, down from about US$12 billion in 1996 (Besada, 2011). The motive for building such an expensive military infrastructure at a time Zimbabwe’s economy was on its knees can only be explained by the need to advance the interests of both parties with China pursuing an economic agenda while Zimbabwe was pursuing a security agenda of perpetuating the ruling party-ZANU-PF’s hold on power. The Chinese government also extended an interest free loan of US$98 million towards the construction of the National
Defence College which started in 2010 and finished in 2013 (The Herald, September 6, 2013). A Chinese company, Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group, built the National Defence College.

The Zimbabwe-China military co-operation also extended beyond arms trade and the construction of military infrastructure to exchange of personnel in various military disciplines and human resource development. Zimbabwean military officials attended training programmes at the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defence University while Chinese military officials presented lectures at Zimbabwe’s National Defence College. The Chinese military also helped in the maintenance of Zimbabwe’s military equipment in order to keep the Zimbabwe defence forces in a state of high operational efficiency. China’s military co-operation with Zimbabwe especially after the ‘Look East’ policy launch was decisive in preventing the collapse of the country following the western imposed arms embargo and economic sanctions. The military relationship, however, remains heavily tilted economically in China’s favour.

7.3.3 Bilateral Trade Relations
Bilateral trade between Zimbabwe and China has been growing steadily since 2002 following the imposition of western sanctions. Zimbabwe was forced to divert some of its trade, investment, tourism and aid linkages towards the East through the Look East policy. Bilateral trade continued on the upward trend between 2002 up to 2007 before slowing down significantly in 2008 and picking up again in 2009 in an unprecedented fashion following the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). The diagram below illustrates the pattern of bilateral trade between China and Zimbabwe;
Table 7.2 China-Zimbabwe Trade Volumes; 2002-2013, USD million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL BILATERAL TRADE</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>191.75</td>
<td>159.59</td>
<td>32.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>197.35</td>
<td>167.08</td>
<td>30.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>254.24</td>
<td>141.18</td>
<td>113.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>283.29</td>
<td>157.92</td>
<td>125.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>275.39</td>
<td>139.09</td>
<td>136.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>344.38</td>
<td>142.77</td>
<td>201.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>281.31</td>
<td>148.21</td>
<td>133.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>297.13</td>
<td>140.87</td>
<td>156.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>561.56</td>
<td>245.70</td>
<td>315.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>874.37</td>
<td>464.09</td>
<td>410.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,105.00</td>
<td>430.00</td>
<td>585.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,102.00</td>
<td>688.00</td>
<td>414.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The following issues are pertinent in accounting for the phenomenal growth in bilateral trade between the two countries. First, the increasing trend in bilateral trade between the two countries signifies that Zimbabwe had secured markets for some of its products after the withdrawal of the West. Both countries took advantage of the gap left in the disengagement of the West from Zimbabwe to pursue their trade agenda. China simply activated the solid bonds of comradeship which were established during the liberation struggle to intensify trade relations and to access trade opportunities through political connections. The momentum of trade growth stemmed from sanctions imposed by Western countries and China’s Africa re-engagement policy. Secondly, most of China’s bilateral aid to Zimbabwe was tied to the use of Chinese companies and Chinese sourced materials and this conditionality had the effect of promoting Chinese imports into Zimbabwe. Due to the lack of foreign currency by Zimbabwe, this Chinese trade strategy was decisive in promoting trade between the two countries. Thirdly, the increasing growth of Zimbabwe’s exports to China was driven by unmet domestic demand for natural resources in China which reflects the phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy and an increase in household consumption patterns.
Fourthly, China was not bothered by the absence of democracy, human rights, the rule of law or corruption in Zimbabwe in keeping with its foreign policy principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. This attitude resonated well with that of Zimbabwe which was under pressure from western countries over the issues. Zimbabwe was a reliable source of political support for China which was facing the same problems of human rights abuses. It was therefore possible to increase trade co-operation in the absence of political conditionalities and political differences.

The Look East policy did not manage to disengage Zimbabwe from the world capitalist trading system as had been intended by the Zimbabwe government, through the Look East policy. Trade figures from the National Bureau of statistics of China (2014) and the Zimbabwe National Statistical Office (Zimstat, 2014) show total bilateral trade between Zimbabwe and China compared to total bilateral trade between Zimbabwe and the European Union as follows:

**Table 7.3 Comparative Bilateral Trade between Zimbabwe and China and Zimbabwe and the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Bilateral Trade between Zim and China</th>
<th>Total Bilateral Trade between Zim and EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$197m</td>
<td>$448m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$254m</td>
<td>$791m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$283m</td>
<td>$588m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$275m</td>
<td>$1,628bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$344m</td>
<td>$884m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$281m</td>
<td>$480m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$297m</td>
<td>$607m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$561m</td>
<td>$758m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$874m</td>
<td>$651m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$1,105bn</td>
<td>$3,308bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1,102bn</td>
<td>$1,785bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above bilateral trade figures show that while bilateral trade between Zimbabwe and China had been growing at a rapid pace since the pronouncement of the Look East policy by Zimbabwe in 2003, the trend did not disturb the established, traditional trade relations between the European Union and Zimbabwe. For example in 2008, total bilateral trade between China and Zimbabwe was US$281million while total bilateral trade between the European Union and Zimbabwe was US$480million. Again on a comparative basis, in 2010 China-Zimbabwe total bilateral trade was US$561million in contrast to US$588million with the EU, US$126million with the US and US$2.4billion with South Africa (Thompson, 2012). This largely explains why Zhang Chun (2014) argued that the China-Zimbabwe bilateral relations did not grow at a fast pace as had been anticipated due to Zimbabwe’s unwillingness to put all her eggs in one basket. Despite the existence of western sanctions, Zimbabwe was more pragmatic and commercially oriented in its trade relations with the West despite anti-western political rhetoric. While sanctions affected access to lines of credit from western countries and multilateral financial institutions, the supply of weapons to Zimbabwe and the movement of political leaders to the western world, trade relations remained intact even at the height of the political and economic crisis from 2006 to 2008 as the above bilateral trade figures amply demonstrate. In this particular case, trade relations did not necessarily follow the foreign policy orientation of the Zimbabwe government. When political relations between Zimbabwe and the EU improved after the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009, trade relations also rapidly grew up following a similar pattern to the Zimbabwe-China relations. Both bilateral relationships were spurred by the political and economic stability obtaining in Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2013 and the re-engagement process by Zimbabwe following years of political isolation by the western world. Zimbabwe therefore maintained its permanent economic interests with the West despite the sanctions imposed by western countries while at the same time expanding its trade relations with China in response to those sanctions.

Despite the growing bilateral trade relations between China and Zimbabwe following the launch of the Look East policy, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) statistics for 2008 show that most African countries including Zimbabwe had a limited trade relationship with China.WTO figures show that 70% of Africa’s exports to China came from Angola (34%), South Africa (20%), Sudan (11%), and Democratic Republic of Congo (8%) (Renard, 2012). The other 27% is shared by the rest of the continent including Zimbabwe. The concentration of China’s imports from four countries in Africa reflects the importance of crude oil which is
imported from Angola and Sudan (UNCTAD, 2008). It also reflects the importance of certain minerals and other industrial inputs which are in demand in China. Renard (2008) also observed that about 60% of Chinese exports are destined for six countries in Africa which are South Africa (21%), Egypt (12%), Nigeria (10%), Algeria (7%), Morocco (6%), and Benin (5%). The ADB Policy Brief (2010) pointed out that China’s trade with Africa reached US$100 billion in 2008 and this compares with the China-Zimbabwe paltry trade figure of US$281 million in the same year. According to the Xinhua News Agency 2005 Survey of Sino-Africa bilateral trade, Zimbabwe had benefited marginally from trade with China compared to other African countries as the survey amply demonstrates. The following bilateral trade figures between China and selected 20 African countries in 2005 illustrate this; South Africa $7.27bn, Angola $6.95bn, Sudan $3.96bn, Nigeria $2.83bn, Congo (Brazzaville) $2.47bn, Egypt $2.14bn, Algeria $1.77bn, Morocco $1.484bn, Equatorial Guinea $1.457bn, Libya $1.3bn, Benin $1.09bn, Ghana $769m, Togo $570m, Kenya $475m, Tanzania $474m, Gabon $393m, Ethiopia $370m, Tunisia $340m, Zambia $300m while Zimbabwe was at $283m. Zimbabwe occupied trade position number 20 in relation to China’s trade with the African continent.
These trade figures suggest that whilst there was some movement in terms of trade relations between Zimbabwe and China following the launch of the Look East policy, the change did not affect China’s trade pattern with its traditional partners on the African continent. For that reason, it was therefore unrealistic to expect China to solve Zimbabwe’s economic crisis especially between 2003 and 2008, through the Look East policy, because China’s trade relations with Zimbabwe were dictated by its economic interests on the African continent.
7.3.4 Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment relations

Another channel of diplomatic interaction that will be analysed to assess the success or failure of the Look East policy at bilateral level is inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Achievement of foreign investment inflows from an ‘all weather friend’ like China was one of the key objectives of the Look East policy. Chinese businesses capitalised on the excellent bilateral political relations between Beijing and Harare to ease themselves into various investment opportunities obtaining in Zimbabwe either through government-to-government arrangements which are protected by government protocols or through individual investor initiatives which are processed through the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA). Individual Chinese investors were not accorded any special dispensation but were expected to meet the criteria for investment set by ZIA. However, they also took advantage of the special bilateral political relationship to bargain for some concessions or privileges not recognised at law.

The pattern of FDI by China had followed similar patterns of China’s involvement with Zimbabwe, starting with the period of low intensity in the 1980s to improvement in the 1990s and a resurgent period especially after the pronouncement of the Look East policy from 2003, to a period of rapid, intense growth after 2009 following the establishment of a Government of National Unity which brought political and economic stability and growth. Chinese companies had been active in Zimbabwe’s mining, manufacturing, agricultural, infrastructure, transport and retail sectors of the economy since independence. For example in the mid-1980, Chinese companies constructed the National Sports Stadium, donated $241million in 2001 worth of agricultural equipment to support the agricultural sector, established a tile and brick factory in 2004, provided a credit facility of $200million in 2007 to support the acquisition of farming equipment from China which included the import of 1000 tractors, an assortment of combine harvesters, irrigation pumps, disc harrows and planters, the construction of the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence in 2007 and the National Defence College between 2010 to 2013 as indicators of a growing FDI relationship. China had been able to secure access to Zimbabwe’s abundant investment opportunities through a ‘combination of soft power, tactical incentives, strategic investment and political collaboration’ (Shelton and Kabemba, 2012).
7.3.4.1 Categories of Chinese FDIs in Zimbabwe

Chinese investments in Zimbabwe fall into two categories, that is, joint ventures with state companies and individual investments. Examples of joint venture companies are the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and Norinco. The two companies have a 50%-50% share in Zimbao which mines copper and Global Platinum which mines platinum. ZMDC also has a 40%-60% partnership with chrome miner Star Communications of China. Sino-Zimbabwe Limited and its subsidiaries Sino-Zimbabwe Cement company and Sino-Zimbabwe Diamond Limited have an investment agreement with the Government of Zimbabwe and the companies are involved in cement manufacturing, cotton contract farming and buying, and the mining of chrome and platinum. There is also yet another category of joint venture companies registered to mine diamonds on a 51%-49% joint shareholding involving Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) on one hand and Sino-Zimbabwe and Anjin-Zimbabwe on the other.

Following the launch of the Look East policy, Chinese investments in Zimbabwe grew rapidly. According to Zhang Chun (2014: p.17), Chinese companies in Zimbabwe grew from 29 in 2005, 42 in 2011, 44 in 2012, 45 in 2013 and about 62 in 2014. There is also an estimated 200-300 small Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe that are not registered (Zhang Chun, 2014). Annual FDI from China to Zimbabwe increased from $11.2million in 2009 to $602million in 2013, an increase of about 5375% within a five year period, thanks to the peace dividend arising from the GNU (Zhang Chun, 2014).
**Fig 7.1 Chinese investments trends in Zimbabwe**

![Chinese companies investing in Zimbabwe for the period 2002-2013](image)


**Table 7.4: Chinese companies investing in Zimbabwe from 2003 – 2013:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Company Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tian Ze Tobacco Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zimasco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sogecoa Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sino Zimbabwe Cement Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Nantong International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NORINCO Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Jiangsu International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hualong Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Liaison Office for Huawei Tech.Investment Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>China Jiangxi Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>China Shougang International</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
China’s investment interests in Zimbabwe are concentrated in the areas of mining, infrastructure development, information communication technologies and agricultural
development. Zimbabwe has the second largest deposit of platinum in the world with an estimated value of over US$500 billion, over 40 mineral deposits which include diamonds, gold, silver, copper, coal, ferrochrome, iron and steel. In addition, Zimbabwe has large reserves of gas and produces quality cotton which is in demand in China. Zimbabwe’s Look East policy provided China with a unique opportunity to exploit Zimbabwe’s natural resources and to secure profitable deals for Chinese companies.

Beijing is also interested in investing in agriculture production in order to meet the future food requirements of its rapidly growing population of 1.3 billion. The China International Water and Electric company had been contracted to farm 250 000 acres in southern Zimbabwe and the project was expected to yield 2.1 million tonnes of maize every year (Thompson, 2012). China is also involved in infrastructure financing of big projects like the expansion of the hydro electric power station at Kariba at an estimated cost of US$670 million. Zhang Chun (2014) observed Chinese project contracting turnover in Zimbabwe in US millions of dollars between 2002 and 2012 as evidence of a growing FDI relationship in the construction sector. Chinese companies built major construction projects like the National Sports Stadium and the Magamba Hockey Stadium in the mid-1980s, some district hospitals, schools, roads and supplied equipment for the rural electrification programme in the 1990s, built a tile and brick factory in 2004, the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence in 2007 and the National Defence College in 2010 and the China-Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre in 2011 as some of the major construction projects. The construction sector did not suffer the impact of the economic meltdown as other sectors due to the active involvement of Chinese companies in that sector during the period 2002 to 2012 as the diagram below demonstrates. Project contracting actually doubled in 2008, the height of Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown, and trebled in 2011 (Zhang Chun, 2014). The Look East policy can be credited for achieving such remarkable results in terms of the growth of FDI in the construction sector indicated below (Figures are in US $millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73.82</td>
<td>45.64</td>
<td>47.92</td>
<td>89.32</td>
<td>75.30</td>
<td>86.64</td>
<td>158.88</td>
<td>65.09</td>
<td>138.05</td>
<td>398.91</td>
<td>382.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zhang Chun (2014)

According to China’s Ministry of Commerce (2008), China’s FDI flows into Africa by destination between 2003 and 2007, however, shows that Zimbabwe’s share of Chinese FDI
was very insignificant compared to other countries on the African continent. The FDI figures by country were as follows:

**Table 7.5 Chinese investments in Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Zimbabwe and the rest of the continent)</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce (2008)

The above figures demonstrate that the pattern of FDI by China in Africa follow a similar trade pattern in that the countries who are major beneficiaries in terms of trade and FDI are essentially the same. Zimbabwe does not feature in the top ten and was not considered to be strategic from a Chinese business vantage point of view especially during the period 2003-2008 due to a number of reasons which shall be explained below.

