Zimbabwe's Diplomacy 1980 - 2008

Wenceslaus Mudyanadzo
PREFACE

This book reviews and analyses Zimbabwe’s conduct of its diplomacy or foreign relations between 1980 and 2008 and helps to draw practical lessons for scholars and practitioners on how Zimbabwe could continuously reposition its foreign policy approach to advance its national interests regionally and internationally in the light of the experience encountered. Such an approach serves as a vehicle of fostering critical insights and opening additional space in which to think about the central dilemmas that continue to confront the conduct of foreign relations at the level of the nation –state especially for a developing country like Zimbabwe. The book also highlights the philosophy and principles that informed Zimbabwe’s foreign relations between 1980-2008. In writing the book, an attempt was made to balance comprehensive coverage of the subject matter whilst at the same time observing the limitations that naturally comes with such comprehensiveness without sacrificing coverage of any major aspect of Zimbabwe’s diplomacy. The book will serve as a useful reference textbook for students doing undergraduate and postgraduate studies in International Relations and those in Tertiary Colleges and the Diplomatic School taking studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Studies. It will also be useful to practitioners in Government whose core business is the formulation and implementation of Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy.

I have endeavored to verify all the facts contained in this book and any errors of fact or judgment remain, however, my sole responsibility.

Wenceslaus Mudyanadzo
Gweru; 2010
Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the considerable financial support obtained from the Midlands State University (MSU)’s Research Board which enabled me to research deep and wide on various aspects of Zimbabwe’s diplomacy. I am also extremely indebted to my colleagues at MSU, Chris Gwatidzo and Chipo Hungwe for their total and unwavering support in this project and other colleagues who are numerous to mention for their enthusiastic support and encouragement throughout; Ambassador Hasu H. Patel, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Zimbabwe who gave me the confidence and support to embark on such a mammoth academic exercise, Dr J. Kurebgwa, Chairperson, Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe, for offering me some vital insights into the subject matter and numerous colleagues for helping me with the research. I am also indebted to colleagues who reviewed and proof read the book for their distinguished service. Last but not least, I am grateful to my wife, Joyce and my three children, Catherine, Jacqueline and Michael for their assistance and inspiration in all my research endeavors. My gratitude to them is eternal and unwavering; they are the wind beneath my wings.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this book to all the compatriots in the foreign service, academia and other spheres of life whose core business in the promotion and advancement of the national interest through the generation, application and dissemination of diplomatic knowledge for the present and future generations. May the Zimbabwean “spirit and dream” abide with them eternally.
CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction to Zimbabwe’s Diplomacy

1.0 This book reviews and analyses Zimbabwe’s conduct of its diplomacy or foreign relations between 1980 and 2008 and helps to draw practical lessons for scholars and practitioners on how Zimbabwe could reposition its foreign policy approach for competitive advantage regionally and internationally in the light of the experiences encountered. Such an approach serves as a vehicle of fostering critical insights and opening additional space in which to think about the central dilemmas that continue to confront the conduct of foreign relations at the level of the nation-state especially for a developing country like Zimbabwe.

In the context of this book, the term diplomacy and foreign relations are used interchangeably. According to Barnhart, C.L et al (1994:593), diplomacy is the management of relations between nations. This view is also supported by Sir Ernest Stow (1969:122) who defined diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states. The conduct of relations between nations is guided by a foreign policy framework which basically translate to systematic principles and practices that regulate the intercourse of a state with other states. Chandra, P (2006:1) defined foreign policy as a systematic statement of deliberately selected national interests. This view is also supported by Modelski, G (1962:3) who argued that foreign policy is the systematic activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the environment. Rodee, C. C et al (1957) also echoed this view when they argued that foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behavior pattern of a state while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interests. The Foreign Policy processes of Zimbabwe, like all other nation states, involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behavior pattern of Zimbabwe while negotiating with other states to protect or further its strategic interests. Foreign policy, therefore, involves
translating broadly conceived national goals and objectives into concrete courses of action to attain prescribed goals and objectives and preserve national interests.

1.1 Factors Determining Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy between 1980-2008
The factors determining Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy between 1980 – 2008 can broadly be divided into three categories; i.e. (a) internal factors, (b) external factors and (c) policy making factors. These factors have greatly influenced the manner in which Zimbabwe conducted its foreign relations and how it had gone about defending its national interests. The three broad factors are examined in detail in order to relate their influence on foreign policy outcomes.

(a) Internal Factors
Internal factors determining Zimbabwe’s foreign policy during the period 1980 – 2008 can be divided into the following subcategories: i.e. history, geography, political ideology, political culture, domestic politics, national capacity and public opinion. Each of these factors will be discussed in relationship to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy thrust during the period under review.

1. Historical factors
Every political system has a unique historical past and the inheritance of the past bears heavily on the present and the future and Zimbabwe’s struggle for freedom and independence had a strong bearing on its foreign policy outlook. Zimbabwe fought a protracted struggle for independence from the 1960s up to 1979, supported by neighboring countries; Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Angola which were called then the Frontline States as they provided frontline rear bases for nationalists and guerilla fighters who fought the racist, colonial settler regime in Rhodesia. Support also came from Socialist bloc countries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, North Korea, Cuba, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, among others, and other countries on the African continent like Ethiopia, Libya, Algeria and Nigeria, to mention a few key countries who contributed immensely to Zimbabwe’s Liberation war. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy during the period 1980 to 2008 was therefore crafted to
reflect the special relationship with its key liberation war allies and other Western countries who had also supported the struggle for independence.

The war of liberation was about repossessing ancestral lands which were forcibly captured by the colonial regime in 1890, for redistribution to the black majority and this message clearly came out of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy pronouncements. The foreign policy pronouncements of Zimbabwe emphasized the need to equitably redistribute land to the black majority populace as a way of politically and economically empowering the previously marginalized owners of the ancestral lands with the ultimate objective of creating an indigenous agrarian and capitalist bourgeoisie class. The foreign policy objectives of Zimbabwe, during the period, were also promised on the need to eliminate all forms of racism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism within the country, the need to achieve unity of the Zimbabwean people by eliminating petty and divisive loyalties based upon tribe, region, race, sex, religion and most importantly the need to extent frontiers of freedom to brothers and sisters in the region through the support of liberation movements of South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa because Zimbabwe believed that her independence was meaningless without the independence of South Africa and Namibia because the new state was bound to suffer from destabilization activities from these states. These issues which featured prominently as rallying points in Zimbabwe’s history for independence, also found expression in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives immediately after independence.

However, Zimbabwe’s foreign policy thrust on the land issue suffered a major setback between 2000 – 2008 due to the manner in which the land was acquired and distributed, with the resultant conflicts and violence on the farms and reduced agricultural productivity which made it difficult for Zimbabwe’s foreign policy messages on the land to be accepted by the international community, and in particular, by Britain and its Western Allies (mainly the USA and the European Union).

The Eastern and Western blocs’ strategic competition for a foothold in Southern Africa and in Zimbabwe in particular, especially in the 1970s, convinced Zimbabwe to pursue a policy of non-alignment on attainment of independence so that it could look at foreign
policy issues objectively without influence from the East or the West who had played a role, in one way or another, in the liberation of Zimbabwe. The history of superpower rivalry to control the resources of the region greatly influenced Zimbabwe to pursue a non aligned foreign policy framework in its relationship with both powers although in practical terms, Zimbabwe had, during the period under review, tended to agree more with the Eastern bloc countries, in particular, Russia and China, as opposed to Western bloc countries of the United States, Britain and some European Union member states on major foreign policy issues relating to Zimbabwe.

2. Geographical Factors
Geography is another internal factor which influenced Zimbabwe’s foreign policy thrust after independence in 1980. Zimbabwe is an African state, situated in the Southern Africa region and therefore her foreign policy preoccupation, during the first two decades of her independence was to extend frontiers of freedom to her neighbours, South Africa and Namibia, through the provision of material and moral support to liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia, because the logic was that the independence of Zimbabwe was meaningless without the independence of those territories she shared borders with because destabilization activities would continue which would be detriment to the political, economic and social success of the new state and the Southern African region in general. Zimbabwe also preoccupied herself with establishing an elaborate network of sound bilateral relations with independent neighbouring states of Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, Botswana and Malawi who had provided rear bases, material and moral support during the struggle for independence. Sound bilateral relations were also established with South Africa and Namibia after their independence. Zimbabwe placed a lot of emphasis on regional cooperation in order to promote trade, investment and tourism opportunities for Zimbabwe in the region and to secure peace and stability within the framework of regional cooperation. It was therefore instrumental in the establishment and crafting of the objectives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) economic bloc which was thereafter replaced by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994. The idea was to promote the economic integration of the African continent through regional economic communities like SADC and COMESA which would
constitute building blocs on which the African Economic Community would be built. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy featured prominently at all regional and international fora to promote the vision of regional and continental integration as a way of consolidating and safeguarding the territorial integrity and prosperity of Zimbabwe and its regional and independent allies. Zimbabwe had also, during the period 1982 to 1999, fought side by side with the Mozambican government, its former ally in the liberation struggle, to quell the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) rebellion which was threatening Zimbabwe’s rail, road and fuel pipeline link to the Beira port. Besides defending its strategic lifeline to the sea, Zimbabwe was also extending a helping hand to a liberation war ally who had made it possible to achieve independence. Zimbabwe’s decisive military intervention in Mozambique saved the territorial sovereignty of that country. Zimbabwe also fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war from 1998 – 2002, at the invitation of that government, to protect its territorial integrity which was being threatened by rebel fighters. Zimbabwe justified its involvement in the DRC war on grounds that the collapse of the DRC could have had far reaching consequences resulting in regional conflicts, destabilization, and general regional insecurity which would not have been conducive to regional economic growth and integration.

It can therefore be concluded that Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Mozambican and DRC wars was based on geo-political, economic and security considerations which formed the basis of its foreign policy orientation. The two wars were justified, in foreign policy terms, by the need to defend and guarantee the territorial integrity and sovereignty of these SADC member states within the framework of regional cooperation.

3. Political Ideology Factors
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy thrust, during the period under review was influenced by the socialist ideological orientation of the liberation struggle and the need to extend frontiers of freedom to other liberation movements in Southern Africa. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) party which came to power in 1980, was guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology during the liberation struggle and this ideology was subsequently adopted with some modification to suit the Zimbabwean scenario after independence as the basis of organizing and running the new state. Political ideologies,
according to Axford et al (1997:227) are sets of political beliefs involving political programmes of action which draw on large-scale views about human nature and/or historical development. Political ideologies are therefore a set of beliefs about politics incorporating specific proposals and general ideas about human nature. Political ideologies are used by politicians to make value judgments and to support those values by arguments in a practical way; thus political ideologies are used by politicians to persuade people of the soundness of their political ideas in a changing political scene. It can therefore be argued that political ideologies are attractive justification for providing rough guidelines which will provide direction and legitimacy to foreign policy pursuits and objectives.

Zimbabwe adopted Marxist – Leninist ideology after independence, an ideology which had guided the liberation movements of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), a military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front Party (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) a military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union – Patriotic Front (PF-ZAPU). The doctrine of Marxism – Leninism or scientific socialism had great appeal in Zimbabwe because of its emphasis on public ownership of the means of production i.e. capital, land, or property – which would then be administered in the interests of the public. Socialist ideology was accepted as a unifying force because of its anti-individualistic appeal and its non recognition of ethnic divisions other than those divisions based on class which are purely materialist and socialism believes such divisions can be conquered, suppressed or prevented. It was also generally believed that by preventing the concentration of wealth in private hands the government and ruling party will prevent the concentration of power and influence that can be used to exploit people and influence public policy for narrow partisan interests. Socialism was also adopted by the ZANU-PF Government because of its historical progressive movement towards the total independence of the African continent and the envisaged rule of the proletariat. Socialism was also acceptable as the legitimate ideology because it provided a justification for the nationalization of foreign owned and locally owned businesses, given the colonial history of the country which resulted in a system of inequality between the white minority race who had entrenched
privileges in the political and economic system and the black majority race who were marginalized from the mainstream economy through a system of racial segregation, dispossession and deprivation. While a minority white race sought to maintain its stranglehold on the key resources of the country – mainly land, industry and mining resources – a socialist ideological orientation was viewed as the answer in dismantling that privilege and promoting racial harmony.

It can also be argued that Zimbabwe’s nationalists adopted socialism at independence because of the successes of two socialist countries once considered underdeveloped, the Soviet Union (now Russia) and China from where nationalists and guerilla fighters where sheltered and offered political and military training and other moral and material support systems which enabled them to achieve independence. The influence of these countries helped Zimbabwe to reorient its national ideology.

The ideology of socialism was also adopted because it was also in line with African nationalist aspirations of dismantling colonial political and economic systems of humiliation, manipulation and exploitation. According to Rubin and Weinstein (1977:151) nationalism is the desire to free the national community and to build and maintain its integration; it is an effort to strengthen it so that it might better maintain internal order, solve problems and protect itself from outside threats. In conclusion, it can be noted that Zimbabwe adopted a Marxist – Leninist ideology which was reinforced by a Zimbabwean nationalist ideology with its emphasis on national self determination in its relationship with the international community.

3. Political Culture Factors

Political culture, according to Dahl et al (2003:91), refers to ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions about politics held in common by the people of a state. Political culture also refers to shared values and corresponding ways of acting, interacting and belonging that fits under a single national culture. Although defining political culture is a controversial business, it is generally acceptable that political culture has to do with political practices and rituals of a given community. Political culture is therefore a set of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, habits, traditions and rules within which a given political system operates and these aspects of political culture sit at the heart of every political
system and helps to shape the behavior of the main players in the foreign policy making process.

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy had been influenced a lot with its political culture – which was formed before and after independence. Zimbabwe’s leadership had projected to the international community that Zimbabwe was a sovereign, indivisible territory, under the same institutions and leadership, facing the same enemies, developing common resources, coming to terms with the same environmental challenges; a united people sharing the same experiences and becoming relevant to one another and developing a sense of common identity and destiny. Zimbabwe therefore projected a united front in its relations with other nations.

The heroic struggle for freedom and independence was also used to link the past with the present and to project the country’s destiny internationally as a free and sovereign nation with full rights to engage the international community as Zimbabwe saw it fit, in developing its human and natural resources; and in developing its national institutions and policies. Zimbabwe had also demonstrated in its foreign relations that it is a community of order with shared historical memories which utilizes its institutions, symbols, leaders and languages to maintain norms of behavior, internal peace and external peace without the need for foreign interference. The national belief system was used to explain and justify Zimbabwe’s domestic and foreign policy. For example, politicians and the general populace understood and appreciated what it meant to be a Zimbabwean and an African, they had certain ideas about the reasons for government action based on past experiences and prejudices and they had certain values, like freedom, which they were prepared to defend with their lives. Unity of the Zimbabwean people had been a central theme of national building and consolidation and ethnicity had been manipulated, not to divide, but to unify people.

There was also an attempt, without success, by the ruling party, ZANU (PF) to create a one party state during the first two decades of independence, thereby symbolizing the identification of the party with the state and the nation as a way of bringing different ethnic groups together. The attempt failed because it did not reflect the political aspirations of the majority of the population. The Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM)
party which was formed by Mr Edgar Tekere in 1990 successfully fought against the concept of a one party state in the 1990 General Election and received significant endorsement from the population although, as a party, it failed to win the elections, a development which resulted in its demise. The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai in 1999 reinforced the political culture of multipartism which has been dominant since then on the political scene. The Zimbabwe government had cited multipartism as proof that the country was democratic when it was defending its foreign policy record at international fora although a closer look at the political system in operation since 1980 shows a mixture of oligarchic and democratic characteristics and intolerance of opposition. The Government had during the period, suppressed or banned opposition gatherings (rallies) insisting on police permission to demonstrate or organize a political rally – a practice which violates the universal rights enshrined in the constitution, silencing private media through the closure of critical newspapers, arrest of critical journalists and the unwillingness to open media space to private players. Such political practices diminished Zimbabwe’s foreign policy successes abroad since Zimbabwe was perceived as an intolerant and undemocratic society which did not believe in the virtues of civility, consensus and partnership in politics. Elections were held as schedule but those elections especially after 2000 did not contribute towards a democratic political culture given the contested nature of the elections outcome. It can safely be argued that the political culture that was adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe between 2000 – 2008 which resulted in (a) violent and disputed elections in 2000, 2002 and 2008, (b) restrictions on political mobilization and participation in the political process by the opposition, (c) restrictions and closure of private media houses by the Government, and (d) the violent and chaotic land reform which began in 2000 and which was meant to engineer a rupture with the past as a way of redressing past colonial land expropriation, all had contributed towards political instability leading to a negotiated political settlement of September 2008, - the Global Political Agreement (GPA) - which was facilitated by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) through Mr Thabo Mbeki, SADC mediator and former South African President, as a way of sanitizing the political environment, by bringing the Government and the opposition together in a Government of National Unity (GNU) and
to kick start Zimbabwe’s faltering foreign policy which was reeling from the impact of sanctions and international isolation. A political culture of a country therefore determines, in a big way, the foreign policy outcomes since domestic policies are inextricably linked to foreign policy processes. Zimbabwe’s political culture, in a way was, and remains inextricably linked to regional African countries and in turn to the African continent in general due to the common cultural heritage and abiding interests. It was for this reason that an African solution to the Zimbabwean problem was possible in September 2008 because African countries appreciate Zimbabwe’s political culture and are in a strategic position to positively influence Zimbabwe’s political culture development.

5. Domestic Politics Factors
Domestic or internal politics in any country has a direct influence on foreign policy processes and outcomes and Zimbabwe is no exception. Zimbabwe experienced a period of relative political and economic stability during the first two decades after independence because during that period the country was largely a one party state following the Unit Agreement of two liberation movement parties of ZANU (PF) and (PF) ZAPU which was signed on 22 December 1987. The two parties, together, dominated the political scene in government and parliament, thereby resulting in the dilution of ethnic or regional particularism which had threatened the unitary project between 1982 and 1987 when civil and military conflict erupted in parts of Matabeleland and Midlands provinces against the ZANU (PF) government. On 30 December, 1987, following the Unity Agreement between ZANU (PF) and (PF) ZAPU and the elimination of ideological differences between the two main political parties, Members of Parliament and the Senate met as an Electoral College and unanimously elected Robert Gabriel Mugabe as Zimbabwe’s First Executive President. In line with the Unity Agreement, the government sought to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe guided by Marxist – Leninist principles (Patsanza, 1988; 107). The political direction and policies that Zimbabwe followed were therefore guided by ZANU (PF) and the Executive President who, in his inauguration speech, stated inter alia, that “I can assure you that the party and Government will remain cognisant of the fact that political power without economic means is hollow and deceptive…. ” (Patsanza, 1988:109). The President went on to
indicate that the direction of the policies to be followed by the Government would derive from the ruling ZANU (PF) party, which, though its leadership (via the Central Committee), its Women’s League and Youth League as well as all its provincial, district, branch and cell organs, had acted as the people’s political vanguard and paved for the development of the nation. President Mugabe went further to spell out his doctrine----“It is our country together, and together let us develop it. It is our nation together, and together let us built it. It is our freedom together, and together let us defend it. It is our unity together, and together let us consolidate it” (Patsanza, 1988:105). It is this ideological perspective, in the absence of effective opposition parties, which dominated political organization, political socialization, political participation and therefore the political culture and economic modeling that emerged between 1980 and 1999 and how Zimbabwe related, by extension, to the international community. Because there were no major economic and political challenges to the Government during the first two decades of independence, domestic political activity was mainly concerned with the unity project or the consolidation of independence and territorial integrity of the new nation state and bilateral and multilateral engagements were quite successful during that time in the absence of any serious contestation or conflict within the body politic.

The year 2000 was a turning point in the domestic politics of Zimbabwe. A major opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was born in 1999 as an offshoot of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and it announced its entry in politics in 2000, by campaigning successfully for a NO Vote in a referendum against a constitution which had been spearheaded by the Zimbabwe Government’s Constitutional Commission. In the 2000 Parliamentary elections the MDC party won 57 seats in Parliament while ZANU (PF) obtained 63 seats of the 120 elected seats thereby creating an effective two party political system. The MDC hotly contested the 2002 Presidential election but the process was marred by political intimidation, violence and allegation of electoral irregularities leading to a disputed electoral outcome. A similar scenario emerged in the March 2008 Parliamentary and Presidential election and the rerun Presidential election of June 2008 which was marred by violence, intimidation and allegations of electoral irregularities leading to the condemnation of the outcome by the SADC region and the international community. The June 2008 electoral outcome,
because of its unacceptability within the domestic body politic, destabilized the domestic political environment and in turn affected Zimbabwe’s regional and international relations, in particular Zimbabwe’s relations with the Western countries who responded by tightening economic and travel sanctions leading to the Global Political Agreement of September 2008 – a political settlement between the Government and the Opposition which was facilitated by SADC countries leading to the establishment of a Government of National Unity (GNU) and the restoration of dialogue and engagement with the West and the opening of substantial lines of credit with African institutions and other international players. It is therefore an established fact of life that if you get your domestic politics wrong, your chances of success in your foreign relations are substantially diminished judging by the collapse of Zimbabwe’s major elements of national power like national morale, quality of government, public support and political and economic stability, which had been compromised by the end of 2008 under the weight of western backed sanctions, economic mismanagement and general political instability.

6. National Capacity Factors
National capacity is also another important determinant of foreign policy. National capacity implies military strength, technological advancement and economic development. According to Chandra, P (2006:3), a foreign policy must compromise with national capacity if it is to succeed and to illustrate the point, he cited the abandonment of the superpower role by the Soviet Union since 1985, as recognition by its leader Michael Gorbachev of the declining national capacity of the Soviet Union. According to Simmons, B.A et al (2005:185), power analysis in international relations can be described in terms of national power deriving from a country’s resources and relational power, which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship. In the context of Zimbabwe, power as the possession of resources e.g. land, minerals, industries etc – had been used widely by politicians in the international poker game to advance foreign policy outcomes and this makes national power appear more concrete, measureable and predictable. Zimbabwe, as a small power in military and economic terms, had not flexed prominently its relational power, in matters like military strength, technological advancement and
economic development. Zimbabwe, however suffered from the relational power of the Western countries when Britain and its Allies used their economic muscle, through sanctions, to restrict economic activity in Zimbabwe between 2000 – 2008 and this seriously compromised Zimbabwe’s foreign policy delivery. Zimbabwe’s military and economic strength was adversely affected by the economic decay and general contraction of the economy between 2000 and 2008. The Agricultural sector, the main pillar of the Zimbabwean economy with strong linkages to the rest of the sectors, contracted by an average of -7.1% between 2000 – 2008. Cumulatively, Zimbabwe’s Treasury figures show that agricultural output contracted by -79.4% during 2002 – 2008. Similarly, the mining and manufacturing sectors recorded average annual declines of -9% and -9.5% respectively during the same period. Inflation figures spiraled out of control to record hyper-inflation levels of 231 million per cent by July 2008, driven by high money supply growth caused by excessive printing of money which was not linked to production and the expansionary quasi-fiscal activities of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; activities which resulted in the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar as a medium of exchange by the end of 2008 and the adoption of multiple currencies, i.e. United States Dollar, South African Rand, Botswana Pula, British Pound and the Euro, as the means of exchange and the pricing of goods and services in foreign currencies. All international lines of credit had been cut due to sanctions by rich Western countries. Schools and public hospitals closed for the greater part of 2008, as the state could not afford to pay a living wage to teachers, doctors and nurses; many people succumbed to treatable diseases due to the financial inability of the state to provide resources to open hospitals, clinics and to provide food, drugs and essential medical equipment and diseases such as cholera and HIV/AIDS killed people needlessly due to lack of financial resources. The near collapse state of the economy by the end of 2008 meant that Zimbabwe, as a country, was severely compromised in its national capacity to deliver its foreign policy objectives.

7. Public Opinion Factors
Public opinion is another important internal determinant of foreign policy especially in democratic countries where such countries cannot afford to ignore public opinion because electorally it is suicidal to do so. In Zimbabwe, public opinion is seldom well organized
or articulated and whatever role it plays is limited as the Foreign policy in Zimbabwe had, during the period under review, been formulated by the Head of Government (Prime Minister between 1980 – 1987 and Executive President thereafter), in consultation with the Cabinet and the ruling party, ZANU (PF). According to Dr Mangwende (1985) then Minister of Foreign Affairs, “the Head of Government is the centre of gravity in the conduct of international relations. He defines the policies to be pursued and establishes the context, tone and the actual pace at which the goals are to be pursued.” It is therefore difficult to establish the extent to which such a foreign policy making framework could be influenced by public opinion. As Zimbabwe continues to implement its reform agenda, it may be necessary to ensure that this critical public policy making process is democratized to involve think-tanks and other groups who may not be part of the government to ensure national acceptability of the foreign policy making framework and positive foreign policy outputs.

(b) External factors determining Zimbabwe’s foreign policy

A state formulates its foreign policy taking into account the international environment which it interacts with. As Dahl and Stinebrickner (2003:63) put it, a national government must adapt their actions to the hard fact that other national governments, alliances, coalitions and international organisations also exist. The influence of other political systems is so obvious and far reaching that any governments that ignore such relationships do so at their own peril. Issues like global conflicts, recession, bipolarity and unipolarity of international politics, the emergence of bodies of international law which set in place the principle that in some instances nation-states cease to be the highest form of authority for citizens, mutational impact of technological advances, development of highly sophisticated and destructive nuclear weapons, the appearance of issues such as ozone depletion, global warming, acid rain and pollution which serve to illustrate the juxtaposition of the doctrine of national sovereignty and the global ecological totality and the formation of regional, continental and international political and economic alliances or groupings all contribute to the formulation of national policies in response to such developments in the international environments. Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy had adapted, from time to time, to changes in the international environment in an effort to help maintain the existing status quo, influence world public opinion especially on the economy and the land, and to address and harmonise its interests with those of other states. For example, Zimbabwe’s foreign policy of non-alignment, since independence, implied that it reserved the right to examine issues or areas of foreign policy on the basis of their merit, and within that context, either promote or protect its national interest in its engagement with all the countries of the world. Zimbabwe had also adopted, during the period under review, a foreign policy of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states although it intervened militarily in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo to help crush internal rebellion at the invitation of those governments.

Zimbabwe had emphasized its position that it should not operate in isolation in global affairs; it emphasized therefore the need to know and consult its allies especially in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), African Union (AU), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations (UN) system whenever it came to taking foreign policy positions or voting on issues it had a direct interest. Zimbabwe, during the period under review, had compromised its allegiance to the doctrine of territorial sovereignty in pursuit of cooperative and institutional frameworks which are critical for regional and continental integration. Zimbabwe had invested a lot of time in putting SADC and COMESA in place and these supranational institutions may design trade and investment policies from time to time which have the overall effect of changing how as a nation, Zimbabwe relates to other countries, economically and politically.

(C) Policy makers role in determining foreign policy

A major determinant of foreign policy in Zimbabwe between 1980-2008 had been the attitudes, interests and perceptions of decision makers especially the President, Cabinet and the ruling ZANU (PF) party. As noted by Zimbabwe’s second Minister of Foreign Affairs after independence, Dr Witness Mangwende, in a speech delivered to the 4th session of the First Parliament of Zimbabwe, “The Head of Government is the centre of gravity in the conduct of international relations. He defines the policies to be pursued
and establishes the context, tone and the actual pace at which the goals are to be pursued.”