### 7.3.4.2 Challenges relating to Zimbabwe-China Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment relations

China considered the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe as very high and risky due to hyper-inflation, high debt overhang and the failure to service previous loans, lack of respect for property rights and failure to uphold Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs), policy inconsistency, corruption, political instability and the general breakdown of law and order. There were perceptions by Chinese financial institutions which
were borrowed from western financial institutions that Zimbabwe was a risky investment destination due to the failure to service her debt obligations in addition to the political and economic instability prevailing in the country (Mlambo, 2015). China was therefore uncertain about investing in an economy marked by political and economic uncertainty. China had lost heavily in its investment in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein and in Libya following the fall of Colonel Muammar Kaddafi. It was therefore naturally prudent for China to tread carefully on Zimbabwe for fear of backing the wrong political party which would jeopardise its investments. There were also perceptions by Chinese which were raised in the public media that Zimbabwe’s economic challenges were self-inflicted due to lack of financial discipline on the part of state institutions and individuals. Chinese government officials and business people also had the perception that Zimbabweans are Eurocentric and were most likely to drop China for Europe at the drop of a hat especially in view of the frantic efforts by Zimbabwe government officials to normalise relations with the West after 2009 despite more than a decade of debilitating economic sanctions on Zimbabwe by the same countries (Mlambo, 2015).

Brautingam (2009) argued that China had not fully invested in Zimbabwe as was widely believed following the launch of the Look East policy due to the Zimbabwe government’s inability to service debts payments and agreements and its lack of credible plans to resuscitate its economy, in particular the agricultural sector. Brautingam (2009) cited two examples to back this point, first the withdrawal of the China International Water and Electric Corporation from a project involving land clearance and the construction of an irrigation system in Zimbabwe, and secondly, the turning down by the China State Farm Agribusiness Corporation to take over and resuscitate previously white owned farms based on the high political risk relating to such investment. Furthermore, Brautingam (2009) also argued that Zimbabwe failed to attract much needed FDI from China due to international consensus on the promotion of human rights and democracy, coupled with Beijing’s rise as a major global power. Zimbabwe was viewed as a potential liability which negatively affected the image of China with the West and this situation inevitably saw Zimbabwe being shunned in China’s establishment of Special Economic Zones in Africa. Taylor (2009) supported Brautingam by arguing that China had learnt, with respect to Zimbabwe, that in places where mal-governance was so acute, even opportunities for exploitation were limited and counter-productive, particularly with regards to international reputation. Brautingam (2009) concluded that Zimbabwe’s unreliability, poor macroeconomic performance rather than
Chinese reticence had kept the Chinese from deeper investment and engagement with Harare. Sachikonye (2008) also lend his weight to the argument by Brautingam by adopting an analysis that focused on Zimbabwe’s lack of institutional and bureaucratic capacity to harness Chinese funds and investments for the benefit of the country as some of the funds fell prey to mismanagement and bureaucratic and individual corruption. The irony of Chinese investments in Zimbabwe such as in the areas of platinum, nickel, chrome extraction and tobacco growing and harvesting was that they were designed to feed into its industrialisation at home while Chinese exports to Zimbabwe of manufactured items like textiles, toys, buses and other manufactured goods had contributed towards the de-industrialisation of Zimbabwe which was detrimental to economic revival.

Another contentious issue regarding Chinese investments in Zimbabwe relates to Chinese investors’ violation of the country’s labour laws which are prescribed in the Labour Relations Act (Chapter 28:01). Chinese firms in Zimbabwe are well known for poor salaries, long working hours, lack of protective clothing for its employees working in hazardous environments and their style of physically abusing employees, like beating them for mistakes done during the process of production. As noted by NewsDzeZimbabwe (2012), the Labour Court of Zimbabwe and other law enforcement institutions like the Police tend to be weak or lenient when dealing with labour disputes involving Chinese firms and therefore most labour disputes involving Chinese tend to go unpunished, thereby giving them immunity where such immunity may not exist at law. Analysts have tried to explain this apparent powerlessness of law enforcement agents on the fact that government agencies are the major beneficiaries of Chinese technical assistance and they are therefore compromised in their law enforcement role.

According to Mugabe (2014), Deputy General-Secretary of the Zimbabwe Construction and Allied Trades Workers Union, it was increasingly becoming difficult to represent their workers who are either injured at work or subjected to all sorts of unfair labour practices prohibited in the Labour Act because Chinese companies always claim that their operations are not covered by the Labour Act but fall under bilateral agreements between Zimbabwe and China. It is very difficult to verify the authenticity of such claims because of the secretive nature of such bilateral agreements. Furthermore, Chinese investments in Zimbabwe have been exempt from strict compliance with the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Regulations which require foreign owned companies with an investment threshold of US$500 000 and above to surrender 51% of their shareholding to black Zimbabweans. All western
companies have been subjected to strict compliance with these regulations and this has raised controversy regarding discrimination and selective application of law.

While FDI investment from China had played a pivotal role in resuscitating Zimbabwe’s economy, Zimbabwe needs to come up with strategies to fully utilize and benefit from its FDI relations with China. Some of the strategies could include, firstly the development of consistent policies that take into consideration implementation processes that are transparent and are consistently applied. Secondly, Zimbabwe should respect investment agreements and other legal instruments signed with China since this will increase investor confidence not only with China but other countries as well who may fall in the same category as China. Thirdly, the Zimbabwe government should increase the country’s competitiveness and business climate considering that Zimbabwe is also competing with its counterparts in SADC for the same Chinese investments and therefore the need for sound political and economic governance cannot be over-emphasized. Fourthly, the Zimbabwe government should come up with an effective and efficient labour and environment regulatory and governance framework to ensure that Chinese firms adhere to labour and environmental laws. An institutional framework involving ministries of Foreign Affairs and Labour should be put in place to investigate and punish offending companies who fall under bilateral agreements as this had proved to be a major loophole in the system in place.

7.3.5 Bilateral Tourism Relations between Zimbabwe and China

Another channel of bilateral relationship that will be analysed in the context of the Look East policy is tourism business between China and Zimbabwe. In line with the Zimbabwe government’s thrust of reorienting its business towards the East following the imposition of sanctions by Western nations on the country, Zimbabwe signed an Approved Destination Status agreement with China in 2003. The agreement was meant to encourage Chinese tourists to prioritise Zimbabwe as their destination market in Southern Africa. After the launch of the agreement, there was a sharp rise in tourist arrivals from China in 2004 as the graph below demonstrates, before a steep decline in 2005. The decline was linked to the negative publicity of Zimbabwe by western powers, safety concerns by Chinese and poor air connectivity between China and Zimbabwe, among some of the major reasons cited by the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA) in its various press statements. In response to these challenges, Zimbabwe signed a Preferred Destination Access Agreement with China in 2006 (Zimbabwe Situation; March 14, 2014). Under the agreement, visa conditions for Chinese
tourists were relaxed and this was followed by a high profile campaign to market the country in China. However, the agreement and the marketing campaign failed to attract the target of 50 000 Chinese tourists annually by 2015. According to official Chinese statistics (2013), Zimbabwe attracted 5000 Chinese tourists in 2012 compared to 145 000 for South Africa, 128 000 for Ethiopia, 83 000 for Algeria, 38 868 for Tanzania and 44 2700 for Kenya. A total of 1million Chinese tourists visit Africa annually. According to the Head of China’s National Tourism Authority, Shao Qiwei (2013), of the 27 African nations that have been granted ‘tourist destination status by the Chinese, Kenya, South Africa and Mauritius are the best in terms of attracting Chinese tourists. Zimbabwe is at number 13 in terms of Chinese tourist arrivals among SADC nations (Financial Gazette, 2014). Zimbabwe did not, therefore, manage to change its traditional pattern of tourist arrivals from western countries to Eastern countries like China, Japan and South Korea which were the major target of its tourism campaigns in line with the Look East policy. Political and economic instability obtaining in Zimbabwe especially between 2003 and 2008 also affected the Chinese’ perception and choice of Zimbabwe as a tourist destination.

When the tourism initiatives were launched in 2003 by ZTA in line with the Look East policy, there was a big increase of tourist arrivals in Zimbabwe in 2004, an increase of 17 775 tourists from the 2003 figures, but the momentum could not be sustained between the 2005 and 2008 period which registered annual declines and small growth rates.

It is significant to note that there was a surge in Chinese tourist arrivals in Zimbabwe in 2009, as the diagram below shows, following the peace dividend arising from the GNU. The increasing trend of Chinese tourists involvement with Zimbabwe after the GNU follow similar trends involving bilateral visits, military co-operation, trade and investment initiatives that took place after the coming to power of the GNU in 2009. The GNU restored some measure of international confidence in Zimbabwe which was however shortlived following sharp differences among coalition partners and the return to the old retrogressive ways of running government, especially when ZANU-PF took over after the 2013 General Election.
The tourists’ arrival pattern shows a big jump in 2009, a sharp decline in 2010, a big jump again in 2011 and the lowest decline in 2012 before another jump in 2013. In general, the
figures show the failure of this channel of bilateral co-operation to realise tourism business for Zimbabwe.

7.3.5.1 Challenges relating to Zimbabwe-China Bilateral Tourism Relations

Tourism and Hospitality minister, Walter Mzembi (2014), attributed this failure to the fact that Chinese tourists are spread and tend to visit not just Zimbabwe but other countries in Africa. Another drawback cited was Zimbabwe’s incapacity to fund marketing campaigns in China and the fact that Victoria Falls was being advertised by other countries in the region as their destination. Zimbabwe continues to work on attracting 2 million Chinese tourists and turning the tourism sector into a US$5 billion economy by 2020. (The Herald, November 17, 2014). Considering that Zimbabwe had failed to achieve a modest target of 50 000 tourists by 2015, it is unrealistic to expect to realise a target of 2 million visitors from China into Zimbabwe from the 200 million outbound Chinese travellers worldwide. According to ZTA’s 2014 overseas market analysis of tourism statistics which were compiled quoting statistics from Zimbabwe’s Department of Immigration and Control, Europe remains the largest regional tourism market for Zimbabwe, attracting 155 865 tourists in 2009 and 125 231 tourists in 2010, followed by the Americas with 57 842 tourists in 2009 and 69 008 in 2010. Asia region (including China) managed to attract 76 945 in 2009 and 49 214 in 2010 followed by Oceania region which attracted 36 453 in 2009 and 39 015 in 2010. The overall picture of tourist arrivals show that over 50% of international tourists come from the European Union while China accounts for over 11% of the tourism business (Zimbabwe Independent, May 22, 2015). The Look East policy, therefore, did not succeed in reorienting the country’s tourism business from traditional markets of Europe and the Americas which have dominated even during the crisis period between 2000 and 2008 when western sanctions were in place.

7.4 Bilateral Development Co-operation between Zimbabwe and China

Chinese development co-operation with Zimbabwe is structured around the five features of its foreign aid policy which are: (a) to help recipient countries build up their self development capacity, (b) imposing no political conditions or interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient or to seek political privileges, (c) adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development...through economic and technical co-operation, (d) providing foreign aid within the reach of its abilities in accordance with its national conditions, and (e) keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation (Embassy of China, Harare, 2015).
Although officially China claims that it does not impose conditions on development aid, it requires recipients of development aid to support the ‘One China’ policy and China’s Anti-Secession Law which upholds China’s policy of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the peaceful reunification of China and the policy regards the non-peaceful means as the last resort to stop Taiwan’s independence. In addition to this political condition, China attaches economic strings to its aid especially its use of the dollar power to tailor the international system more to its liking. African states were cajoled by Beijing to vote out Taiwan’s permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council in 1971 in return for significant aid from China. Beijing, therefore, uses its dollar diplomacy to gain diplomatic ground on the African continent. Chinese aid is also tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services and at times aid comes with significant component of Chinese labour (ADB Group, 2011). China emphasises development co-operation that provides economic gains for China as the official aid policy (Alden, 2007). Chinese development co-operation with African countries and with Zimbabwe in particular is premised on striking a ‘win-win’ outcome for both parties by focusing on direct national interest outcomes as defined by the bilateral parties. China argues that the starting point in its relations with African countries is not aid but development but motives point more to the development of China than the recipient country. Chinese ‘aid’ is a different kind of ‘aid’ since it emphasises infrastructure, production, trade and university scholarships as a way of investing in a mutually profitable future (Brautigam, 2009; p. 21).

7.4.1 Types of Chinese Development Aid
Chinese development aid falls basically under three categories; that is, grants, interest free loans, and concessional loans.

Grants are used by the Chinese government to fund emergency humanitarian programmes like drought relief and to help Zimbabwe to construct schools, district hospitals, low cost houses and to support human resource development programmes through scholarships which are tied to programmes offered at Chinese tertiary institutions. Grants have also been used in Zimbabwe to deploy medical teams in hospitals, to support volunteer programmes and in some cases, to provide debt relief and to supply agricultural equipment. Another key feature of Beijing’s grants programme is the construction of stadiums under what is commonly referred to as ‘stadium diplomacy’, the construction of residential palaces for the top leadership in the country and the construction of major government buildings, school dormitories and dams. The complete buildings and other infrastructure projects are then donated to the government as a launch pad to securing government-to-government lucrative
contracts in various sectors of the economy. As Alden (2007) put it, ‘this symbolic diplomacy has great appeal to African elites who welcome the opportunity to replace colonial public buildings’ through Chinese largesse. The linking of Chinese grants to lucrative business contracts in Zimbabwe had led some scholars like Alden (2007), Rotberg (2008), Taylor (2009), Brautigam (2009), Men and Barton (2011) and Shelton and Kabemba (2012) to conclude that China does not give aid as such since most of the grants are used to ease Chinese companies and business people into lucrative business contracts with the recipient of such grants. These grants come with economic strings attached in contrast to aid offered by Western governments and institutions which tend to link their aid to political conditions like democracy and good governance. Even the Sino-Zimbabwe scholarship programme has a business slant to it.

According to Zeynep Erdal (2014), the aim of China’s scholarship programme is to grow China’s soft power in Africa (and the recipient countries) which is vital to China’s continued economic growth. The scholarship programme targets government officials and children of the powerful political and economic elites who act as a conduit for Chinese penetration of the country in various sectors. More importantly, the scholarship programme provides a platform for the next generation of Chinese and Zimbabwean professionals to interact and boost business and political ties which is crucial to China’s continued rapid industrialisation in future. The use of cash grants is rarely used in China’s aid programmes since most grants are tied to the use of Chinese products, services and personnel.

Interest-free loans are another form of development co-operation between China and Zimbabwe. Such loans are used by China to finance public infrastructure in Zimbabwe and the tenure of such loans is usually 20 years. Although the loans are said to be interest-free, there are suspicions which are usually raised relating to the fact that such loans may have been inflated due to lack of transparency surrounding the negotiation of such loans. What is not in doubt is that such interest-free loans are a form of business and Chinese companies stand to benefit.

Concessional loans is the third form of development co-operation between China and Zimbabwe. Concessional loans are provided by China’s Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank). The loans are used to undertake productive projects, like infrastructure development, that have the effect of achieving economic and social benefits to Zimbabwe. For example in 2012, Exim Bank provided the Zimbabwe government with a concessional loan of
US$670 million for the expansion of hydroelectricity power at Kariba dam and the terms and conditions of the loan were not made public amidst claims by opposition parties and civil society groups that the contract could have been overpriced. Chinese concessional loans usually carry annual interest rates of between 2%-3% and repayment period is usually between 15-20 years with a grace period of 5-7 years.

7.4.2 Chinese Official Development Finance to Zimbabwe by sector; 2000-2011 (in 2009 US$)

Although quantitative figures relating to Chinese development assistance to Zimbabwe are difficult to establish because the Chinese government does not publish such data due to the secretive nature of most such aid deals, the aid data issued by Amber Will (2013) using media sources to compile granular information on Chinese humanitarian assistance and economic development projects appears to be the most authoritative source to date on the matter. The data includes all non-investment official projects which are in the commitment, implementation or completion stage. Most of this aid may not have benefited the people of Zimbabwe (Will, 2013). The following figures were identified by Will (2013) as constituting Beijing’s official finance to Zimbabwe for the period 2000-2011:

Table 7.6 Beijing’s estimated financial assistance to Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Finance</th>
<th>Amount Financed (2009 USD millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Food Aid/ Food Security</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Development</td>
<td>9.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Tourism</td>
<td>20.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business and Other Services</td>
<td>28.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Multi-sector</td>
<td>57.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to NGOs and Government Organizations</td>
<td>71.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, Mining and Construction</td>
<td>99.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking and Financial Services</td>
<td>104.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>107.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social infrastructure and services</td>
<td>118.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency response</td>
<td>187.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>295.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>440.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The figures above demonstrate that Beijing’s financial support to Zimbabwe during the period 2000-2011 was very huge and projects in energy generation and supply, agriculture, transport and storage, support towards water supply and sanitation, and assistance to health, education, communication and other governmental agencies received top priority in terms of funding. The figures do not indicate the component of the financing which was in the form of grants, interest-free loans or concessional loans and this raises serious concerns about the Zimbabwe government’s potential to mortgage future generations through such opaque transactions. There is also a figure of US$1,139 billion whose allocation is unspecified and such transactions raise questions on whether the national interest was served by such a transaction. The figures above support the view that China does not provide aid to Zimbabwe but does business with Zimbabwe. Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Xin Shunkang, however, indicated that China had provided at least US$300 million in aid to Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2009 (The Herald, 21 November, 2009). The Chinese ambassador did not specify the nature or type of aid given to Zimbabwe at the time. However, the Ambassador of China indicated that in 2009, China provided a further US$260 million towards Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector through the purchase of inputs and machinery for the revival of the agricultural sector and the secondment of experts in the area of animal disease control, fisheries and grain (The Herald, 8 November, 2009).

In contrast, despite strained relations, the USA had been the leading provider of humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe, giving more than US$1.4 billion from 2001 to 2010 (US Embassy Press Statement, Harare, 2014). According to Brautigam (2009), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) listed the top ten donors to Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2010 as USA, UK, EU, Germany, Sweden, Global Fund, Norway,
Australia, Denmark and Netherlands. China did not make the list for the top ten donors to Zimbabwe despite the so-called ‘all weather friendship’. While Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is growing, it remains small compared to assistance from OECD countries.

China uses its development finance to secure business licences and lucrative contracts for its companies. In addition to this, China also uses its development finance to access abundant sources of energy and natural resources which are required for the continued rapid growth of its economy. Beijing’s dollar diplomacy is, therefore, not for charity but is meant to secure short, medium and long term business benefits to fuel her rapid industrialisation. Brautigam (2009) summarizes the China-Zimbabwe bilateral relationship by arguing that China is not focused on giving ‘aid’ to Zimbabwe but conducts business with the country. Beijing’s engagement with Zimbabwe is part of her long term strategy to displace the traditional western orientation of the country by forging partnerships with Harare under the rubric of South–South solidarity. This partnership may compromise Zimbabwe’s sovereignty if it is not handled with prudence and sound judgement, leading to a dependent relationship. Such an outcome may not be desirable considering that Harare has been on an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist crusade since independence in 1980 as a way of fighting its dependent relationship with the west.

7.5 Multilateral influences

7.5.1 China’s Multilateral Co-operation with African countries

China is building a network of international co-operation through friendship pacts, co-operation agreements, grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans and operating contracts with African countries. Such networks are deepening China’s presence in Africa and are viewed as a threat to the West’s economic interests on the African continent. As Rotberg (2008) has succinctly put it, Beijing is using these networks to “replace London, Paris, Washington and Taipei in African ministries and African hearts”. China is not concerned about the absence of democracy or abundant corruption on the African continent and this message is sweet music in the minds of corrupt, dictatorial African leaders. China had actively nurtured these networks to achieve her interests in institutions of global governance. Beijing is using African networks to achieve its regional and international geo-political and economic aims while African nations use the Chinese connection to make choices about who to turn to, between China and the West, for aid, trade, investment and political support especially in institutions of global governance. Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, stated at the
China-Africa Cooperation Forum in Addis Ababa in 2003 that the global strategic purpose of forging closer ties with Africa was to ‘counter western dominance which was raising its ugly head’. According to Alden (2007), this position resonates with many African nationalists who despise conditionalities by western donors as a threat to their sovereignty, independence and their own positions. Premier Wen Jiabao further argued that China was ready to co-ordinate its positions with African countries in the process of international economic rules formulation and multilateral trade negotiations with a view to obtaining, at relatively low cost, the means to secure its position in the World Trade Organisation and other multilateral organisations. Alden (2007) pointed out that China’s multilateral diplomacy is tuned towards African sensibilities whose emphasis is anti-colonial discourse and support for pan-africanism. Beijing had incorporated these aspects in her official policy statements to maintain African support in institutions of global governance. For example, African nations were crucial in blocking resolutions tabled at the UN Commission on Human Rights which ensured that the International Olympic Committee awarded the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing. The resolutions were meant to block the award of Olympic Games to Beijing based on allegations of human rights violations.

7.5.2 Zimbabwe’s co-operation with China in institutions of Global Governance

President Mugabe’s government, with the active support of the Chinese government, had marshalled the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist rhetoric as a weapon to deflect western criticism of Chinese rule and his own rule especially at international fora such as the United Nations, African Union and Non-Aligned Movement, among others. The two countries share historical experiences based on anti-colonial struggles in Africa and the struggle for Zimbabwe in particular which was inspired by the Maoist socialist ideology.

In 2004, Zimbabwe and China worked together to forestall resolutions at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights that would have condemned both countries for human rights abuses.

On July 11, 2008, Zimbabwe was rescued by China and Russia who vetoed against a United Nations Security Council draft resolution that would have tightened an arms embargo as well as travel and financial restrictions on President Mugabe’s government. Nine countries voted in favour of the draft resolution, that is, USA, UK, France, Italy, Panama, Costa Rica, Croatia, Belgium and Burkina Faso while China was joined by Russia, Libya, South Africa and Vietnam in voting against the resolution. The resolution was triggered by the highly
contested March 2008 Presidential election and the June 2008 Presidential election re-run which were marred by violence and intimidation against opponents of the ZANU-PF government. China used its veto power influence which was exercised in the Security Council to publicly urge the Zimbabwe government to form a Government of National Unity with the opposition due to the “deterioration of the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe”. Beijing’s strategy in pushing for a GNU was to protect her economic interests in Zimbabwe and to ensure it continued to benefit from the vast natural resources of Zimbabwe in a politically and economically stable environment. The irony of China’s diplomatic action was that while it was vetoing against a UN draft resolution that would have tightened an arms embargo on Zimbabwe, it was intensifying its military supplies to Zimbabwe. China was clearly conflicted in this case and was pursuing its national interest regardless of the situation in Zimbabwe.

7.0 Conclusion

The picture that emerged from this research is that China is in Zimbabwe to make money in all its diplomatic activities whether they involve political, military, trade, investment and development co-operation. All these forms of co-operation are underpinned by a business motive which is strategically linked to China’s rapid industrialisation and the need to fuel its continued growth. Although the Chinese and Zimbabwean governments want people to believe that their model of diplomatic co-operation is a win-win formula, the reality could be far from that. Zimbabwe, with its crumbling economy, is desperately in need of Chinese trade, investment and development aid to fund its dilapidated infrastructure, to revive collapsing and closed industries and the agricultural sectors which are the engines of growth, to develop its extractive industries and to obtain the much needed foreign currency in order to address the crippling liquidity challenges in the economy. On the other hand, China is the second biggest economy in the world after the US with excess foreign currency reserves which are in demand all over the world. It is therefore inconceivable that Zimbabwe can negotiate effectively at par with China given the huge gap in economic endowment between the two countries and the lack of comparable negotiating skills by Zimbabwe. China became a Republic in 1949 compared to Zimbabwe in 1980.

Most of the bilateral co-operation agreements between the two countries are structured in secrecy without the opportunity for review by independent experts. As the study demonstrated, Zimbabwe is not negotiating from a position of strength with China and this is
compounded by the absence of effective international relations strategies which are complimented by appropriate domestic policies to ensure that Zimbabwe’s long term developmental needs are met. China is also taking advantage of Zimbabwe’s desperation and estrangement from its traditional western allies to bargain for business in Zimbabwe at ridiculous prices. A win-win developmental model for the two countries can therefore not work because of the lopsided nature of the bilateral relationship which is heavily tilted in favour of China. Zimbabwe is a small fry compared to China which is a huge economic giant. The Look East policy, while opening several opportunities to grow Zimbabwe’s economy, could not be expected to be a panacea to Zimbabwe’s economic challenges because China will only put money where there is a return on investment. Therefore the Look East policy should not be seen as a solution to Zimbabwe’s economic shortcomings but as a policy to diversify Zimbabwe’s channels of diplomatic interaction with other economies like that of China. The study established that the Look East policy was indeed a good policy to adopt given Zimbabwe’s economic challenges but it failed to break Zimbabwe’s traditional channels of economic interaction with western powers even at the height of the crisis from 2003 to 2008.

The China-Zimbabwe bilateral relationship has the potential to deliver huge economic gains to both countries in the long term if a proper policy framework is put in place. Such a policy framework should define how the win-win economic partnership model for the two countries should be structured taking into account the national interests of the two countries. The Zimbabwe- China bilateral relationship should be credited for proffering solutions to some of the challenges associated with neo-liberal paradigms which had caused problems in Zimbabwe.
Chapter 8

Conclusion and Recommendations

8.0 Analytical conclusions drawn from the study

The study concluded that Zimbabwe’s international relations profile was damaged by a number of factors outlined in this thesis which included the following:

(1) Irrational public policies which contradicted with foreign policy objectives,

(2) Centralisation of foreign policy decision making processes in the Office of the Head of State and Government, and the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF, under the “one centre of power” principle

(3) A belligerent foreign policy communication strategy compounded by intellectual dishonesty and arrogance which did not resonate with national capacity,

(4) Obsession with regional and international leadership on key regional and world agendas,

(5) The failure by the Zimbabwe government to respect the rule of law and international agreements signed by the country and a poor governance record at home which created a high risk profile for the government and substantially weakened the country’s capacity to interact politically, economically and socially at regional and international levels. As the previous chapters have unravelled, Zimbabwe had behaved more like a liberation movement than a ruling government.

(6) The use of racism and sanctions as a defensive mechanism to fight detractors and justify lack of progress

(7) Some public policies did not demonstrate clarity, consistency, predictability and non-discrimination in their application in order to boost investor confidence, both local and foreign investors

(8) Failure to establish partnerships with multilateral financial and international creditor nations as a way of establishing the country’s credit worthiness.

(9) The failure to pursue a coherent and balanced international relations strategy which relied on the West and the East simultaneously.
The inability to effect the doctrine of collective responsibility of cabinet to contain ministerial indiscretion and present the image of a united government.

The lack of a commitment to fighting corruption as a key factor in reviving the economy and engagement with the international community; among other key challenges identified in the study.

8.1 Policy Recommendations for Future Governments

8.2 Political Reform as a key pre-requisite for effective international engagement.
Political reform is a key pre-requisite of the transformation of Zimbabwe’s international relations practices. If there is no political will to transform the current practices, the country will remain stuck in many ways which are contrary to its national interests and the dynamic changes taking place in the region and internationally. China has a good way of influencing the country’s transformation which involves change of leadership at party and government levels every ten years. Leadership renewal was therefore seen as an agenda of change and transformation in China. Different leaders bring their own leadership styles and transformational agenda which may positively influence the direction of the country. Unless there is political will to change the status quo given the challenges outlined above, the country will continue to struggle within the international diplomatic system.