Dr Mangwende’s view is also supported by Chandra (2006:4) who argued quoting Prof Galbraith that foreign policy to an extent is a reflection of the fundamental instincts of those who make it. The ruling elite’s interpretation of the national interest, their perception of the external scenario and the impact of their views and personality has a great bearing on foreign policy outcomes. Bandyopadhyaya (1980:2) reinforced this view when he argued that “the personalities of the ultimate decision makers, their ideological predilections, psychological propensities, and above all, their need for personal political survival, inevitably condition the final choice of ends and means”. In order to democratise the foreign policy decisional system, it is recommended that political public opinion institutes, political party organisations, pressure/interest groups, the legislature, the executive arm and the Foreign Ministry must be part and parcel of the foreign policy formulation process.

2.0 Principles guiding Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy Between 1980-2008

The principles that guided Zimbabwe’s foreign policy were largely based on the African Union (OAU when it was formed) constitutive principles and ideals and those of the United Nations Charter and the Non Aligned Movement which are as follows:

1. The sovereign equality of all member-states.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
5. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of all African dependent territories leading to self-determination, through the support of liberation movements which are still dependent.
6. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.
7. Promotion of African unity and solidarity within SADC and the AU.
8. Belief in non-discrimination, whether based on colour, creed, religion or other forms.
9. Promotion of solidarity and cohesion among developing countries through south-south cooperation.

These principles, together with the constitutive principles of the United Nations Charter, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) principles, and the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of Principles of 1991 (before Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in 2003) formed the basis on which Zimbabwe crafted its foreign policy principles from time to time. In summary, it can be noted that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, during the period 2000 – 2008, was influenced by a complex interplay of history, geography, past experiences, present circumstances, perceptions of the ruling ZANU (PF) party elite of what constituted the national interest and the ideological consciousness of the ruling elite; in addition to domestic, regional and international affairs which impacted on the nation.
Examination Questions

1. Discuss the factors which helped to determine Zimbabwe’s foreign policy between 1980 – 2008.

2. With reference to the principles that guided Zimbabwe’s foreign policy between 1980 and 2008, would you say Zimbabwe defended its national interests using those principles? Justify your answer with concrete examples.

3. What are the components of Zimbabwe’s political culture and how are they related to the foreign policy making process.

4. “Defining political culture is a controversial business.” Discuss in relation to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy

5. Discuss how Zimbabwe’s political culture had transformed between 1980 and 2008.

6. To what extent do you think that it is possible to explain Zimbabwe’s political stability or instability, between 1980 and 2008 with reference to underpinnings provided by political culture.

7. “Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.” US President Barack Obama Speech in Accra, Ghana, 11 July 2009. Do you agree or disagree with this argument. Justify your answer with reference to Zimbabwe’s foreign relations practices.

8. How would you respond to this statement? “Zimbabwe did not advance the virtues of dialogue and persuasion to the full in its diplomacy between 2000 – 2008”

9. Articulate the political and economic constraints which impacted negatively on Zimbabwe’s diplomatic agenda between 2000-2008. How could those constraints have been resolved politically and diplomatically?

10. In broad terms “diplomacy” tends to be synonymous with “foreign policy.” Do you agree? Justify your answer with concrete examples
References

8. Mumbengegwi, Simbarashe S (2009) Speech delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Diplomatic Class on 16 October 2009
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 Historical Development of Zimbabwe as a Nation- State and its Impact on Foreign Policy

It is difficult to understand or appreciate Zimbabwe’s foreign policy between 1980 and 2008 without reference to Zimbabwe’s history which had a direct impact and influence on how she conducted her relations with other states. The history of Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence brings to the fore (a) the vested interests of the contesting parties which were perpetuated into the new political dispensation after independence and which the foreign policy aimed at addressing (b) the impact of negotiations for a peace formula and lessons learnt therefrom in shaping Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, and (c) the role played by the East-West strategic competition in Zimbabwe and in Southern Africa in general and its effects on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy after independence. This chapter will devote to these issues in order to come up with an analytical expose of the factors at play.

2.1 The History of Political and Military Struggle for Self-Determination

Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was the name given by the British in 1895 to the colonized territory of the Ndebele and Shona peoples situated between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. British imperial interests in and subsequent colonization of Zimbabwe were set in motion in the 1850s through British fortune seekers for land, hunting and mining concessions from Zimbabwean traditional leaders of that time. This was the period when British, Portuguese, Germans and Boers scrambled for colonial territories on the African continent. The process of the systematic colonization of Zimbabwe was accompanied by the “civilizing” missions of notable missionaries like John Smith Moffat, who established the first mission at Inyati, near Bulawayo, for the London Missionary Society. Famous British fortune seekers and travellers of the time were David Livingstone, the first white man to “discover” the Victoria Falls on behalf of the British and European imperial interests, Thomas Baines, the painter who “discovered” gold in Mashonaland and Frederick Selous, the hunter who from 1872 onwards in reported to have moved out of Zimbabwe tonnes of ivory for British exploitation, according to Berens et al (1988)
Cecil John Rhodes, who had become Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in 1890, dispatched his Pioneer Corps of some 200 recruits from his British South Africa Company (BSAC) backed by 350 mounted police as escorts and other auxiliaries into Lobengula’s kingdom to colonise it. The colonizing pioneers were adventurous settlers accepting military rank and discipline with promises of 15 gold claims and 3,000 acres of farmland (Griffith A, 1998:11). Charles Rudd, a mining magnate and partner of Cecil John Rhodes negotiated the Rudd Concession with King Lobengula in 1888, exclusively for mining. The concession had been conditioned by an oral undertaking to King Lobengula that “not more than ten white men” would work in the country and “that they and their people would abide by the laws of his country and be as his people” (Blake R, 1977:47). The Rudd Concession effectively colonized the region between Limpopo and Zambezi and when Lobengula later discovered that he had been misled by the oral guarantees, he tried to repudiate the concession and sent two emissaries to London asking Queen Victoria to stop Rhodes from occupying the country. Queen Victoria ignored Lobengula’s repudiation plea and in 1889 granted Rhodes a Royal Charter to his British South Africa Company (BSAC) for the purpose of “promoting trade, commerce, civilization and good government” (Griffiths, 1998:12). The British South Africa Company’s move into what is now called Zimbabwe forestalled the Boer and Portuguese imperialists designs by blocking out Boer northern expansion from South Africa and Portuguese ambitions for a tract across the continent linking Mozambique and Angola. British colonial settlement, beginning with Fort Salisbury in Mashonaland in 1890, were quickly extended to Matabeleland.

2.2 Initial Resistance to Colonial Rule

King Lobengula resisted the occupation of Matabeleland by the British Pioneer Column in 1893 and a war broke out but the Ndebele weapons were no match for the machine guns of the colonial occupiers. The Ndebele people were conquered and King Lobengula burnt his capital Bulawayo and fled. A group, “the Shangaan Patrol” sent to pursue Lobengula and led by Major Alan Wilson was annihilated to the last man on the Shangaan (Umguse) river banks by the Ndebeles. The colonialists using the Pioneer
Column Corps, proceeded to divide Lobengula’s land amongst the settlers, his people were moved to barren lands (reserves) and their cattle was confiscated.

The colonialists established their administrative system of governance which entailed the imposition of hut tax, forced labor, the expropriation of land and cattle by force and the unrestrained influx of white people to lands in the highveld attractive to settler farming. The exploitative and oppressive colonial system of government coincided with large scale depletion of cattle herds through natural disasters especially drought and locust plagues triggering the Ndebele and Shona uprising throughout the country in 1896. The resistance achieved some form of national coordination through such leaders as Kaguvi and Nehanda who traveled up and down the country mobilizing indigenous people but they were captured and hanged in 1898. The BSAC had succeeded in putting down black insurgency which contributed to the growth of a white settler political and economic tradition. In 1899, the colony was officially named Southern Rhodesia, a British colony under the British South Africa Company (BSAC).

2.3 Birth Of Nationalism and the Struggle for Independence

After the end of World War I, several black organisations and societies were formed to agitate for change for example the Southern Rhodesia Native Association and the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association (1920s), the Southern Rhodesia National Congress (1934) and the City Youth League (1955). These black resistance movements tended to be docile and pacifist in their approach to the problems faced by Africans. Nationalist movements of that time articulated common grievances concerning land appropriation, livestock destocking, hut tax and other forms of colonial taxation, poor working conditions and the general oppression faced by workers and peasants. These African movements emphasized equal political, economic and social rights for all people regardless of their color and they contributed significantly to African political consciousness which gave rise to nationalist movements like the National Democratic Party (NDP) which was formed in 1960. The NDP resorted to strike, mass demonstrations and boycotts as means of pressuring both the British Government and the settler regime in Salisbury to democratize the parliamentary system and its franchise.
leading to black majority rule. When NDP was banned in 1961, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was formed in December 1961 and it abandoned the methods of resistance used by NDP i.e. strikes, mass demonstrations, and boycotts, because these methods had exposed thousands of defenseless supporters to shooting, torture, arrest and intimidation by the settler security forces. Instead, ZAPU devised a new strategy of extensive sabotage of industries, farms and commercial concerns by using any available destructive means available including explosives, axes, spears, arrows and ordinary fire as a way of pressuring Britain to a constitutional conference which would negotiate a political settlement leading to universal suffrage and majority rule. The methods were ineffective and ZAPU was banned at the end of 1962 and the nationalist leaders went to the drawing board to reappraise the entire political situation vis-à-vis the methods hitherto employed to bring about political change and this appraisal led to the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on 8 August 1963 with the express mandate to use armed struggle to dislodge the colonial settler regime in Salisbury.

Zimbabwe’s second war of National Liberation began in earnest with the battle of Sinoia in 1966 when ZANLA guerilla fighters fought a conventional battle with Rhodesian security forces and all the guerilla fighters perished on the battlefield. ZIPRA fighters also launched its armed struggle in 1967 thereby reinforcing the armed struggle as the preferred method of dismantling the racist, minority regime in Salisbury. The ZANLA fighters losses in the Battle of Sinoia prompted its leadership to change its warfare strategy and tactics to incorporate guerilla tactics of ‘hit and run’, mass mobilisation and education in guerilla warfare, and putting in place strategies of winning over the support of the peasants, the workers, the youth, the women, the intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie and religious and other progressive groups who were constituted into a national democratic front against settler imperialistic forces and other reactionary forces, who were against the national revolution. By 1972, ZANLA had established the North-Eastern front from the Tete province of Mozambique marking an escalation of the armed struggle. Between 1974 and 1975 there was an attempt to stop the war by internal and external forces who wanted to halt the progress made in the war, through the process called Détente. There was a revolt within ZANLA and its top leadership was arrested.
There were unsuccessful attempts to get ZANU submerged and extinguished under the African National Council (ANC) leadership of Bishop Abel T Muzorewa who was based in Rhodesia. The disturbances of 1974 and 1975 seriously affected the progress achieved in waging the armed struggle. The ZANU Chairman, Advocate Herbert Chitepo, was killed in 1975 together with many other liberation fighters and the liberation war virtually came to a halt. In January 1976, ZANLA and ZIPRA regrouped after these disturbances and formed the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) to spearhead the war effort collectively and this resulted in the opening of three war fronts Tete, Manica and Gaza in Mozambique. Rhodesia responded by arming and equipping a counter insurgency force – the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) as a way of destabilizing Mozambique to weaken its resolve to support Zimbabwe’s guerilla fighters but this move strengthened Mozambican President Samora Machel’s resolve to support ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA war efforts. ZIPA disintegrated in 1977 due to factional problems meeting the same fate as its predecessor, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) which had succumbed to the same factional and ethnic problems in 1971. ZANLA and ZIPRA intensified the war separately.

By 1979, the colonial settler regime had introduced martial law to over 90% of Rhodesia. The Rhodesian security forces had divided the whole country into war zones i.e. Operation Hurricane (North), Operation Thrasher (East), Operation Repulse (South), and Operation Tangent (West); an acknowledgement that indeed guerilla fighters had engulfed the whole country. Rhodesian cities and towns were surrounded from the countryside by guerilla fighters who made occasional daring raids on key installations for example the Salisbury fuel depot which was ignited by guerilla machine guns in 1979. This was psychological warfare at its best as it sent a clear message to the colonial settler regime that the war was unwinnable. The war was costing the Rhodesian economy US$1 million every day, prompting the military and political establishment to acknowledge that they were fighting a “no-win” war.
The hosting of the Lancaster House Conference by the British Government from 10 September – 21 December 1979 averted a bush to office situation for the guerilla fighters since the conference resulted in a political agreement which included details of ceasefire for the warring parties and transitional mechanism arrangements leading to independence.

The overall impact of the Lancaster House negotiated settlement was that the liberation movement felt its goals of delivering unfettered independence and total emancipation in political, economic and social terms had been compromised by the negotiated settlement and that frustration on the part of the political leadership was to boil over into the political arena especially at regional and international fora where Zimbabwe justified its foreign policy approach. Dr Ibbo Mandaza (1986: 38) quoted the leader of ZANU (PF) to the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, Mr. Robert G. Mugabe as saying, “Yes, even as I signed the document I was not a happy man at all. I felt we had been cheated to some extent… that we had agreed to a deal which would to some extent rob us of the victory that we had hoped to have achieved in the field”.

The Lancaster House Agreement signed on 21 December 1979 by the Patriotic Front leadership of Mr. Robert G. Mugabe and Dr. Joshua Nkomo, representing liberation movements, Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, representing the internationally discredited Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government in Salisbury and Lord Peter Carrington, representing the United Kingdom government, provided for a multi-party state, with free elections on the basis of one man one vote on two different rolls; parliament was to have 100 seats; 20 of which were reserved for the white minority during a transitional period of 10 years while the other 80 seats were reserved for blacks. The Lancaster House Agreement therefore, limited the sovereignty of the Zimbabwean parliament, through such an entrenched clause, to guarantee the civil liberties, property rights and entrenched privileges of the white minority whose powers, privileges and influence seemed precarious. The Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) also provided for the retention of a significant component of white settler security forces and administrative machinery as a “confidence building measure” and to “maintain standards” of the white settler regime.
What emerged after independence was therefore the perpetuation of a white settler colonial state with solid socio-economic structures favourable to the white minority race and protected by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The land issue, which was the rallying point of the liberation struggle was to be addressed through the willing seller, willing buyer arrangement and the British Government committed itself to funding such a land reform programme but it later on reneged on its earlier commitments arguing that it had transferred that responsibility to the Government of Zimbabwe when it surrendered sovereignty over the territory on 18 April 1980. When the British Government failed to honor its obligation under the Land Reform programme, as provided under the Lancaster House Agreement, conflict emerged between the forces of liberation on one hand and the indigenous agrarian white bourgeoisie and international capitalism on the other leading to land invasions in 2000 as a way of redressing colonial expropriation of land from the blacks by the whites. The forces of international capitalism hit back at the government of Zimbabwe for the violent and chaotic land reform, by imposing sanctions, cutting all lines of international credit and imposing severe limitation on trade and investment initiative, thereby compromising Zimbabwe’s bilateral and multilateral relationships especially with the West and the United States.

Of course it would have been unrealistic to expect the white minority race to cooperate in dismantling without a fight, those privileges and economic conditions which gave them economic and political leverage within the economic structure of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the choice for the Zimbabwe black people was clear; they could either acquiesce in their own perpetual economic subjugation as second class citizens in their own country or fight to secure the destiny and prosperity of themselves and their children by controlling their own resources and in particular the land which was the raison d’être for the liberation struggle.

The LHA failed in its attempt to translate Westminster institutions and culture into acceptable Zimbabwe institutions and political culture because the outcome was not in line with the values and aspirations of the liberation struggle and the values of the African society in general thereby creating serious challenges in the area of foreign
policy delivery. The Zimbabwean government, in trying to go against the notion of the Westminster representative government after independence tended to cling to power without it being shared with the opposition. Politics had been reduced to a zero sum game where the winner takes all and this was symptomatic of colonial governments which did not alternate power with the opposition. The result was an unstable political environment which triggered political and economic pressures within and outside the country resulting in a decade of negative economic growth between 2000 and 2008. Promises of massive development aid to Zimbabwe by the British and their American allies had secured acceptance of the LHA by the nationalist to ensure that Zimbabwe remained within the Western sphere of influence, but when the pledges were not forthcoming especially after the year 2000, Zimbabwe shifted its foreign policy preoccupation to the East – the “Look East” policy – to counter the British and her allies sanctions on Zimbabwe.

2.4 The East-West strategic competition in Zimbabwe and in Southern Africa in general and its impact on Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy.

2.4.1 Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Southern Africa in general became the theatre of superpower rivalry and competition especially between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) in the 1960s and 1970s. Soviet Union President Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, fired the salvos of anti-colonization in 1960 at the United Nations General Assembly when he successfully ensured the passage of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People which was sponsored by 43 members of the Afro-Asian bloc and made colonization illegitimate. The resolution was carried by 89 votes with no opposition and only 9 abstentions (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514). The resolution endeared the African countries, who were suffering from the yoke of colonization, to the Soviet Union and exerted some moral pressure on the United States of America and her allies – Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Holland – who were all colonialists or former colonialists. International fora like the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement were effectively used to demand the decolonization of Rhodesia and other colonized territories in Southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.
The infusion of Marxists-Leninist philosophy into the liberation struggle of Southern African countries and Zimbabwe in particular, justifying the use of arms to liberate themselves, came from two competing centres of Marxist-Leninist leadership, the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union relied on a strategy of supplying military hardware and advisors to liberation movements and prepared their clients for open warfare. The Soviet Union used this strategy on the following liberation movements: ZAPU (Zimbabwe), People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA; Angola), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO; Mozambique), the African National Congress (ANC; South Africa), and the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO; Namibia). The Soviet Union’s strategy, according to Griffith (1998:6), created alarms in the targeted countries and in the West and led initially to Western resistance to the African cause but the harsh realities of Soviet penetration of Southern Africa led to a rethink of the strategy on decolonized territories and the need for negotiated settlements which would safeguard their strategic interests. On the other hand, the Chinese doctrine of guerilla warfare accompanied by massive politicisation of the peasantry was used effectively by ZANU/ZANLA (a Zimbabwe liberation movement) and FRELIMO (a Mozambique Liberation Movement). Although Southern African liberation movements sought support from both USSR and China for beneficial support a dominant alignment with either the USSR or China characterized the ideological and policy orientation of liberation movements especially ZANU and ZAPU. In the context of this decolonization process through the armed struggle and negotiations the United States could morally not afford to uphold white minority rule since its own American revolution was based on the need to obtain full independence. America had also suffered racial discrimination between its white and black races and through its Black Caucas in Congress, it was keen to steer positively the direction of Southern Africa politics leading to independence that would protect American interests.

Thus throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the independence of the remaining colonial territories of Southern Africa attracted the competitive interest of the United States, Soviet Union and China.
2.4.2 The Soviet And Cuban Intervention In Angola

Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of developing power relations with anti-Western forces in Africa was given prominence in Southern Africa following the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire (Portuguese East Africa – now Angola and Portuguese West Africa-now Mozambique, on 25 April 1974, through an armed forces coup d’etat in Lisbon, Portugal due to Portugal’s failure to cope with the impact of African colonial wars of liberation). The Soviet Union intensified its support for its client liberation movement in Angola, the MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) led by its Marxist-Leninist leader, Agostinho Neto following the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa. In Luanda, three liberation movements competed for control of the capital; the MPLA was challenged from the North by National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto and from the South by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. FNLA drew its support from Zaire (now DRC) while UNITA received support from apartheid ruled South Africa. Portugal tried without success to arrange a transitional government inclusive of all three political combatants, i.e. MPLA,FNLA and UNITA. When joint operations by FNLA and UNITA were launched against the MPLA’s hold of Luanda the Soviet Union intervened decisively by increasing military aid to MPLA. Cuban President Fidel Castro sent Cuban military advisors to Luanda in 1975 to support the MPLA regime and together with the Soviet Union, they were able to decisively defend the MPLA regime in Luanda. The deteriorating security situation in Angola and the feared possibility of a communist takeover in Luanda alarmed Washington and triggered direct American intervention to arrest the fall of Luanda to a Marxist-Leninist regime.

The United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger approved a US$50 million programme of covert CIA aid to the anti-MPLA forces of UNITA and FNLA (Griffith, 1998:32). The MPLA regime had, in response, received large quantities of military supplies from the USSR and also deployed regular units of highly trained Cuban soldiers under highly expert Soviet military advisors. South Africa had also committed troops to an anti-MPLA battle in Angola coordinating action with UNITA and FNLA but the
South African forces and its allies were decisively driven back from Luanda and defeated in subsequent battles, especially the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, where the South African air force was knocked out of the sky by Cuban and Soviet anti-air missiles.

The defeat of the US surrogate forces in Angola posed serious challenges to Kissinger’s African policy. The Doctrine of Soviet President Brezhnev which stated that “communist seizure of power in any country is an irreversible process” had been demonstrated in Angola and American foreign policy had to address that challenge. According to Griffiths (1998:32), Dr. Kissinger’s US African policy had assumed that liberation movements would not unseat white rule in Southern Africa and saw advantages in political adjustments falling short of majority rule, because “the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence”. This American foreign policy – derisively dubbed “Tar Baby” had been decisively extinguished in Angola and it was to affect the course of liberation movements in Southern Africa, and in Zimbabwe in particular. As Griffiths (1998:33) contends the policy of using CIA without congressional approval, to counter the Cubans in Angola had angered American Congress which was still under the influence of post-Vietnam disillusionment. The resultant controversy, brought its own congressional rebuke in the form of the Clark Amendment of 9 February 1976 to the Arms Export Control Act which was sponsored by Dick Clark the US Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prohibiting the use of covert funds to assist anti-communist movements. The Senate decision received overwhelming support in the House of Representatives and on 11 February 1976, the OAU Council of Ministers gave legal recognition to the MPLA in a show of support to the Clark Amendment.

When Dr. Kissinger and the American Administration were faced by the inability to intervene in Angola because of the Clark Amendment, Dr. Kissinger attempted to place the issue of Angola on the global strategic agenda in terms of “geopolitical balance” where, according to him, détente could be used to counter Soviet power. Dr. Kissinger therefore set himself the task of invigorating negotiations for a Rhodesian settlement.
having been outmaneuvered by the Soviet Union and its allies in Angola. At a press conference on 22 April 1976, Dr. Kissinger outlined his “Kissinger Doctrine” which stated that the only successful African policy is one in which African nations can achieve African objectives without outside intervention. Dr. Kissinger thereafter became a leading exponent of a Rhodesian settlement and committed the maximum weight of his diplomacy to the achievement of a settlement in Southern Rhodesia using his foreign policy approach which had been outlined on 22 April 1976.

2.4.3 Rhodesian Negotiations for a political settlement: the practical implementation of the Kissinger Doctrine

In line with Dr. Henry Kissinger’s African policy which recognised that “the only successful African Policy is one in which African nations can achieve African objectives without outside intervention”, there was a major regional attempt to solve the Rhodesian problem with the active participation of regional leaders. South Africa and Rhodesia had lost a strategic ally in Portugal which, by October 1974, had commenced the process of arranging the transfer of power to liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique and this development led the South African Prime Minister Mr. John Voster, to seek strategic options and to review his relations with Rhodesia as a way of managing the escalating conflict and to contain communist encroachment in the region in view of the humiliating failure of the South African and the United States’ strategy in Angola.

Prime Minister Voster proclaimed on 23 October 1974 that “Southern Africa has to make a choice: between peace on one hand and escalation of conflict on the other” (Griffith, 1998:35). President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia viewed this statement as a “voice of reason”, and this led to a regional summit in Lusaka in December 1974 between Rhodesia, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and South Africa. The outcome of the talks was a programme aimed at promoting negotiations and the suspension of the armed struggle as a means of achieving Zimbabwe’s independence. The talks agreed on elements of confidence building, ceasefire, release of political prisoners, leading to a constitutional conference. The success of this agreement was dependent on the goodwill of Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to honour the agreement to release all political prisoners who included Joshua Nkomo, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Mr. Robert Mugabe and to
negotiate on the basis of commitment to majority rule, an issue emphasized by ZANU’s external leader Advocate Herbert Chitepo who demanded a Smith commitment to majority rule “now” (Martin & Johnson, 1982;151).

The agreement required the African nationalists to negotiate through a single umbrella organisation, the African National Council (ANC), under Bishop Abel Muzorewa, thereby effectively paralyzing the military wing of the nationalist struggle (ZANLA and ZIPRA). In pursuit of that agreement a unity accord was signed in Lusaka on 7 December 1974 by Bishop Muzorewa representing ANC, Dr. Joshua Nkomo representing ZAPU, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole representing ZANU and Mr. James Chikerema representing FROLIZI effectively sidelining and subordinating liberation movements to an ANC led negotiation strategy. In recognition of this unity agreement the OAU Liberation Committee met in Dar-es-Salaam in January 1975 to sort out leadership squabbles and to accord Bishop Muzorewa’s ANC exclusive endorsement and recognition. These developments had been preceded by unfortunate developments in the military wing of the nationalist struggle caused by the revolt of 1974 within the ZANLA forces in Lusaka. As divisions in the nationalist ranks mounted because of the revolt and subsequently as a result of the détente exercise (the suppression of the war effort in preference for a negotiation strategy), the Rhodesian regime attempted in many ways to incapacitate the militancy of ZANLA and its external leadership whilst at the same time oscillating between prevarication and conciliation as far as negotiations for a peaceful settlement were concerned. On 18 March 1975, Advocate Herbert Chitepo, ZANU’s external leader based in Lusaka was assassinated by what were reliably believed to be Rhodesian security agents but President Kaunda’s government detained General Josiah Tongogara, allegedly accusing him of the murder of Adv. Chitepo. This was followed by the arrest and imprisonment of DARE (Revolutionary War Council of ZANU) and the High Command of ZANLA in Zambia in order to neutralize the guerilla war leadership. Hundreds of ZANU cadres were arrested and detained in Zambia and military reinforcements to the battlefront were stopped and in the process seriously exposing guerilla fighters to the Rhodesian forces. Prominent nationalist, Dr. Eddison Sithole, disappeared in Rhodesia, during the same period, under mysterious circumstances. It was
during this difficult period that Mr. Robert G. Mugabe was chosen to go to Mozambique to lead the liberation struggle; replacing Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole who had been accused by ZANU militants of betraying the struggle. The liberation struggle had virtually come to a standstill at that time and that fitted well with Dr. Kissinger’s strategy of ensuring that liberation movements were not used as a vehicle to unseat white minority rule in Southern Africa; preferring instead the option of a negotiated settlement where the interests of the white minority and those of international capitalism would be protected and entrenched.

2.4.4 Victoria Falls Bridge Talks: 25 August 1975

A meeting to break the political logjam between Zimbabwean nationalists and Mr. Ian Smith was convened without preconditions, at the Victoria Falls Bridge on 25 August 1975 under the ceremonial patronage of Dr. Kaunda and Mr. Vorster. Mr. Smith met with Dr. Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Sithole but the talks failed to chart the way forward and were therefore, abandoned. When Dr. Nkomo returned to Rhodesia after the collapse of the Victoria Falls talks, he proclaimed the leadership of the African National Council (ANC), by displacing Bishop Muzorewa’s authority in a power struggle that ensured and in his new capacity, Dr. Nkomo was then drafted by Dr. Kaunda and Mr. Vorster into weekly dialogue with Mr. Smith (Griffith, 1998:37). The Smith-Nkomo talks, which began in mid-December 1975 ended in failure in March 1976, when Mr. Smith declared on March 7 1976 that there will be “no majority rule in my life-time” (Griffith, 1998; 37). The Rhodesian Front and ZANLA, both sworn enemies, saw advantages in a military strategy and concentrated their efforts in fighting each other rather than in negotiations as regional sponsored talks and the Smith – Nkomo talks had collapsed. Efforts by Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Sithole who controlled disputed internal following to assert leadership over external liberation forces were dismissed by the liberation forces and Mr. Smith declined to recognise their authority by flirting with Dr. Nkomo and Dr. Kaunda. As the military strategy gained momentum, ZIPRA and ZANLA were merged into ZIPA in 1976 in an effort to unite the forces and to intensify the liberation struggle but the unification of forces strategy had the unintended effect of intensifying divisions in the liberation
movements which forced ZANLA and ZIPRA to operate separately with rear bases in Mozambique and Zambia respectively. The Smith regime intensified its attack on guerilla bases in Zambia and Mozambique and in the process confirming the military strategy as the only viable option available to the Rhodesian Front and the liberation movements. It was in this context that Dr. Kissinger was forced to intervene to bring life to the détente process.