8.3 Alignment of the Discord between Public Policies and Foreign Policy objectives
An area requiring urgent attention in terms of re-engaging the international community has to do with contradictions and inconsistencies between public policies and foreign policy objectives. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) seeks to obtain trade, investment, tourism and development opportunities for the country abroad. However, this noble objective was being stunted by dysfunctional and irrational public policies which discouraged potential co-operating partners. Examples are the Land reform policy and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment policy whose intentions were nationally embraced but became the bone of contention with both Western and Eastern block powers, including Zimbabwe’s close allies of China and Russia. The policies were poorly crafted and were implemented in a manner which was inconsistent, unpredictable, lacked clarity and contradicted the foreign policy thrust of government.

Moreover, the two policies mentioned above failed to achieve their intended social justice by benefitting more the elites at the expense of the majority. Therefore it would be difficult to
argue that they were meant to benefit the poor given the outcome of the implementation processes. Furthermore, their implementation was mired in controversy and this ruined investor confidence which was critical in attracting investment and trade opportunities in the short, medium and long term basis. Therefore, while foreign policy was seized with securing investment, trade, tourism and development assistance opportunities, these and other public policies were obstructing the thrust of creating investor confidence. Government officials also exarcebated the situation by interpreting the policies in various ways which were political and reflected ZANU-PF factional politics. Magaya (2015) argued that the way the indigenisation policy was structured promoted rent-seeking behaviour which included bribery, corruption, extortion and outright theft by public officials and politicians. The public policies therefore frustrated investors and capital inflows into the country.

The challenges of poorly focused public policies had also been compounded by the unfavourable business environment marked by failure to respect the rule of law and property rights through endless farm invasions which included farms protected by Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection agreements, dilapidated state of key infrastructure such as roads, railways, erratic supplies and high cost of key utilities such as electricity and water, bureaucratic incompetencies and widespread corruption in the public and private sector. Industry was depressed due to low capacity utilization, the closure of many companies due to lack of working capital while those companies that remained open were using old and inefficient equipment. Unemployment was estimated at over 80% (Treasury figures, 2015).

According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2015), the ratio of Government debt to GDP was 77% in 2014 and this affected Zimbabwe’s capacity to borrow on world financial markets. The UNDP had been releasing reports between 2000 and 2016 showing that the level of food insecurity in rural and urban districts was significantly increasing. However, the Zimbabwe government disregarded such irrefutable evidence that a prerequisite for recovery of the economy and its subsequent development depended on FDI, inflows of other forms of funding including grants and humanitarian assistance and access to international markets which were being stymied by dysfunctional public policies.

The Zimbabwe government needs to refocus its public policies as a way of promoting its foreign policy objectives and as a strategy of reaching out to the regional and international community. Minister Chinamasa’s budget statement of 2013 showed that Zimbabwe was sliding back economically even though sub-Saharan African countries’ economies had
maintained a strong pace despite challenges posed by exogenous factors like poor commodity prices on world markets. According to the SADC Statistical Committee (2014), in 2013, Zimbabwe had a Gross Domestic Product of USD 13.490 billion compared to countries previously considered as weak economically like Zambia (USD 26.835 billion) and Mozambique (USD15.764 billion). Zimbabwe was the second biggest economy in SADC at independence in 1980 after South Africa. By 2015, Zimbabwe had been overtaken in GDP terms by countries which it traditionally looked down upon, that is, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Zimbabwe was leading small economies and island nations of Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. Such a spectacular economic decline in 35 years can be explained by poor policies which could not be supported through bilateral and multilateral relationships. A country once described in 1980 by the first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, as the “jewel of Africa” had been turned into a derided basket case marked by perennial food deficits, high unemployment, company closures and general macro-economic instability.

As analysed elsewhere in previous chapters, there is overwhelming evidence of the link between Zimbabwe’s inappropriate policies which were not clear, consistent and predictable, and which did not reinforce foreign policy objectives of attracting investment and other business opportunities. Despite continuous denial by the government that these policies were not to blame for Zimbabwe’s catastrophic economic decline, it would be the height of intellectual dishonesty to argue that the deterioration could be reversed without addressing challenges associated with these policies as a way of creating an enabling environment for doing business with the international community.

Zimbabwe requires a lot of capital inflows to attend to the unsustainable balance of payments, foreign public sector debt (USD 8bn) and private sector debt (USD 2bn), foreign currency liquidity shortages, and antiquated plant and machinery which made Zimbabwe’s products uncompetitive regionally and internationally as a result of high costs of production. Treasury statistics for 2015 showed that 4160 companies were closed between 2011 and 2014, rendering 55 443 employees unemployed (Businessdaily, December 27, 2014). Chinamasa admitted in an interview in Paris on June 30, 2016 that the country was “broke” and was looking for “lines of credit” (Newsday, July 4, 2016). In that interview, Chinamasa said “Right now, we literally have nothing…”
In the same government, there were other officials who argued that the decline had more to do with western imposed sanctions and not government’s incompetence. This is a dishonest argument because while sanctions existed, the government failed to come up with sanctions busting strategies given that it had a network of diplomatic relations within the region and internationally. Sanctions did not preclude Zimbabwe from engaging in trade, investment, tourism and other activities with other countries, which were not western, who could have rescued Zimbabwe.

Pragmatic ministers like Chinamasa who appreciated the perilous state of government finances had argued in favour of engaging with multilateral financial institutions like IMF and the World Bank and other creditor nations to obtain lines of credit as a way of rescuing and rebuilding the economy. Chinamasa had even promised creditors and investors that he was going to lobby government to revise contentious aspects of the indigenisation policy to make it investor friendly. However, there were other “hawks” in cabinet who believed that Zimbabwe does not need Foreign Direct Investment and that the policy would remain the same.

Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Minister, Patrick Zhuwao, sought to undo Chinamasa’s efforts to re-engage western countries and multilateral financial institutions by arguing that “Zimbabwe does not need Foreign Direct Investment,” suggesting that arguing otherwise was either “ungodly” or “unpatriotic”(Southern Eye, February 24, 2016). Zhuwao further argued that those advocating for FDI were denouncing President Mugabe and were agents of regime change. Minister Zhuwao went on to give April 1, 2016 deadline for foreign companies to comply with the indigenisation legislation by transferring their majority shareholding to black Zimbabweans or face withdrawal of licences, which was interpreted by investors to mean nationalisation. The deadline passed without compliance but it triggered capital flight especially in banks which experienced serious cash shortages immediately after the deadline.

It is such mixed and confusing signals over the indigenisation and economic empowerment policy from ministers in the same cabinet which suggest inconsistency, uncertainty and unpredictability in policy interpretation and implementation. Zimbabwe is in dire need of investment to retool industry and to resuscitate dying companies and it could not afford such contradictions which did not inspire investor confidence. Minister Zhuwao had previously ridiculed Minister Chinamasa’s efforts at attracting FDI arguing that “Why should we as
Zimbabweans go outside seeking foreigners to build our economy? We do not need a foreigner to sort out our economy, no” (The Herald, December 24, 2015). This case reflects dysfunctionality at the highest level of government in terms of policy formulation, implementation and co-ordination. This dysfunctionality at the highest level, as a result of Marxist-Leninist ideological preoccupation, had been a huge set back in terms of decision making in the party and government.

The arguments by Zhuwao had been described by analysts as the “tyranny of the misinformed” (Mutori & Paradza, 2016). Zhuwao’s argument was illogical considering that Zimbabwe’s gross domestic savings were so negligible that it could not be relied upon to build the economy. Zimbabwe’s economy had shrunk by over 40%, unemployment was above 80%, companies were closing due to lack of recapitalisation, government was failing to pay its workers on time and the fact that the nation was experiencing serious foreign currency liquidity shortages all pointed to a doomed future for the nation unless the country was able to attract FDI to grow the national cake.

Even countries with a strong savings culture like Qatar, Kuwait, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, China, UK the USA were also attracting FDI as part of their overall national development strategy. Qatar gross national savings were 59 % of the GDP, China was at 50% of the GDP while the US was at USD 2.8 trillion or 17 % of the GDP in 2013 (Alexander, November 8, 2013). The World Bank data for 2014 showed that gross domestic savings as a percentage of the GDP for a few selected SADC countries were: South Africa at 18.5% of the GDP, Angola 22.3% of GDP, Botswana 37.7% of the GDP, Malawi 6.5% of the GDP while Zimbabwe was the lowest in the SADC region at -12.2% of the GDP. Zhuwao’s internally driven investment strategy for Zimbabwe does not work given the negative investment figures reflected above. Zimbabwe, therefore, cannot survive without the injection of capital inflows from the international community.

Magaya(2015) observed that the change of ministers in the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment ministry from Saviour Kasukuwere, to Francis Nhema, to Christopher Mushowe and finally to Patrick Zhuwao brought with it a change of tone, emphasis, some adjustment of policy and different interpretation on key aspects of the indigenisation policy, often different from the predecessor’s, thereby causing uncertainty and unpredictability to investors especially those keen on investing in long term capital intensive industries. President Mugabe was forced to step in to clarify the indigenisation policy when his ministers
Chinamasa and Zhuwao publicly clashed over the implementation of the law in the financial services sector with Chinamasa arguing that the players had met their obligations while Zhuwao argued that they were yet to meet the shareholding structure stipulated in the law. Mugabe clarified that banks were guided by the Banking Act (Chapter 24:01) and not the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. He further clarified that the 51:49 shareholding structure for black Zimbabweans and foreigners was non-negotiable in the natural resource sectors like mining. However, there are some foreign companies like Anjin of China which had a 50:50 shareholding with the Zimbabwean military (Zimbabwe Independent, May 13, 2016). Mugabe’s intervention did not address the case of companies like Anjin owned by Chinese in a joint venture with Zimbabweans which was located in the natural resource sector but was not complying with the stipulated shareholding. This showed that the law was being implemented selectively in favour of the Chinese.

President Mugabe had intervened to solve the contradictions of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment law because questions continued to be asked about the discretionary application of the law by politicians. Investors and analysts continued to ask why a law should be so vague to the extent of requiring the intervention and interpretation of the President. The intervention of President Mugabe in cancelling a special grant for Chinese companies mining diamonds in Chiadzwa had created a serious diplomatic row with China which might affect multi-billion bilateral investment deals signed by China and Zimbabwe in 2015 and 2016. China thought that it could activate its special political relationship with the Zimbabwean leader to avoid the indigenisation challenges but it got a rude awakening and appealed to the Supreme Court. In short, both the West and the Eastern block countries were complaining about Zimbabwe’s policies.

As part of the re-engagement policy in future with both Western and Eastern block countries, government will need to come up with investment policies which demonstrate clarity, consistency, predictability and non-discrimination in their application. Measures should also be factored to ensure that government does not run away from its obligations especially those involving signed bilateral and multilateral agreements. Public policies have the duty to promote Zimbabwe first instead of party or selfish interests of individuals regardless of their standing in society. Such policies should be implemented and interpreted uniformly and transparently to avoid the rent seeking behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats. That would be the only way to create the necessary conditions for attracting investment and participating in global markets.
8.4. Reforming the Dysfuntional Diplomatic Communication Strategy

One of the areas which must be addressed as part of Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with the international community has to do with the country’s belligerent, confrontational and dysfunctional diplomatic communication strategy which had attracted more enemies than friends in the region and internationally. Zimbabwe’s diplomatic communication strategy had made it difficult to build bridges as part of the re-engagement process due to deep suspicion, mistrust, hatred and misunderstanding created as a result. The diplomatic communication strategy created a rift between western powers and some countries sympathetic to them on one hand, and Zimbabwe and her allies on the other. The Zimbabwe government remained in the trenches 36 years after the end of the liberation struggle! The government projected an image of a liberation movement and not a governing institution.

The Mugabe government’s diplomatic communication strategy manifested in various forms as explored in other parts of this research. First, the national leadership pursued an aggressive, confrontational diplomatic strategy especially against western countries and western multilateral financial institutions who had imposed sanctions. Mugabe linked the sanctions to the purported resistance by western powers to the land reform programme. He argued at national, regional and international platforms that the resistance was linked to their history of colonial racism and slavery.

Secondly, Mugabe’s government used the “race card” as a tool to mobilise domestic and international support and to fight detractors. The “white race” was used as a scapegoat for most of Zimbabwe’s problems because of the whites’ association with the history of colonialism and their expropriation of land belonging to indigenous Zimbabweans and other key resources during colonial times. The government also communicated to the international community that the British and Americans were trying to protect their kith and kin and this message soured relations between Zimbabwe and Anglo-saxon nations. The targeting of whites was not consistent with Zimbabwe’s national policy of reconciliation which was announced by Prime Minister Mugabe. Prime Minister Mugabe’s 1980 independence speech had the values of reconciliation, as evidenced in the following except;

An evil remains an evil whether practised by white against black or black against white. Our majority rule could easily turn into inhuman rule if we oppressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not look or think like the majority of us.
When the fast-track-land reform programme was launched in 2000, the government said then it was not going to compensate whites who were losing land since that was the responsibility of Britain. In a surprise development 15 years later, the government started paying compensation to white farmers. This was another clear case of inconsistent diplomatic communication as it had indicated earlier that the British government and not the Zimbabwe government was expected to compensate white farmers in line with the unwritten undertaking done at Lancaster House Conference.

Thirdly, the Zimbabwe government, at every diplomatic fora, cited sanctions as the root cause of its problems in order to justify lack of progress in its nation building efforts. The sanctions blame game was not useful to the country’s development efforts. It did not refer to issues of maladministration, corruption and a poor governance record, nor did it come up with effective strategies to fight the sanctions. Zimbabwe would have strengthened its bargaining power with the international community if it had developed effective sanctions busting measures which ensured that the country continued to function normally.

Fourthly, Mugabe’s government accused anyone who disagreed with their ideology and world view as a “traitor, surrogate of imperialism, puppet, counter-revolutionary and sell-out” (Mawere, 2013). It is such ideological shortsightedness, rigidity, intolerance and lack of adaptability which diminished the country’s space in the international diplomatic system. Future governments should avoid such a communication strategy which breeds enmity, mistrust and makes consensus building difficult to achieve.