2.4.5 Anglo-American Diplomacy on Rhodesia

Following the failure of the Frontline State (FLS) leaders initiative of 1975 to realize a political settlement to Rhodesia’s antagonistic forces of repression and forces of liberation, and also in the wake of the failure of the Smith-Nkomo negotiations and the increasing profile of the Soviet Union’s involvement in Southern Africa as evidenced by the victory of the MPLA in Angola which was backed by Soviet and Cuban military weapons and expert military advisors, and the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique which was backed by Soviet and Chinese military aid, Rhodesia attracted, for the first time, the intervention of the United States backed by the British Government, to counter the success of the Soviet Union and China. Dr. Kissinger embarked on his “shuttle diplomacy” supported by Anthony Crosland, the British Foreign Secretary, to convince Mr. Smith to accept British settlement proposals set out in a statement to the House of Commons in March 1976 offering Mr. Smith two years in which to prepare for majority rule elections. The Smith regime rejected the proposals. Dr. Kissinger visited the Frontline States of Zambia and Tanzania in March and April 1976 to promote his position that the United States sought an early majority rule solution to the Rhodesian problem. Dr. Kissinger also used the strategy of a carrot and stick in his negotiations with the Smith regime; they would receive economic aid if they accepted his settlement proposals, but if they refused, sanctions would be tightened and no assistance would be given to them to fight liberation movements. Dr. Kissinger also threatened the removal of the Byrd Amendment Act which permitted Rhodesian exports of the strategic chromium mineral and emphasized that “Africa’s destiny must remain in Africa’s hands” (Carter
and O’Meara, 1979:33). The Kissinger strategy left Mr. Smith with no option but to cooperate.

The other target of Kissinger’s strategy was the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, who was still trying to come to terms with the after-shock of the Soweto massacre of 16 June 1976. Dr. Kissinger told the responsible US congressional committee, “The question I want to explore with Prime Minister Vorster is whether South Africa is prepared to separate its own future from that of Rhodesia and Namibia” (Martin and Johnson, 1982:35). In several meetings that Dr Kissinger held with Mr Vorster and Mr Smith, he argued that independence had to be “preceded by majority rule within two years” (Tamarkin, 1990:133). As Griffiths argued (1998:40), Smith later acknowledged that he could defy the United States and Britain, but he could not defy South Africa after Dr. Kissinger had moved to underwrite South African security in the face of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. Mr. Smith acknowledged that South Africa controlled Rhodesia’s lifeline, its lines of communication and supplies, and therefore Rhodesia was forced reluctantly to accept Kissinger’s proposals for a political settlement to be discussed at a conference in Geneva on 28 October 1976. The situation in the region was tense; the guerilla warfare was intensifying; in August and October 1976 the Smith regime had launched attacks on guerilla bases in Zambia and Mozambique in what the regime referred to as “hot pursuit” operations against guerillas. After the humiliation of Angola, South Africa did not want a cross border war with Mozambique, a potential Soviet Union proxy and the Frontline States whose economies were suffering negatively from the impact of the war, were also eager to register progress on the negotiations front and it was within this myriad of pressures, challenges and the search for regional peace and stability that the Geneva Conference was held.

2.4.6 The Geneva Conference of October 1976
The Geneva Conference was convened by Britain as the colonial power in Southern Rhodesia, under the chairmanship of the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir Ivor Richard, functioning as the mediator. There were four African
delegations namely the Patriotic Front Coalition of ZANU and ZAPU representing external liberation movements led by Mr. R. G. Mugabe and Dr. Joshua Nkomo, the UANC led by Bishop Muzorewa, ZANU led by Rev. Sithole, and Mr. Ian Smith’s delegation representing the white minority government in Salisbury.

The Geneva Conference was doomed to fail from the beginning when the British Foreign Secretary, Antony Crosland, opposed the idea of taking charge of Southern Rhodesia’s problems and elected to distance himself by his non-attendance. In addition to that the British Cabinet was reluctant to participate in any public venture launched by an American administration governed by a political party fractured by the Watergate scandal (Griffith, 1998:42). The Americans were observers in the conference. The conference broke up because Mr. Smith could not cede control of the interim government and its processes, insisting on responsible majority rule while African delegations could conceive no formula for settlement that left the transitional government in the hands of Mr. Smith. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Crosland, insisted that the issue of the interim government was for the parties concerned which left Sir Ivor Richard in a weak position to decide the way forward as the chairperson of the conference. The conference, however, gave prominence to the new leader of ZANU- PF/ ZANLA,, Robert G. Mugabe, whose intellect and consistency of policy demands captured the attention of both foes and allies and strengthened ZANU- PF and Mugabe’s diplomatic and military position.

2.4.7 The Jimmy Carter Administration strategy on Rhodesia and the Anglo-American Initiatives.

US President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy on Southern Africa and Rhodesia in particular changed when he came to power and it re-emphasised the element of geopolitical containment, which was dominant in the Ford/Kissinger era, in order to “deal with each problem in its own context and not as a local battle in a global East-West geopolitical struggle (Vance, 1983:91). The US Secretary of State under the Carter Administration, Cyrus Vance argued that, in its search for justice and peace in Southern Africa, the Carter Administration “modified global considerations to allow for African
regional sensibilities, and thus brought added reassurance to the African nationalists” (Vance, 1977). The Carter administration made early overtures to Soviet President, Mr Brezhnev, indicating preparedness to improve relations on the basis of “reciprocity, mutual respect and benefit” (Griffith, 1998:45). This US foreign policy position on Southern Africa helped to positively and strategically reposition US foreign policy vis-à-vis the decolonization process. As a result, David Owen, who became the British Foreign Secretary in March 1977 was able to launch revised US-British proposals on Rhodesia on 1 September 1977. The plan envisaged Rhodesia’s return to legality to be achieved by a surrender of power to a transitional administration, headed by a British Resident Commissioner, supported by a Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General; security was to be provided by the Rhodesian police supported by a UN Zimbabwe force. The proposals also provided that the Rhodesian armed forces would be at the core of the security forces who will supervise the ceasefire and support civil power. The draft proposals also provided for the appointment of a new Commissioner of Police and a new draft constitution to be confirmed through negotiations. These proposals led to Malta-One talks in January 1978 at which Andrew Young, David Owen, and General Prem Chand (representing the UN Secretary General) met leaders of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Robert G. Mugabe and Dr. Joshua Nkomo, to discuss military aspects of the transition. The Patriotic Front wanted to play a key role in the transitional government but Mr. Smith rejected the proposals and began to explore his own internal course of action. In a follow up to the stalled talks, Dr. Owen and Mr. Vance traveled to Africa for Malta Two Talks in Dar-es-Salaam, Pretoria and Salisbury, but without success since the Smith regime rejected the Anglo-American proposals and instead announced on 15 February 1978 internal settlement proposals aimed at bringing into a coalition government Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Chief Chirau.
2.4.8 Internal Settlement Proposals: 15 February 1978

The Smith regime realized that if it rejected the Anglo-American proposals, it had to wriggle out in a manner that provided an alternative strategy acceptable to the British and Americans. Thus Smith dramatically announced, on 15 February 1978, internal settlement proposals which carried neither British nor American support despite their resonance with the Kissinger proposals which involved the transfer of power to a majority ruled government within two years, with some modifications.

Smith’s proposals were aimed at bringing Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. N. Sithole and Chief J Chirau into a coalition government with the white minority regime in a power arrangement which ensured white control of the civil service, judiciary, police and the armed forces which was to be traded-off for the whites’ partial loss of parliamentary power. Smith’s constitutional proposals provided for a Defense Force Commission, a Judicial Service Commission, and a Police Service Commission, which were to be exclusively white. Smith’s Proposals provided for a parliament of 100 seats. 28 of the seats were reserved for whites, who constituted 3% of the population, while 72 of the seats were reserved for blacks. The Smith proposals had a blocking mechanism for white MPs which was to last for 10 years and this blocking mechanism ensured that the 72 black MPs would not be able to amend those sections of the constitution that protect property rights and white control over the public service, judiciary and the security forces and in the process ensure that inequality, injustice, and racism were entrenched in the constitution.

The proposals also provided for a Ministerial Council, during the transition, comprising of one white minister and one black minister for each portfolio, that was to function under the authority of an executive council consisting of the four signatory leaders (Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau), with each having a veto power. The country was to be named Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the proposals did not have mechanism for a ceasefire or strategies to end the war. The proposals were agreed to, and signed by four signatories (Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau) on 3 March 1978.

The proposals were vigorously opposed by the Patriotic Front and led to the intensification of the armed struggle. The Frontline States denounced the internal
settlement agreement as unworkable and intensified political, economic, military and diplomatic pressure on the regime in Salisbury while the British and American diplomats sought to negotiate refinements compatible with the principle of majority rule.

According to Griffith (1998:49) on 14 March 1978 Western members of the Security Council abstained on a resolution calling for the rejection of the Rhodesian settlement, and the Carter Administration’s policy neither supported nor rejected the Smith plan and his efforts to secure international support and legitimacy. As the war intensified, and after Smith and his partners in the internal settlement had explored without success all options to end the war and to get international legitimacy it became crystal clear to everyone involved, including the British and Americans, that the case for a universal suffrage could no longer be denied to the people of Rhodesia and that an all parties conference was the only way to break the political logjam and to decide the way forward.

2.4.9 The Lancaster House Conference: 10 September – 21 December 1979

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) which was held in Lusaka on 25 July 1979 decided that the only escape route from the British colonial dilemma of Rhodesia pointed to the need for an all parties conference, convened by the British Government at Lancaster House in London. This followed justifiable fears, within the Commonwealth and Frontline States that Margaret Thatcher, on coming to power in May 1979, would recognise Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government (hence the “Great Betrayal” argument by Ian Smith when this did not happen.)

The Lancaster House Conference (LHC) which was held under the chairmanship of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, agreed on a formula which had components of an impartial transitional arrangement, internationally supervised ceasefire, elections with a universal franchise, agreed constitutional ends and protection of whites political and economic interests. The agreement also outlined the roles of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and the Commonwealth Observer Group which was accountable to the office of the Secretary General of the Commonwealth and the role of national observer teams of contributing states. The Lancaster House Agreement made
important modifications to the Anglo-American proposals notably the agreement in advance of transitional arrangements of a constitution and the provision of a conspicuous Commonwealth monitoring and political presence. The ceasefire was to be monitored by the Commonwealth exclusive of United Nations involvement (because of the political culture and history of the country) and the contending political parties were excluded from the transitional administration. Again, the other essential feature was the formula of a ceasefire which was integrated with a transition to legitimacy through an internationally supervised electoral process.

The success of the Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) was made possible by its chairman, Lord Carrington, who combined brinkmanship and unique tactical negotiating skills which ensured that the negotiating teams remained focused. Lord Carrington assembled a competent and focused team which helped in the preparation and subsequent negotiations and kept inter-governmental relations with the Frontline States carefully OILED. Lord Carrington was also able to hold at bay political pressures from his detractors in the British Cabinet and his Conservative Party as he sought to come up with a formula which was acceptable to all.

Elements of the Lancaster House Agreement

a) The Constitution

The British Government outlined seven proposals which formed the basis of a discussion for a constitution to be adopted by the independent government of Zimbabwe. The proposals were as follows

1. Zimbabwe will be an independent sovereign state in which all citizens enjoy equal rights under the land
2. There will be a Constitutional Head of State
3. The Head of Government will be a Prime Minister who will be a member of the House of Assembly having a majority of support in that House. Power to appoint and dismiss Ministers will be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
4. Parliament will consist of the Senate and the House of Assembly. The Senate will be indirectly elected, and a majority of its members will be Africans. It will have power to delay but not to block bills passed by the House of Assembly. The House of Assembly will be directly elected by universal, adult suffrage.

5. For a specific period (10 years) the House of Assembly will contain a minority of seats, reserved for representatives to be elected by the European community. The proportion of these seats to the total number of seats in the house will be a matter for discussion between the British Government and the Rhodesian parties. (A total of 20% of the total number of seats in the House of Assembly was agreed to as the representative number of the European community (20 seats) but they did not have power to block legislation).

6. Parliament will have the power to amend the constitution, which will prescribe the procedures to be followed for effecting such amendments on lines similar to those contained in other independence constitutions granted by Britain.

7. The Constitution will protect the independence of the judiciary.

The British Government’s constitutional proposals emphasized a Bill of Rights for the protection of minority interests especially parliamentary representation, citizenship, property and pension rights. Although these proposals were agreed to, they were counter balanced by an understanding that giving the whites economic security should not limit the need to satisfy African economic aspirations especially access to land. After promises for assistance were given to address the land issue by the British government and the Patriotic Front, having also consulted with the United States, it was agreed that the Anglo-American proposals that contained a formula for international funding would be activated to address the land issue, among other pressing needs of the new government (Griffith, 1998; 67). According to Jeffrey Davidow (1979;65), the Patriotic Front was “compelled to accept undoubtedly sincere, but vague, promises of assistance. Promises of assistance on the land issue concluded negotiations as it went some way in meeting the demands of the Patriotic Front delegation.
b) Transitional arrangements

Transitional proposals, which had wrecked previous constitutional conferences, were crafted by the British in such a way that Rhodesia was to return from its illegitimate independence (Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 1965) to the legitimacy of colonial status. Transitional arrangements vested executive and legislative authority in the British Governor with command over security forces and the police. It was left for future negotiations to give precision to the machinery supporting the Governor in his intended role. According to Griffith (1998;68), the transitional arrangement served two purposes, firstly, to establish a system which could adequately superintend on end of the civil war and the effective adoption of a new constitution, and secondly, to provide a proficient justification for ending United Nations sanctions – a key demand of the Muzorewa delegation.

The military commanders of the Patriotic Front, according to Lord Carrington’s statement of 25 October 1979, were to be answerable to the Governor for ensuring that their forces observe the ceasefire. This Carrington position was also supported by “the Kaunda proposals” which contained a new formulation on the status of the forces, “the opposing armies should be frozen and accorded equal status” (Carrington, 1979). The Patriotic Front leaders yielded to advice from the Frontline States and accepted the Kaunda proposals.

The ceasefire

The ceasefire negotiations had taken some five weeks and threatened the constitutional talks with failure. The British tabled general ceasefire proposals which were adopted with some modification and they required the Rhodesian forces to be deployed to their bases, following which the guerilla forces would gather at Assembly Points where they would be fed and monitored by a Commonwealth force. Although the Patriotic Front initially feared entrapment and interpreted this arrangement as tantamount to surrender, finer details of the ceasefire were discussed and agreed to by all the parties. When Muzorewa’s delegation accepted a ceasefire on 26 November 1979, the British government moved in swiftly to promulgate the Southern Rhodesia constitution (interim provisions) order 1979. The British government proceeded to appoint Lord Soames as the Governor of...
Rhodesia, effectively ending the UDI rebellion. Lord Soames moved to Salisbury on 12 December 1979 when the Rhodesian Parliament announced its dissolution, declaring Rhodesia “part of Her Majesty’s Dominions”.

The Lancaster House Agreement was then signed on 21 December 1979 after the ceasefire item had between disposed of and the British Government informed the UN Security Council that the Rhodesian rebellion had ended. The LHA was signed by Lord Carrington, representing the British Government, Robert G. Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo representing the Patriotic Front joint delegation of ZANU and ZAPU and Bishop Abel T Muzorewa, representing the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government in Salisbury, and in the process ending one of the most intractable crisis through active diplomacy. It can therefore be concluded that global diplomatic pressures weighed in heavily to give impetus to constitutional negotiations for a settlement in Rhodesia as evidenced by the following factors:

a. The ascendancy of the United Nations role of advocating for decolonization, through various resolutions, and its ideal of egalitarian membership which manifested in the composition of the United Nations General Assembly and the platform given to newly independent black states to advocate for the independence of colonized territories, all helped to galvanise global diplomatic pressure for a settlement in Rhodesia. The UN provided a critical platform for coordinating African and the international community’s response to the Rhodesian problem.

b. Commonwealth member states, following the adoption of the Singapore Declaration of 1971 which recognised racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness threatening the health development of the human race, mounted pressures on Britain, as the colonial power in Rhodesia, to actively seek an immediate end to the end to the racist, oppressive settler regime in Salisbury. Successive Commonwealth meetings sought to address the Rhodesian crisis through diplomatic pressures on Britain leading finally to the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) of 1979 which proved the major breakthrough leading to the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference. The departure of South Africa in 1961 from a Commonwealth that could not digest institutionalized racism (apartheid) reinforced the view that white political
domination in Southern Africa could not be tolerated any longer by the global community.

c. The “Cold War” undercurrents between the East and Western blocs accelerated the decolonization process with the United States of America and the Soviet Union engaging in a strategic competition for power and influence in Southern Africa and in Rhodesia in particular. While the United States found itself in a predicament of supporting its allies who were either colonialists or former colonialists, i.e. Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Holland and Germany – the Soviet Union did not have this colonial baggage to carry and its Marxist-Leninist policy of national and social liberation which opposed the oppression of one man by another and championed man’s right to dignity and freedom from enslavement reinforced and tallied with African Liberation movements’ ideology. Both East and West blocs sought to facilitate decolonization whilst protecting and promoting their strategic interests in the process.

d. The combination of political, economic and military pressures worked to loosen the Rhodesian government’s grip on power and to facilitate a negotiated settlement. By 1979, virtually all the countries had cut diplomatic ties with Rhodesia except apartheid ruled South Africa. Rhodesia was under punitive United Nations sanctions. The Smith regime had introduced martial law and curfews to cover over 90% of the country in response to the intensification of the guerilla war. The major cities were surrounded by guerilla fighters backed by peasants and workers; the whites were emigrating in large numbers every month and the Rhodesian war was costing US$1 million every day prompting the political and military establishment of the Rhodesian regime to declare that they were fighting a “no-win” war. The Frontline States economies had been ravaged by Rhodesian air raids and sabotage on railway roads, bridges, power generation installations and telecommunication networks and pressure was also mounting internally from their domestic constituency for a political settlement. Global diplomatic initiatives were, therefore, able to realize positive results given a myriad of political, economic and military pressures which had been brought to bear on the Rhodesian regime.
2.4.10 The Impact of the Liberation Struggle and constitutional negotiations for independence on the diplomatic character of Zimbabwe as a nation state.

The liberation struggle and constitutional negotiations for Zimbabwe’s independence had far reaching repercussions on the diplomatic character of Zimbabwe when it was finally born on 18 April 1980. These will be examined aimed briefly.

a. The Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation, which guided the liberation movements of ZANLA and ZIPRA in prosecuting the war and which also played a crucial role in defining the Patriotic Front (PF)’s negotiating positions during the constitutional conferences, was adopted by the new nation state in formulating its value system in the political, economic, social and diplomatic spheres. Zimbabwe had inherited a capitalist economic system and structures which were closely linked to Western economies and the attempt by the ruling ZANU (PF) party to utilize a Marxist-Leninist ideology as guiding principles informing the economy and international relations do not seem to have generated the required responses in terms of growing the economy and winning many international cooperating partners. It was a typical case of the superstructure not relating properly to the economic base. There had been too much emphasis, rhetorically, on guarding against imperialist and capitalist machinations bent on reversing the gains of the revolution without necessarily looking at policy issues in a much more pragmatic manner in response to the economic challenges facing the country. In domestic and foreign relations matters, especially between 2000-2008, there had been an attempt on the part of the Zimbabwean government, to view its economic, political and social problems as a product of Western countries and in particular Britain who had imposed sanctions on the country without necessarily acknowledging internal weaknesses within the country’s governance structure impacting negatively on economic growth and the declining fortunes in Zimbabwe’s international relations. The message that resonated in Zimbabwe’s diplomatic pronouncement was that of a country facing an imperialist plot bent on creating a neo-colonial state in Zimbabwe. It was made an election issue by the ZANU PF government in the March 2008 general elections, but the message did not seem to have made an impact with the electorate judging by the poor showing of ZANU PF in those elections {i.e. Zimbabwe will never be a colony again} Thus
the Zimbabwe government, trapped by an over emphasis on repossessing land at the expense of everything else, in an ideological driven argument, had its foreign policy stalemated by the end of 2008 when the economy had practically collapsed. When an economy almost collapses foreign policy collapses as well because foreign policy is an extension of the domestic economy. A country’s national capacity will determine its ability to engage the international community. A foreign policy of unremitting ideological confrontation with the West coast Zimbabwe dearly in political and economic terms; such a policy had been used as a national strategy to achieve national policy objectives as well as a crusade against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

b. The outcome of the Lancaster House agreement produced a radical state, in its domestic and foreign policy outlook, which sought to redress, the shortcomings of the Lancaster House Agreement, through the state machinery, in line with the aspirations of the liberation struggle. The Lancaster House Agreement fell far short of the expectations of the Patriotic Front liberation movement of delivering total and unfettered independence to black Zimbabweans, the Patriotic Front felt that they had been robbed of the total victory that they had hoped to achieve in the battlefield through the numerous compromises they were forced to make on the land and on the minority whites economic interests and civil liberties which were protected by a constitutional Bill of Rights. The negotiation tactics of Lord Carrington were crude in that before the ceasefire negotiations were finalized, the British government had appointed Lord Soames, as the Governor of Rhodesia, and on 12 December 1979, he moved to Salisbury to assume his posting, when the Rhodesian Parliament announced its dissolution, effectively becoming part of Her Majesty’s dominions. The PF delegation tried to hold out in order to extract more concessions but they were faced with the option of being left out thereby delivering a “second class solution” where they were not involved instead of the preferred “first class solution” where they were involved. Pressure was also mounting on the PF delegation from the Frontline States Presidents who needed a settlement so that they could rebuild their economies which had been shattered by the Rhodesian war. Commonwealth member states were also keen to see a settlement and they exerted enormous pressure on the delegations to
deliver a settlement. Faced by pressures from all angles, the PF delegation signed the Lancaster House Agreement on 21 December 1979, and the British Government immediately informed the Security Council to lift UN sanctions because the rebellion had ended.

Some of the issues which were not satisfactorily resolved in the constitutional talks spilled over in the theatre of international diplomacy, after independence, through adversarial conduct towards the West on the part of Zimbabwe’s political leadership, in an effort to bring focus on the unfinished business of constitutional negotiations. Such an approach does not seem to have added value to the foreign policy process of the country as it had earned the country more enemies than friends and therefore less trade, investment, tourism and aid linkages between Zimbabwe and the Western countries and their sympathizers. It can therefore be pointed out that Zimbabwean nationalists’ abiding interests for Zimbabwe did not end with the war and the Lancaster House Agreement but continued thereafter informed by the values of the liberation struggle.

c.  The Frontline States (i.e. Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Botswana) who shared the burden of economic, financial and military assistance to liberation movements in Zimbabwe and who were ready to give bases and to engage the United Nations and the Commonwealth on Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe’s were then, and continue to be central to Zimbabwe’s destiny. Zimbabwe had put the full weight of its diplomacy on the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), an economic grouping of countries who evolved from the Frontline States (FLS), because SADC shares geographical and historical partnership with Zimbabwe based on consultation and collective action through regional cooperation. SADC countries would always be there for Zimbabwe in any crisis as they did during the liberation struggle and after independence when they facilitated the Global Political Agreement of September 2008 leading to a SADC supported government of National Unity in February 2009 and this explains why, for Zimbabwe, SADC comes first. Zimbabwe is bonded to these countries through nature, culture and a sense of community and the long history of political and economic corporation.
2.4 Constitutional negotiations and the East-West strategic competition in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa in general and its impact on Foreign Policy.

Examination questions

1. Outline the major reasons why Zimbabwe had put the full weight of its diplomacy on SADC since independence.

2. Discuss how the history of dishonesty and betrayal which characterised the protracted and complicated constitutional negotiations for independence, affected the relationship between Zimbabwe and Anglo-Saxon nations between 1980-2008.

3. “A foreign policy of unremitting ideological confrontation with the West cost Zimbabwe dearly in political and economic terms” discuss.

4. “Imperialism cannot be defeated by developing countries; it only needs to be managed”. Support or refute this argument in the context of Zimbabwe’s nation building efforts.

5. “The history of Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence is inextricably linked to Zimbabwe’s domestic and foreign policy”. Discuss.
References


3. Carrington, Lord P’s Statement of 25 October 1979


21. Tarmakin, M (1990) *The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonisation in Regional and International Politics*


CHAPTER THREE
Protocol Practices as Instruments of Zimbabwe’s Diplomacy

3.0 Introduction
The conduct of Zimbabwe’s protocol practices, between 1980 and 2008, were guided by Section 31H, Subsection 4, Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (1996 revised edition), which articulates the protocol role of the Head of State and Government in diplomatic protocol matters, and the Privileges and Immunities accorded to diplomatic, consular and international organization representatives based in Zimbabwe. The two pieces of legislation had guided Zimbabwe’s policies, procedures and practices with regard to diplomatic protocol.

3.1 The Diplomatic Role of the Head of State and Government in Protocol Matters.
The Head of State and Government, His Excellency the President, performed the role of Chief Diplomat of the country and was at the centre of diplomatic protocol activities by virtue of the powers bestowed on him by the Constitution of Zimbabwe. According to section 31H, subsection 4, paragraphs (a) and (b), the Head of State and Government had the following constitutional powers with regards to diplomatic practices:

“To appoint, accredit, receive and recognize diplomatic agents and consular officers and to enter into international conventions, treaties and agreements.”

The Head of State and Government performed protocol functions as provided for in the Constitution, and in the process, defined, articulated and promoted Zimbabwe’s domestic and foreign policy agenda which emanated from the political, economic, social, cultural or security challenges facing the country at any given time. The Head State and Government attended state functions or important national day occasions like the Independence Day (18 April), Workers Day (1 May), Africa Day (25 May), Heroes Day
(8 August), Defence Forces Day (9 August) and the National Unity Day (22 December) where he used such occasions to outline the foreign policy of Zimbabwe for the consumption of foreign diplomatic agents / envoys based in Zimbabwe who were required, through protocol practices, to attend such occasions. The President as Head of State and Government, had also participated in regional and international state visits and official business functions which were carried out in accordance with internationally acceptable protocol procedures and practices especially at regional and international fora like SADC, COMESA, AU, NAM, Common wealth (before the withdrawal in 2003) and the U.N where the President articulated Zimbabwe’s foreign policy agenda and by extension, its national interests.

The Head of State and Government also performed the constitutional role of appointing diplomatic agents and signing their letters of credence which accredited them as official representatives of Zimbabwe abroad subject to the requests for agreements [pronounced agremos] having been granted by the receiving states in certain categories of diplomats e.g. Heads of Mission, Defence Attachees, Consul-Generals.

3.2 Privileges and Immunities accorded to Diplomatic, Consular and International Organisation Representatives based in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwe Government passed the Privileges and Immunities Act Chapter 3:03 (Date of commencement of Act: 1st December, 1972) to give the force of law in Zimbabwe to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations signed at Vienna on 18 April, 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations signed at Vienna on the 24th April 1963. The Privileges and Immunities Act Chapter 3:03 confers certain privileges and immunities to Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of Foreign States, certain international organizations and persons connected with such organizations. According to the preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of Diplomatic missions as agents of states. As soon as the Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Consular Posts and International Organisations and their staff are accredited by the Zimbabwe Government through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, they become entitled to enjoy privileges and immunities in Zimbabwe according to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. The privileges and immunities are enjoyed on condition of reciprocity which is a key principal in the conduct of international relations. Another principle of the Vienna Conventions which is implemented in Zimbabwe is the requirement of persons enjoying privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and if staff of foreign missions fail to respect this principle, they run the risk of bringing discredit not only on themselves personally and their mission but on their country as well and may be recalled by their government as a result. While some categories of diplomatic staff enjoy full diplomatic immunity i.e. personal immunity from criminal and most civil jurisdiction, subject to its waiver by their home governments, other categories of diplomatic and consular officers do not enjoy such blanket immunity but get functional immunity which only protects them in respect of official functions. According to Section 7 (2) (a) and (b) of the privileges and immunities Act Chapter 3:03, the President may confer Privileges and Immunities to international organizations and persons connected therewith, by a notice in the Government Gazette specify in such notice, the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by such organizations in Zimbabwe. The President may also, by notice in the Government Gazette, repeal, or amend any such gazetted notice in line with Section 7 (3) of the Privileges and Immunities Act.

3.2.1 Application of the principle of reciprocity with regard to privileges and immunities

The principle of reciprocity in the enjoyment of Privileges and Immunities in Zimbabwe is articulated in section 4 (1) of the Privileges and Immunities Act (Chapter 3:03) which states that where it appears to His Excellency the President that the privileges and immunities accorded to a mission of Zimbabwe in any State, or to persons connected with that Mission, are less than those conferred in terms of this Act or any other enactment in relation to the Mission of that State or to persons connected with that Mission, H.E the President may, by notice in the Gazette, withdraw, modify or restrict, in relation to the mission of that State, or to persons connected with that mission, such of the privileges and immunities so conferred to such extent as appears to H.E the
President to be proper. In other words, according to the Privileges and Immunities Act Chapter 3:03, any or all the privileges or immunities may be withdrawn, modified or restricted from any mission on the basis of reciprocity. The application of the principle of reciprocity with regard to the enjoyment of privileges and immunities in Zimbabwe is based on the letter and spirit of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

3.2.2 Articles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations having the force of law in Zimbabwe.

3.2.2.1 Diplomatic immunity granted to diplomatic agents in Zimbabwe

1. According to Article 22 of the Privilege and Immunities Act Chapter 3:03, the premises of the Mission shall be inviolable and the agents of the receiving State may not enter them except with the consent of the Head of Mission of the sending State. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of a mission against any intrusion or damage or to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The premises of a mission are immune from search, attachment or execution. By the same token under International law, the premises of a mission must not be used in a way which is incompatible with the function of the mission.

2. Article 24 protects the archives and documents of the mission which shall be inviolable at any time wherever they may be.

3. Article 27 requires the receiving state to:
   - Permit and protect free communication on the part of the Mission for all official purposes
   - Guarantee the inviolability of all official correspondence of a mission
   - Ensure diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained
   - Protect diplomatic couriers in the performances of their functions

4. Article 29 stipulates that a diplomatic agent shall not be inviolable and shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State is required to treat him/her with due respect and to take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his/her person, freedom or dignity.

5. Article 31 stipulates that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state as well as immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction. Under the same Article, a diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness and no measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the case of:

(a) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state, unless he/she holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purpose of the Mission,

(b) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State,

(c) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his/her official functions. It is important to point out that whilst diplomatic agents in Zimbabwe enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction this does not preclude them from obeying the laws of the country. Moreover a diplomatic agent enjoying diplomatic immunity in Zimbabwe is not exempt from the jurisdiction of the sending state. The Act stipulates that the sending state may waive the immunity from diplomatic agents enjoying immunity under Article 37 of the Act. When that scenario happens, the waiver must always be express. Where a diplomatic agent enjoying immunity initiates proceedings, he/she cannot claim immunity in respect of a counter claim directly connected with the principal claim.

In general, the waiver of immunity is unusual except in criminal matters. Shaw (2003:687), citing the experience of the United Kingdom, pointed out that waival of immunity in the face of criminal charges is not common but it is routinely sought and occasionally granted. Zimbabwe had also been influenced by such practices under international law. The important point to note is that waiver of immunity does not belong to the concerned diplomatic agent but is for the benefit of the sending state and for that reasons such waiver must be express and performed clearly by the sending state. If a waiver is not offered, then that diplomatic agent will be declared persona non grata in line with the rules of international law. Zimbabwe’s protocol practices do not offer blanket immunity to all categories of diplomatic agents, and in conformity with Article1 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), draws a distinction between four categories of diplomatic staff i.e (i) the head of mission (ii) members of the diplomatic staff (iii) Administrative and technical staff and (iv) service staff (maids, cleaners, drivers). The first two categories enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities. Diplomatic identity cards issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs determines the categories of privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by diplomatic agents in line with the laws of the country. There are duties which are imposed on diplomats to counter the abuses of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Zimbabwe had enforced these obligations and these are contained in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) which include:

(a) The duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and the duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that state.
(b) The duty to conduct all official business with or through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving state or such other ministry as may be agreed upon.
(c) The premises of the mission should not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the Mission.

3.2.2.2 Diplomatic Privileges granted to Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Zimbabwe

As part of its obligations under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations, Zimbabwe exempts all diplomatic agents from dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, under Article 34, except:

(a) Indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in prices of goods or services
(b) Dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state unless the agent holds it on behalf of the sending state for the purpose of the Mission.
(c) Estate succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State
(d) Dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving state and
taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving state;
(e) Charges levied for specific services rendered
(f) Registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to
immovable property.
(vi) Article 36 requires the receiving state, in accordance with such laws and regulations
as it may adopt, to permit entry of, and grant exemption from all customs duties, and
related charges other than charges for storage, cartage and similar services, on:
   (a) Articles for the official use of the mission
   (b) Articles for the personal use of a diplomatic agent or members of his family
       forming part of his household, including articles intended for his/her
       establishment. Waival of duty on goods purchased by diplomatic missions,
       consular posts and their diplomatic staff are normally considered where the goods
       are:

       • Not intended for resale
       • For the official use of the diplomatic missions and which would be necessary to
         meet the reasonable requirements of the mission
       • Intended for the personal use of members of the diplomatic mission or consular
         staff of the Mission or their immediate family members to meet their reasonable
         personal requirements.
       • Not to be sold before a prescribed period like cars for personal use.

The in-built conditions applying to these waival of duty are meant to safeguard possible
abuse by diplomatic Missions whilst at the same time facilitating the smooth flow of their
diplomatic work.

Zimbabwe had implemented the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963 through the Privileges and Immunities Act Chapter 3:03 taking into
account the principles deep rooted in international law which include unimpeded conduct
of consular relations, promoting the development of friendly relations among nations, and
ensuring the protection and assistance of aliens resident in the territories of other
states. The privileges and immunities of consuls are less extensive than diplomats and this is a reflection of their different roles (O’Brien, 2002:312). Consuls have an administrative role in respect of the nationals of the sending state in the receiving state such as keeping a register of nationals, recording births/deaths, witnessing documents, facilitating marriages among other duties, whilst diplomats are concerned with political relations with the receiving state.

The provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) are part and parcel of Zimbabwean law and include the inviolability of consular premises and archives, exemption from taxation, the right of a consul to communicate with nationals of the sending state who may be in prison in the receiving state and the right of a national in prison to communicate with a consul and to be informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Consuls enjoy limited privileges and immunities compared to diplomats. Article 41 provide that a consul shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by a competent judicial authority, while Article 43 stipulates that the consul will enjoy immunity in respect of acts undertaken in the course of his/her official duties.

3.3 Accreditation of Diplomatic Representatives

i. Before a Head of Mission can be accredited in Zimbabwe, the sending State has to obtain the agreement (pronounced agremo) or consent of the Government of Zimbabwe in accordance with Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Request for agreement are made by an official note from the sending state to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the receiving state may decline the proposed Head of Mission-designate but it is under no obligation to give reasons for any refusal of consent. Similarly, Shaw (2003:670) also points out that under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the receiving state may at any time declare any member of a diplomatic mission persona non grata without having to explain its decision, and thus obtain the removal of that diplomatic agent.
ii Once approval is granted for the Head of Mission–designate to come and present his/her credentials, arrangements were then made with the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive the Ambassador /High Commissioner –designate and for the Ambassador-designate to make courtesy calls on the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to present his/her letters of introduction and to the Chief of Protocol in order to get details of the presentation of credentials ceremony at State House.

Iii The presentation ceremony is by far the most important date on the calendar of a Head of Mission –designate because it is an opportunity to get the distinguished honour of meeting, discussing and having photographs taken with His Excellency The President at State House. The Chief of Protocol will do some rehearsal with the Ambassador /High Commissioner –designate prior to the presentation ceremony to ensure that the ceremony is executed flawlessly in accordance with the honour and dignity befitting such a state occasion.

Iv The Head of mission –designate would be accompanied by his/her spouse and diplomatic staff of his/her mission. The recommended attire for such an occasion will usually be the sending State’s national dress, executive dark suits or military uniforms with full decorations for defence attaches/advisors and this requirement is clarified by the Chief of Protocol during courtesy call meetings. The Head of Mission –designate would then be presented to his Excellency the President by the Chief of Protocol in the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Mission –designate will then present, firstly, letters of recall of his predecessor and then letters of credence by which his/her government accredits him/her as Ambassador or High Commissioner to the Republic of Zimbabwe. After the presentation ceremony there is usually an opportunity to be taken photographs with His Excellency the President and the Head of Mission.

i. Once Ambassadors /High Commissioners presented their credential to His Excellency the President they were deemed to have taken up their official functions in Zimbabwe. Credentials were presented strictly in the order of each Head Of Mission’s arrival in Harare and this is how their order of precedence was
arrived at. That order of precedence determines the line-up positions of Heads of Missions in the event of a state occasion where they were required to attend.

v. Heads of Mission upon being accredited by His Excellency the President, are free to make courtesy calls on various Ministers of Government and senior government officials to acquaint themselves with the political, economic, social and cultural set up of the country and to brief those government officials about their mandate and to explore possible areas of bilateral cooperation, New Heads of Mission were encouraged to call on the Dean of the Diplomatic corps as early as possible to get some advice on how to go about their duties whilst in Zimbabwe.

vi. When their tour of duty came to an end, Heads of Mission were required by protocol practice to arrange farewell courtesy calls on His Excellency the President, Vice Presidents, Honourable Ministers and other Senior government officials if the schedule of such senior official permit. Farewell courtesy calls are in line with international best practices in diplomacy.

Protocol practices in Zimbabwe have evolved since independence in 1980 and they represent continuous processes of change and innovation, backed by basic principles of international law and diplomatic practices which were derived from the accumulated experiences of generations of wise and intelligent diplomats.
Examination Questions

1. Discuss the diplomatic protocol role of the Head of State and Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe during the period 1980-2008.

2. Discuss the provision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 in relation to the principles of reciprocity in the context of the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomats based in Zimbabwe.

3. Article 4 of the Vienna convention requires a sending State to obtain agreement of the receiving state for the person it proposes to accredit as Head of Mission. Discuss the circumstances under which such a request for agreement may be declined.

4. Can a Zimbabwean citizen appointed as a Head Mission of an International Organisation enjoy full privileges and immunities accorded to diplomats based in Zimbabwe. Justify your answer with reference to the privilege and immunities Act Chapter 3:03.

5. “The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and whenever they may be.” Justify why this should be the case with concrete examples.

6. Discuss the circumstances under which the immunity of a diplomatic agent may be waived.

7. Discuss the difference between “full diplomatic immunity” and “functional diplomatic immunity” with regards to diplomatic agents.

8. Outline and discuss the main functions of a diplomatic mission.

9. “There is no right as such under international law to diplomatic relations and they exist by virtue of mutual consent” Shaw (2003:670). Discuss the merits of this argument.
References

2. Foreign States Immunities Act of 1985, Australia
3. Privileges and Immunities Act Chapter 3:03, Zimbabwe
4. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963
6. Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites

Equatorial Guinea Special Envoy and Minister of Agriculture Mr. Teodoro Obiang Obiang handing over a special message from his President Mr. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo to President Mugabe at Zimbabwe House. (Source: The Herald 2006)
President Mugabe receiving Saharawi Democratic Republic Special Envoy Mr. Mohammed Yeslem Beissat at Zimbabwe House. (Source The Herald 25 May 2006)
The Acting High Commissioner for Zimbabwe Mr. Wenceslaus Mudyanadzo and Mrs.
Farirai Mudyanadzo being received by the Governor General of Australia, Sir William
Deane and Madam Diana Deane at Government House (State House), Canberra,
Australia, 1999. (source: Courtesy of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra
Australia)
PART TWO
Regional and International Co-operation
CHAPTER FOUR

4. Zimbabwe and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

4.0 Introduction
The Zimbabwe government’s foreign policy between 1980 and 2008 was primarily driven by the need to consolidate SADC solidarity, cohesion and mutual support as a way of protecting its national interests, security, independence, sovereignty and economic prosperity. Zimbabwe was instrumental in the institutionalization of SADC and its various organs and committed itself to the full implementation of SADC decisions as a key feature of its foreign policy. According to President R.G Mugabe (2009) Zimbabwe valued SADC’s solidarity since it was viewed as truthful, well meaning and that it derived from well-known SADC ideals of the liberation struggle.

SADC, as a regional bloc, had its roots in the Frontline States (FLS) main objective of achieving not only the political liberation of Southern Africa but its emancipation from all forms of economic subjugation. SADC had been existent since 1980 when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine independent states in Southern Africa known as the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with a mandate of coordinating development projects in their respective countries a way of lessening dependence on the then apartheid ruled South Africa. SADCC was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April, 1980 following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration – “Southern Africa : Towards Economic Liberation.” The formation of SADCC was spurred by the independence of Zimbabwe, a development which extended the frontiers of freedom in Southern Africa and gave hope to the struggling peoples of South West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa that independence was indeed possible as they had a reliable ally to launch their struggle from. Zimbabwe was a founding member of SADCC together with Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.
The transformation of SADCC from a coordinating conference into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) took place on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, when the SADC Declaration and Treaty was signed at the Summit of Heads of State and Government thereby bestowing on SADC a legal character. Member states of SADC comprise Angola, Botswana, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had played a key role in the political emancipation of apartheid ruled South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia) when in March 1992 President R.G Mugabe became Chairperson of the Frontline State Alliance and galvanized regional and world opinion for the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa in order to accelerate the attainment of independence. Zimbabwe also provided material and moral support for the liberation movements of ANC and PAC of South Africa and SWAPO of Namibia as its contribution to their independence.

4.1 SADC Objectives
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy within the SADC region was aimed at forging political, economic and cultural co-operation with Zimbabwe’s neighbours in SADC as a way of promoting win–win regional development initiatives and also to protect her national interests, security, sovereignty and independence. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy preoccupation in the first 28 years of independence was therefore aimed at promoting SADC’s vision of achieving a prosperous regional community through political and economic integration, improvement of standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa. As a founding member of SADC, Zimbabwe crafted and implemented its foreign policy in line with the SADC objectives as stated in articles 5 of the SADC Treaty of 17 August 1992 which are:

a) To achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of peoples of Southern Africa and to support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration
b) To evolve common political values, systems and institutions
c) To promote and defend peace and security
d) To promote self–sustaining development on the basis of collective self–reliance and the interdependence of member states.

e) To achieve complimentarity between national and regional strategies and programmes,

f) To promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the region,

g) To achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.

h) To strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.

In crafting the objectives of SADC, member states agreed that under-development, deprivation and backwardness could only be overcome through cooperation and integration and therefore member states formulated their foreign policy agenda accordingly.

4.2 SADC Priorities and Common Agenda

The foreign policy of Zimbabwe in the first 28 years of independence was aimed at promoting SADC’s priorities and common agenda which is based on a number of principles such as a development orientation, subsidiarity, market integration and the development and facilitation as well as the promotion of trade and investment. The SADC’s common agenda include the following:

- The promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its elimination.
- Promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective.
- The consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security.
In order to operationalise the SADC Common Agenda through the provision of a strategic direction, Zimbabwe and other member states came up with a 15 – year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) which is being implemented in phases of 5 years each and by 2008, the RISDP had entered its fourth year of implementation. The purpose of RISDP is to strengthen and deepen SADC regional integration by setting targets and time frames for goals in the various fields of cooperation and by providing SADC member states with a consistent and comprehensive programme of long term economic and social policies and clear view of SADC’s approved economic and social policies and priorities.

The widening diplomatic agenda, as reflected by SADC’s priorities and common agenda, which currently encompass anything from regional and international trade, investment promotion, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, globalization and regional integration initiatives, to mention but a few such activities, calls upon the use of expertise beyond that of career diplomats in the management of a country’s diplomacy or what Kennan (1997) described as “diplomacy without diplomats.” Zimbabwe had been called upon to utilize the services of its experts in various fields in pursuit of its diplomatic activities whilst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in such cases, played a co-ordinating role.

4.3 Zimbabwe’s Political Cooperation with SADC Member States

Zimbabwe together with other SADC member states, were instrumental in the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation which is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region through the efficient management of inter and intra-state conflict whilst recognizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. The Organ (in short) which is the successor to the Frontline States Alliance, was established on 28 June 1996 and President R.G Mugabe became its first chairperson.

The origins of the SADC Organ can be traced to the meeting of 18 April 1996, in Gaborone of SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security who recommended to the SADC Summit of the establishment of an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation which would allow more flexibility and timely
response at the high level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations and the Organ was launched in Botswana on 28 June 1996 at an extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of SADC countries. In launching the Organ, the Heads of State and Government reiterated the five principles of SADC and added two additional principles in support of the organ; i.e

- Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence
- Military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon after all possible political remedies had been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU (now AU) and the United Nations.

The Gaborone summit communique of 28 June 1996 adopted the following Institutional guidelines for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation:

- The organ shall operate at the summit level and shall function independently of other SADC structures.
- The organ shall also operate at ministerial and technical levels
- The Chairperson of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and on a troika basis
- The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee shall be one of the institutions of the Organ
- The Organ may establish other structures as the need arises

Although the principles adopted in support of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation were in keeping with the principles of international law, their application within the context of SADC regional cooperation were arguably broken by Zimbabwe’s military intervention in the DRC in support of President Laurent Kabila’s government which was facing imminent collapse from rebel onslaught and South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 to counter the mutinous army although, ironically South Africa refused to be militarily involved in the DRC after Lesotho’s intervention, preferring instead a negotiated settlement. Although Zimbabwe had consulted with other SADC Ministers of Defence and Security prior to intervention in the
DRC the mandate remained controversial since it had not been sanctioned by a SADC summit and the fact that there was no mutual defence pact between the two countries.

It is pertinent to point out that Zimbabwe after receiving a request for assistance from the DRC – a member of SADC- Zimbabwe which was the then chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation called a meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) comprising SADC Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs held at Victoria Falls from 7-8 August 1998. After deliberating on the situation in the DRC, the meeting proceeded to set up a Verification Committee to assess the situation in the DRC with a view to recommending a course of action to be taken.

According to Baregu (1999) it was on the recommendation of the Verification Committee that a special meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee was held in Harare on 18 August 1998. The ISDSC recommended that “those countries able to so could give assistance to President Laurent Kabila”; and on that basis Zimbabwe together with Angola and Namibia dispatched military contingents to the DRC to defend the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity which was under threat from DRC rebels who were backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

In order to avoid future recurrence of such controversies, Zimbabwe and other SADC member states created SADC mechanisms and institutions for collective security such as the SADC Mutual Defence Pact which was adopted on 4 August 2001 and the SADC Brigade which operates under the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

The SADC Mutual Defence Pact operates under the principle “injure one injure all.” The SADC Brigade, which operates under the African Standby Force, contributes to peace and security in the region and on the African continent as a whole, Zimbabwe had contributed troops to Operation Golfinho Training exercises in South Africa in 2009 as part of its contribution to the SADC Brigade and to SADC’s collective security building.
4.3.1 The SADC Organ had mandates in the following key areas according to the SADC Secretariat (2008)

(a) Peacekeeping and peace enforcement: the Organ’s role in this area is to develop regional peace keeping capacity within national armies of SADC member states for internal and external use and to coordinate peacekeeping operations by member states.

(b) Conflict prevention, management and resolution: The Organ’s role in this area is to make use of preventive diplomacy and early warning of conflicts as instruments of conflict prevention and management. The Organ also mediates in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflict resolution.

(c) Crime prevention: the Organ’s role in this area is to facilitate cooperation among member states in dealing with cross border crime especially through the international police organization (Interpol).

(d) Intelligence: the Organ’s role is to facilitate close cooperation and early warning in intelligence matters among member states.

(e) Foreign Affairs: The role of the Organ in this area is to promote cooperation among member states in developing a common foreign policy and lobbying as a region. It is also the Organ’s role in this area to promote the development of common political value systems and institutions, to monitor international arm control and disarmament and to address extra-regional conflicts that impact on the region.

(f) Human rights: the role of the Organ in this area is to develop democratic institutions and practices, encourage observations of regional and international human rights conventions and treaties.

4.3.2 The Organ reports to the SADC Summit and it consists of a Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson. In the diplomatic resolution of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA)’s Outstanding issues in November 2009, the SADC Organ convened a SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in Maputo, Mozambique, to report to the Summit on the outstanding issues and to offer its recommendations. In the case, the SADC’s troika consisted of the outgoing Chairperson,
President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, Chairperson Joseph Kabila of the DRC and Incoming Chairperson President Rupiyah Banda of Zambia. SADC through its appointed mediator President Thabo Mbeki had earlier on played a key facilitation role which resulted in the three major political parties in Zimbabwe; ZANU (PF), MDC-T and MDC (M) signing a global political agreement (GPA) in September 2008, following the inconclusive March 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, and the subsequent widely disowned June 2008 presidential elections run-off which made it necessary to come up with a negotiated agreement which would be used to run the government until new credible elections were held under a new democratic constitution, and hence the establishment of a government of national unity or inclusive government which comprised ZANU (PF), MDC T and MDC (M) in February 2009.

Zimbabwe’s diplomacy was therefore closely linked to SADC’s vision and objectives and where Zimbabwe had backtracked from the vision and objectives as was the case with the June 2008 Presidential elections, SADC was there for Zimbabwe to ensure that it remained focused in terms of the region’s quest for peace, security and stability and in promoting sound political governance which was in line with the common political value systems and democratic institutions that SADC was developing. Zimbabwe was able to listen to the wise counsel of SADC because it believed in SADC’s values and solidarity which were inextricably linked to its survival as nation-state. On its part, SADC had dwelt with issues of democrazation and advancement of human rights in Zimbabwe in a politically sensitive manner cajoling its liberation war ally, ZANU (PF), to play ball for the sake of regional stability and economic development.

4.4 SADC’s Achievements which have benefited Zimbabwe.

SADC, as a regional economic group had achieved notable successes in its regional integration agenda which had benefited Zimbabwe and some notable achievements include:

- The rehabilitation of roads, ports and railways to improve trade and investment infrastructure and to facilitate free movement of goods and people in the region, through a seamless network among SADC member states.
- The establishment of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) to overcome energy deficit in some member states, and Zimbabwe in particular which faced chronic power shortages for many years. Zimbabwe also benefited from a number of energy sector exchanges with SADC member states which include the NAMPOWER deal with Namibia, Cabora Bassa deal with Mozambique and sharing electricity from Lake Kariba with Zambia. SADC member states’ power utilities, through SAPP, have identified a number of priority projects for commissioning in the short, medium and long term to address the crippling energy situation in the region. Between 2009 and 2013, SAPP expects member utilities to commission projects that would add 8800 megawatts of electricity to the regional grid, allowing the region to match supply and demand (The Herald 6/3/10)

- The establishment of a one stop border post at Chirundu to facilitate regional trade especially between Zimbabwe and Zambia.

- The removal of visa regimes between Zimbabwe and other SADC countries which facilitates trade, tourism and the movement of people in the region.

- The establishment of the Great Transfrontier Park between Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa and between Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia where tourists do not need more than one visa to visit all the parks,

- The establishment of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Centre in Harare.

- The development of social activities such as SAPPRO and COSAFA tournaments and the UMOJA Cultural Festival which have contributed significantly towards the social and cultural integration of people in the region.

Zimbabwe’s faith in SADC is, therefore, not misplaced when you assess the level of benefits deriving from membership.
Examination Questions

1. In the first 28 years of independence, Zimbabwe dedicated the full weight of its diplomacy towards achievement of SADC regional solidarity and regional integration.
   Why do you think Zimbabwe behaved that way?

2. Are there any complementarities between SADC’s objectives and Zimbabwe’s national objectives? Argue your case with concrete examples.

3. How has Zimbabwe helped to consolidate SADC solidarity, cohesion and mutual support in the 28 years since its independence?

4. To what extent do you think the values of the liberation struggle will continue to influence Zimbabwe’s foreign policy given SADC’s regional integration agenda?

5. In your opinion, do you think Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC war in 1998 was justified from a national and geo-strategic consideration? Argue your case with concrete examples.

6. Discuss the composition and role of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

7. What are the major differences between the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)?

8. What are the advantages and disadvantages of SADC to member countries?

9. Discuss the major barriers to economic competitiveness within the SADC countries?

10. Discuss the major benefits that will accrue to Zimbabwe through partial surrender of state sovereignty to a larger political entity like SADC.
References

10. SADC In Brief: An Easy to Read Information Guide to the Southern African Development Community, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana
11. SADC Gaborone Summit Communiqué, 28 June 1996
12. SADC. Intern
13. SADC; Strategic Indicate Plan for the Organ, (1999)
CHAPTER 5
Zimbabwe and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

5.0 Introduction
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 1994 as a successor regional organization to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) which had been in existence since 1981. The PTA was established within the framework of the OAU’s Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The Lagos Plan of Action envisaged an evolutionary process in the economic integration of the African continent in which regional economic communities would constitute building blocs on which the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) would be established. The Treaty that established the PTA was signed in Lusaka on 21 December 1981 and came into force on 30 September 1982 after having been ratified by more than seven states as provided for in Article 50 of the Treaty.
The PTA Treaty envisaged its transformation into a common market and in line with this thrust the Treaty establishing COMESA was signed on 5 November 1982 in Kampala, Uganda and was ratified in Lilongwe Malawi on 8 December 1994 and notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) under the enabling clause on 29 June 1995. Zimbabwe is a founding member of both the PTA and COMESA. The current members of COMESA include Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

COMESA was established to take advantage of a large market size, to share the region’s common heritage and destiny and to allow greater social and economic cooperation with the ultimate goal of creating an economic community.

5.1 Objectives of COMESA
The main objectives of COMESA are defined in the Treaty and its Protocols. In summary the main objectives are to facilitate the removal of all structural and institutional weakness of member states and the promotion of peace, security and stability in order to
achieve sustained development of each member state and collective sustained development of COMESA as a regional bloc.

The Objectives of COMESA are:

a) To create a Free Trade Area (FTA) guaranteeing the free movement of goods and services produced within COMESA and the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

b) To create a Customs Union under which goods and services imported from non-COMESA countries will attract an agreed single tariff in all COMESA states.

c) To achieve free movement of capital and investment through the adoption of common investment practices and policies in order to create a favourable regional climate for investment and trade.

d) To gradually establish a payments union based on the COMESA Clearing House and the eventual establishment of a common monetary union with a common currency.

e) To adopt a common visa arrangement leading to the free movement of persons within COMESA member states.