Fifthly, President Mugabe speaking at the Heroes Acre on June 19, 2016 refused western aid linked to reforms of some policies like the indigenisation and economic empowerment and land reform programme, urging the west to “keep its resources”. Mugabe spelt out his viewpoint as follows:

Some will say your policies are blocking funding. Americans and the British might want to pour lots of funds into the country if we don’t have policies like indigenisation and empowerment. Nonsense. If we are going to suffer and be denied resources by outsiders, them demanding that they should do as they like in our country, we say no, keep your resources. Our land, which we have died for, and suffered for, is greater, much greater than your resources. Your resources will come and go, but my land will be there.

(The Herald, June 20, 2016).
The statement took place at a time Zimbabwe had applied for USD 1.6 billion for food aid through UNDP to attend to a critical food crisis as a result of drought. Finance minister Chinamasa was also visiting Paris and London during the period to secure lines of credit which had obvious conditionalities. President Mugabe had dismissed western aid at his 92\textsuperscript{nd} birthday arguing that “If aid, as I understand, is to be given on the basis that we accept the principle of gay marriages, then let that aid stay where it is”. He went on to say such aid was “rotten aid, filthy aid, and we have nothing to do with it.” In 2010, during the Government of National Unity’s re-engagement processes with the EU, Mugabe told his partners in government that:

Zimbabwe will not be saved by any country or organisation, least of all Western. Let our partners in the inclusive government get that so we do not waste our efforts on useless initiatives.

(Zimbabwe Independent, July 9, 2010)

The irony of the Mugabe government’s communication messages was that western nations, especially the EU, remained the leading donor of humanitarian assistance for Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe government budget is funded by donors to the tune of between USD 800million and USD 1 billion according to Zimbabwe Treasury figures for 2014, 2015 and 2016. According to Treasury over 80\% of Zimbabwe’s budget goes towards recurrent expenditure leaving only about 20\% for capital expenditure and social service provision. Aid under such circumstances was a lifeline to the government and spurning foreign aid under such circumstances was an unrealistic, suicidal policy choice. A pragmatic diplomatic communication strategy in future should recognise that it is possible to differ in some areas with other states and still leave room for co-operation in other areas.

Sixthly, the Mugabe government’s diplomatic communication strategy was also to tarnish key leadership of western countries whom the President labelled “gay gangsters” and he argued that gay rights were “unnatural” and “filthy”. Two key leaders of the western world, Tony Blair and George Bush, Jr., were the target of Zimbabwe’s diplomatic vitriol. The UN Secretary-General Ban Kin-moon had to respond to Mugabe’s stance on gay rights in 2015 indicating that they are part and parcel of international human rights standards.

What is clear is that Zimbabwe raised unnecessary diplomatic controversy in the international diplomatic system in defence of its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, in order to rebuild
Zimbabwe’s diplomatic profile through re-engagement, the following issues would have to be
attended to with respect to Zimbabwe’s diplomatic communication strategy.

Firstly, Zimbabwe does not need to re-engage the Western nations only but the international
community as a whole. It is not only the Western nations who were complaining about
Zimbabwe’s policies but the SADC region and the Eastern block countries of China and
Russia as illustrated in this study. Zimbabwe’s domestic policy agenda should reinforce the
foreign policy agenda in the region and internationally. It will not help the country to remain
in denial mode about the impact the country’s domestic policies are having on the
international community.

The communication strategy for Zimbabwe should be realistic and should link with the
national development trajectory. Such a strategy should aim at pushing realistic targets in
order to deliver national outcomes. Zimbabwe’s leaders must synchronise actions, words,
national interest and positive images to send the right message to the regional and
international community as a way of achieving desired national results.

Secondly, Zimbabwe should move away from a confrontational agenda and seek common
ground as the basis of international re-engagement. The requirement to build trust, co-
operation and sustainable peace, through continuous dialogue, should underlie the process.
Emphasis should be placed on quiet diplomacy instead of megaphone diplomacy as a means
of resolving differences between states and non-state actors. Diplomatic theory teaches that
nation states should conduct their relations with great civility even in situations involving
sour relations or sensitive issues. According to Sharp (2009), some arguments may not be
settled on terms of either of the protagonists while some arguments do not necessarily have to
be settled in the sense that life can go on and people stay alive even without a settlement.
Grandstanding and tough talking did not benefit Zimbabwe and therefore continuous, cordial
dialogue becomes the hallmark of co-existence among nations with differences.

Thirdly, the Zimbabwe government should never use the “race card” and “insults” to fight its
battles on the regional and international stage. Racism is against the policy of racial
reconciliation adopted at independence which helped to create a non-racial, stable democracy
that was embraced by the international community. Section 56(1-3) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe dealing with equality and non-discrimination provides that “all people are equal
before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. This provision is
also in line with the SADC Treaty, the AU Constitutive Act and the UN Charter. Therefore
abiding by the letter and spirit of these legal documents will positively enhance the standing of Zimbabwe in the international community. It is also pertinent to point out that trading “insults” in the international diplomatic system does not build consensus but polarises world opinion which is not appropriate in conducting diplomacy.

Polarisation, through hate speeches and political insults, leads to diplomatic isolation and the souring of relations between nations. Therefore, Zimbabwe should carry a voice which resonates with its national capacity as a small, weak and economically decimated country within the international diplomatic system. It is inconceivable that a government can provoke battles when it is ill-prepared to fight back. Rich, powerful nations like the USA and the EU have been able to fight back through punitive sanctions which paralysed Zimbabwe’s economy and Zimbabwe had not been able to respond accordingly.

Fourthly, Zimbabwe’s communication strategy articulated by President Mugabe as illustrated above rejected aid with strings attached. However, what needs to be appreciated in Zimbabwe’s diplomatic communication strategy is that aid programmes whether from the Western countries and institutions or the Eastern block countries and institutions have strings attached. The purpose of attaching strings is to ensure that the intended objectives of the aid programme are realised. Western aid, especially from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, has political conditions which include the promotion of democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and support for humanitarian and development programmes. Western multilateral financial institutions place rigid conditions relating to borrowing as a way of safeguarding shareholders money.

On the other hand, China for example, requires recipient of aid to support the ‘One China policy’ and to cut all diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a way of upholding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. China’s aid also had economic strings attached where recipient of aid must facilitate Chinese business people’s access to lucrative business contracts in the recipient countries. China also links provision of aid to the purchase of Chinese goods and services and the aid usually comes with a significant component of Chinese labour. Therefore all aid programmes have a motive and strings attached regardless of whether they originate from the west or east. It is therefore prudent for Zimbabwe to assess all conditional aid programmes to determine the national interest because all aid programmes have an element of strings attached. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that Zimbabwe had been receiving aid with strings from both the West and the East as
demonstrated in this study and to deny that fact is an element of intellectual dishonesty on the part of the Zimbabwe government. The only aid that should be denied was that aid that undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and the national well-being of Zimbabweans as defined by their development trajectory.

Fifthly, Zimbabwe should desist from its crusading role of providing leadership and prescribing solutions to regional and world issues at a time when its diplomacy and governing record was not exemplary to the international community. The crusading role adopted by Zimbabwe on key regional and world issues was being resisted because of the country’s bad track record in various aspects of leadership at home. The country lacked moral authority and illustrious leadership credentials to promote and prescribe leadership values within the region and internationally. Zimbabwe should exercise the leadership role that resonate with national capacity and its credibility on the world stage.

One aspect which needs to be highlighted is that the success of a leader should not be based on demagoguery or oratory skills, the thunderous applause, appreciative whistling or standing ovations a leader receives at the regional and international stage. Great national leaders should be judged by their capacity to extend a nation’s sphere of influence through trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and development assistance opportunities that a country can obtain within the international community. Leaders that secure political, economic and social stability in their country which is backed by a balanced state security and human security agenda were likely to leave a legacy to be admired by future generations. Great leaders bring prosperity to their nations not poverty and underdevelopment.

Although President Mugabe was often misunderstood and unappreciated by the western world because of his policies, the general direction of his policies remain popular and uncontested from a developing world’s perspective. The challenge for the government was to rebrand the policies to make them realise national objectives through the participation of the international community. The policies must also be packaged and marketed to the international community through an attractive and persuasive diplomatic communication strategy.

Sixthly, a diplomatic communication strategy for Zimbabwe should aim at turning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into a learning organisation which facilitates knowledge acquisition, generation and dissemination within and outside the organisation. The aim is to create an enabling organisational culture that allows continuous dialogue, free
communication of ideas and the empowerment of managers and employees. The current culture was conservative and closed and it does not nurture policy renewal through engagement with academia, think tanks in the country and the international community. An enabling diplomatic communication strategy should capture the best talent outside government and involve them in strategy formulation and evaluation processes. Establishing a Council on Foreign Relations will go a long way in promoting research, dialogue and exchange of ideas between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials and the academic community and think tanks within and outside the country who specialise in foreign relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should also establish the Public Diplomacy Section which will constantly communicate with external and internal publics about government policy and developments and also to facilitate feedback from the diplomatic environment. It is vitally important to recognise the potential of those outside government to provide useful input to the diplomatic agenda of the country. External and internal publics are crucial instruments in realising foreign policy objectives.

Another recommendation is that a future diplomatic communication strategy for Zimbabwe should aim at correcting the impact of sanctions rather than shedding tears about them. The diplomatic communication strategy should de-emphasize the approach of the government where all of its failures are attributable to sanctions even in situations where sanctions had evidently not played any role. A future communication strategy should take responsibility for actions of commission or omission by government than to blame third parties. The sanctions “mantra” had weakened the state’s capacity to respond to its challenges through creativity and innovation.

Therefore, a future foreign policy communication strategy for Zimbabwe should emphasize the wholesome transformation of foreign policy perspective by de-emphasizing liberation struggle narratives in preference for post-liberation struggle imperatives for national development and commitment to democracy and good governance.

8.5. Revisiting the “One Centre of Power” Foreign Policy Decision Making Framework in Zimbabwe

One of the major challenges of Zimbabwe’s international relations framework is the concentration of foreign policy decision making in the Head of State and Government and the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF. The ruling party calls this arrangement the “one
centre of power concept,” implying that power resides in, and is administered through the Head of State and Government and the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF. The ruling party takes the lead in initiating the foreign policy agenda which is then recommended to Cabinet, through the Politiburo, for implementation. Bureaucrats in key ministries like Foreign Affairs, Defence, Industry and Commerce also provide technical input to the policy making process but such input is subject to the President’s approval before operationalization. The centre of gravity in all these processes is President Mugabe. There are a number of challenges associated with this centralised and narrow framework of foreign policy decision-making.

Firstly, although the President may have advisors, his individual talents, inclinations, biases and limitations may in the final analysis determine the foreign policy outcome by virtue of the centralisation of foreign policy processes in his person. Centralisation of foreign policy making in one individual may lead to the promotion of the personality cult of the President and an image of infallibility. As has been demonstrated in this study, even President Mugabe had his own shortcomings in terms of gauging with certainty the costs and benefits of policies designed by his government as demonstrated by policy inconsistency, uncertainty and unpredictably. The complexity of the foreign policy decisions to be made may impact negatively on the President’s decision making ability leading to a minimal rather than the very best decision. Decision making theory stipulates that individuals have bounded rationality and could therefore not be expected to understand every aspect of the policy environment.

Secondly, the President may be obsessed with promoting self interests and the interests of the ruling party per se and not necessarily national interests. For example, when President Mugabe addressed the Fort Hare University Centenary celebration in South Africa on May 20, 2016, he argued that the reason he was not leaving office was to thwart a regime change in Zimbabwe. The question which arises is whether the national interest can only be served by him and not any other leader. Therefore one can argue that national leaders may also be prone to irrationality because of their obsession with maintaining, at all cost, national power, influence, personal interests and the interests of the ruling party. This behaviour pattern is in line with the realist tradition of international relations articulated by Morgenthau (1978) where all states and national leaders are interest-driven power seekers, differentiated primarily by the amount of power they possess and, to a lesser extent, by their status quo or radical orientation to the existing distribution of power and the order sustained by it.
Thirdly, in the context of Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF had run a de facto one party state between 1980 and 2016, except during the Government of National Unity between 2009 and 2013. During this time, ZANU-PF had majority MPs in Parliament and this constrained Parliament to check the sweeping powers of the President through “the power of the purse” and other legislative checks and balances. The courts which are another branch of government that could have provided checks and balances to the President were constrained by the fact that their jurisdiction was limited to national affairs only. The President, through the power of judicial appointments, wielded a lot of influence over the judiciary and this compromised their capacity to challenge policies that appeared to contradict with international norms and values, the constitution and the national interest. Therefore President Mugabe assumed unassailable powers in the absence of any meaningful checks and balances to his power. This scenario did not promote rational decision making by the President.

The President did announce far reaching policy initiatives at the National Heroes Acre during burial ceremonies when emotions were usually high or at political rallies. This style of conducting a country’s foreign policy decision making ignores the requirement to subject policy options to well defined processes that pursue well defined goals after weighing the risks and benefits as a way of choosing optimal solutions.

Fourthly, the power of political appointment at party and government levels rests with President Mugabe as Head of State and Government and the President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF. The power of appointment at various levels ensured that President Mugabe’s power could not be challenged by anyone in the party and government and this had the effect of weakening the quality of his decisions. The major advantage of this system was that the country spoke with one voice internationally as President Mugabe’s views became the benchmark. However, President Mugabe’s views, at times, became an albatross around the neck of the nation since his views were the law which guided foreign policy decision-making at various levels even though the decisions might not have been rational and clearly thought out.

Fifthly, the “one centre of power” concept had proved to be a liability and an albatross around the neck of the government and the ruling party, ZANU-PF. While the concept was useful in building an envisioned strong and united nation, it had inadvertently produced factionalism and divisions in government and the party as politicians fought succession battles to enable them to access that “one centre of power” as the ultimate prize. Leadership
succession battles manifested in factions at party and government levels which aimed to influence the one centre of power. Therefore the talent pool of advisors at the disposal of the President also reflected those factions and this complicated the decision-making processes and prospects for effective policy reform.

As a way of rebranding Zimbabwe’s foreign policy decision making to ensure effective re-engagement and rebuilding of its international relations profile, Zimbabwe should find a way of checking the powers of the President so that his views and the views of his party do not necessarily represent the views of the government. Having an all powerful President is good in terms of policy co-ordination and implementation but there needs to be some checks and balances at formulation stage to ensure that national interests, and not individual and party interests, dominate. A way should be found to do away with the concept of the “one centre of power” in government. Power should be dispersed among the three arms of government to ensure efficient, effective and democratic government.