5.2 ZIMBABWE’S LEADERSHIP OF COMESA

Zimbabwe, as a founding member of COMESA, had taken a key role in the activities of COMESA in keeping with its diplomatic role of promoting, coordinating and networking in the economic sphere with other countries, through a regional bloc like COMESA, in shaping the region’s economic architecture. As the diplomatic agenda widens to incorporate critical issues of trade, investment and tourism opportunities between member states, Zimbabwe found herself assuming the leadership of COMESA. The Republic of Zimbabwe, represented by President R.G Mugabe, was elected Vice Chair of COMESA from May 2007 to December 2008 while the Republic of Kenya represented by President Mwai Kibaki, was elected the Chair of COMESA. At an Extraordinary Summit of COMESA Heads of State and Government that took place at Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt on 30 June 2008, a Zimbabwean national, Mr Sindiso Ngwenya, was appointed COMESA Secretary-General, becoming the third COMESA Secretary General since it was transformed from the Preferential Trade Areas (PTA) in 1994. President Mugabe assumed the chairmanship of COMESA in December 2008 at
the 13th Summit of Heads of State and Government which was held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe from 7-8 December 2008. The 13th Summit was preceded by Policy Organs meetings from 27 November to 5 December 2008, followed by the meeting of Foreign Affairs Officials on 6 December 2008 before the grand Summit of 7-8 December 2008. The Victoria Falls summit witnessed the launch of the COMESA Customs Union and the Regional Commercial and Competition Commission.

The Victoria Falls Summit had been preceded by the Nairobi Summit of Heads of State and Government from the 19 member bloc which agreed on a Common External Tariff (CET) as a major step to launching a Customs Union. A common external tariff system implies that all COMESA member states are expected to apply the same tariffs on goods from outside the region and allow free movement of capital goods and raw materials within the COMESA regional bloc. A tax of 10% for intermediate products and 25% for finished goods was agreed upon at the Nairobi Summit. The common external tariff system helps to maintain a price advantage for goods produced in the region compared to goods produced outside the customs union.

### 5.3 Advantages of a COMESA Customs Union

The launch of The Customs Union at the Victoria Falls Summit was heralded as a watershed in the development of COMESA as a regional economic bloc because it marshaled in many opportunities and benefits to customers, producers, investors, business persons in general and the region as a whole. The following are the opportunities and benefits of the COMESA customs union:

a) Producers get a larger and wider market and can produce more goods as a result. The customs union (CU) encourages mass production of goods and services, because of the large market created and in the process lowers the cost of production by taking advantage of economies of scale. The CU offers equal protection through the CET to all manufacturers against imports from countries that are not in the Customs Union. Again, the CU promotes fair competition by reducing disparities in production costs for manufacturers in the various countries.
with regard to taxes on imported raw materials and intermediate goods from third countries

b) The customs Union removes border controls and trade barriers and this make it faster to import goods since traders do not have to go through so many customs procedures in different countries and this has the effect of reducing transaction costs and results in timely deliveries

c) Consumers benefit from a wider choice of goods and also benefit from lower prices due to increased productivity.

d) Traders get a wider source of goods and therefore have more bargaining power in dealing with suppliers, which results in cost savings. As a Customs Union is an advanced stage of integration over Free Trade Area, intra regional trade is enhanced as there are no tariffs or quotas on goods originating from within the region. In addition, the CET helps to maintain a price advantage for goods produced in the region compared to goods produced outside the Customs Union

e) Landlocked countries that are neighbours to CU members who have access to the sea, will in actual terms no longer be landlocked as their goods will have free circulation rights when moving to such countries because all formalities would have taken place at the port of entry.

f) A customs Unions promotes cross-border investment and serves to attract investment both Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and domestic investment as the enlarged market is more attractive to investors than the previously small individual national markets.

5.4 Challenges Relating to COMESA’s Regional Integration Agenda

A lot of challenges are inevitable as COMESA pursues and implements its regional integration agenda but these challenges should be handled in a positive spirit of regional cooperation. The following are some of the challenges which Heads of State and Government diplomats and technical experts will have to grapple with in the implementation process.

(i) There is the fundamental and universal problem of balancing supra-national and national interests which may appear to be in conflict for example a member state may
wish to protect or exempt from CET a good or product which it considers “sensitive” and therefore eligible for higher than approved tariffs if its contribution to the national economy and revenue generation is high while other goods may be protected for social, health, cultural and religious reasons. Such a move may militate against the aim of removing tariff barriers among member states and the harmonization of barriers with third parties through the common external tariff system. Many COMESA member states are afraid of competition and they have produced a long list of “sensitive” items for exemption thereby excluding almost every major trading item—a development which undermines the Customs Union.

Whilst it is recommended that the Customs Union should not ignore national challenges like the ones which beset Zimbabwe’s economy between 2000-2008, attempts should be made to reconcile divergent interests and differences by replacing “opposing passions with common objectives” as was done with the European Union [Blond, 1967:62]

(ii) Intra COMESA trade had remained below 15% in the last 5 years since 2004 depressed by supply side capacity constraints, poor infrastructure and communications connectivity, political and macro-economic instability in some states, policy and structural weakness (i.e. the extent to which government policies are conducive to and encourage fair competition unpredictable policies on taxation, monetary policy and policy and policy towards exchange rates and exchange controls, high inflation rates, low levels of foreign direct investment and domestic investment, high levels of unemployment and poverty and high incidence of HIV/AIDS in member countries’ most productive age groups, failure to protect property rights and the breakdown in the rule of law, poor corporate governance and the brain drain to developed countries have posed serious challenge to implementation of COMESA’s objectives.

(iii) Many countries may be compelled to institute far reaching reforms in political, economic, legal and institutional terms inorder to compete effectively within a wider market of over 400 million people such as that of COMESA because through regional integration, a nation’s existing fault lines and weakness in economies and policies are exposed, and it takes a lot of political will to implement such reforms because politicians and elites are bound to lose their grip on centralized political and economic decision making
(iv) COMESA has to establish ways of enhancing intra and extra regional exports through global value claims and to benchmark its performance in trade and investment vis-à-vis other regional groupings and international standards and practices.

(v) As competition intensifies among COMESA member states, measures should be taken by governments and private sector bodies to address environmental challenges presented to the earth’s limited capacity to protect the quality of life vis-a-vis target quantities of industrial production through such strategies conservation, preservation, rehabilitation and reduction of dereliction or landscape degradation through pollution, affluent or bad husbandry. It is important to point out that isolated national conservation strategies may not work in some cases and it may be necessary to implement regional conversational strategies to meet regional challenges and ultimately global challenges.

(vi) Other challenges which may need to be tackled include multiple membership by member states which may have a bearing of protocols and agreements ratified by member states.

5.5 Challenges of Zimbabwean companies operating under the COMESA trade regime

a) Zimbabwean companies face daunting challenges operating under the COMESA customs union regime initially because the economy had been in a free fall for over a decade and many companies require funding to recapitalize their operations in order to compete effectively. Zimbabwean companies require working capital and access to international lines of credit and they will be competing for the same resources with other regional companies whose economies have been stable for some time.

b) Zimbabwean companies might need protection to enable them to get off the ground otherwise many of them may be forced to go under due to the weight of the competition because of their high input costs, depressed aggregate demand and low capacity utilization which increases their average costs. As President Paul Kagame of Rwanda pointed out in 2007 regional integration will inevitably produce and losers and winners initially, but he suggested the implementation of compensation mechanisms to provide the least prepared members with time to put in place strategies against initial shocks.
c) There is also the risk of other regional countries dumping their products in Zimbabwe due to lack of competitiveness of local firms. However, the positive side of opening floodgates that Zimbabwean companies will get an opportunity to recapitalize cheaply since raw materials and capital goods will enter the country duty free.

Despites all the challenges associated with regional integration, the merits for regional integration have become so obvious and far reaching and there are heavy costs for those countries and regions that opt out of regional arrangements such as COMESA. Some of the notable achievements of COMESA include:

- The establishment of a single COMESA Customs document to replace previous multiple documents (up to 32 in some countries)
- The establishment of the COMESA third party motor vehicle insurance scheme (yellow card) to allow free circulation of motor vehicles within the region
- The establishment of the COMESA carrier licence to replace individual national permits.
- An increase in formal and informal intra-COMESA trade and a significant reduction of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers

Zimbabwe’s diplomatic thrust therefore has been tailor-made to achieve a strategic fit with COMESA’s vision and objectives of achieving greater socio-economic cooperation with the ultimate objective of creating a prosperous economic community.
Examination Questions

1. Discuss the inherent weakness of COMESA as a regional economic bloc
2. What does Zimbabwe stand to benefit from COMESA membership?
3. Discuss the options for businesses in leveraging available financial and capital resources under the COMESA arrangement.
4. What policy interventions can the Zimbabwe Government implement in order to facilitate the regional integration of COMESA and to benefit from the arrangement?
5. What are the major barriers to competitiveness among COMESA member states?
6. “Value addition in the economy is also value addition in political terms” (Robert G. Mugabe, speaking at the 12th Summit of COMESA Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, 23 May 2007). Discuss the merits of this argument
References

1. COMESA Pre-summit 2008 Document, COMESA, Secretarial, Lusaka, Zambia
2. COMESA Customs Union: Opportunities and Benefits to Anyone, COMESA Secretariat, Lusaka, Zambia
4. Mumbengegwi, S.S Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 16 October 2009
6. The Financial Gazette, August 27 September 2, 2009
President RG Mugabe taking over the Chairmanship of COMESA in December 2008.
(Source The COMESA Secretariat Newsletter 2009)
African Heads of State and Government pose for a group photo during the 13th COMESA Summit held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, in 2008.

(Source The Herald 4 May 2010)
CHAPTER SIX

Zimbabwe and the African Union

Introduction
Zimbabwe relations with the African Union and other African States were defined by the Pan African thrust of its foreign policy which recognized the distinguished role that Africans and the continent in general played in Zimbabwe successful liberation struggle, through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)’s Liberation Committee (the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa) which provided weapons, food and medicines, training and military bases and coordinated moral and other material support to colonized nations fighting for majority rule or independence. In Zimbabwe’s case, the liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU and their military wings ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively, were the main beneficiaries of the OAU’s Liberation Committee’s material and moral support.

Zimbabwe was admitted as a new member state of the OAU in June 1980 and in recognition of the importance of the OAU(AU) as a key guarantor of Zimbabwe’s national interests national security, independence, sovereignty and political and economic prosperity, Zimbabwe observes African Liberation DAY (Africa Day) on 25 May (OAU was established on 25 May 1963) and on that day, Africans are reminded to work towards strengthening the achievements of the African Union. In its diplomatic quest of promoting pan Africanism, African unity and solidarity through the African Union, Zimbabwe had established a total of seventeen Embassies and Consulates in Africa the highest concentration of Missions compared to other regions [Mumbengegwi :2009]. The AU consisted of 52 African states as at 9 July 2002 when it was formed as successor to the OAU. The strong diplomatic representation in the African region was established in order to coordinate Zimbabwe’s foreign policy through the African Union forum in addition to conducting its own international relations on a state by state basis using the African Union forum. Zimbabwe regards African states as an extension of its own state, and in line with its commitment to the African Union project, Zimbabwe had
participated actively in regional development initiatives such as SADC and COMESA which are the building blocs in the political and economic integration process of the African continent. Zimbabwe fully subscribed to AU diplomacy which is based on achieving agreement by consensus among member states. In recognition of its diplomatic role on the African continent Zimbabwe was chosen by the OAU in November 1983 to hold one of the non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council for two years which brought it onto the centre stage of world events and gave it much needed experience in international affairs it had won its independence three years earlier.

6.1 Broad Aims of Zimbabwe Diplomacy within the African Union
Zimbabwe’s diplomacy within the African Union sought to achieve the following broad aims:

- To mobilize diplomatic and moral support for Zimbabwe through African Union institutions
- To monitor political, economic, social and security developments on the African continent with a view to assessing their implication on bilateral, regional and international developments that affect the well being of Zimbabwe.
- To promote trade, investment and tourism linkages between Zimbabwe and AU member states
- To ensure Africa’s ownership of AU institutions and processes, free from outside interference
- To promote African Unity and Solidarity through the AU framework
- To promote, continentally, peace, security and cooperation through African Union structures, by peaceful and diplomatic negotiations, and through collective peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations by AU member states,

6.2 Broad aims of African Union Diplomacy
The broad aims of Zimbabwe’s diplomacy outlined above reinforces the AU’s broad aims which are to ensure and maintain continental unity, peace, security and
prosperity. The AU’s objectives are contained in the AU’s Constitutive Act and include the following

a. Achieve greater unity and solidarity among African countries,
b. Defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence of its members,
c. Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent,
d. Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest, and of the continent and its people,
e. Encourage international cooperation taking due account of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
f. Promote and protect human rights and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on human and people’s rights and other human rights instruments,
g. Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations,
h. Promote sustainable development at the social and cultural levels as well as the integration of the African economies,
i. Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity in order to raise the living standards of the African people

Briefly stated, the broad aims of the AU are;

- To promote the unity and solidarity of African States and act as a collective voice for the Africa continent inorder to secure Africa’s long term political and economic future.
- To eradicate all forms of colonization
- To ensure all Africans enjoy human rights
- To raise living standards of Africans
- To settle all arguments and disputes between member states through peaceful and diplomatic negotiations .
- To achieve agreement in African diplomacy among member states , through consensus

Zimbabwe ‘s Participation in AU Structures}
6.3.1 Assembly of Heads of State and Government
According to the OAU (AU) Charter, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ which decides policy matters binding on AU committees. The Assembly has the power to review AU structures, functions and acts of all the organs of the AU. Each member state has one vote; meetings are held once a year and two-thirds of members states form a quorum. President Mugabe, as Head of State and Government, had religiously attended all OAU\AU Assemblies of Heads of State and Government to represent and defend Zimbabwe’s interests. Zimbabwe hosted the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government, in Harare, from 2-4 June 1997 and President Mugabe was the chairperson of the OAU for a year from 2 June 1997 to 8 June 1998 and Chairperson of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Angola. During President Mugabe’s Chairmanship of the OAU Summit, the 1997 OAU Harare Declaration on an African Common Position on the Perform of the UN Security Council was adopted. African leaders resolved that the UN Security Council should be expanded from the current 15 members to 26 members to embrace both categories of its membership and Africa had to be allocated no less than two veto wielding permanent seats and five non permanent seats.

6.3.2 Council Of Foreign Ministers
The Council of Foreign Ministers is composed of an Assembly of Foreign Ministers of African member states or their representatives and the Council is responsible to the Heads of State and Government by preparing the agenda of Heads of State and Government conferences and making appropriate recommendations arising from standing committees and ad hoc committees which may require the sanction of Heads of State and Government. Zimbabwe had fully participated in such Assemblies through its foreign ministers who were at the helm during such Assemblies.

6.3.3 Peace and Security Council (PSC)
The body that is charged with the AU’s objectives of “promoting peace, security and stability on the African continent” and the “peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the AU through such appropriate measures as may decided by the
Assembly,” is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). According to Article 3 (f) and Article 4 (e) of the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC has the power to authorize peace support missions, impose sanctions in cases of unconstitutional change of government and to take measures it deems appropriate in response to potential or actual conflicts. According to Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act on the PSC, it recognizes the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in circumstances of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and any decision to intervene in a member state is made by the Assembly on the recommendations of the Peace and security council. The PSC first met in 2004 and had been active in resolving conflicts in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Comoros, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cote D’ Ivore, among other countries, by adopting resolutions establishing AU peacekeeping operations. Zimbabwe had participated effectively in AU peacekeeping missions through its defence forces and the police force, in countries like Somalia, Sudan and Angola as part of its contribution to the continent’s objective of promoting peace, security and stability on the African Continent. The PSC is in the process of overseeing the establishment of an African standby force which would serve as a permanent peacekeeping force on the African continent. Zimbabwe is involved in such endeavors which will go a long in promoting peace, security and stability on the African continent. The AU had intervened in some member states in support of constitutionality. For example, when the President of Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema died on 5 February 2005, the AU denounced the naming of his son Faure Gnassingbe the successor, as a military coup. The AU’s diplomatic protest forced Faure Gnassingbe to hold new elections which he won in circumstances of serious allegations of electoral fraud. In Mauritania, a coup which took place on 3 August 2005 led the AU to suspend the country from all AU activities but membership was restored in 2007 following elections which were generally agreed to be free and fair. On 6 August 2008, a fresh coup overthrew the Mauritania government elected in 2007 and the AU once again suspended Mauritania from AU membership. Zimbabwe had lend its support to all these AU endeavours which were aimed at restoring constitutionally to AU states who had transgressed.
At the 14th session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government from 31 January to 2 February 2010 Zimbabwe together with Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria were elected to serve a three year term at the AU Peace and Security Council commencing March 2010. The appointment was an acknowledgement by the AU of Zimbabwe’s strong credentials in this area given the crucial role it had played in peacekeeping operations on the African Continent. The PSC resolves African conflicts by applying African solutions to African problems.

6.3.4 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is an economic development programme of the AU which was adopted at the 37th session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in July 2001, in Lusaka, Zambia. The aim of NEPAD was to provide a policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries. The Origins of NEPAD can be traced to two plans (which were subsequently merged) for the economic regeneration of Africa: The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki in conjunction with the former President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and the OMEGA Plan for Africa developed by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. The leaders of the rich G8 countries endorsed the plan on 2 July 2001 and other international partners including the European Union (EU), China, and Japan, among others, publicly supported the programme.

NEPAD had four primary objectives which are:

- To eradicate poverty
- To promote sustainable growth and development
- To integrate Africa in the world economy
- To accelerate the empowerment of women
NEPAD sought to achieve these objectives through increased investment, capital flows and funding and by providing an African owned framework for development as the foundation for partnership at regional and international levels. When it was launched, NEPAD was based on the underlying principles of commitment to good governance, democracy, human rights, conflict resolution and the recognition that the maintenance of these standards was fundamental to the creation of an environment to investment and long term economic growth.

In July 2002, the AU Durban Summit adopted the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and States participating in NEPAD undertook “took with renewed determination to enforce among other things the rule of law, the equality of citizens before the law, individual and collective freedoms; the right to participate in free, credible and democratic processes, adherence to the separation of powers, including protection for the independence of the judiciary and the effectiveness of parliaments.” The NEPAD Declaration also committed participating member states to establish an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to promote adherence to and fulfillment of its commitments.

Since its inception, there had been tension among AU member states over the place of NEPAD within AU programmes, given its origins outside the framework of the AU, and the continuing dominant role of South Africa where the Secretariat is located. Successive AU Summits and Meetings of Heads of State and Government had proposed greater integration of NEPAD into AU structures and processes. However NEPAD’s main objectives remain uncontested and it had since developed partnerships with international development finance institutions including the World Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Development Bank (ADB), Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), the European Union and the private sector.

The Durban NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance sounded like the Harare Commonwealth Declaration and that partly
explained why it presented some dilemmas to Zimbabwe which was reluctant initially to participate in NEPAD activities. Zimbabwe’s position on NEPAD was that while it fully endorsed the NEPAD process as an African driven initiative, it nevertheless objected to attempts at hijacking NEPAD by donor nations and using it to divide the continent into “good” and bad” Africans with the former being rewarded and the latter being punished.

In response to these concerns, AU leaders dissolved NEPAD on 2 February 2010 at their annual summit and replaced it with a new agency, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and allocated USD 3 million as startup capital for funding the new office. Zimbabwe’s diplomatic concerns had been addressed by this AU move.

6.5 AU’s Resolution of Zimbabwe’s Electoral Crisis

Following the controversial Presidential election run-off of June 2008 which failed to secure SADC and AU endorsement because of the perceived violent electoral environment and biased media coverage a political crisis emerged in Zimbabwe became the focus of debate at the 11th African Union Summit held on 1 July 2008 at Sharm el Sheik, Egypt with some states backing strong action against Zimbabwe, including suspension and the imposition of sanctions. However the summit adopted a resolution that did not suspend Zimbabwe, impose sanctions or demand new elections but instead urged the two main political parties, ZANU (PF) and MDC, to negotiate their differences through SADC mediation resulting in the triumph of Zimbabwe’s diplomacy which aimed at avoiding a fallout which would have resulted in either suspension, sanctions or the requirement of new elections. AU Commission Chairperson, Mr. Jean Ping, could only voice grave concern at the “increasing acts of violence” in Zimbabwe.

The AU body urged the commencement of a sincere and constructive dialogue in order to resolve the problems facing Zimbabwe leading to the creation of a national unity government to heal the deep political wounds. It is important to point out that AU leaders had the legal power to condemn the conduct of Zimbabwe’s June 2008 Presidential election run-off and they also had the power to suspend the membership of the country and to demand new elections but as the 11th Summit of African Heads of State and
Government in Sharm el Sheikh demonstrated, they did not have the political will and some of them lacked the moral authority to do so given the situation prevailing in their own backyards. In the end, AU leaders had to rely on SADC leaders to effect their resolution. It was felt that Zimbabwe’s problems were regional and truly African hence the AU had to move in to facilitate the process of peace and stability through guaranteeing the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and dismissing Western countries’ call for action on Zimbabwe. In a way this was the AU’s response to growing calls for African leaders to set democratic standards for democracy and good governance in order for the AU to remain relevant.

Examination Questions

1. Critically discuss instances in which Zimbabwe offered leadership in OAU (AU) institutions /structures. Did its participation make a difference to African diplomacy? Justify your reasons with concrete examples.

2. Outline those critical aspects of Zimbabwe foreign policy that it shares in common with the African Union.

3. What are strength and weakness AU’s diplomacy which is based on achieving agreement by consensus among member states?

4. Do you believe Zimbabwe’s diplomatic concerns over NEPAD were justified? Give reasons for your arguments.

5. Assess the relevance of the Durban NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Economic and Corporate Governance to the economic development of AU member states.

6. Do you think the AU’s treatment of Zimbabwe at the 11th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Sharm –el Sheikh, Egypt was a good example of African peer review? Give reasons for your arguments.
The Minister of Regional and International Cooperation Professor Simbi Mubako signing a bilateral cooperation agreement with his Tunisian counterpart in Tunis May 1991. (Source ZIANA 1991).
References

1. African Union Constitutive Act, 9 July 2002
2. AU@intern.com
7. Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amb S.S Mumbengegwi
9. NEPDA Declaration, July 2002, Durban, South Africa
13. Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, January 2010
CHAPTER SEVEN
Zimbabwe and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM)

7.0 Introduction
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organization of states which consider themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc and was founded in 1955 in the wake of the Cold War to counter superpower rivalry of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Founding fathers of NAM were India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, former President of Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser and Former Yugoslavia President, Josip- Broz Tito. NAM had 118 member states and 15 observers in 2007 and the membership rose to 132 member states NAM represents nearly two thirds of UN membership and comprise 55% of the world’s population particularly countries considered to be developing or Third World countries. The purposes of NAM as outlined in the Havana Declaration of 1979 was to ensure “the national independence sovereignty territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great powers and bloc politics.” NAM had exposed an ideology underpinned by a commitment to World peace and security and at its 7th Summit in New Dehli, in March 1983, it described itself as “history’s biggest peace movement.” Zimbabwe was elected to the NAM Coordinating Bureau at the 7th NAM Summit in New Dehli.

7.1 Principles of NAM
Interacting and interfacing with the broader international community, NAM member states have been guided by the following principles:

- Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
- Mutual non-aggression
- Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs of other states
- Peaceful co-existence
The above principles served the original objectives of NAM but because NAM had gone fundamental changes since the end off the cold war in response to international political circumstances, it also had to change from the original requirements to membership in order to find relevance after the end of the Cold War. There had been deliberate strategy to fuse the original requirements of NAM membership with the key beliefs of the United Nations to come up with new principles or values that guide NAM membership in line with the need to counter the excesses of the unipolar world. Currently NAM is guided by the following principles:

- Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter
- Respect for the sovereignty and territory integrity of all nations
- Recognition of the equality of all races and the equality of all nations, large and small
- Abstention from interference or invention in the internal affairs of another country
- Respect of the right of each country to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations
- Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country
- Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations
- Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation
- Respect for justice and international obligations.

7.2 The Applications of the concept of Non–Alignment by Zimbabwe

In his address to the United Nations in October 1985, Zimbabwe’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Witness Mangwende, defined the application of the concept of non-alignment in relation to Zimbabwe’s national interests as follows:

“By non–alignment we mean we reserve the right to examine issues/areas of foreign policy on the basis of merit, and within the context, on each occasion, either promoting or protecting our own interests.
The application of the above principle in the conduct of Zimbabwe’s diplomacy can be traced to the position by Zimbabwe on the Iran and Iraq war in early 1980’s, on the Kuwait invasion by Iraq and on the India–Pakistan conflict as examples. Zimbabwe established diplomatic relations with both Iran and Iraq in the early 1980s despite the fact that the two Non-Aligned countries were at war with each other and despite several attempts by both sides and their supporters to away Zimbabwe to support one side or the other, Zimbabwe chose to steer neutral course between the two countries thereby faithfully adhering to its principles (as outlined by Dr Mangwende) and the founding principle of NAM embodied in the meaning of Non alignment. Zimbabwe’s diplomatic position on the Iran-Iraq war can be said to have been derived more from its attachment to NAM as a positive force in the international system rather than any principle of neutrality perse as deep divisions over the Iran – Iraq war would have weakened NAM’s ability to play an effective role on other international issues.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait and occupied it, Zimbabwe took a very strong position on the matter, issuing official condemnation of Iraq’s violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kuwait. The actions of Iraq had breached NAM and UN charter principles i.e., “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means” and Zimbabwe, as a number of both organizations which it fervently supported and believed in, was duty bound to defend these principles in the context Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Zimbabwe had chosen to neutral in the conflict between two Non Aligned countries, India and Pakistan, over Kashmir and maintained sound diplomatic relations with both countries but it condemned the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which was supported by Soviet allies in NAM and was condemned by Islamic Nations of the Non Aligned Movement. It can therefore be seen that NAM, as a organization, has little cohesion since many of its members were closely aligned with either one or the other of the great powers and some of its members were involved in conflict with one another. Zimbabwe, therefore, had to tread carefully in its application of the concept of non alignment, in its diplomacy, given the lack of cohesion among NAM member states.
7.3 Zimbabwe's leadership of NAM

Three years after its independence Zimbabwe leadership to NAM for the first time in 1983 at the 7th New Dehli Summit when Zimbabwe was elected to the NAM Coordinating Bureau. Zimbabwe was the nerve center of NAM diplomacy when then Prime Minister, Robert G. Mugabe hosted the 8th Non Aligned Summit of Heads of State and Government in Harare, from 1-6 September 1986, becoming the chairman of the 101 NAM members. The Harare NAM summit was attended by over 50 Heads of State and Government and included luminary world like Fidel Castro of Cuba, Rajiv Gandhi of India, Col Muammar Gadaffi of Libya, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Yasser Arafat the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader among many others. Coming as it did immediately after Zimbabwe liberation and independence, the Harare NAM Summit was a fitting occasion for revolutionaries around the world to meet and share notes and to express solidarity with the liberation movements the world over and in particular the liberation movements of Southern Africa notably those of ANC and PAC IN South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia. The Harare Summit witnessed a spirited bashing of the United States policies towards NAM member states.

In his key note address to the summit, the Chairman of the Summit and Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert G. Mugabe expressed dismay at arising world military expenditure, a development which militated against world peace and security and was contrary to NAM’s objective of peaceful co-existence. The chairman of NAM also condemned foreign interference, in all parts of the world, in the internal affairs of other states by big powers and called for an end to the Soviet Unions invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnam’s occupation of Union’s Kampuchea, and the United states’ support for CONTRA rebels in Nicaragua and UNITA rebels in Angola.