The “one centre of power” principle in matters of foreign policy in Zimbabwe is similar to the US system where the President had sole and exclusive authority over diplomacy and the diplomatic process. According to Henkin (1990) the US President’s powers include the recognition of states and governments, maintenance of diplomatic relations, conduct of negotiations and gathering of intelligence. These powers are not subject to congressional interference. However, Congress is obligated to support the President’s role with proper laws and money and this is where the checks and balances and scrutiny processes come in. For example, the US President can deploy troops abroad but such a decision can not be operationalized without congressional authorisation. The President may also plan military policy and strategy but requires congressional approval to acquire weapons and their deployment. Congress in this case acts a counter balance to the “one centre of power” in foreign policy matters in the US. A very independent judiciary system also counter-balances the US President’s powers.

The difference between the Zimbabwe and the US “one centre of power” in foreign policy is the lack of a powerful Parliament in Zimbabwe which is dominated by the Zimbabwean President and his party, ZANU-PF, and a weak, compliant judiciary which avoids disagreeing with the Zimbabwean President on major policies that he champions. The US “one centre of power” in foreign policy making utilises a lot of inter-governmental agencies and interest groups consultation in making decisions, unlike the situation in Zimbabwe.
The second way of rebranding government in this area is to ensure that no inflammatory policy statements, aggressive speeches and statements towards the international community are done at political rallies, burial ceremonies, and social events outside the institutional structure of government agencies. Critical policy decisions or statements made at such fora tend to be based on emotions and irrational behaviour that deviates from decisions chosen rationally through analysis, assessment of facts on a step by step basis, bargaining process and the reaching of consensus before taking a decision. This proposed culture of doing business would ensure that only optimal solutions are selected as policy outside the framework of personal ambitions, personal and party interests and emotions which could wreck the foundation of international partnerships.

Zimbabwe should in future avoid engaging in verbal aggression and confrontational boldness which is not backed by military, economic and other forms of national power. Effective diplomacy pursued along rational lines should always guide the conduct of engagement at regional and international levels. There is no value in pursuing protracted confrontational diplomacy when you cannot sustain a siege like was the case with the international isolation and imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by Western countries. Zimbabwe’s political leadership and President Mugabe in particular could still have raised the complaints that they did with the Western countries without stoking tension, confrontation and the further tightening of sanctions as the verbal wars escalated.

The third point in rebranding Zimbabwe’s behaviour pattern in this area is to ensure that diplomatic efforts are directed towards dissuading Zimbabwe and western nations from denigrating each other and their leadership. The use of the terms “rogue state”, “pariah state” or “dictatorial regime” by the western world should be avoided as a way of building bridges and the necessary confidence needed to solve all outstanding differences. Professional diplomats should constrain their leaders from engaging in name-calling, on both sides, in order to facilitate mutual understanding. Political visits to each other’s countries should be intensified as a way of gradually opening other channels of diplomatic interaction in economic, social, military and cultural affairs leading to normalisation of relations. A key strategy in ensuring that re-engagement takes place efficiently and effectively is to strategically replace “hawks” with pragmatic peace builders in important national posts to ensure that the right issues are done and appropriate messages are communicated all the time.
8.6. Creation of a new value system in politics as the basis of reaching out to the region and the international community

Zimbabwe needs to embrace the values of democracy, good governance and constitutionalism as the basis of reaching out to the region and the international community. The founding values of the nation are articulated in chapter 1, section 3(1) (a)-(h) and section 3(2) (a) –(l) of the Constitution which include supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, recognition of the nation’s diverse cultural, religious and traditional values, recognition of the equality of all human beings, good governance, observance of the principle of separation of powers, citizen participation in the political process and the values of transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness, non-discrimination, equity and fairness among others. These constitutional values are in line with international best practice and should therefore be easy to follow if the political will exists. The following issues must be attended to if Zimbabwe was to be fully embraced in the family of nations.

Firstly, Zimbabwe had struggled to run clean, credible, violent-free elections since 2000 and this had created a legitimacy crisis for the government since then. Priority should be given to the holding of free, fair, credible, violence-free elections in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No.20 of 2013 and SADC and AU Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. Fulfilling this criteria would be in sync with the concept of “African solutions for African problems”. Holding credible elections is the surest way to ensure that foreign powers will not continue to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and this would contribute towards the political and economic stability of the country. It is the first step in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and in advancing the values of peace and development in the country and the region.

Secondly, the country should subscribe in word and deed to the values of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Henkin (1990, p.7) defined constitutionalism “as a government subject to the constitution.” In the context of the American constitution, it also implies limited government, government with agreed powers for agreed purposes, subject to the rule of law. It also implies fractionalised authority to prevent concentration of power and the danger of tyranny. Under such a constitution, citizens are expected to be treated the same regardless of their positions in society and their political affiliation. Zimbabwe has one of the most democratic constitutions in the world despite a significant concentration of power in the Head
of State and Government. The people consented to these powers in a referendum which was approved by over 90% of those who voted. The values in the constitution, therefore, reflect a social contract entered into by the people to institute a blueprint of the institutions, laws, principles and customs that should govern them. The major challenge with Zimbabwe was the failure to abide by the values outlined in a constitution that was made by Zimbabweans for Zimbabwe. Therefore the first task in trying to reach out to the international community during the re-engagement process is for Zimbabwe to abide by its own constitution.

The Zimbabwe government should also uphold the values of good governance, democracy, transparency, accountability and responsiveness as provided for in the constitution. This will assist state institutions and entities to operate a clean government through good governance processes of transparency, accountability and responsiveness to the people. Services under such a good governance and democratic framework are provided impartially, fairly, equitably, efficiently and effectively without bias. Citizens are encouraged to participate in policy making under such a framework.

The Zimbabwean government should not violate international agreements it had appended its signature to like what happened to the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs) that were not respected during the land reform programme. Observance of such values will contribute towards investor confidence and act as a facilitator in attracting investment. The legal instruments that Zimbabwe ratifies should be based on sound political and economic policies which take on board input from citizens, other stakeholders and independent experts before the implementation of such legal instruments.

Thirdly, Zimbabwe should show wholehearted commitment throughout the re-engagement process without changing goal posts or demonstrating intellectual dishonesty and arrogance. This requires Zimbabwe to speak with one voice and to prove that it could be trusted to own-up to its word. A situation where some senior government officials claim that they do not want investment and aid when other senior officials are desperately trying to attract the same does not augur well in any nation branding process. Acknowledging the perilous state of the economy and the fact that the country is indebted to almost all developed countries and multilateral and bilateral creditors would be the stepping stone to unlocking lines of credit. The major objective of the re-engagement process is to ensure that the country is able to clear its debt arrears and then open new lines of credit as a panacea to its development agenda.
Zimbabwe’s experience with both western countries and financial institutions on one hand and eastern block countries and institutions on the other was that failure to repay debts would result in denial of access to more lines of credit. Paying back what one owes is a cardinal principle which is reinforced by Zimbabwe’s traditional philosophy and practice of “ubuntuism” which enhances human dignity, harmony, kindness and promotes human relationships. The “ubuntuism” practice reinforces the international practice of creditworthiness. The values outlined above are a critical component of statecraft which are necessary in defending the country’s strategic interests. The government needs to have the confidence of the citizens and the international community which is reflected through a conducive behaviour pattern.

8.7. Government should enforce the doctrine of ministerial collective responsibility.

The Zimbabwe government should enforce the doctrine of collective responsibility to contain ministerial divisions and indiscipline in so far as the defence and implementation of public policies was concerned. Ministers should be collectively responsible for the successes or failures of the Government, and must therefore share moral responsibilities for its policies.

The implication of this doctrine is the view that all “ministers are bound to support government decisions before the public, parliament, and the party, and at very least must refrain from openly criticizing government policy” (Punnett, 1980). The doctrine implies that a minister who disagrees with a particular government policy must reconcile his differences or resign from government. The doctrine serves as a tool of suppressing differences in Government in view of the fact that ministers make policies together in cabinet and should reconcile their difference in cabinet. A divided government is prone to destabilisation from the domestic and international constituencies especially in matters to do with attracting foreign direct investment.

Furthermore, a divided government cannot implement its policies efficiently and effectively and may attract defiance from the population. A good example is the April 1, 2016 ultimatum given by Minister Patrick Zhuwao to foreign companies to transfer their majority shareholding to Zimbabweans in line with the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment law which was ignored by the companies concerned because they realised that opinion was divided in government on the matter. Similarly, in terms of ministerial responsibility, a minister is responsible for his own departmental responsibility and should be able to take blame or credit should something bad or good happens in the department and in cases of
serious errors of judgement, policy failure or dereliction of duty, such a Minister may be
required to resign. Sometimes a minister’s error may be used to avoid government’s
collective responsibility. Such a minister can therefore be sacrificed to protect the image and
integrity of the government.

This doctrine needs to be enforced to have discipline in the Zimbabwe government. A
situation where ministers attack each other in public, disagree publicly or leak cabinet
deliberations in public does not give confidence to the domestic constituency and the
international community. Such behaviour opens room for manipulation by internal and
external enemies. This phenomenon had weakened Zimbabwe’s pursuit of its interests in the
international diplomatic system as co-operating partners adopted a wait-and-see attitude in
order to assess the direction of government. The behaviour is common in coalition
governments like was the case with the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe from
2009 to 2013. Cabinet ministers belonged to different political parties and ideological
orientations and they were trying to prove to their domestic and international constituencies
that they were doing a good job compared to their opposite counterparts. However, the
divisions in the ZANU-PF government were destabilizing the government to say the least.
Partly the problem emanated from the party which is riddled with succession battles which
naturally spills over into government with devastating consequences in terms of how the
international community relates to the country.

The solution to the indiscipline in government and the ruling party could be found in two key
areas. First, ZANU-PF as the ruling party should put its house in order by attending to the
intractable Presidential succession battles. For as long as the issue remains unresolved, the
country would continue to bleed politically, economically and socially. ZANU-PF as the
ruling party is the backbone of the governmental system in place. The ruling party
determines to a large extent the success or failure of the government since it is responsible for
the formulation of key policies of government, oversees the implementation of the policies by
government and evaluates the success or failure of those policies. It is therefore important to
have think tanks in the ruling party, who may not necessarily be members of the party, to
assist in policy development. Such experts could help the party to appreciate the impact of
their proposed policies on the regional and international diplomatic system. Experts in the
party are naturally constrained by the need to stick to the ideological line and to pander to the
whims of the leadership in order to benefit from the political patronage system.
Secondly, political indiscipline could be tackled at governmental level through the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committees and in Parliament through effective co-ordination of government policy. The Cabinet of Zimbabwe should facilitate strategic leadership in the delivery of government programmes, their co-ordination, implementation and evaluation to ensure that there is policy coherence nationally and the harmonisation of domestic policies and foreign policy, through a shared understanding of the direction of the nation. This strategy should also filter to the highest decision organs of the ruling party, that is, the Central Committee and the Politburo to ensure that there is coherence between the direction of government and the party. More importantly, Cabinet Ministers should attend Question Time in Parliament to clarify issues from restless Members of Parliament who may want guidance on the direction of government policies. The Speaker of Parliament, Advocate Mudenda, had complained on several occasions about the behaviour of Cabinet Ministers who appeared not interested in government business by their unavailability to respond to burning issues which may have both domestic and external dimensions. Such an attitude could damage irreparably the image of the country especially with external co-operating partners. Therefore if Zimbabwe wishes to re-engage the international community, these are some of the issues which may need to be attended to.

Political reform will be a critical element to ensure that the country starts moving again with respect to international engagement and the restoration of cordial and fruitful relations. Such reform should ideally take place at government and party level to ensure the injection of new ideas. In the context of Zimbabwe, the ruling party ZANU-PF provides most of the policy inputs which informs government practices and the fact that there has been no change of leadership or at most minor changes at those two levels meant that the same foreign policy framework continued to dominate international relations practices. In China, it had overcome that challenge through changes in leadership at party and government levels every ten years as a way of injecting momentum in the system of the government and the party. Adoption of an appropriate reform agenda is therefore crucial for transforming the rigidity and static nature of Zimbabwe’s international relations.

8.8 A commitment to fighting corruption as a key factor in the re-engagement process

The re-engagement process should start in Zimbabwe with the country declaring war on corruption which had decimated the economy more than the western imposed sanctions. Corruption is multifaceted, multi-dimensional and can best be described as a cancer or a thief.
which robs the nation of well-deserved services and hard earned national resources. In short, corruption negatively impacts on national development. Therefore before Zimbabwe re-engages the international community for assistance to get out of its desperate political and economic situation, it must first and foremost place emphasis on eliminating corruption which is really the enemy within the country.

Transparency International 2015 Index ranked Zimbabwe at 150 out of 168 countries in terms of levels and intensity of corruption and this creates negative perceptions about the country and discourages prospective foreign and domestic investors. According to internationally acclaimed anti-corruption campaigner, John Githongo (2016), a lot of the resources which are corruptly looted from Africa go to the West and more recently to China (Newsday, July 4, 2016). In the context of Zimbabwe most of the material and financial resources corruptly looted will end up in Western countries’ financial systems due to the intractable post-colonial networks with the country. Zimbabwe therefore ends up reinforcing the sanctions imposed by the same western powers through such corrupt illicit financial flows. The major challenge arising from these corrupt networks is that they need the co-operation of the same western powers and the international community who may have facilitated such looting to recover such stolen resources. In practice, they will not co-operate in reversing such plunder because of self-interest considerations. This is a new type of neo-colonialism where the previously colonised nations co-operate with former colonial powers to loot their own resources instead of channeling them towards development as part of their independence agenda.

Tackling corruption as a strategy of national renewal and a strategy to reach out to the international community through re-engagement requires an appreciation of its various manifestations and the creation of an institutional corporate governance framework to meet the challenges. In Zimbabwe, corruption takes many forms like manipulation of tender procedures through inside trading, bribery, theft, fraud, nepotism, electoral fraud, disregarding the rule of law and court judgements, human rights abuses, criminal abuse of office, money laundering, abuse of public property, extortion, embezzlement, under-invoicing/over-invoicing, and other sophisticated underhand dealings. The source of wealth of some of the most politically well connected people in politics, business, the bureaucracy and a few ordinary people is not easy to account in an environment of grinding poverty and a general national economic decline.
There are many institutional governance frameworks which regulate corruption in Zimbabwe. The constitutional pillars of good corporate governance are articulated in the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No.20 Act 2013. Specifically, chapter 1 section 3 (1) (h) and section 2(g); Chapter 2, section 9 (1); and Chapter 9 sections 194, 195, 196,197 and 198 are all devoted to ethical guidelines on accountability, fairness, transparency, independence, justice and responsiveness in terms of how public institutions and officials are directed, controlled and held accountable. The other legal frameworks which reinforce the constitution in controlling corruption include the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 9:16), the Anti-Corruption Commission Act (Chapter, 9:22) which provides for a commission appointed by the President to fight corruption and the Public Financial Management Act (Chapter 22:19).

In addition to the above legal frameworks, the Government of Zimbabwe had also launched a National Code of Corporate Governance (Zimcode) in April 2015. In order to strengthen the Code, the government was also in the process of promulgating into an Act of Parliament the Public Sector Corporate Governance Bill during the 3rd Session of the 8th Parliament of Zimbabwe. The legal framework outlined above demonstrated a serious commitment by the country’s political leadership to run corrupt-free government ministries, state entities, local authorities and private sector entities.

Despite the existence of a well crafted legal framework to fight corruption in Zimbabwe, a lot of challenges stood in the way of an implementation framework. Firstly, according to Vice President E.D. Mnangagwa, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was ineffective since it had been housed under the Ministry of Home affairs where “ministers tended to avoid investigating each other” (The Herald, June 17, 2016). The ACC was then moved to the Office of the President and Cabinet to show government’s serious commitment to tackle the corruption scourge amidst a litany of corrupt activities involving government ministries, state enterprises and other public entities. Even after this move, there is little evidence to show that there is political will to contain the rampant corruption scourge which had decimated Zimbabwe’s economy.

There were many outstanding cases of corruption raised by the Auditor-General’s Annual Reports which had not been investigated with a view to prosecute the offenders. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committees especially on Public Accounts had similarly investigated and exposed corruption in government and state enterprises but there appears to be no political will to prosecute alleged offenders. Despite the establishment of commission after commission and the existence of many reports indicating corruption, there were no
significant prosecutions which led to convictions. Instead nineteen and a further four anti-corruption officials were suspended in 2016 and the Chief Executive Officer of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission was jailed for 5 years for defrauding the commission of USD 435 000 (Nemukuyu, 2016). The conviction of the CEO of the Anti-Corruption Commission is symptomatic of the practice in Africa where Commissioners who are expected to arrest corrupt people end up being arrested themselves.

Secondly, the institutionalisation of codes of conduct to fight corruption in the constitution and other legal documents did not have an impact in Zimbabwe because of little regard for the rule of law which is part of the political culture of the country. Certain powerful people tended to exist above the laws, regulations and corporate governance codes of the country. A thorough enforcement of the law through tough penalties like what happens in countries like China and Singapore will go a long way to ensure compliance with the law. China and Singapore penalties include death sentence, jailing for life without possibility of parole or further reduction of sentence, hefty fines of up to USD 100 000 or more, among others.

If corruption is not contained in Zimbabwe, it has the potential to undermine democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Corruption in Zimbabwe had undermined fair play, justice, equal opportunities, equity and non-discrimination which are all key principles of the constitution. Corruption violates people’s economic rights through the diversion of national resources meant to uplift the nation like was the case with the Chiadzwa diamonds which ended up benefiting a few. In Zimbabwe, corruption also led to low levels of FDI as investors avoided exposing themselves to a high risk business environment. Corruption also affects people’s right to life as demonstrated by the High Court Case of State vs Martin Tichaona Muchero (Chief Executive Officer of Grain Marketing Board), Tobias Takavarasha (Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture) and Kumbirai Kangai (Minister of Lands and Agriculture). The minister and the two others were involved in an alleged looting scheme that led to the critical shortage of strategic maize reserves for the country, thus leading to serious shortages of the nation’s staple food. However, the High Court acquitted them after the state failed to prove a prima facie case against the three.

Corruption also undermines democracy and the rule of law which requires that all citizens in a country should be subjected to the same laws, fair and impartial laws and that they should be held accountable in the event that they violate the laws. As Kunaka et al (2002; p.8) correctly observed, “in a genuine democracy, no person, whatever their position in society, is
above the law.” Therefore in the context of Zimbabwe, the re-engagement process should aim to ensure that Zimbabwe’s laws are enforced equally, fairly, freely and without political interference or prejudices as a strategy to contain and eliminate corruption.

Thirdly, corruption had proved difficult to eradicate in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa in general because anti-corruption strategies tended to concentrate not on eradication but “on curtailment, containment and minimisation of the negative impact of corruption to society” (Kunaka et al, 2002). This approach is considered pragmatic since corruption mutates taking different dimensions in keeping with the ever changing economic, political, social and technological environment. The fight against corruption should target both elimination and minimisation of the scourge as a national survival and economic revival strategy.

Fourthly, corruption had also proved difficult to eradicate in Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries due to the lack of harmonisation of strategies to fight it at regional level under the SADC Protocol Against Corruption which was signed in Malawi in August 2001. Under this Protocol, SADC countries are expected to work closely by exchanging information on corruption and best practices and the harmonisation of different anti-corruption policies and legislation in their respective countries. However, member states’ strategies tended to be disaggregated in line with their political and cultural values, national interest considerations, their legislative framework and the level of participation by civil society, media and non-governmental organisations in anti-corruption activities. Harmonisation of strategies to fight corruption at regional level will positively impact on the fight against corruption at national level.

Fifthly, corruption had also proved difficult to contain in Zimbabwe and other African countries due to the corruptisation of cultural traditions. For example, it was culturally acceptable for people to offer tokens of appreciation to Chiefs and Village Heads in the form of goats or chickens for allocating them land or to be charged token fines such as a goat, a hen, a bag of maize at traditional courts (Kunaka et al 2002). However, some Chiefs and Village Heads were now abusing a culturally acceptable practice to commercialise the practice of allocating land and the payments of traditional fines which were exorbitant in comparison to previous tokens of appreciation and token fines. Some Chiefs and Village heads were charging about 2 to 5 heads of cattle depending on the gravity of the case they will be presiding over, leading to government intervention. In Zimbabwe and Mozambique, there is a saying which says that “a goat must eat where it is tied,” implying that corruption is
justifiable if it occurs where the culprit is employed. Therefore nation building strategies which address retrogressive, corrupt cultural practices would be the preferred route to tackle the scourge.

8.9 Good corporate governance as part of Zimbabwe’s re-engagement agenda

President Robert G. Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai agreed during the Government of National Unity (2009 to 2013) that investment inflows favour regions characterised by good corporate governance. They also agreed that good corporate governance was necessary to complement legislation governing State Enterprises and Parastatals and the Public Financial Management Act (Chapter 22:19) as a tool to fight corruption and to build sustainable goals. These two positions should inform how Zimbabwe could re-engage the international community by ensuring that the country’s governance is anchored on good corporate governance and the rule of law if progress was to be achieved. The framework would help public and private sector entities to reach out to the international community by improving investors’ confidence and the business environment in general. Government should therefore embrace the national code of corporate governance framework, in word and deed, as the foundation of rebuilding the economy, a strategy to reach out to the international community and to give impetus to the fight against corruption.

Secondly, Zimbabwe should appreciate that corruption had more devastating effects on the economy than western sanctions. Corruption had allowed Zimbabwe’s material and financial resources to be looted out of the country by western and eastern block imperialist forces. Evidence had been proffered in various areas of this thesis. Zimbabwe is a very rich country by world standards. The country is endowed with rich mineral resources like gold, diamond, platinum, chrome, coal, asbestos, copper, iron, methane gas that is yet to be explored, among others. Zimbabwe may not need aid if it were able to accurately account for the utilisation of its resources. President Mugabe shocked the nation when he revealed that USD 15 billion had disappeared at Chiadzwa Diamond fields due to obscrurity and corruption in the mining sector leading to the withdrawal of licenses of companies operating in Chiadzwa and their replacement with a state owned company, the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company(ZCDC) (The Sunday News, May 22, 2016).

The Chiadzwa Diamond looting case demonstrates the critical importance of upholding sound corporate governance standards as the basis of conducting government business. The government was prejudiced of unspecified huge amounts of revenue which it could have used
to fund its budget operations without having to rely on external funding. Therefore, future policy options in the key, rich mineral resources sector should strengthen corporate governance frameworks through strict financial monitoring procedures, measures to promote transparency and accountability and other measures to ensure that the power for the administration of key minerals like diamonds rests with the state while parliament plays an oversight role. The issuance of mining concessions should be done through a transparent public process to avoid senior public officials from enriching themselves contrary to the national interest. Therefore if Zimbabwe is keen on self-reliance in matters to do with development, then the solution lies in a sound corporate governance framework which is not only written down and talked about but one which is enforceable in the national interest.

Thirdly, corporate governance can be used as a strategy to rebrand Zimbabwe’s international image. Abnormal relations between Zimbabwe and the international community can be attributed to a high risk business environment in which macro-economic volatility, trade restrictions, feeble institutional environments, poor property rights and corruption underlie the country’s public sector (Laiton, 2014). The fragile economy is characterized by political and economic uncertainty and therefore the institutions of transparency and accountability should be strengthened to attract investment and offset the uncertainty which characterise the country’s governance. Government should also continue with strengthening broader policy reforms by aligning its policies and regulations to the constitution as a way of managing the risk business environment. The Zimbabwe government should continue to strengthen the institutional capacity of public and private sector bodies as a way of creating trust between external shareholders and potential investors on one hand and internal stakeholders on the other.

Nation branding strategies in Zimbabwe should also be underpinned by strengthening public financial management, improving the ease of doing business and the intensification of reforms of parastatals and other state owned enterprises. Nation branding the world over had emerged as one of the key strategies for national economic development. Many nations across the world, both developed and developing, have embraced the concept as they compete against each other for export markets, foreign direct investment, tourists, scarce human resources, international leverage and influence. As competition among nations intensifies as a result of these variables, it became imperative for countries across the world to create, nurture and sustain “strong nation brands”. The idea of a nation brand had gained prominence across the world as governments are realizing the importance of creating,
nurturing and managing a competitive nation brand especially in view of globalization and the subsequent competition for resources and markets. Zimbabwe must come up with a plethora of strategies to brand the country. This may involve appointing cabinet ministers, chief executive officers of state enterprises and parastatals with appropriate academic qualifications and experience using a competitive recruitment and selection process. Merit and not political patronage should be the preferred criteria in order to attract people with the skills to deliver in line with international best standards.

Another strategy of nation branding is to put in place various projects which seek to lure investment, for example the Governance and Institutional Strengthening Project (GISP) which strengthens the internal control mechanisms like, for example, a transparent procurement process which should be monitored by independent non-executive directors. In this regard, public sector entities should make sure that audit committees are kept independent of management. This can be ensured by giving the non-executive directors the exclusive preserve to create these fundamental committees. According to Zimbabwe’s National Code on Corporate Governance, non-executive board members should be of a significant number compared to the executive directors to enhance their objective opinion in companies’ visions, missions and performance management. This structure is useful in forestalling corporate failures and enhancing the corporate image of the country. There is no country which would be prepared to invest in a country with a high rate of corporate failures.

Investors evidently regard the relationship between the Board of Directors and the organization to determine if it is a safe environment for investment. Nevertheless, the National Code on Corporate Governance is shrouded in grey areas with regards to the chairmanship and Chief Executive Officer posts. It provides that a single person can exercise both roles if need arise and independence should be maintained. These roles are not supposed to be exercised by an individual due to the fact that conflict of interests will always arise as shown by the irresponsible remuneration of Chief Executive Officers of Premier Medical Aid Society, who earned USD 230 000 per month and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Chief Executive Officer who earned USD 40 000 per month (Newsday Editorial, January 29, 2014). Investors are well aware of the implications of ‘dual hatting’ as this contributed to the collapse of Enron in the United States of America whereby Ken Lay was Chief Executive and also Chairman of the corporation. Under such circumstances, no foreign investors would be
willing to put money in such a business where primitive looting took the form of legalized mega-salaries.

The announcement of the disappearance of USD 15 billion of revenue at Chiadzwa diamond mines by President Mugabe does not only show a high level of irresponsibility in Zimbabwe’s publicly traded companies, but a lack of integrity in the interactions between the internal stakeholders and the responsible government agencies. Therefore this example demonstrates the imperative need of strengthening corporate governance systems as a nation branding strategy.

Information and Communication Technology advancement is also a key strategy in branding the nation and in attracting Foreign Direct Investment. According to the African Development Fund (2013) ICT enhances the presentation of national statistics for national intervention and the implementation of macro-economic policies. Statistical databank is required by stakeholders who facilitate development projects as part of the country’s re-engagement with the international community. Zimbabwe is faced with many challenges like high unemployment, high levels of poverty, food deficit, diseases, inadequate rail, road, water, housing and energy infrastructure which makes the need for statistical planning relevant as a nation branding strategy. As the international community engages with Zimbabwe on its future development needs, the statistical database becomes a useful tool for planning and implementation of projects.

7.10 Zimbabwe should pursue a balanced international engagement strategy
Zimbabwe should pursue a balanced international relations strategy which places equal impotance to both the West and the East simultaneously. During the period 1980 to 1999, the international relations strategy of Zimbabwe was anchored on the world capitalist system and when relations soured after 2000, Zimbabwe was forced to “Look East” as a national survival strategy.A situation where a nation depends largely on one sphere of influence to get what it wants in the international system opens a lot of scope for manipulation and exploitation by that influential bloc. Zimbabwe should therefore strive to normalize relations with both Western and Eastern powers in order to effectively promote its interests. Obsession with regional and international leadership on key agendas has the effect of endangering its influence due to resistance by regional and international leaders who may be competing for the same influence. Zimbabwe should therefore take diplomatic positions that resonate with its power and small influence in the international community.
8.10 Alignment of Foreign Policy Objectives towards Commercial Diplomacy.
The country’s foreign policy objectives should be re-oriented from a close focus on political issues to emphasise on how we could increase our business opportunities and interests by exporting and interacting with the world business people and institutions. This will entail the Zimbabwe government getting in partnership with all sectors of the economy to expand the wealth and well being of the nation through an aggressive export promotion strategy, using diplomatic channels and processes.