Prime Minister Mugabe also used the occasion to rally support from fellow African Heads of State and Government to provide economic aid to Frontline States (FLS) who were independent African states-bordering apartheid ruled South Africa as a way of helping liberation movements in that country to dismantle institutionalized racism and achieve independence. The chairman also used the occasion to rally NAM member states
to contribute towards military equipment and training assistance for the armed struggle in South Africa as a way of helping to extend the frontiers of freedom in Southern Africa.

One of the highlights of the Harare NAM Summit was the 75 minutes address by the Libyan leader, Col Gadaffi, in which he attacked the validity of NAM as an organization if it could not defend a member state from attack, in reference to the 15 April 1986 bombing of Tripoli by American jets. Col Gadaffi went on to say “I want to say goodbye, farewell to this funny movement, farewell to this utter falsehood.” Prime Minister Mugabe responded immediately after the address assuring the Libyan that NAM member states condemned the American action but he also advised the Libyan leader to be grateful to NAM for providing him with a platform to address his concerns directly to the United States of America. Col Gadaffi later on said he was not withdrawing from NAM.

As part of NAM diplomatic efforts to resolve the Afghanistan conflict following the SOVIET Union’s invasion of that country, the NAM Chairman, R.G Mugabe, dispatched Zimbabwe’s remove Foreign Minister Dr Nathan M. Shamhuyarira, to Afghanistan to try and bring unity between Mujahideen fighters and Government forces. It was one of the most dangerous and life threatening diplomatic assignment given to a Zimbabwean Envoy. Minister Shamhuyarira had to be provided with an aircraft armed with bullets repellants by the Soviet Union President, Michael Gobarehev, inorder to be able to reach Kabul and Jalalabad which was not accessible by air or by road due to the Mujahedza militants’ hostile military activities and fire power. Dr Shamhuyarira’s place was fired by militants throughout the trip but it was able to reach Kabul and Jalalabad return to the Soviet Union after the completion of the diplomatic appreciated and acknowledgement the potential role that NAM could play in resolving the conflict in Afghanistan, under the chairmanship of Zimbabwe.
7.4 NAM’s Solidarity with Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe had sought and obtained NAM’s diplomatic solidarity on many occasion. One such notable example is the 15th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement which was held in Tehran from 27-30 July 2008. At that meeting, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NAM expressed their support for the resolution on Zimbabwe adopted at the 11th Ordinary Session of the AU Summit held on 1 July 2008 at Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt, which welcomed negotiations aimed at resolving the political impasse in Zimbabwe. The Ministers expressed their unequivocal support for the mediation efforts of SADC, through the facilitation of President Thabo Mbeki. Ministers also expressed their deep concern at the imposition and extension of unilateral sanctions on the country and appealed to all states and parties concerned to refrain from any actions that may negatively impact on the negotiations for a political settlement. They also called for the lifting of arbitrary and unilateral sanctions on Zimbabwe such diplomatic solidarity is crucial especially if a country is going through a difficult political and economic period.

7.5 Challenges facing NAM
During the period under review, Zimbabwe had continued to exercise its diplomacy within the framework of to address the challenges facing NAM, as an international organisation, in the theatre of international diplomacy and these challenges can be summarized as follows:

a. Zimbabwe emphasized the need to restructure the global exercise of political, economic, military and social power to counter the excesses of the unipolar world and unilateralism in world diplomacy. For example, many important world decision were being decided outside the framework of the United Nations system especially by big powers disregarding the concerns of developing countries. Zimbabwe had contributed to this debate arguing that the UN should be the main advocate and custodian of multilateralism in the face of growing unilateralism,
suggested in the process that the UN should be representative, democratic, accountable and development-oriented and that Africa must be fully represented in the Security Council in line with the Ezulwini Consensus on UN reform, to counter superpower bullying and Security Council veto powers. NAM had sponsored many resolutions in the United Nations to correct problems obtaining in developing countries, but most of the resolutions had not succeeded because of superpower bullying and Security Council veto powers. President Mugabe had challenged NAM to lead the process of reforming multilateral financial institutions and in particular the Bretton Woods institutions – IMF and the World Bank – in pursuit of a more equitable global order and for the sake of fairness in the way the two institutions deal with developing countries, by bringing the institutions under the control of the UN General Assembly. President Mugabe had also criticized the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for allowing those who produce nuclear bombs to keep them without being charged for treaty violation while pursuing smaller nations which later produce the bombs.

b. The other challenge facing NAM is to ensure the success of South co-operation with its emphasis on co-operation among developing countries’ organizations like the Group of Fifteen (G15), the Group of Seventy Seven (G77) and other organizations of similar nature as a way of bolstering, collectively, the clout of developing countries vis-à-vis the developed countries and Zimbabwe had been actively involved in promoting that thrust. The problem of poverty and underdevelopment is envisaged to be ameliorated such a strategy.

c. The other challenge facing NAM member state is to influence or persuade richer nations to transfer resources to poorer nations inorder to meet the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDCs)

d. NAM is also faced with the perennial problem of promoting cohesion among its member states given the diverse backgrounds, conflicts among some members and different interests of the members concerned which do not always coincide.
e. NAM accepts universality of human rights and social justice but fiercely resist cultural homogenization in line with its views on sovereignty. NAM appeals for the projection of cultural diversity and tolerance of the religious, socio-cultural and historical peculiarities that define human rights in a specific region. This view is resisted by the most western countries who believe that human rights are universal and should not take historical or peculiarities into consideration.

f. NAM had been struggling to find relevance after the end of the Cold War and had been reinventing itself as an advocate of the issues bedeviling developing countries. Its focus is now on South-South co-operation and the pursuit of policies and practices of cooperation that are multilateral and provide mutual benefits to all concerned. NAM had also been stressing on socio-economic challenges facing member states, especially inequalities manifested by globalization and the pursuit of neo-liberal policies, issues on economic underdevelopment, poverty and social justice as growing threats to peace and security in the world. These are difficult issues which may occupy NAM and Zimbabwe’s diplomacy for many years to come as continue to seek relevance under different international circumstances. NAM will continue to play an important role in international diplomacy and a considerable amount of its work will continue to be undertaken at the United Nations where there is a coordinating Bureau which is the main instrument of directing the work of NAM’s taskforces, Committees and working groups which are involved in various themes which include the Working Group for the restricting of the United Nations, Working Group on Human Rights, Standing Ministerial Committee on Economic Cooperation and the Committee on Palestine. Zimbabwe diplomatic missions at the United Nations become, therefore, critical instruments of coordinating Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in these key areas of NAM’s diplomatic activities.
Examination Questions

1. Do you think NAM is still relevant to Zimbabwe in view of the changed international political circumstances? Argue your case with concrete examples.

2. NAM was formed as an attempt to thwart the Cold War but it has struggled to find relevance after cold war ended.” Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Justify your answer.

3. In which foreign policy areas does NAM’s principles complement Zimbabwe’s diplomatic principles?

4. Document the achievements of Zimbabwe’s leadership of NAM and how such achievements complemented Zimbabwe’s diplomatic successes.

5. “NAM is a bureaucratic talking shop” Do you agree or disagree? Argue with concrete examples.

6. Document cases where NAM can be cited as a positive force in the international diplomatic system.

7. Cite practical examples where the doctrine of South-South cooperation had been implemented by Zimbabwe within the context of NAM.

8. What values and beliefs inform NAM leaders’ choices of the various positions in international diplomacy?

9. Explain how Zimbabwe’s national interests are promoted or enhanced by belonging to NAM.
References
2. Dr N.M Shamuyarira’s interview on ZBC on NAM
3. NAM Havana Declaration of 1979
4. NAM. Facts and Figures National Archives Document, September 1986
5. Speech Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister S.S. Mumbaegwi, 16 October 2009
6. Speech by Zimbabwe’s foreign Minister, Dr. Mangwende, October 1985
7. Speech by Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert G. Mugabe at the 8th NAM Summit, 2 September 1986
8. Speech on NAM by President Thabo Mbeki, 19 August 2004
9. The Herald, 2 September 1986
10. The Herald, 3 September 1986
11. The Herald, 4 September 1986
12. The Herald, 5 September 1986
13. Zimbabwe 8th NAM summit document, September 1986
EIGHTH NAM SUMMIT

Harare, August—Sept 1986
The outgoing chairman of NAM, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India handing over the gavel of chairmanship to Prime Minister R.G Mugabe at the first plenary session. 1September 1986.
(Source; Zimbabwe NAM documents 1986)
CHAPTER EIGHT
Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth of Nations

8.0 Introduction
The Commonwealth of Nations is a loose association of sovereign states which came into existence through a shared experience of British colonial rule and the resultant evolution of a shared framework of values, beliefs and institutions. The Commonwealth organization is therefore a result of an evolutionary process by which the former colonial power, Britain, eventually granted its former colonies complete independence whilst seeking a framework within which ties with the new states could be strengthened after independence. According to Harkness D (1974: 335), cooperation persisted beyond the end of colonial rule because “it suits the members that it should do so.” When it was established, the commonwealth was not meant to compromise the independence and sovereignty of former colonies but to promote those essential aspects which are crucial for advancement and survival of humanity i.e. “multiracial cooperation, development across the frontiers of wealth, dissemination of information and understanding amongst peoples, as well as governments of all races, creed and continents” (Harkness 1974:336). The former Ghanaian president, Nkrumah K (1963) described the Commonwealth as an “association of sovereign states each of which is free from interference from the others, including the United Kingdom. Each decides for itself its own foreign and domestic policies and the pattern of its government….Members have the right to criticize each other and do.” This description of the Commonwealth by Nkrumah is widely accepted by member states as the basis for association

Zimbabwe had taken centre stage within the Commonwealth of Nations, both before and after independence, when various diplomatic initiatives were taken to bring about Zimbabwe’s independence before 1980, and thereafter in 2002, when Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth for breaching, ironically, the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles of 1991 which sets out democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law as the basis of membership.
Zimbabwe’s diplomatic lobby within the Commonwealth of Nations was very solid before independence evidenced by the fact that the Commonwealth was at the forefront of rejecting Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 1965, imposing tough economic sanctions on Rhodesia, and its refusal to recognize the Zimbabwe – Rhodesia Government a development which galvanized international opinion for majority rule in Rhodesia leading to the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 1979 which succeeded in breaking the diplomatic log jam on Rhodesia leading to the Lancaster House Conference Agreement which brought independence under majority rule.

8.1 Commonwealth Diplomatic Initiatives on Zimbabwe before Independence.

The Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which was adopted in January 1971 and the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles adopted in 1991 are the foundation of the modern Commonwealth because they articulate what the Commonwealth believe in and what it is determined to work for or to work against. African statesmen had a key role to play in the crafting of these guiding principles. According to Rubins and Weinstein (1974:280), President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia presented a draft Declaration of Commonwealth Principles at the Singapore CHOGM Meeting (14 – 22 January 1971) which was adopted by 31 members with some amendments. Among some of its provisions are:

- Membership of the commonwealth is compatible with the freedom of member governments to be non-aligned or to belong to any other grouping, association or alliance.
- Racial prejudice was recognized as a dangerous sickness threatening the health development of the human race and each member state was to vigorously combat this evil within its own nation.
• Members sought to overcome poverty, ignorance and disease as a way of raising standards of life and achieve a more equitable international society.

• Members sought to promote the freest possible flow of international trade on terms fair and equitable to all, taking into account the special requirements of the developing countries; bearing in mind the true spirit of partnership.

The Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles was therefore used effectively, immediately after its adoption, to fight racism and subjugation of the majority black populace by a white minority race in Rhodesia, by African nationalists and African statesmen in the Commonwealth. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965 leading to the Singapore CHOGM Summit of 1971 caused feelings to run high in African member states who were keen to assert a specifically African viewpoint on racism within the Commonwealth and the Singapore Meeting provided that opportunity. The subsequent 1973 Ottawa CHOGM Conference and its communique recognized the legitimacy of the liberation struggle to win full human rights and self determination for Africans in Southern Africa and agreed on the need to give every humanitarian assistance possible to the people’s efforts to self determination. The Ottawa CHOGM decision galvanized commonwealth member states, in particular countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Nordic states – Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, among other States, to channel humanitarian assistance and medical supplies to liberation movement of ZANU and ZAPU.

The 1975 CHOGM Conference gave special attention to the Rhodesian colonial problem because of the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Southern Africa which shifted pressure to Britain but there were no major developments on the Rhodesian colonial problem. The 1979 Lusaka CHOGM Conference marked a watershed in the decolonization process of Rhodesia. African Commonwealth member states were very angry at the apparent reluctance by Britain to resolve the Rhodesia colonial problem, and there were vigorous protests by Kenya and
Nigeria with the latter threatening to nationalize British oil companies in Nigeria. The full weight of diplomatic pressure on Britain, however, came from Zambia and Tanzania who were directly affected by the Rhodesia war due to the destabilization activities and bombing raids on guerilla bases by Rhodesia forces which crippled their economy and infrastructure. Sustained diplomatic pressure, through negotiations at the Lusaka CHOGM, led Britain to accepting the need to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia leading to the Lancaster House Conference of 1979. The official communiqué of the conference invited the Zimbabwe – Rhodesia Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith to a constitutional conference in London with ZANU and ZAPU guerilla leaders leading to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 and independence the following year.

The Commonwealth’s diplomatic initiatives on Zimbabwe did not end with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 but were further carried out during the implementation stage of the agreement when the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Sir Shridath Rampal, created the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) which included representatives from Britain, Australia, Canada, Fiji, Kenya and New Zealand which had the mandate to organize ceasefire assembly points where guerilla fighters were to be disarmed and reintegrated into their communities before the elections. The CMF succeeded against all odds in monitoring peace, demilitarizing guerilla forces and Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole’s militias, leading to an election which was declared as free and fair by regional and international observer missions and independence was granted on 18 April 1980 by the colonial power, Britain, which was represented at the Rufaro Stadium ceremony in Harare by the last British Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Soames (who took over from the Zimbabwe – Rhodesia Government led by Bishop Muzorewa) and Prince Charles. Zimbabwe assumed membership of the Commonwealth on independence day.

The history of Zimbabwe’s decolonization is therefore inextricably linked to numerous and positive diplomatic initiatives by the Commonwealth and its member states to amicably resolve the Rhodesian colonial problem and, as such, the decolonization story
of Zimbabwe would be incomplete without the active diplomacy of the Commonwealth of Nations.

8.2 **Relations between Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth after Independence**

Zimbabwe enjoyed warm, cordial and fraternal relations with the Commonwealth after independence in the 1980s and early 1990s and was privileged to host the 12th Summit of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), under the chairmanship of President Robert G. Mugabe, in October 1991, which adopted the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles on 20 October 1991. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration outlined the Commonwealth’s core principles and values, stipulating the criteria for commonwealth membership and redefining and reinforcing what it stands for, believe in and what it is determined to work towards and against. The Harare Declaration reaffirmed the political principles outlined 20 years earlier in the Singapore Declaration making the two Declarations the most important documents of the Commonwealth’s uncodified constitution. The Harare Declaration reaffirmed all the Singapore Declaration principles; i.e. support for individual liberty and egalitarianism, denunciation of racial prejudice and intolerance, eradication of poverty, ignorance, disease and economic inequality; free trade, institutional cooperation and multilateralism but it rejected and removed the principle of international coercion since the Commonwealth was required to stick only to its members’ internal situations.

The following Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 is viewed as integral to the Commonwealth project:

- We believe that international peace and order; global economic development and the rule of international law are essential to the security and prosperity of mankind.
- We believe in the liberty of the individual under the law, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief, and in the individual’s inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which he/she lives.
- We recognize racial prejudice and intolerance as a dangerous sickness and a threat to health development.
• We oppose all forms of racial oppression, and we are committed to the principles of human dignity and equality.
• We recognize the importance and urgency of economic and social development to satisfy the basic needs and aspirations of the vast majority of the peoples of the world, and seek the progressive removal of the wide disparities in living standards amongst our members.


The Harare Declaration was further clarified by the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme of 12 November 1995 which mandated the Commonwealth to stick to its members’ internal situations. The Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme created the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) which was mandated to rule on whether members meet the requirements for membership under the Harare Declaration.

It follows therefore that all the Commonwealth principles are anchored on the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 20 October 1991 which remains the most authoritative reference document on the Commonwealth project.

The Harare Commonwealth Declaration, to the extent that it was approved by one of the foremost critic of British colonial and imperial project in Rhodesia and Southern Africa, Robert G. Mugabe, was viewed favorably within the Commonwealth as a democratic document and its launch in Harare, during the chairmanship of President Mugabe, raised the diplomatic profile of Zimbabwe in general, and in particular that of President Mugabe and his foreign minister, Dr Nathan M Shamuyarira who steered successfully the chairmanship of CHOGM for two years, making Zimbabwe the nerve centre of Commonwealth diplomacy.

Zimbabwe’s political leadership in particular, President Mugabe and Dr N Shamuyarira, took advantage of the consultative framework of Commonwealth meetings to negotiate a wide range of technical assistance schemes, loans, grants and scholarships and fellowships for the benefit of Zimbabwe. In addition to the above cooperation arrangements, meetings of commonwealth Foreign Ministers,
Finance and Defence met from time to time to consult on a wide range of programmes and projects. An interlocking network of exchanges had also developed within the commonwealth involving Zimbabwe government officials and academics – a network which criss-crossed the globe. Through the Association of Commonwealth Universities, many Zimbabwean scholars, professors, and lecturers went on exchange and secondment visits to other Commonwealth Universities. Communication and consultations, through member countries’ High Commissioners across the globe was widespread and Zimbabwe benefited immensely from these Commonwealth diplomatic contacts and exchange of views, through such fora as the Commonwealth Heads of Mission.

8.3 Deterioration of Zimbabwe – Commonwealth Diplomatic Relations and the Subsequent Withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth.

Zimbabwe’s relations with the Commonwealth started deteriorating around 1997 when the British Government categorically refused to fund Zimbabwe’s land reform programme under Tony Blair’s Labor Government, disowning commitments made by the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 to fund the land reform programme in Zimbabwe as part of the settlement package of the constitutional negotiations at Lancaster House, triggering an acrimonious relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe, and in particular between Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Robert Mugabe. The following events in Zimbabwe drew the attention of the Commonwealth, which in turn, activated its internal review mechanism of Zimbabwe’s membership in line with the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of Principles.

(i) In response to Zimbabwe’s quest for funds to enable it to implement its land reform programme, an International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement was launched in Harare in 1998 but the conference failed to agree on the way forward. There was a feeling among the Western countries that it was better to wait and deal with the new leader who was expected to emerge after the June 2000 Parliamentary Elections and the 2002 Presidential Election. This
position was viewed as some “declaration of war” on the incumbent Government which sought in turn to solidify its position and tenure. The West’s view was also seen as brazen interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

(ii) In 2000, the Zimbabwe Government lost the Constitutional Reform Commission Referendum, which it had sponsored, to an alliance of opposition forces ie National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party of Morgan Tsvangirai. The feeling in Government was that the victory of opposition forces was a British sponsored regime change agenda in line with the sentiments that had emerged at the 1998 International Donors Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement. Violent and bloody land invasions started immediately after the referendum results. Although, officially the land invasions were “spontaneous reactions by peasants meant to redress colonial land appropriations by the whites”, given their national character, they had all the hallmarks of a well co-ordinate national strategy. After the June 2000 Parliamentary elections in which the MDC emerged as a force to reckon with by garnering 57 seats against ZANU (PF)’s 63 seats in Parliament, the land invasions intensified with tacit government support and the Zimbabwe government refused to compensate white farmers who were losing their land arguing that the British Government had an obligation to compensate them under the Lancaster House Agreement.

(iii) A stormy diplomatic relationship developed between Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth over Zimbabwe’s land invasions with the “white commonwealth” member states calling such a land reform “racist”, “a land grab”, and a “violation of the rule of law”. The Commonwealth sought to defuse the tension by engaging Zimbabwe diplomatically. In September 2001, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) invited a Zimbabwe delegation to Abuja, Nigeria, in an effort to stop further farm invasions and violence on farms. An agreement was reached between the two delegations in which the Zimbabwe Government was required to stop the violence
on farms, prevent the invasion of further farms, cease the suppression of the opposition and uphold human rights in line with the Harare Commonwealth Declaration but the violence on farms intensified. The Presidential Election of 2002 which was controversially won by Robert G. Mugabe was held in an environment marked by violence against the opposition and intensified farm seizures in line with the fast track land reform programme of government and the Commonwealth Observer Group in its report, indicated that while the actual polling had been peaceful and the secrecy of the ballot assured, it nevertheless condemned the conduct of elections, which in its view were marred by violence, caused by paramilitary youth groups in the run up to the election. The Commonwealth Election Observer Group report concluded that “the elections did not adequately allow for a free expression of the will of the electors and were in violation of the fundamental Commonwealth values and principles, most notably those of the 1991 Harare Declaration”. The diplomatic tension between Zimbabwe and Britain, on one land, and the Commonwealth and Zimbabwe on the other intensified after the release of that report with both sides exchanging undiplomatic language. The Commonwealth Heads of Government had originally rejected a call by Tony Blair to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth immediately before the 2002 Presidential election recommending instead that a three member troika act on receipt of a Commonwealth Election Observer Report, a development which made the outcome of the troika report more predictable.

(iv) The Commonwealth Heads of Government set up a troika comprising leaders of Australia (Chairperson – Mr John Howard), South Africa (President Thabo Mbeki) and Nigeria (President Olusegun Obasanjo) to explore appropriate action in the wake of the Commonwealth Election Observer Mission’s Preliminary Report. The troika decided on 20 March 2002 to suspend Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth for one year pending the curbing of politically motivated violence, restoration of the rule of law and the holding of free and fair elections. The troika also emphasized the Commonwealth’s readiness to assist
Zimbabwe with its land reform processes and to promote national reconciliation between ZANU (PF) and the MDC party.

(v) As Zimbabwe’s suspension came for review after a year, President Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairman of the Commonwealth, with the support of Commonwealth Heads of Government established a Group of Six member states comprising Heads of Government of South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, India, Australia, Canada and chaired by Jamaican President Patterson to explore the appropriate action to take on Zimbabwe and the group ruled 6 to 1 (South Africa being the only dissenter according to 2003 Commonwealth Secretariat Documents) against lifting Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth because of alleged human rights violation and deliberate mismanagement, a decision which was upheld by the CHOGM Abuja Summit in December 2003. President Mugabe who had not been invited to the Abuja meeting, reacted swiftly and withdrew Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth on 7 December 2003. President Mugabe speaking at the ZANU (PF) Conference in Masvingo in December 2003 likened the Commonwealth to George Orwell’s Animal Farm characters where “some animals were more equal than others”. President Mugabe said he would turn his back on the “unholy anglo-saxon alliance”, which ran the Commonwealth. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair was excited about the outcome and said it “was the right outcome” and that it was important for the Commonwealth to “send a strong signal” to Zimbabwe. The New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark also backed the suspension saying “it is not a crisis for the Commonwealth, but it is a crisis for Zimbabwe.”

Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth removed any leverage that Commonwealth countries could exert on Zimbabwe and it resulted in the collapse of the Abuja diplomacy which aimed at keeping Zimbabwe within the Commonwealth. Although the suspension of Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth was largely symbolic, it did damage Zimbabwe’s international standing which made it difficult to access international lines of credit from such institutions like
the IMF and the World Bank and it also compromised its ability to raise money on international money markets. The suspension also meant that Zimbabwe could not benefit from Commonwealth technical cooperation programmes; some students had their scholarships terminated and Zimbabwe could not participate in the 2006 Commonwealth Games, among some of the drastic consequences of loss of membership. Although the suspension of Zimbabwe was controversial because of the perceived vested interests of the “white commonwealth members” – notably Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, it was an irony that Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo helped the commonwealth to retain its credibility by voting for Zimbabwe’s suspension although they had been expected to vote against suspension since their own Observers Missions had approved the 2002 Presidential elections as legitimate. Sometimes in diplomacy there is no easy explanation or logical progression of some positions especially those undertaken in privileged and confidential circumstances such as this one.

Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth is the third occasion that a country had withdrawn voluntarily, after apartheid ruled South Africa withdrew in 1961 in response to Commonwealth members’ condemnation of apartheid and Pakistan withdrawal on 30 January 1972 in protest at the Commonwealth’s recognition of breakaway Bangladesh but rejoined on 2 August 1989. Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth marked the end of a long, fruitful and sometimes acrimonious and stormy diplomatic relationship between Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth dating back to the liberation struggle when ZANU and ZAPU were the only liberation movements recognized by the Commonwealth and other international organizations. It is important to point out that Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth robbed the African Group within the Commonwealth, and in particular SADC countries, of a strong diplomatic partner who could stand up to the “big guns” of the Commonwealth in defence of the African identity and African interests and it is no wonder that the Abuja Summit of 2003 came to an end amidst acrimony and divisions among member states over Zimbabwe.
It can be argued that Zimbabwe made a good decision to quit the Commonwealth voluntarily because it was going to be booted out anyway, sooner rather than later, in a development that could have brought national diplomatic humiliation and shame. This position, however, does not condone the perceived political violence, human rights abuses and the uncoordinated land seizures, which resulted in the collapse of Commonwealth membership as the violations were a clear breach of the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which Zimbabwe had voluntarily agreed to follow as a condition of membership. It is however interesting to draw parallels between Zimbabwe’s disputed Presidential election of 2002 and the violent electoral environment which was linked to the fast track land reform programme which delivered Commonwealth membership suspension, and the disputed and violent Presidential elections of 2001 and 2006 in Uganda which resulted in Uganda being given the honour to host the CHOGM Summit in 2007, raising questions as to whether Commonwealth member states are treated equally regardless of the colour or race of their citizenry especially with respect to the implementation of the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles.

The diplomatic profile of Zimbabwe was, however, very huge during the time of its Commonwealth membership and the Commonwealth principles reinforced Zimbabwe’s foreign policy principles which were backed by then Prime Minister Robert G. Mugabe’s policy of racial reconciliation in 1980 which helped to reposition Zimbabwe as an example of a multiracial society within the Commonwealth family. In contrast, the diplomatic profile of Zimbabwe within the Commonwealth and internationally took a heavy knock with the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in 2002 and its subsequent withdrawal on 7 December 2003, and it may take a lot while to rebuild the same diplomatic profile, assuming that Zimbabwe puts its house in order and resume membership of the Commonwealth, which, according to Commonwealth delegates and civil society bodies at the CHOGM Summit in Uganda, in 2007 will entail a lot of political reform in line with the Harare Declaration.
Examination Questions

1. Identify and discuss the contents of the three documents which outline the values and principles of the Commonwealth.

2. Was the Commonwealth justified in suspending Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth in 2002? Justify your answer with concrete examples.

3. Why did Zimbabwe attract so much attention within the commonwealth to the extent of causing acrimony and divisions among member states?

4. Do you think Zimbabwe overreacted by pulling out of the Commonwealth on 7 December 2003? If yes, why do you think so? If no, why do you think so?

5. Is it sound diplomatic practice to take confrontational stance in International Relations? Give reasons for your argument. What are the limitations of such a strategy?

6. Why do you think Prime Minister John Howard was able to prevail over President Thabo Mbeki and President Olusegun Obasanjo in the Troika’s decision to suspend Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth in 2002? Was this a collapse of African diplomacy or a victory of the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles or both?
References

5. Info@commonwealth.int
CHAPTER NINE:
Zimbabwe and the European Union

9.0 Introduction
Zimbabwe’s relations with the European Union were defined and dominated by the bilateral relationship between Zimbabwe and Britain. When relations between Zimbabwe and Britain were cordial and growing between 1980 and 1994, the relationship between Zimbabwe and the European Union was also booming and cordial. The same relationship applied to Zimbabwe-Commonwealth relations; when relations between Zimbabwe and Britain started to deteriorate, Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Commonwealth also deteriorated. In the context of Zimbabwe’s international relations, Britain, the European Union and the commonwealth had the same concerns and same interests when it involved engaging Zimbabwe diplomatically. The unifying factor and definer of the diplomatic terrain remained Britain. Future studies should closely monitor this relationship to establish the extent to which a country could have sour relations with Britain and yet on the other hand enjoy cordial and booming relations with both the European Union and the Commonwealth.