8.11 Restoring Relations with Multilateral Financial Institutions and International Creditors
Restoring relations with multilateral financial institutions and international creditor nations is the only way to establish once again Zimbabwe’s credit worthiness, attract investment, address macroeconomic challenges and achieve global partnership in nation building efforts following decades of economic ostracisation.

Zimbabwe’s re-engagement policy which was started during the Government of National Unity (GNU; 2009-2013) was meant to resolve debt arrears with International Financial Institutions and creditor nations, and to eventually seek debt rescheduling or waiver of some of the debt under the umbrella of the Paris Club. Zimbabwe also sought huge new capital injection to support its economic recovery from the effects of almost three decades of economic contraction as a result of dysfunctional policies and general poor governance. The policy sought to present an acceptable strategy for clearing Zimbabwe’s external debt to enable the country to be embraced once again by international creditors and development partners. The re-engagement process was also targeted at addressing macroeconomic challenges in general and advancing policy reform, attracting investors confidence, restore confidence in the financial services sector, reverse a shift in economic activity from the informal to the formal sector and to promote sustainable development.

There were notable achievements in Zimbabwe’s re-engagement processes. The first major achievement of the process was the EU’s suspension of appropriate measures on Zimbabwe under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement in November 2014. The suspension of the measures enabled the EU to provide direct financial assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe which was a significant step in normalizing relations between the EU and Zimbabwe. The EU Ambassador, Dell ‘Arricia in 2015 indicated that the EU and its member states were to immediately operationalize the indicative programme agreed by the two parties.
in the area of health, rural based economic development and governance. The Ambassador also indicated that the EU and its member states would continue to fund humanitarian programmes, in addition to the new initiatives. According to Ambassador Dell ‘Arricia, total funding by the EU to humanitarian programmes to Zimbabwe reached USD 2 billion between 2009 and 2014 (Gapare, 2014).

The second notable achievement of the re-engagement process was the Ministry of Finance’s development of a debt clearance strategy for arrears owed to IFIs. The strategy received strong support from creditors and development partners at the sidelines of the 2015 Annual Meetings of the IMF and WB in Lima, Peru. According to the plan the government of Zimbabwe was to repay USD 1.8 billion in arrears owed to IFIs by April, 2016. The external debt resolution strategy was to be achieved by a combination of the following methods (a) using domestic resources to clear USD 110 million owed to IMF, (b) a bridge loan to clear USD 601 million from the AfDB Group and (c) a medium to long term loan facility to clear USD 1.1billion owed to the WB Group. As Munyati (2014) observed, the debt clearance strategy was viewed as credit positive since it was expected to renew engagement with bilateral and multilateral credit partners.

The third achievement of the re-engagement process was the successful completion of the IMF sponsored Staff Monitoring Programme in Harare from August 31 to September 11, 2016. Under SMP, Zimbabwe was given fiscal and monetary targets to fulfill and it was also required to make the indigenization laws more appealing to investors. The IMF declared after the review meeting that Zimbabwe had met the set targets although the IMF appeared to have compromised its demands to ensure that Zimbabwe remained in the re-engagement process. Many targets had been missed and the indigenization law had not been amended to make it investor friendly. The conclusion of SMP with Zimbabwe was expected to set the stage for advancing the re-engagement process leading to the unlocking of lines of credit. There were, however, challenges associated with the IMF sponsored debt clearance strategy. Firstly, Zimbabwe was to be locked in a cycle of debts stress through the strategy of using new loans to pay current obligations and retire old debts. The strategy required accessing new bridging loans to retire old debts owed to AfDB Group and the WB Group, implying that Zimbabwe would be locked in a vicious cycle of indebtedness. This strategy raised questions on whether Zimbabwe would be capable of escaping debilitating debt while it also attempts to promote growth and social justice.
Secondly, the plan required Zimbabwe to implement conditional austerity measures which come with the financial plan attached to the strategy. The question that should be grappled with was how the austerity measures would impact on growth, standard of living of the marginalized poor people and whether the people were ready for a second Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) following the 1991-1996 programme which brought misery to the lives of the ordinary people.

Thirdly, the challenge of the debt clearance strategy was that it required the support of the US and British governments during voting at IFIs for any lending to the government of Zimbabwe to take place. The US and British governments have already given conditions for their support. According to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in a letter to the US Treasury Secretary in 2016 indicated that, “the current law requires the President to make a number of certificates including the restoration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, satisfactory election conditions in the country, equitable legal and transparent land reform and the subordination of the security force to civilian authority” (Munyati, 2016). The UK Ambassador Catriona Laing also reinforced this American position when she clarified that British support would only be offered on condition that Zimbabwe upheld the rule of law and human rights. The British Ambassador emphasized on July 27, 2016 that “no UK taxpayer’s money has been or will be used to fund the government of Zimbabwe” (Mananavire, 2016). The British Ambassador also clarified that while economic reforms were necessary, they were not by themselves sufficient and urged the ZANU-PF government to uphold the rule of law and human rights as defined by the country’s constitution and its obligations as a member of the international community.

Ambassador Laing’s statement had been confirmed earlier by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns in the House of Lords who agued that “Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with IFIs will only be possible once it has demonstrated a clear commitment to economic and political reform. We, along with the wider international community, have made this clear to the Zimbabwe government” (Rukuni, 2016). This British position was also transmitted to the Zimbabwe Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, by British Minister for International Development, Nick Hurd and Minister for Africa, James Duddridge (Rukuni, 2016).

Moreover, it would be difficult to get the support of US and British governments without reforming the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment law and other contentious
legislation which impinged on the application of the rule of the law and those that infringe the enjoyment of human rights. It may therefore be difficult to reform some of the policies given the rigid political culture of the country.

Evidence from the various policy statements of the US, UK, EU, China, India and other foreign governments point to certain conditions which must be met if Zimbabwe’s re-engagement is to succeed. These include;

(1) The government of Zimbabwe should demonstrate to creditors and co-operative partners that it had the political will to reach an amicable settlement to the problem by negotiating in good faith and implementing agreed recommendations arising from the re-engagement discussion.

(2) Meeting key demands of the US, UK and EU would certainly go a long way in achieving progress in the re-engagement process. Achieving consensus on upholding the rule of law and human rights, in addition to holding free, fair, transparent, credible elections in accordance with the country’s constitution and SADC and AU guidelines on holding democratic elections will facilitate the support of these key countries in voting favourably in International Financial Institutions where they have a veto power on Zimbabwe’s access to international financing. Continued farm invasions, breach of court orders, breach of human rights and the rule of law may serve to buttress the view that the country was not negotiating in good faith in the re-engagement process. In general terms no country was willing to deal or invest in a country whose future is uncertain. Meeting the key demands of US, UK and EU should not be difficult since they do not interfere but rather compliment our national interests as reflected by the relevant constitutional provisions which were overwhelmingly approved by 94.5% of Zimbabweans voters in a referendum on March 16 and 17, 2013.

While Zimbabwe may not meet these conditions in their totality, a major departure from its past practices will certainly result in a favourable response from western nations. A case in point is that relating to the IMF’s Staff Monitored Programme where the IMF was very lenient to Zimbabwe by setting low targets and when most of the fiscal and monetary targets were not met, the IMF proceeded to endorse Zimbabwe’s targets. This IMF position reflected elements of compromise, accommodation and flexibility which were intended to keep Zimbabwe in the re-engagement process.

(3) Zimbabwe should also implement its constitution in full, protect property rights, and defend domestic and international agreements signed by the country as a way of instilling confidence in development partners and investors. The Zimbabwe government should not
change goal posts as and when it sees it convenient. Policy inconsistency, unpredictability, and lack of transparency and unaccountability should be eliminated as a culture of doing business. Government should therefore adopt investor policies which are friendly and predictable as part of the re-engagement with the international community.

(4) Zimbabwe should re-engage the West and the East simultaneously as a viable strategic agenda. Such a strategy should aim at comparing the old, tired, failed prescriptions of the IMF and the WB and the new prescriptions from countries like China, Brazil, India, South Korea, Malaysia, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the Chinese and Brazilian state investment banks.

(5) Zimbabwe should move away from its toxic confrontational diplomatic communication strategy towards the western world as a way of building the necessary confidence to drive the process forward in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, respect and collaboration in all spheres. The use of appropriate diplomatic methods and language to solve differences would be key to the re-engagement process.

Although there are many challenges associated with the re-engagement process given the different national interest considerations, the case for re-engaging the international community can not be over-emphasised. It is the only way of ensuring that the country gets the best out of its international engagement.

8.12 Conclusion

Political and economic reform is therefore, the only way to go for Zimbabwe if it is to successfully re-engage the international community. Such a reform agenda should concentrate on political and economic reforms as per the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No.20 of 2013 taking into account demands by key actors within the world capitalist system as a way of removing western imposed sanctions and injecting impetus into the re-engagement process. Zimbabwe should desist from its dishonest argument that the reforms were meant to effect a regime change in the country because demands for reforms were emanating from both western and eastern block nations and Zimbabwean citizens as a condition for successful re-engagement.

Reforms are necessary to boost the confidence of capital and money markets. Reforms are also critical in tackling public policies’ inconsistency and ambiguity, debt service burden, budget deficit, trade deficit, illicit financial outflows, corruption in its various forms, cash shortages, low levels of national savings, rescucitation of closed industries and the low
capacity utilization of existing industries, high rate of unemployment and the general sluggish growth in the economy.

More importantly, reforms are critical in the area of governance to ensure that the country abides by its constitution and its international obligations. These were not abstract but real issues that had weakened the state’s capacity to service its people and to interact with the international community. Resorting to diversionary rhetoric and tactics of “regime change”, “neo-colonialism and imperialist machinations”, liberation struggle narratives and the use of sanctions to justify lack of progress will not solve the economic and political challenges which had weakened the state. Strategic, focused, realistic, creative, innovative and proactive leadership was critical in moving the country forward as part of the re-engagement agenda.

If Zimbabwe does not want to follow the route of political and economic reform which was being advocated by the international community and citizens, it could follow the route of autarky or self reliance. Given its abundant natural resources it could exploit them in line with its development strategy. This strategy assumes that the country would be able to contain and eliminate corruption which had become a cancer in society. However, given the fragility of the state as reflected in its weak governance record and the poor macro-economic indicators reflected in this research output, this route would be impossible to follow. Realpolitik demands that reform should be the only way out of Zimbabwe’s perilous political and economic challenges. Any intransigent behavior, contrary to the reform agenda, will only serve to perpetuate the crisis and to promote narrow, partisan, selfish interests rather than national interests.
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SPEECHES
Mugabe R.G. Various Speeches Between 1980-2008 at SADC, COMESA, AU and UN fora


Appendix A: Interview Guide


1. What were Zimbabwe’s international relations objectives between 1980 and 2016?
2. How did the foreign policy objectives relate to public policy objectives?
3. What were the characteristics of Zimbabwe’s international relations?
4. Why did Zimbabwe fail to utilise its bilateral and multilateral international relation networks to rescue its economy by 2016 through activities such as trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and overseas development assistance? [Focus on SADC, COMESA, AU, EU, UN, NAM, COMMONWEALTH, BRETTONWOODS INSTITUTIONS]
5. What were the origins of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises?
6. How did the crises in Zimbabwe discourage foreign direct investment into the region as a whole?
7. In which way does Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises delay processes of [SADC] regional integration?
8. Who are the major actors in the foreign policy development, implementation and evaluation processes?
9. What factors influence Zimbabwean policy makers in developing and implementing an international relations agenda?
10. How is foreign policy formulated, implemented and evaluated in Zimbabwe?
11. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy making, implementation and evaluation processes?
12. How is the national interest determined in the context of foreign policy development and implementation?
13. What values should inform Zimbabwe’s engagement with the international community?
14. How could Zimbabwe achieve cohesion between international relations policies and public policies?
15. What were the thrust of Zimbabwe’s diplomatic communication strategy during the period under review?
16. What were the strengths and weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s diplomatic communication
strategy?

17. Cite examples where Zimbabwe’s public policies have had an adverse impact on world affairs.

18. How did Zimbabwe’s international relations practices respond to the sanctions imposed by western countries between 2000 and 2008?

19. What is your assessment of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy in terms of its achievements and challenges?

20. Cite examples where Zimbabwe’s international relations practices can be said to be a positive force:
   [a] at home,[b] in the region,[c] internationally?

19. Cite examples where Zimbabwe’s international relations practices can be said to be destabilising:

20. Comment on any other aspect relevant to this study.
Appendix B: Questionnaire

My name is Wenceslaus Mudyanadzo. I am a PHD student at the Midlands State University. I am carrying out a research on The Post-Colonial Challenges Of Nation Building Through International Engagement: An Analysis Of Zimbabwe’s International Relations From 1980 To 2016. The data collected shall be used for the purpose of this study. Please note that to ensure data privacy, integrity and confidentiality, there are no names that will be used in the questionnaire.

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2. How did the foreign policy objectives relate to public policy objectives
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3. Describe the characteristics of Zimbabwe’s International relations
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4. Why did Zimbabwe fail to utilise its bilateral and multilateral international relations networks to rescue its economy by 2016 through activities such as trade, FDI, tourism and overseas development assistance
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5. Account for the origins of Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis

6. How did the crisis impact on the sub-region (SADC) and the African region in general

7. Who are the major actors in the foreign policy development, implementation and evaluation processes in Zimbabwe

8. What factors influence Zimbabwean policy makers in developing and implementing an international relations agenda

9. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy making,
implementation and evaluation processes

10. How is the national interest determined in the context of foreign policy development and implementation

11. What values should inform Zimbabwe’s engagement with the international community

12. What is your assessment of Zimbabwe’s look East Policy in terms of its achievements and challenges

13. Cite examples where Zimbabwe’s international relations practices can be said to be a positive force
   a) At home
b) In the region

14. Cite examples where Zimbabwe’s International Relations practices can be said to be a negative force
a) At home

b) In the region

c) Internationally

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Appendix C Research Work Plan

15 March 2014: complete interviews

25 March 2014: All interviews to be transcribed and preliminary analytical framework identified

28 March 2014: Code interview transcripts, perform analysis, record findings

April-June 2014: Writing Chapters 1-2

June-July 2014: Writing Chapters 3-4

July-August 2014: Chapters 5-6

November-December 2016: Review, editing and compiling final draft for submission March 2017
Appendix D Turnitin Report