Zimbabwe and the European Union share a very long and fruitful relationship dating back to the period before Zimbabwe attained independence when the European Union member states, especially Sweden, Norway, Denmark and other progressive states contributed material and moral support towards the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe. The European Union’s contribution after independence was even bigger and developmental in nature until the stand-off between Britain and Zimbabwe over Zimbabwe’s land reform program, allegations of human rights abuses, enactment by Zimbabwe of legislation which restricted democratic space i.e. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and fundamental differences emanating from Zimbabwe’s conduct of its general elections – all these factors also triggered a staff-off between Zimbabwe and the European Union.
9.1 Factors leading to the deterioration of relations between Zimbabwe and the European Union

The deterioration of relations between Zimbabwe and the EU was triggered by a plethora of issues which are inextricably linked to the bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and its colonial master, Britain, over the land reform program. These factors will be given closer scrutiny to help in contextualizing the argument.

(1) In 1997 the British labor government under Prime Minister Tony Blair categorically refused to honor its obligation to fund the land reform programme for Zimbabwe as had been agreed by the conservative government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as part of the Lancaster House settlement package that delivered Zimbabwe’s Independence. There was a feeling in the British labor part, that it could not be obliged to adhere to commitments made by a former government. The personality clashes between the two leaders, Tony Blair and Robert Mugabe did not help matters. As he launches his ZANU PF election manifesto in Harare in February 2005, President Mugabe took on Prime Minister Tony Blair in relationship to his refusal to fund Zimbabwe’s land reform programme and said “So we thank him (British Prime Minister Tony Blair) for his negative attitude. Thank you Mr. Blair for dishonesty, if one party dishonours a contract, the other side is also free to dishonour the contract. That happens with the law of contract and so when he (Blair) said I will keep my money we said we will keep our land”. (The Herald 21 February 2006). The statement signified a complete breakdown in communication between the two leaders.

(2) In 1997, an arms embargo of was imposed on Zimbabwe by the EU in response to Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC war. This embargo was also viewed as a manifestation of the deterioration of relations between Zimbabwe and Britain over the land issues.

(3) In 1998, the EU joined its western allies in refusing to commit itself to funding the International Donors’ Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement which was launched by the Zimbabwe government in Harare in 1998 as a way of raising funds to fund the land reform programme.
Political relations between Zimbabwe and the EU deteriorated rapidly in 2000 when Zimbabwe embarked on a “fast track land reform programme” which resulted in the forcible acquisition of white owned land for distribution to the black majority who had remained alienated to the land due to the colonial policy of disposition of indigenous lands. The introduction of retrogressive legislation like AIPPA and POSA further inflamed the situation together with the perceived political violence on ZANU(PF)’s political opponents during the 2000 parliamentary elections. The EU had responded by passing various resolutions on the situation in Zimbabwe including the resolution on 13 April 2000, 5 May 2000, 6 July 2000, 15 March 2001, 6 September 2001, 13 December 2001, 14 March 2002, 15 May 2002, and 3 July 2002 and as a way of building international pressure on Zimbabwe, these resolutions which condemned various aspects of Zimbabwe’s governance were forwarded to all EU member states, the governments and parliaments of commands Canada, Japan and the USA, Zimbabwe Parliament, President of South Africa, Co-Presidents of ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Commonwealth Secretary General, SADC, Executive Secretary, and the President of the World Bank thereby internationalizing Zimbabwe’s problems with the EU.

(4) On 19 December 2001, then Foreign Minister, Dr. Stan Mudenge, had attended an EU meeting chaired by Belgium’s Foreign Minister Mr. Louis Michel where it was announced to put Zimbabwe under sanctions. Dr. Mudenge said he was told the in the face that EU countries do not want a Mugabe led government because he had taken away their land.

(5) In 2002, the EU introduced sanctions on Zimbabwe which it preferred to call targeted sanctions against individuals members of the Mugabe government” and it claimed that the sanctions were meant to influence political reforms in Zimbabwe. The EU argued it did not have sanctions on Zimbabwe as such, since sanctions would hurt ordinary people and preferred to call them targeted sanctions although the EU had frozen all the lines of credit and all investment from all its member states to Zimbabwe following the passing of the European Parliament Resolution on Zimbabwe of 4 September 2002 which argued EU member states to extent its sanctions and travel ban
on the Mugabe government and it called upon 68 countries to join EU member states in imposing financial and other targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe. This resolution was also forwarded to all the key international players outlined above who had financial leverage over Zimbabwe and the players had the financial muscle to cripple and paralyze Zimbabwe’s trade and financial system and in a way bring to a halt all economic activity as was the case by 2008.

In justifying the measures taken by the EU against Zimbabwe, the EU cited the breakdown of the rule of law, human rights abuses, and the economic and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe and its argument that the presidential elections in 2002 was not free and fair.

(6) The EU rejected the verdict of the March 2005 Parliamentary elections which gave ZANU (PF) a landslide victory and it also rejected the June 2008 Presidential elections run-off results thereby sealing off a diplomatic standoff between the EU and President Mugabe’s government.

(7) The revival of frost relations between the EU and Zimbabwe stated following the formation of the inclusive government involving both ZANU(PF) and MDC elements in February 2009 when the new government set up a ministerial team, headed by Foreign Minister Mumbengegwi to engage the EU on sanctions and the normalization of relations as provided for under article 8 of the Cotonau Agreement, a pact between the EU and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states signed on 23 June 2000 for a 20-year period and revised for the first time in 2005. The agreement is designed to promote and expedite the economic, social and cultural development of African, Caribbean and Pacific states and it contributes to peace and security through the promotion of a stable and a democratic political environment.
Questions
1) Within the context of article 8 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, what needs to be done to normalize diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and the EU?

2) Do you think there is any difference between “targeted sanctions” and “comprehensive sanctions” with respect to the sanctions imposed by the EU on Zimbabwe? Give reasons for your viewpoint.

3) (a) Compare and contrast the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000 and the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 in terms of their objectives.

(b) Do you think Zimbabwe may be caught in yet another political quagmire like that of the Commonwealth unless it implements the political requirements of the Cotonou agreement? Justify your answer with concrete examples.
References
4] Lisbon Declaration on the EU-Africa Summit, 8-9 December 2007.
5] Speech by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Amb Joey Bimha on 9 May 2006 at a reception to mark Europe Day.
6] Speech by Dr Stan Mudenge, Former Foreign Minister at a Debt Forum.
8] Various speeches by President Mugabe on Zimbabwe-EU Relations.
9] Various Speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amb S.S Mumbengegwi on Zimbabwe- EU Relations.
CHAPTER TEN
Zimbabwe and the United Nations

Introduction
Zimbabwe was admitted to the United Nations (UN) membership on 25 August 1980 following its achievement of independence from British colonial rule on 18 April 1980; a development which brought it into the center stage of world events and international diplomacy and gave the new nation state much needed international exposure and experience. Zimbabwe diplomacy during the period, was aimed at developing a network of solidarity and cooperation framework with the majority of United Nations member states in order to promote its domestic political, economic and social agenda and to reinforce the United Nation’s global mandate of maintaining international peace and security. Zimbabwe had participated in and subscribed to the global initiatives and declarations held under the auspices of the United Nations style which helps to craft the international community’s shared values, goals and strategies for the advancement of humanity and the conference included:

- Basic education for all by year 2000 (Jomtien 1989)
- World Summit on Children (New York, 1990)
- International conference on Nutrition (Rome, 1992)
- International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994)
- The 21st Universal Postal Union Congress (Seoul, 1994)
- World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995)
- Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995)
- Shelter/Habitant (Istanbul, 1996)
- World Solar Summit (Rome, 1996)
- World Solar Summit (Harare, 1996)
- Conference on Postal Reforms (Geneva, 1997)
- World Telecommunication Development Conference (Buenos Aires, 1994; Valetta 1998)
• The Millennium Summit (New York, 2000)

The Zimbabwe government had used conference diplomacy effectively by embracing the recommendations of those United Nations global conferences in its development priorities and strategies as a way of attending to some of the pressing issues confronting Zimbabwe as a nation and the international community in general. Zimbabwe was therefore able to obtain considerable assistance from the United Nations to realize its commitment to those global initiatives because of its faithfulness and active diplomacy towards the shared values, goals and strategies of such United Nations global conferences.

10.1 The United Nations’ Response to the Zimbabwe Government’s Development Challenges

The United Nations through its various agencies, had played a key role in the development agenda of Zimbabwe since independence, guided by the principles and ideals of the United Nations as well as the national aspirations and priorities of Zimbabwe. According to the Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF); 20078 – 2011), which was formulated by the government of Zimbabwe and the United Nations Country Team (UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNAIDS, UNFPA) among others, development assistance was focused round the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which were agreed to by 189 heads of states and governments at the Millennium Summit of September 2000, in New York and launched in Zimbabwe by President Mugabe on 11 September, 2005. Development assistance by the United Nations agencies focused on six major themes that characterized the main elements of Zimbabwe developmental thrust.

a) Governance and Human Rights
b) Poultry, Economy and Employment
c) HIV and AIDS
d) Population and Basic Social Services
e) Agriculture, Land and Environment
f) Gender
A brief analysis of the these key areas of intervention by the United Nations will highlight the progress made and challenges which are still being encountered

**a). Governance and human Rights**

United Nations agencies had assisted the Zimbabwe government to carry out a comprehensive constitutional reform program, starting in 1999 with a view to promote political pluralism, increase people’s participation in the political process, promote tolerance of oligercent views, promote transparency in governance arrangements and to realize long term political stability through a home grown and nationally owned constitution. several programs were also launched to achieve sound governance and one of them was the Rural district Councils Capacity building Program which was launched at the end of 1994 as a means to aid the implementations of the Rural District Council Act with the aim of ensuring that RDCs are strong enough to assure responsibility for development planning and the effective delivery of services in education, health, water supply and sanitation, housing roads, and commercial development and urban planning and management.

Zimbabwe had also demonstrated its commitment to fulfilling United nations human rights requirements by rectifying or acceding to the following major international human rights instruments;

- 1949 Conventions and their two 1997 Additional Protection
- 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees
- Zimbabwe national commitment to human rights has also been demonstrated by the ratification of the following international Conventions and Covenants:
  - Convention on the right of the Child (Ratified 1990)
  - international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (Ratified 1991)
  - International Covenant on Civil and political Rights (ratified 1991)
  - international convention on the elimination of racial discrimination (ratified 1991)
  - convention on the elimination of discrimination against women (ratified 1991)

It is pertinent to point out that two major conventions remains unsigned: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age for Child Labor.

The country is still facing a number of challenges in the area of human rights especially with respect to political rights and women's rights and future United Nation efforts will continue to be exerted in these areas in conformity with the United Nations’ role as the guardian of all human rights. the United Nations agencies’ role was that of supporting the capacity of Zimbabwe's national institute to demonstrate and implement required and international instruments in their respective areas of mandate including strengthening the capacity of Zimbabwe to mainstream human rights to all development programs.

(b) Poverty, Economy and Employment

Zimbabwe pursued a poverty reduction agenda to address the country's economy downturn (between 1997 to 2008) caused by a plethora of issues among them recruitment dropouts which spearhead food insecurity poor economy mismanagement leading to hyper inflation, high unemployment, shortages of goods and services and foreign currency the loss of skilled labor to Diaspora and strained relations with West conveyed with the imposition of economic and political sanctions which led to in aid flows and the restriction of trade and investment activities leading generally to the decline of economy. the United Nations agencies played a critical humanitarian role which ensured provision of relief food and agriculture inputs and in the development of capacity at household community and natural lands in order to rebuild livelihoods and ensure sustainable development.

(c) HIV and AIDS

The Un agencies intervention were aimed at combating HIV and AIDS prevalence rates and reducing pressure on the health delivery system in Zimbabwe. the Zimbabwe governance in conjunction with its developments partners especially UN agencies were able to reduce HIV and AIDS prevalence rate at a time when Zimbabwe was excluded
from benefitting from the Global Fund on HIV and AIDS due to political differences with the western countries. Zimbabwe relied mainly on the National Aids Levy to its programmers whilst developments partners concentrated on institutional capacity to respond to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, essential health sector imports e.g. (ARVs), provision of water and sanitation and care and support of orphans.

(d) Population and basic social services
The focus of UN agencies' role in this area had been that improvement in access to good quality and equitable basic social services especially in the education and health sectors.

(e) Agriculture, land and environment
The UN's intervention in this area was based on the understanding that agriculture contributed between 14% and 18% of the GDP, over 40% of national exports, 60% of raw materials to agro-industries it provided livelihood to over 70% of the population and every layed about 1/3 of the formal labor force (Zimbabwe United Nations Assistance Frameworks 2007-2011:1)
Zimbabwe was also dependents on its own natural resources especially land for agriculture, forests, wildlife and aquatic life as well as minerals for the generation of employment, household income and foreign exchange (ZUNDAF 2007 - 2011:8).
restoring food security at household and national level became a priority for the Zimbabwe government in conjunction with its cooperating partners. UN agencies focused on improving agricultural productivity and this improve livelihood, income and food safety needs for the most vulnerable and increasing awareness and enhancing the capacity of local authorities to monitor and promote the sustainable use and management of natural resources. some of the strategies enjoyed included review of the agricultural sector and drought arrogation policies, improved gender sensitive agricultural services, improving farmers timely access and adequate supply of agricultural inputs; improving sustainable farming systems, improving farmers' access ands security of tenure and reducing post harvest losses and improving farm income (ZUNDAF, 2007-2011:13)
(f) Gender

The thrust of the UN agencies’ efforts in this area was to reduce the negative social, economic, political, cultural and religious practices that sustain gender disparity by helping the Zimbabwe government to mainstream and institutionalize gender in all sectors including support in terms of human and financial resources. Strategies employed included the design and implementation of broad-based pro-froar and pro-women empowerment programs, the meaningful participation and equal representation of women in politics, decision making and leadership positions through the provision of supportive environment, provision of adequate resources for campaigning and the general provision of educational opportunities for women as well as training for transformational leadership.

Zimbabwe’s multilateral diplomacy outlined above was therefore aimed at working effectively with UN agencies and other international organizations to achieve its national development goals, aspirations and priorities in line with the pursuit of its natural interests. Promotion of national ownership, capacity building and participating process have remained the pillar of UN interventions in cooperation with Zimbabwe government. There were times however when the Zimbabwe government felt that UN agencies and their international cooperating partners were exceeding their mandate by interfering in the internal political affairs of the country especially during election periods. Food distribution and other relief work were at times suspended by the government as a result of such accusations and it is the poverty stricken people, the beneficiaries who were the losers in such diplomatic disputes.

It is also pertinent to note that between 2004-2007, there was no United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Zimbabwe and this absence of critical donor support seriously diminished the country's capacity to deliver basic services to the people.
10.2 Zimbabwe’s position on UN reform

Zimbabwe had argued vociferously in support of the reform of the United Nations at both regional and international fora so that the UN could serve as the main advocate and construction of multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism in world diplomacy. Zimbabwe believed that if the UN member states both big and small advocated and uphold the values of multilateralism thus UN would be in a better position to fulfill its aims as enshrined in article of the UN Charter of 1945 which are:

a) To maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustments or settlements of international disputes or situations that might lead to breach of the peace.

b) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of people and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

c) To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms from all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion and

d) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Zimbabwe had also argued that the principles of the United nations should guide all member states whether big or small - in their international relations in order to make the
world a more peaceful and prosperous place. Such principles are contained in Articles of
the UN Charter and are as follows:

i) The UN is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members

ii) UN members shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present charter.

iii) All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace; security and justice are not endangered.

iv) All members shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force
against the territorial integrate or political independence of any state or in a manner
inconstant with the purposes of the UN.

v) All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter.

vi) The UN shall ensure that any states which are not members of the United Nations Act
in accordance with theses principles so far as maybe necessary for the maintenance of the
international peace and security

Zimbabwe was concerned by the fact that these UN aims and principles which are
centered to international law and the system of collective international peace and security
were not being adhered to by some big powers who pursue unilateralism and national
interests considerations at the expense of universal values, peace and world harmony.
Zimbabwe did not see any justification in maintaining the monopoly powers of Security
Council as currently constituted which was created at San Francisco in 1945 by the five
big powers that won the Second World War, i.e. the USA, UK, China, France and Russia.
Of the UN’s 189 members, 15 member states are allowed to sit on the Security Council
and only five of these states are permanent members of the security council (ie USA, UK,
China, France, Russia) with a veto power to stop any decisions they do not like or if they
think the decision is not in their national interest. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was
therefore ceased with the UN reform agenda to ensure that the UN remains democratic,
representative, accountable and development oriented. Zimbabwe fully identified with
the African position on UN reform commonly referred to as the Ezulwini Consensus
whose main elements include the allocation to Africa in the Security Council of two permanent seats and two additional non permanent seats.

In arguing for the reform of the United Nations at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2007, President Mugabe's address emphasized the need to counter the influence of the big powers by reinvigorating the UN General Assembly to become more active in all areas and including the area of peace and security. President Mugabe argued that Zimbabwe was for a United Nations that recognizes the equality of sovereign nations and the peoples whether big or small and that Zimbabwe was averse to a body in which the economically and militarily powerful behaved like bullies trampling on the rights of the weak and smaller states as had happened in Iraq without UN mandate which is against international law.

On UN membership President Mugabe had criticized the fact that Africa was the only continent not represented in the UN Security Council whilst acknowledging that the General Assembly is the most representative organ of the united nations.

President Mugabe had earlier reiterated the need for the UN Security Council reform at the 58th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2003 when he argued:
"the reality today is that we can not treat the UN as given. The international arrangements in place were relevant only for a specified period and must inevitably be adapted, transformed or even radically modified as material circumstances have changed and prevailing meanings and purposes have been challenged by new inter subjective voices. In this unipolar world of today what can the Security Council do to one of its members whose actions threaten world peace?”

Zimbabwe also supported Africa’s position that either the veto power be scrapped for all permanent members or it be extended to all permanent members. The veto powers had frustrated the effective participation of many developing countries in the work of the United Nations. As Bennett et al (2007:54) put it “the applicability of the veto even outside the strict area of peace and security such as charter amendments, admissions of members and the selection of a Secretary General withstood all attacks and remained a bastion of great power privilege”
In arguing for the reform of the United Nations, Zimbabwe’s foreign policy during the period under review sought to advance the view that UN member states – whether big or small – should observe, respect and abide by the provisions of the UN Charter which constitute the fundamental law or constitution of the United Nations and which provides clear guidelines and focal point for state law practice. Any disregard of these established principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter served to undermine the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

**Zimbabwe’s Engagement with the Security Council of the United Nations**

On 24 June 2008, the UN Security Council for the first time, publicly condemned in a statement the conduct of Zimbabwe’s Presidential election run-off and placed squarely the blame for violence, intimidation and denial of free campaigning on the Zimbabwe government.

The statement had also condemned the Zimbabwe government’s suspension of humanitarian organizations’ operations which had affected 1.5 million people including children. The UN Security Council statement had been endorsed by South Africa and China indicating a major diplomatic shift by Zimbabwe’s key allies at the UN Security Council. The UNSC statement was a watered down version of the statement that had been proposed earlier by the British government.

On 11 July 2008, China and Russia vetoed against a Security Council Resolution that would have imposed targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe, imposed an arms embargo as well as travel and financial restrictions on President Mugabe’s government. Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to the UN, Amb. B Chidyausiku, had argued before the vote took place that Zimbabwe did not pose a threat to international peace and security to warrant the sanctions. Nine countries had voted in favor of the resolution while Libya, South Africa and Vietnam joined China and Russia in voting against it arguing that the resolution if adapted would undermine talks which were underway in South Africa between the opposition and the Zimbabwe government leadership.

Although the Zimbabwe government won the diplomatic battle, a strong signal had been ncommunicated to the Zimbabwe government leadership that world opinion was shifting and that it had to compromise in the talks which resulted in the Global Political
Agreement of September 2008 and the formation of an inclusive government in February 2009.

On 11 December 2009, those proposed resolutions condemning widespread human rights abuses in Sudan and Zimbabwe failed to plan a UN committee when the committee was divided between African and Western nations. South Africa’s permanent representative, Pitso Montwedi argued that “the African groups remains unwavering in its total rejection of the country specific resolution within the UN because they run against the principles of “friendly cooperation” that underlie UN actions”. Although Zimbabwe survived the censure, its human right need was more and more under scrutiny by the international community and it has to put its house in order.
Examination Questions

1) Outline the role of the United Nations Security Council in terms of:
   (a) Its origins and mandate
   (b) Its success and failures in implementing its mandate

2) Discuss why nation-states have retained their positions as primary political units of international relations despite the proliferation of successful international organizations on the world stage

3) What arguments has Zimbabwe proffered in advancing reforms of the United Nations? Justify your answer quoting recent developments in international relations.

4) When a member state brings a dispute to the Security Council, what procedural steps are taken in the resolution of a dispute?

5) Discuss why most international organizations operate at the level of consent, recommendations and cooperation rather than through comprehension or enforcement.

6) Discuss the several ways in which UN agencies have responded to Zimbabwe’s development challenges between 2000 and 2008.
President Mugabe addressing the 60th session of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization at Rome’s FAO Headquarters 2005. (Source: The Herald 2005)
President Mugabe addressing the United Nations General Assembly (Source: The Herald 2005)
References


3) Magwenzi, G (2009) Speech given by the Head of the Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zimbabwe to commemorate 64 years of the existence of the United Nations, Harare (23/10/09)


5) Mumbengegwi, S.S (2009) Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zimbabwe, on the 16th October 2009, Harare

6) Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals. 2004 Progress Report, Published by the Government of Zimbabwe with support from UNDP Zimbabwe


CHAPTER 11
Zimbabwe’s Look East Foreign Policy

11.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe’s “Look East” Foreign Policy was officially launched by President Mugabe on 6 December 2005 when he presented his State of the Nation Address to the Parliament of the Republic of Zimbabwe. In his address, President Mugabe declared that “Zimbabwe is looking east and there is no looking back”. The President commended the Asian nations for their unwavering support, both during the liberation struggle when the eastern bloc countries like China, Russia and other Asian countries provided shelter, material and moral support to Zimbabwe’s liberation movements of ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA respectively and after independence when the same countries proved to be Zimbabwe’s all weather friends by continuing to assist Zimbabwe in all sectors of the economy and in creating new trade, investment and tourism opportunities especially at a time when the western countries had imposed a sanctions regime on Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe’s Look East Foreign Policy was officially adopted by the government in 2005 following the imposition of a defacto and dejure sanctions regime by the EU countries, the USA and some western countries notably Canada, Australia, and New Zealand which resulted in the economic meltdown of the Zimbabwean economy. The Look East Foreign Policy was not aimed at excluding western countries from having constructive bilateral and multilateral relationships with Zimbabwe but to encourage them to rethink their strategy because the eastern bloc countries could easily fill in the gaps left in the process of disengagement. The Look East Policy, therefore, challenged the western countries to rethink whether their diplomatic posturing was furthering or endangering their economic interests, both in the short, medium and long term.

In launching the Look East Foreign Policy, the Zimbabwe government intended to increase cooperation with a number of countries in Asia and the Far East with a particular focus on China, Iran, Indonesia, India and Malaysia and in the process break the west’s economic stranglehold on Zimbabwe.
11.1 Zimbabwe – China Bilateral Relations

Zimbabwe – China bilateral relations had dominated Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy because of the huge volume of mutually beneficial cooperation activities between the two courtiers. Zimbabwe-China bilateral relations are based on mutual trust and respect and they date back to the colonial period when China supported Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle materially and morally. Diplomatically, Zimbabwe had, since independence, supported the One – China policy as a way of upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Zimbabwe regarded Taiwan and Tibet as part of mainland China.

According to the Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe, H.E Mr Xin Shunkang, China had provided at least US$ 300 million in aid to Zimbabwe from 2006 to 2009. A further US$260 million was provided in 2009 to support Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector through the purchase of inputs and machinery for the revival of the agricultural sector and the secondment of experts in the area of animal diseases control, fisheries and grain. Other bilateral cooperation activities between the two countries included the following:

- The level of Sino – Zimbabwe trade for 2005 was US$283 million according to the Zimbabwe China Business Council (ZCBC). The tend in trade activities between the two countries suggest a surge in bilateral trade.

- Tobacco is Zimbabwe’s major export to China but the volume is very small compared to China’s insatiable demand for tobacco which is used for blending purposes in cigarette manufacturing.

- China has a keen interest in developing Zimbabwe’s mining and agricultural sectors. China is involved in some joint venture mining projects with state companies in Zimbabwe. In mining, China’s main interests, in order of importance are copper, zinc, lead, gold, nickel, chromium, silver, platinum, tin, stannum, tantalum, manganese, iron, diamonds, lithium, cobalt, coal and coke among other minerals which are needed for infrastructural development and its industrial growth.
In the transport sector, China supplied Air Zimbabwe with three MA60 aircrafts in 2005 and 2006 at a time its fleet had been depleted and when Air Zimbabwe needed short range aircraft to service its huge domestic and regional markets. Cooperation in the aviation industry between China and Zimbabwe was meant to rebuild Zimbabwe as a regional aviation hub. The aircrafts were meant to fly the Bulawayo and Victoria Falls domestic routes and the regional routes of Johannesburg, Lusaka, Lilongwe and Lubumbashi. China also supplied 135 conventional buses and 41 minibuses to ZUPCO, a state owned company and further replenishment of ZUPCO’s fleets had been a regular activity since 2005.

China, together with India supplied the country with essential equipment for the rural electrification programme.

China shipped into Zimbabwe 3000 tonnes of maize in 2005 as a way of alleviating food shortages and improve the standard of life of the ordinary people.

China had, between 1980 and 2006, availed more than 300 million Yuan in different areas of cooperation such as agriculture, sport and rural development, according to Zimbabwe’s then Minister of Finance, Dr. Herbert Murerwa (The Herald, 19 January 2006). The giant National Sports Stadium and the Magamba Hockey Stadium in Harare were build through Chinese technical cooperation.

China had also helped the Zimbabwe government to build district hospitals in some rural areas and other infrastructural projects such as schools, roads and agricultural demonstrating centers in addition to humanitarian assistance programs.

Chinese investors has shown a keen interest in mining, agriculture, manufacturing and the retail sectors with business delegates from China visiting Zimbabwe regularly to explore opportunities.

As part of the look east policy thrust, the Zimbabwe – China Business council (ZCBC) was officially launched by Vice President Joyce Mujuru and the former Chinese Ambassador, Mr Zhang Xianyi, at the Harare International Conference Centre on 30 September 2004. The key objectives of ZCBC were:

- To promote trade between Zimbabwe and China
To create an awareness in Zimbabwe of trade and investment opportunities and political developments in the People’s Republic of China

To serve as an advisory body to the Zimbabwe government on matters relating to Zimbabwe’s trade and economic relations with the People’s Republic of China

ZCBC had been involved in several activities aimed at promoting win-win bilateral linkages which included the following:

- High profile bilateral visits between China and Zimbabwe which resulted in the identification of trade, investment, tourism and joint venture projects and the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties in some cases.

- High level trade and investment missions to China were carried out by Zimbabwe government officials. Several trade and investment seminars were held in China especially in the Yunnan Province of China to publicize trade and investment opportunities in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean companies participated at the China International Fare for Trade and Investment (CIFTI) from 8-11 September 2006.

- A Chapter of the Zimbabwe – China Business Council was launched in Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China, on 15 November 2006 which is being used by Zimbabwe as a vehicle to penetrate Chinese markets and financial investments.
Challenges relating to Zimbabwe-China bilateral relations

Although bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and China have grown from strength to strength especially after the launch of Zimbabwe’s Look East policy in 2005 based on the values of equality, mutual trust and respect, the relationship had not lived up to expectations especially in terms of breaking up the west’s economic stranglehold on Zimbabwe and creating a robust economy locally. A number of factors will be explored to explain this apparent lack of momentum in realizing the “great leap forward” as had been anticipated by Zimbabwe through the Look East Policy:

a) Zimbabwe had not attracted the much needed foreign direct investment (FDI) from China because Zimbabwe had defaulted on some due payments for a number of transactions with China and hence China’s apparent reluctance to invest in an economy where return on investments is not always guaranteed. China had demonstrated through its economic plans that it was in business to make money and the emphases on historical ties was only relevant if it translated to business opportunities and the growth of its economy. Zimbabwe’s financial institutions had therefore failed to obtain cheaper offshore funding and lines of credit from China, as provided for under the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009, because of the failure to service some previous loans.

b) Despite Zimbabwe’s apparent whole hearted commitment to the Look East Policy and in particular to the Sino-Zimbabwe relations, it would appear that Zimbabwe did not feature prominently in China’s grand plans for the African continent judging by China’s Going Global Strategy which was outlined in its Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, it is encouraging its leading state corporates to establish effective operations in designated Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in foreign countries, and the first SEZ in Africa was established in February 2007 in Chambishi in the heartland of Zambia’s copper belt region and it is reported that 3500 local jobs had been created as a result. China is a major player in Zambia’s copper mines and in South Africa’s ferrochrome industry. The special economic zones with manufacturing clusters are expected to assist Chinese companies to expand into new markets on the African continent. The SEZs create jobs and export earnings
for local citizens through the clustering effect in Africa economies which helps to move away from simple resource extraction to expanded beneficiation activities. Another Chinese SEZ in Africa had been established in Mauritius, a strategic investment destination considering its offshore financial status and strong trading links with Africa as well as South Asia. It is anticipated that the Mauritius SEZ will earn over US$200 million annually in export earnings when fully operational and the Mauritius Prime Minister Mr. Navinchandra Ramgoolam, described it as “China’s springboard for entry into Africa”. Other Chinese SEZs are being mooted in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. It is therefore imperative to note that China is using its developmental strategy which originated from the market liberalization experiments of its special economic zones that were set up along the Chinese coastal provinces in the mid-1980s to rollout similar special economic zones in targeted African countries which will create hubs for Chinese capital investment, and help to trigger the broad market reforms and stimulate economic growth in the recipient countries through the development of well functioning industrial clusters. The China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUD), a venture capital fund for Chinese firms to tap into when investing in Africa is spear heading the financing of Chinese companies intending to set-up in these zones. A reassessment of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy, in the light of China’s Grand Strategy in Africa is therefore imperative to ensure that it remains relevant and is aligned to China’s Global and African strategy. There is a real danger that Zimbabwe may enjoy excellent political relations with China but fail to capitalize on such sound relations to achieve win-win economic benefits which is a key future of China’s global strategy. As it stands, Zimbabwe is not a targeted African country in terms of China’s global strategy and there is a need to interrogate why this is the case despite the existence of a well defined Look East Policy which has a strong focus on China.

c) China needs to do more to spruce up its image in Zimbabwe and in Africa in general because of the sub-standard products which it is bringing on the Zimbabwean and African markets. Such products, derisively known as “Zhingzhong” had created the general impression that the Chinese produce low
grade electrical, machinery, clothing and other items, with some Africans accusing it of dumping shoddy products on the African continent. Responding to the growing belief that China produces poor quality products its Vice Foreign Minister in charge of African Affairs, Mr. Zhai Jun said the money offered by the consumer always determines the quality of the products they would get and that Chinese companies conform to market dictates. Mr. Zhai Jun further explained that China, as the world’s workshop, manufactures a variety of products to suit all market categories (The Herald 5 May 2010). Some Zimbabwean sectors such as textile and clothing have bemoaned losing a significant portion of their market share to Chinese products which were much cheaper than locally produced goods particularly the lower end market segment, which had been significantly affected. However poor quality Chinese products enjoy great demand from poor, low income and marginalized customers who could otherwise not afford high quality, expensive products due to high poverty levels stemming from global recession, political and economic instability and high levels of unemployment. Chinese investors have been accused of bringing their own labor force even for manual operations in some sectors thereby depriving locals of potential jobs. Suspicion also arises from lack of transfer of technology in some of their investments and these are some of the issues which need to be tackled to spruce up China’s image in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. Zimbabwe therefore needs to develop her own strategic economy agenda with the Chinese to ensure that Zimbabwe does not become a huge market for cheap imports from China whilst at the same time ensuring that Zimbabwe’s vast natural resources are not exploited by the Chinese without value addition benefits to Zimbabwe’s economy.

d) Zimbabwe needs to guard against the development of an unequal relationship between China and Zimbabwe similar to the relationship that developed between African countries and their colonial powers, a potentially development which is realized by both Chinese and African leaders. Zimbabwe, with a weak and decimated economy, may be tempted to enter into some unsustainable bilateral relationships like mortgaging it natural resources in exchange for capital in an arrangement which could result in Chinese state-owned capitalist corporation
benefiting more than Zimbabwean economy. A dependent relationship may also
develop thereby defeating the win-win economic partnership model. Zimbabwe
needs to be aware that China means business and is not in Zimbabwe and Africa
to “sloganeer and reminisce about the good old days of the liberation struggle that
were waged on the African continent in the 1960s and 1970s” but is in Zimbabwe
and Africa to benefit from the vast natural resources available in order to fuel her
continued industrialization, economic growth and infrastructural development.
Therefore in engaging China, the world’s fastest growing economy- Zimbabwe
should be careful not to be squeezed out, by ensuring that it redirects its
development trajectory to make her economic revival more meaningful, enduring
and sustainable. Zimbabwe should therefore be careful and caution when she
enters into economic and financial agreements with China to ensure that she
safeguards her long term strategic interests.

e) Another challenge relating to the bilateral relationship between Zimbabwe and
China has to do with the language barrier. The majority of Zimbabweans do not
understand or speak the Chinese language and this makes it difficult to understand
the Chinese culture of doing business or put differently this makes it difficult to
appreciate Chinese ideas, beliefs, attitudes and predispositions that inform
business practices. The challenges is to set up Chinese Language Centers at major
training institutions like State Universities and Colleges backed up by experienced
instructors and library resource materials as a way of buttressing the Look East
Policy. The setting up of a Chinese Confucion Center at the University of
Zimbabwe is a welcome development but more needs to be done nationwide in
that respect.

f) In analyzing Zimbabwe’s Look East Foreign Policy the focus had been
deliberately on China although there are many bilateral cooperation activities
taking place with countries like India, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
China’s relationship with Zimbabwe overshadows these other relationships hence
the deliberate bias but that is not to say that these relationships are
inconsequential, they do overally contribute significantly towards the economic
well being of Zimbabwe and are therefore equally important. However the point needs to be made here that Zimbabwe does not need to Look East but to focus on both East and West at the same time as a viable strategic agenda. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy should therefore aim to achieve that strategic balance as a way of managing the interest of the country in the short, medium and long term; that way, the country will have many strategic options at its disposal at any given moment.
Examination questions
1) Evaluate the achievements and failure of Zimbabwe’s Look East Foreign Policy between 2005 – 2008

2) “China is Zimbabwe’s all weather friend” Discuss the merits and demerits of this argument.

3) Assess the challenges relating to Zimbabwe-China bilateral relations and how these could be managed.

4) What strategies should Zimbabwe employ to attract investment from China, justify your arguments.

5) Draft a policy paper recommending how Zimbabwe could fit into China’s “going global strategy”

6) “China has a strategic economic agenda in Africa” Outline and discuss the key features of such a strategic economic agenda.
References

1. The Financial Gazette, 14 -20 December 2006. Mbeki Cautions on Sino-Africa relations page 11

2. The Financial Gazette, 10 – 16 December 2009; The Look East Policy Poisoned Chalice p8

3. The Herald 8 December 2005; Look East Policy unlocks investment opportunity, p1

4. The Herald 19 January 2006; China to boost its ties with Africa pB11

5. The Herald 19 January 2006; China Donates MA60 Aircrafts p4

6. The Herald 1February 2006; Sino-Africa Cooperation Hailed pB2

7. The Herald 16 December 2009; China Key to Africa’s Growth p7

8. The Herald 8 November 2009; Emulate China says President, pp1

9. The Herald 8 November 2009; China -Zimbabwe in new aid package, p1

10. The Herald 21 November 2009; China’s Aid to Zimbabwe p1

11. The Herald 5 May 2010; China Denies Exporting Inferior Products, pB3

12. The Sunday Times 30 May 2010; What’s Good for China could be good for Africa p11


CHAPTER TWELVE

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement as instruments of Zimbabwe’s Diplomacy

12.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe had used effectively its peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as instruments of its international diplomacy. Zimbabwe’s defence forces; the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Airforce of Zimbabwe (AFZ) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) had remarkably acquitted themselves in various peacekeeping missions involving various mandates to the extent that their professional services continued to be in high demand especially during the period of Zimbabwe’s political and economic isolation by the USA and other key Western countries between 2000-2008. Zimbabwe had, and continues to build capacity in peacekeeping operations through the various courses that it offers. The Zimbabwe Staff College’s Peacekeeping Department conducts annual two-week Southern African Regional Peacekeeping Course aimed at preparing Officers for peacekeeping duties at UN missions and the courses are offered to officers from SADC countries as well as other African countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Ghana. Zimbabwe’s leadership in this key area of peacekeeping capacity building had gained international recognition and appreciation judging by the prestige that is accorded to such training programmes which enhances SADC regional forces’ operational coherence.

Zimbabwe had also provided leadership to some UN peacekeeping missions which demonstrated the UN and the international community’s confidence in Zimbabwe’s capacity to deliver in this key area of international cooperation and it had positively projected the diplomatic profile of the country and the various individuals who raised high the country’s flag. Notable Among those who provided UN leadership to these peacekeeping operations were Major General Mike Nyambuya as Chief Military Observer United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), as well as Deputy Force Commander, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) while Colonel S.B Moyo served as Deputy Chief of Staff; Lt General Philip V. Sibanda
served as Force Commander, United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III). Officers from the Zimbabwe Republic Police held leadership positions such as Team Site Leaders, Chief of Operations and Information Officers, and as a result of having acquitted themselves exceptionally well in these assignments some officers were recalled to UN postings after completing their tour of duty for example Senior Assistant Commissioner C. Munioriarwa who became UN planning Coordinator in Sudan; Senior Assistant Commissioner A. Munzverengwi (Vulnerable Persons Unit Investigator in East Timor), Assistant Commissioner C. Chirenje (Planning Officer in Ethiopia), Assistant Commissioner C. Charamba (Operations Coordinator for UN Mission in Liberia), and Superintendent W. Zikhali (Mission Management Officer at the UN Headquarters in New York).

Due to the dynamic changes in the nature of world conflicts and hostilities, UN peacekeeping missions had assumed new mandates which include the supervision of elections, safeguarding and distributing of relief supplies, coordinating humanitarian assistance, disarming opponents, monitoring ceasefire, and implementing peace agreements between combatants, promoting reconciliation among warring parties, monitoring of human rights practices, and not just the traditional role of maintaining peace. International peacekeeping had become more and more complex with multidimensional and numerous components and mandates, with a convergence of diverse cultures and traditions, all working side by side and demonstrating mutual cooperation, mutual respect, sensitivity and flexibility, with the ultimate goal of helping countries in conflict find peace gain, [Dr L. Kapungu, 2000]. Zimbabwe’s peacekeeping forces had demonstrated their capacity to adapt to different and changing UN mandates and in the process contributing towards successful peacekeeping missions which boosted international confidence in their professional capabilities and this in turn contributed to an insatiable demand for their services by the UN.

The Zimbabwe peacekeepers’ high professional standards and integrity helped to reposition favorably the country’s diplomatic profile at a time when the country was
going through a difficult period of political and economic isolation due to sanctions imposed by the Western countries.

UN requests for Zimbabwe contribution to peacekeeping duties for both ZDF, AFZ and ZRP are channeled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare, which emphasizes the point that UN peacekeeping remains, primarily, a political rather than a military instrument and for that matter an instrument of Zimbabwe’s diplomacy.

12.1 Zimbabwe Defence Forces’ Peacekeeping Operations

According to the then Minister of Defence Dr Sydney T. Sekeramayi (2008), the Zimbabwe Defence Forces’ (ZDF) participation in peacekeeping missions started in 1991 when it was requested by the UN to contribute peacekeeping troops to Angola to help restore peace and achieve reconciliation between UNITA (opposition party) and MPLA (ruling party) under United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) and UNAVEM III which was led by Major Gen Mike Nyambuya as the UN Chief Military Observer (UNAVEM II) and Lt. General Philip V. Sibanda as the UN Force Commander (UNAVEM III). The Angolan UN assignment was a big challenge according to Brigadier General S.B Moyo (2009) because the UNITA leader, Dr Savimbi, was not negotiating in good faith and there was no proper party institutional framework to work with since “UNITA was Savimbi and Savimbi was UNITA”. Following the signing of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, UNITA and Savimbi refused to comply with its terms and the UN Security Council was forced to adopt a resolution which imposed mandatory travel sanctions on UNITA senior officials and their families. When UNITA was forced to cooperate by the UN, the Zimbabwe Defence Force peacekeepers managed to implement their task of monitoring the demobilization process and facilitated the free movement of goods and services in Angola. The ZDF according to Dr Sekeramayi (2008), shared a platform in Angola with officers from the ZRP whose mandate was to verify the degree of neutrality of the Angolan police as enshrined in the Lusaka Peace Accord. The UNAVEM II Mission ran from June 1991 to February 1995 while the UNAVEM III Mission ran from February 1995 to June 1997 and in both missions, Zimbabwe was the face of the UN according to Brig Gen SB Moyo, since it provided UN leadership for both the Chief Military Observer and Force Commander. To the extent that peace and
stability was restored on Angola, the sterling contribution of Zimbabwe’s army generals should be acknowledged in that respect as a typical example of a successful peacekeeping operation which stopped the civil war and achieved lasting peace.

In 1992, Zimbabwe Defence Forces were deployed in Somalia under Operation Restore Hope to coordinate and escort humanitarian assistance, to monitor ceasefire in Mogadishu and to provide protection and security to UN personnel, equipment and supplies at airports and seaports. The mission, which was known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) ran from April 1992 to March 1993 while the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) ran from March 1993 to March 1995. Major General Mike Nyambuya was the Deputy Force Commander of the UN peacekeeping Mission in Somalia under Operation Restore Hope whilst Colonel S.B. Moyo was the Deputy Chief of Staff. Zimbabwe Defence Forces shared a platform in Somalia with forces from NATO, Nigeria, Egypt and Botswana, among others. According to Brig-General S.B. Moyo (2009), Zimbabwe Defence Forces handled all the communication systems of the UN force in Somalia.

The Somalia UN peacekeeping mission was one of the most difficult missions that Zimbabwe defence forces ever participated in because of the general lawlessness, civil war, lack of a viable body politic and collapsed basic civil infrastructure which made the task of nation building very difficult within the context of a failed state. The UN Somalia peacekeeping mission was therefore regarded as “mission impossible” because of the general anarchy prevailing in the country. The America contingent of the UN forces suffered heavy causalities and some American soldiers killed in the operation where dragged on the streets of Mogadishu and the images, which shocked the world and the American public in particular, prompted the American congress to pass a resolution not to deploy American peacekeepers in Africa again. Although the UN force lost a considerable number of its forces in the Somalia operation, the UN intervention could not be regarded as an object failure because according to Clarke, and Herbst (2010), about 100 000 lives were saved. In 1995, a seven nations combined task force was formed to effect an exit strategy under Operation United Shield and Col S.B. Moyo was
among the last members of the UN force to leave Somalia and to present an end of Mission Report to the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The major peacekeeping lesson learned from the Somalia Operating is that, no large intervention – whether military or humanitarian can remain neutral in a failed state because the task of nation building requires the active participation of peacekeepers in a state’s basic civil infrastructure in restoring civic order and fostering reconciliation.

In 1993, Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) send troops to Rwanda, under the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), from October 1993 to March (1996), where they were mandated to monitor the ceasefire and implement the peace agreement between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Government. ZDF personnel were also deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under a SADC mandate from 1998-2002, in an operation which was called “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy.” The purpose of ZDF’s deployment in DRC was to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC which was being threatened by rebel fighters from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Zimbabwe Defence Forces were joined in “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy” by Angola and Namibia. Although the DRC, as a huge country, presented logistical nightmare for the ZDF, the forces were able to successfully defend Kinshasa, the capital and to contain rebel advancement from the East of the DRC, thereby successfully stopping the civil war and achieving the SADC mandate of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC.

Zimbabwe Defence Forces had also provided peacekeeping services in Liberia (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) beginning September 1993 and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), beginning September 2003, in Sudan (United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)), beginning March 2005 and the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan, (UNAMID), beginning July 2007. The establishment of UNAMID achieved great cooperation between Zimbabwe’s peacekeepers and the AU and UN peacekeepers and the hybrid mission demonstrated what could be achieved through collective efforts. The tripartite approach to decision making (between AU, UN and the Sudan government) achieved commendable positive
Close cooperation was also illustrated by the AU–UN panel which considered modalities of how to support a number of key issues concerning peacekeeping operations and this partnership led to systematic exchanges and cooperation between the Security Council of the AU and the Security Council of the United Nations.

Prior to all these UN and AU peacekeeping and peace enforcement cooperation, Zimbabwe had participated in the Frontline States (FLS) mandated peace enforcement operation in Mozambique from 1982–1992 in defence of Mozambique’s independence which was being threatened by apartheid ruled South Africa and REMANO rebels based in Mozambique. According to Brig Gen S.B Moyo (2009), Tanzania joined Zimbabwe in this operation but at most it participated for six months from the Northern part of Mozambique then withdrew.

12.2 Zimbabwe Republic Police’s Peacekeeping Operations

The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) had also acquitted itself exceptionally well in UN peacekeeping operations around the world and in the process extending its influence as a force to reckon with in resolving regional and international crises and in furthering the interests of humanity as part and parcel of the country’s diplomatic engagement within the world community. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)’s competent handling of peace related projects around the world, under the UN’s auspices, had resulted in the UN giving it more international assignments as a seal of approval for its efficiency and effectiveness in discharging its duties. Between 1995 and 2009, about 994 officers were sent on peacekeeping missions in seven countries (Chikasha, 2009).

In 1999, the ZRP dispatched peacekeepers to East Timor, under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. The Mission briefly ceased operations in 2005 but was reopened in 2006. A total of 133 police officers were deployed to East Timor on UN peacekeeping duties with a mandate to oversee the humanitarian assistance while advising on the implementation of agreements signed and the training of the police force in the new Republic of East Timor.

In 2002, ZRP officers were deployed to Kosovo under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) with the mandate of overseeing humanitarian assistance and advising on the implementation of agreements reached. ZRP officers were deployed to Liberia (127 officers) and Sierra Leone (27 Officers) under the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), beginning September 2003 and under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which ran from October 1999 to December 2005.

ZRP also deployed a total of 122 peacekeepers to Sudan, under the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS;) which began in March 2005. ZRP personnel were also deployed to the UN Missions in Darfur, Cote D’Ivore and Burundi. The ZRP and the ZDF had also contributed personnel to Operation Golfinho training exercises in South Africa between 7-23 September 2009 as part of their contribution to the SADC Standby Brigade and the African Standby Force which will play a crucial role in maintaining peace and security in the region and on the African continent as a whole.

In recognition of the crucial role played by peacekeepers the world over, the UN and Zimbabwe observes Peacekeepers Day on 29 May every year to draw attention to the sacrifices of observes peacekeepers who risk their lives, often without adequate logistical support, in search of world peace and security.

12.3 Challenges relating to peacekeeping operations.
There are many challenges that Zimbabwean and other troop contributing countries are facing in their discharge of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates and these challenges need to be properly planned for to minimize chances of failure. According to the UN Security Council’s 6075 the meeting, the following are some of the challenges relating to peacekeeping missions:

(a) There is a growing demand for peacekeeping missions with increasingly complex and multi dimensional and robust mandates.

(b) There are diminishing human and financial resources compared to the demand for those resources for peacekeeping missions.

(c) Peacekeeping operations are increasingly overstretched, which give rise to the operational challenges of supporting the missions and mounting new ones, a development which was far beyond what the Brahimi Reforms had envisaged.

(d) Many missions carried mandates that represented much more than the deployment of uniformed personnel, being fundamental political operations supporting complex transitions to peace within deeply divided countries.

(e) Peacekeeping should only be deployed where there was a peace to keep or if there was a viable political process.

(f) Peacekeeping should be based on substantive not on financial concerns and should aim at achieving lasting peace. Operations had become more political, had taken on more important roles in security as well as institution building and the reinforcement of the rule of law.

(g) Peacekeeping operations, by definition, were ad hoc in nature, and experience on the ground should come ahead of policy instruments; therefore a flexible approach is recommended although this should be done within the framework of the mandate.

Although the above challenges relating to peacekeeping identified by the UN security Council were also observed by Zimbabwean participants interviewed they went further to list the following unique challenges relating to their contingent:

(a) The most common problem cited related to communication challenges relating to officers deployed to non-English speaking countries like Sudan (Official languages Arabic and French), Sierra Leone and DRC (French), Angola,
(Portuguese) etc. As a result officers take a long time to settle down and to be operationally effective and efficient.

(b) Officers from Zimbabwe and other African countries who were part of these UN missions were, in some cases, subject to ridicule and discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes or wrong misconception about their competency levels but these misconception had fallen away as Officers in teams build solid bonds with time and demonstrate that they are equally competent given a chance.

(c) There were also religious differences between Zimbabwe and the countries who receive peacekeepers which could manifest themselves in negative stereotypes and contempt of Zimbabwean culture especially frowning upon women who wear trousers and do not cover their heads or failure to adapt to alien food.

(d) Peacekeeping Missions which Zimbabwe participates in need to have clear mandates with adequate resources for implementation to minimize problems.

(e) There is also the need to balance the need to participate in peacekeeping operations around the world and operational efficiencies of the forces at home.

12.4 Practical lessons for future peacekeeping operations

There are many success factors that scholars and practitioners could deduce from Zimbabwe’s peacekeeping operations during the first three decades of its independence. Some of these factors which are critical for successful peacekeeping operations were highlighted by Jair Van der Ujn (2008) as follows:

- The parties to the conflict must willingly and sincerely cooperate with the implementers of the peacekeeping operation,
- The peacekeeping operation should be able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties,
- The peacekeeping operation should receive cooperation from important outside actors and parties,
- The operation should be timely deployed and at the right time,
- The operation should be implemented by competent personnel under competent leadership and with clear command structures,
The operation should be part of a long term approach to the resolution of the crisis. The above guidelines for successful peacekeeping operations are also reinforced by Dr Kapungu (2000) who advanced the following guidelines for successful peacekeeping operations whether under the auspices of UN, AU or SADC:

- Peacekeepers should have the highest professional standards in terms of requisite knowledge and skills for the various specialization
- Peacekeepers should have highest standards of professional integrity and personal conduct in order to maintain a good image of themselves, their country and the deploying organization whether UN, AU or SADC and they should live and work strictly by the code of conduct/principles of the deploying organization (UN,AU,SADC),
- In dealing with each other, peacekeepers must be able to interact effectively in a culturally diverse workforce, demonstrating mutual respect, sensitivity and flexibility.
- They should exude the spirit of unreserved good will and humanness that drive international peacekeeping
- Peacekeepers require rock solid leadership that fully understands the dynamics of international peacekeeping. Leaders should have a “visible and practical capability” to manage multidimensional operations and demonstrate attitudes of patience, courage, initiative, ingenuity and integrity,
- Peacekeeping is a hard assignment and peacekeepers should be prepared to work very hard 24 hours a day, 7 days in a week.

12.5 Peacekeeping as an instrument of Zimbabwe’s Diplomacy

During the period of Zimbabwe’s forced “splendid isolation” between 2000-2008, due to western imposed sanctions, which resulted in political and economic isolation, Zimbabwe’s peacekeepers remained the major link with international cooperating partners. Zimbabwean peacekeepers represented the face of the United Nations, the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community in some of the missions where they offered leadership of such operations. The insatiable demand for Zimbabwe’s
peacekeepers by the UN due to their professional capability, integrity, operational innovativeness and their ability to build peacekeeping partnerships with different member states meant that Zimbabwe became a strategic partner and team player in most UN peacekeeping missions. The demand for Zimbabwe’s peacekeepers was so high that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) had to turn down UN offers of peacekeeping during the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy Campaign” (1998-2002), to avoid overstretched the forces.

Zimbabwe peacekeepers played a crucial role in the diplomatic pacification of disputes in Angola, DRC, Rwanda, Somalia and East Timor just to mention a few such peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations by Zimbabwe’s forces had been used to defend and enhance the national interests of the country. In the case of peace enforcement operations in Mozambique between 1982-1992; the operations were used to protect and defend the country’s railway, road and oil pipeline link to the Beira sea port so that there could be continuous flow of trade between Zimbabwe and the outside world. The lifeline to the sea (road, railway, oil pipeline) were constantly being sabotaged by RENAMO rebel fighters who were fighting the Mozambique government and it was in Zimbabwe’s interest to defend the sovereignty and independence of Mozambique and by extension its economic lifeline to the sea.

Zimbabwe had intervened in the DRC together with Namibia and Angola to contain the civil war in that country because the collapse of the DRC could have caused regional instability which in turn would have disturbed the political and economic interests of Zimbabwe which are envisaged to be realized through the regional integration agenda. Zimbabwe, therefore, participated in peacekeeping operations in the DRC (SADC and UN mandates) and in Angola (UN mandate) in order to advance, not only peace and security in the region in line with the United Nations Charter, but also to protect and defend its economic interests within the framework of regional cooperation and integration.
Examination Questions
1] Outline and discuss how Zimbabwe’s foreign relations were enhanced by peacekeeping operations between the period 2000-2008.

2] What challenges have Zimbabwean peacekeepers encountered in their peacekeeping duties.

3] “Peacekeeping should be based on substantive not financial concerns”. Discuss the merits of this argument.

4] What factors should be taken into consideration in executing successful peacekeeping operation.

5] “Peacekeeping should only be deployed where there is a peace to keep or if there is a variable political process”. Support or refute this argument giving practical examples.
References

3. Kapungu , L (Dr) Speech delivered at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Centre , Harare , on 19 May , 2000 by the Director , Lessons Learnt Unit , United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations .
4. Mumbengegwi , SS Speech delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs , Harare , 16 October 2009
7. The Herald , 10 August 2005: Zimbabwe Defence Forces Silver Jubilee Speech by President R.G Mugabe and Commander –in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces , Rufaro Stadium , Harare
8. The Herald 23 May 2008 Speech by Defence Minister , Dr S.T. Sekeramayi
10. Interview with Senior Assistant Commissioner Wayne Vudzijena , Press and Public Relations , Police General Headquarters , Harare , November 2009
13. Interview with Col (Dr) Chinyanganya , Director , Zimbabwe Staff College , Army Headquarters , Harare , October 2009